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ABSTRACT
Frontiers remained closed after the First World War and nobody was able to cross
them without a passport and a visa on the passport from the representative of the
country to which the traveller wished to go. As the refugee problem became an
international subject requiring measures after the War, the international community was
forced to take the issue on the agenda which previously was labeled by political items
concerning war and peace. The world had to study the matters concerning refugees
and also take action accordingly.
The failure of the League of Nations in its central task, maintaining peace, has
influenced the evaluation of other operations of the intergovernmental machinery
during the Inter-war period. The achievements and the importance of the refugee work
undertaken during the 1920s and 1930s have been shadowed by the mainstream of
assessments.
The background and real impetus for the creation of refugee protection system were
constituted by the refugee problems. In this respect, the 1920s was a unique era in the
history of Europe with the mass movements of homeless people. It all begun from
worries about the huge amounts of Russians crossing the borders, and soon it was
realized that there were even millions more, representing a variety on nationalities.
Despite all shortcomings of the League, refugee work was conducted during the two
decades under examination in this study. There was continuation throughout the whole
period in the efforts of international bodies. There was an international refugee regime
consisting of various actors of intergovernmental and non-governmental nature. The
existence of a regime refers to some kind of strategy. The references give us a reason
to believe that this regime had to be directed by the League of Nations, which, in turn,
leads us to find traces of consistency referring to a policy.
This study is a description and analysis of the evolution of the policy. It is evident
that scrutiny has to be divided in two separate periods: the 1920s as well as the 1930s.
It turns out that the first period was the time of reactive and ad hoc responses to the
emerging crises. During the following decade there was more organized, proactive, and
human rights based policy formulation. This project shows how the refugee work was
justified, initiated, formulated, developed, implemented, and financed. All this is policy,
if conducted in a consistent manner. There seems to exist enough continuation and
consistency in the activities during the whole period in order to justify the use of the
term policy.
The refugee policy of the world organizations was formulated, planned and
implemented by the Member States through the different Bodies of the League and the
ILO. This was done in close cooperation with Non-governmental organizations, private
sector and societies on the whole. The substance of the policy was guided by a
number of prominent personalities who were able to draw the attention of the
international community to the matters that otherwise would have been forgotten and
left to be handled by national governments alone.
Refugee agencies were able to play a successful leadership role for several
reasons. Unlike private organizations, their association with the League of Nations
gave them the authority to negotiate with governments directly. Because their
proposals were generally perceived as non-partisan, they were also more likely than
those from Great Powers to win a consensus. The most visible example of this was
definitely the achievement of creating a successful passport system.
It is fair to conclude that all the elements for a consistent policy were in place; the
purpose statements, applicability, scope, effective dates, responsibilities, and policy
statements. They were established in a form or another. They were not in a single
covering document, but, in retrospective, a policy document could be drawn up on the
basis of the compilation of the various documents and the practical work.
The refugee policy of the League of Nations was formulated and adopted in the top
organs of the world organization. It was planned and implemented in close cooperation
with other intergovernmental organization, non-governmental organizations, State
Members’ governments, as well as private sector and representatives of refugees.
The substance of the policy was guided by the refugee situations. The League faced
challenges throughout the whole period of time it conducted its refugee work. The
League was, however, able to respond and develop new solutions to the growing
challenges. The organization was capable of showing some creativeness in its
reactions to the refugee situations. Although the principles of the policies remained
somewhat unchanged, new techniques were applied in combating the destitution of
refugees.
Favorable economic development was the best tool against the destitution of
homeless people. That, in turn, made any excessive special arrangements for the
refugees unnecessary. In that sense we may conclude that the actual results of the
improvement in the position of the refugees were not exclusively achievements of the
refugee organizations. However, the organizations and the policy backing up their work
were most needed, when times were economically bad.
Although Fridtjof Nansen’s personal prestige was sometimes considered higher than
the appreciation of the League in some parts of the world and by some evaluators, it
can be concluded as a result of all deliberations conducted in this work, that the
refugee policy of the League and the ILO was consistent and a pertinent part of the
essence of the Organizations despite seeming inconsistencies.
ACRONYMS
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KEY CONCEPTS
as they appear in this presentation
Assimilation: Integration to the society of the host country, with assuming the
citizenship as the final stage
Assimilated refugees: Used in some legal connections to express the meaning
‘refugees who can be considered comparable with…’
Asylum: Place where people are safe from their persecutors
Citizenship: Status granting an individual his/her basic rights which are political and
legal protection, right for a legal residence, legal identity including documentation to
prove it in a need
Emergency Relief/Humanitarian Aid: Immediate (material) help for refugees
Host Country: Country receiving and accommodating refugees
Inter-war period: Time between the end of the First World War and 1939
Legal Status: Circumstances in which a refugee can identify him/herself as being a
refugee in order to receive protection and assistance as well as to be able to travel
Policy/Strategy: Principles and rules to guide decisions and actions
Refugee: Person staying abroad after losing the possibility to live in his/her home
country, person who was defined to be a refugee
Refugee Policy: Consistency and continuation in the principles and rules of the LON
and the ILO for helping refugees during the Inter-war period
Refugee Regime: International, non-governmental and intergovernmental network of
actors doing refugee work
Refugee Work: All measures taken on behalf of refugees, including policies and field
work
Repatriation: Help to bring refugees back to their original home country if they are
willing to return.
(Re)settlement: Help to find a place where refugees can live (permanently) safe
supporting themselves
Transnational History: Modern way of looking at history, using less categorizing
things like national borders in the explanation and analysis. Tries to see interaction and
interdependency regardless of traditional categorizing.
1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
1.1. The Refugee Problems after the First World War
Serious treatment of refugee questions can hardly be found from most presentations
of general history of the Inter-war period. It is therefore not easy to understand what
role these issues had in the larger picture of the flow of events. It is the task of this
historiographical intervention to try to put this part to the right scale. This presentation
will try to give the refugee question the role that it really had in forming of the political
events before the Second World War. The Inter-war Period has been chosen and
defined by “natural” causes: the League of Nations was the first serious attempt to
regulate international behavior by gathering nations and states together at the same
table. It is not the purpose of this research to try to analyze again, or further, the
reasons for the failure of the League. That has been done already in sufficiently many
connections. Refugee questions were in the center of the political events during the
1920s and 1930s, although they were addressed publicly as a side effect of the
mainstream of political developments.
As the refugee problem became an international subject requiring measures after
the First World War, the international community was forced to take the issue on its
agenda which previously was labeled by political items concerning war and peace. The
world had to study the matters concerning refugees and also take action accordingly.
This enlargement of agendas was a significant point in the course of historical events,
and deserves to be emphasized by the research more than has been done so far.
The history of forced migration is long. No internationally coordinated action was
available in the past to deal with the refugees. There were always places to go to.
There were physical and intellectual spaces to be filled. States welcomed new groups
as an addition to their population. These were considered as enterprising elements
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from abroad.1  No passports were required to cross borders before the events of the
international politics and especially the First World War changed everything.2 Indeed,
possibility to move from a place to another has been one of the most important
contributors in the development of Europe during the past few centuries. Before the
real effects of improvements in farming output and the industrial revolution only
overseas emigration to colonies rich in land and resources and countries where labour-
force was needed permitted Europe to escape starvation and deprivation which
Thomas Robert Malthus had predicted in 1798.3
The refugee problem did not exist in the same sense as we know it before the
modern states with borders. Nevertheless, there were refugees, since people were
staying on a foreign soil, with or without formal borders. The research literature has
presented few arrangements among earlier solutions in Western World. Of those, worth
mentioning are at least the Edict of Potsdam (1685) by which the King of Prussia
invited the Huguenots from France to move and settle in the Prussian state. The British
government issued acts in 18th century in the colonies in America concerning the
naturalization of “Foreign Protestants”. French law concerning foreign refugees residing
in France 1832 was also a remarkable step of its time. Extradition treaties adopted
since 1830 were the first in the field of international cooperation. Resolutions of the
International Institute of International Law have also been mentioned in this
connection.4
The emergence of new nation-states in place of lands which were formerly parts of
Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Romanov empires was the most striking post-war change
in Europe. The world was still Eurocentered, but in an artificial way.5  Simultaneously,
one of the most crucial facts contributing to the escalation of the refugee problem in
Europe specifically was that Europe’s traditional strategy for its displaced populations
no longer performed. Transatlantic export of people was not possible since America
had closed its doors.6
1 Bentwich, Norman: The League of Nations and Refugees. The British Yearbook of International Law XVI 1935.
pp. 114-129. London 1935, 115
2 Simpson, John Hope: The Refugee Problem. International Affairs Vol XVII, No 4, 1938 (Jan.-Oct. 1938), 607
3 Kennedy, Paul: Preparing for the twenty-first Century. London. Fontana Press, 1994, 5-7, 10
4 See more on this; Grahl-Madsen, Atle: The League of Nations and the refugees. The League of Nations in
retrospect. Proceedings of the Symposium organized by The United Nations Library and the Graduate Institute
of International Studies. Geneva, 6-9 November 1980. Berlin 1983, 360
5 Kennedy, Paul: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Minlitary Conflict from 1500 to
2000. New York. Vintage Books. 1989, 275-277
6 Mazower, Mark: Dark Continent. Europe’s twentieth Century. New York. Knopf 1999, 63
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The 20th century changed the history of forced migration. There was a saying among
Russian refugees in the beginning of the century that describes the situation and status
of refugees: "Man consists of a body, soul and a passport”7.  There are a number of
synonyms used in connection of describing people who are considered refugees. Most
of them are used to depict political refugees; political refugee, asylum case, bona fide
refugee, political exile, political persecutee, expatriate, unprotected person. Al these
are used parallel in the same meaning, making distinction to refugees from famine or
natural disaster, economic migrants, alleged criminals etc.8  The word ‘refugee’ is
defined differently for different purposes. The most common nominator for the
definitions is that refugees from famine or natural disaster, migrants for economic
reasons, and fugitives from justice are excluded from these considerations.9 By modern
definitions, a refugee is a person seeking asylum in a foreign country in order to
escape persecution. The most common asylum claims are based upon political and
religious grounds. Asylum, in turn, normally means a place or territory where one is not
subject to seizure by one’s pursuers, or it may mean protection or freedom from such
seizure.10
A refugee is a person who is looking for protection.  A refugee is not able to stay in
his/her own country without his/her human rights being threatened or violated. A
refugee is someone who seeks refuge in a foreign country out of fear of other people.
In many connections, the distinction between refugees and other emigrants is indeed
economic. According to this distinction, emigrants can take their possessions with
them. Refugees are therefore described as immigrants with no capital.11  An essential
matter in that the economic attractions of other countries cannot be criteria for getting a
refugee status.12  A further distinction has been made between refugees proper who
have crossed a national border, and what we call internal refugees, displaced persons,
who remain inside the borders of their own country.13
7 Stoessinger, John George: The Refugees and the World Community. Minneapolis MN 1956, 3
8 Riila, Anu: Poliittiisuuden kriteeri kansainvälisen oikeuden pakolaiskeskustelussa. Jyväskylän yliopisto. Valtio-
opin laitos. Julk. 64. 1991,23-24
9 Grahl-Madsen, Atle: The Status of Refugees in International Law. Vol. I: Refugee Character. Leiden 1966, 3
10 Grahl-Madsen, Atle: The Status on Refugees in International Law. Vol. II: Asylum, Entry and Sojourn. Leiden
1972, 3
11 Although  there  are  exceptions,  notably  among  the  Russian  aristocrats  in  1920s  as  well  as  among  Jewish
refugees from Germany in the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1930s
12 Riila, 17
13 Hakovirta, Harto: The World Refugee Problem. Tampere 1991, 13
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The practical determination whether a person is a refugee or not, is most often
made by governmental agencies of the host country. As a logical result, this can lead to
abuse in a country with a very restrictive official immigration policy. The danger is that a
country will neither recognize the refugee status of the asylum seekers nor see them as
legitimate migrants and treat them as legal aliens.14 There are also de facto refugees
who are not recognized as refugees (for example migrant workers, students, foreigners
in general), but are in the same situation as any refugee. They are unable to return to
their countries of origin for reasons outside their control. People who are not
recognized as refugees are in the same unfortunate position as asylum seekers whose
applications have been rejected. 15 Taking all this into consideration, there are only
very few scholars or politicians who dare to take a position to think of single covering
definition.
In order to come to an understanding it is necessary to look into another approach to
the concept of refugee, which is the relation to the authorities. An emigrant has a
“normal” relation to the officials of the home country as well as to the authorities of the
receiving country. This includes the possibility to return back home. The political
refugee cannot return when he/she likes, as the return depends on conditions
controlled by others.16 In some connections the intensity of the danger has been
described as a dominant factor when deciding who is a refugee. This is also an
essential factor in modern considerations on the need of an asylum in individual cases.
Paradoxically, we may observe that the development of the system of sovereign and
independent states is connected to the existence of refugees. These cannot even be
separated from each other.17 Stateless people were individuals who did not have a
legal bond of nationality with any state and included people who had never acquired
citizenship of their birth country or who had lost their citizenship. Children of stateless
people were often born into statelessness.18 It was not until 1948 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights asserted that "Everyone has the right to a nationality".
14 For these definitions, see eg. Waris, Heikki: Aikamme maailman pakolaisongelma. Porvoo 1976, 12-13
15 Asylum. With a contribution by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill on the principles of international refugee law.
Strasbourg; Council of Europe Publications 1995, 98
16 Riila, 18
17 Hurrel, Andrew: Refugees, International Society, and Global Order. (In Refugees and International Relations.
Ed. by Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher. Oxford University Press. New York, NY 2011), 89; also Grahl-Madsen
1972, 195
18 About this see Kuikka, Maisa (ed.): Réfugiés. Pakolaisten ääniä Suomessa. (Ahmad Khasib,p 19-23 and Zahra
Abdulla, p 69-73). Keuruu 2002, 72-73
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The word “asylum” comes from the Greek language and has been used to denote a
place of refuge. Later on the term came to mean not only the place itself but also and
primarily the protection which the place afforded.19  With the French revolution, the
power of the Church was broken, and with it, the right of an individual to asylum. The
stronger the state became, the less important religious asylum was bound to be.20
Another important term used in modern research and in political deliberations is
persecution. It is not legally defined but it generally refers to consistent patterns of
abuse, intervention, harassment, and intolerance.21 In this presentation, “a refugee”
means a person who found himself abroad and was called and categorized as a
refugee in international connections.
Before the First World War, it was mostly possible to travel without a passport. Since
the War, the frontiers remained closed and nobody was able to cross them without a
valid passport and a visa on the passport from the representative of the country to
which the traveller wished to go. Thus movements of population became controlled.22
Foreigners were supervised strictly in the 19th Century’s Europe. In the extreme cases,
they were suspected to be spies and criminals. There were also some other, merely
economic motivations for supervision: protection of domestic labour force and
merchants.  The 19th Century saw the creation of passports as travel documents in
most of the European countries.23  There has always been a fear for the connections
between refugees and terrorism. This was the case even during the 1920's and 1930's.
Only few people were worried about the particular economic burdens refugees might
impose because there was no general obligation to protect and assist strangers who
arrived from other areas. It was not possible for large numbers of people to survive for
long without a permanent place to stay. If the people had sufficient economic means, it
was possible to seek refuge. Many didn’t, and therefore many simply perished before
getting any attention of anyone who could care. All this makes it understandable, why
there were not more refugees in Europe before the nineteenth century and why the
existing refugees were not considered to be a particular problem.  The uprooted simply
19  See Plaut, Gunter: Refugees and the right of asylum – some historical notes. (In The Living Law of Nations:
Essays on refugees, minorities, indigenous peoples and the human rights of other vulnerable groups: in memory
of Atle Grahl-Madsen. Ed. by Gudmundur Alfredsson and Peter Macalister-Smith.) Kehl 1996, 78
20 Plaut, 79; Asylum. With a contribution by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill on the principles of international refugee law.
Strasbourg; Council of Europe Publications 1995, 95-120
21 Whittaker, David J.: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Contemporary World. New York, NY 2006, 8
22 Simpson 1938, 607
23 Leitzinger, Antero I: Ulkomaalaiset Suomessa 1812 – 1972. Helsinki 2008, 16
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suffered as they had always done. There was no such explicit concept or category as
"a refugee" until the nineteenth century. The consciousness of this whole phenomenon
started to emerge only in the 1880's.24
In most cases, the refugees did not have a legal existing and valid nationality or
citizenship. It was noted in the 1930s, however, that not all refugees were stateless.
This was the situation especially in the cases of the refugees coming from Germany
and Italy. These people were nevertheless in a need of help25. As a matter of fact,
those who fled immediately after the First World War were in a better position than
those taking refuge later. After the war there was plenty of work available when nations
were rebuilding their countries. Foreign labour force was then welcome. At least the
Russians and the Armenians were able to obtain this benefit in the middle of their
misadventure.26  When the recession hit the national economies, it led into
discriminating restrictions against foreign labour. Some of these restrictions were still
prevailing after the Second World War. Research has also pointed out that the massive
problem of Russian refugees was dealt with some efficiency in these favourable
economic conditions. Since those actions the world has not seen such effectiveness in
refugee work.27
It has been difficult to assemble comprehensive and reliable statistics on refugees,
even in modern day’s Europe. Different countries have had different ways of
categorizing and recognizing refugees. There are various ways to make statistics
unreliable or inaccurate even today, and the same concerns the 1920s and 1930s. On
those days, one of the most common ways of making mistakes was that sometimes
only the head of a family was counted, sometimes people could be counted twice. 28 It
is also not surprising, that sometimes it is politically and financially expedient to
exaggerate the numbers of refugees.
24 Marrus, Michael R.: The Unwanted. European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. New York NY 1985, 7-9
25 Francois, J.-P.-A.: Le Probleme des Apatrides. Recueil des Cours III 1935. s. 287-376. Academie de Droit
International. Paris 1935, 367
26 Thompson, Dorothy: Refugees - Anarchy or Organization? New York NY 1938, 16
27 Vernant, Jacques: The Refugee in the Post-War World. London 1953, 19
28 See Joly, Daniele: Refugees: asylum in Europe. London 1992, 23
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Figure 1. Estimated numbers of Refugees in Europe during the 1920s and
1930s.29
1. Russians
2. Greeks
3. Turkish
4. Armenians
5. Spanish
6. Germans
7. Bulgarians
8. Italians
It is also interesting to note that groups of people that were first classified as
prisoners of war, turned into refugees, as they were defined so. After the First World
29 Not  exact  figures;  this  is  based  on  several  sets  of  sources,  an  approximation  of  the  magnitude  of  the
problems compiled by the author of this. Basis for the figures can be found: Thompson, Dorothy: Refugees –
Anarchy or Organization? New York NY 1938, 15; Frings Paul: Das Internationale Flüchtlingsproblem 1919-1950.
Frankfurt a/M 1951, back cover
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War, there were large numbers of men who had been soldiers of some army at some
point of time, scattered in many places of the world, waiting for to be evacuated and
send back home. In many cases, especially as far as Russians were concerned, the
evacuation never came. In 1921 the League was informed by the newly nominated
High Commissioner for Refugees Fridtjof Nansen as he wrote in his report in
connection to the efforts of repatriation of the prisoners of war: “... Europe is suffering
not only from the absence of these men from their homes...... the prisoners living as
refugees in countries foreign to them...”.30 Even  in  case  of  former  soldiers,  it  is
necessary to emphasize again, that characteristic to refugees before and during our
times has been their poverty and need for help compared to voluntary immigrants.
Stateless people were individuals who did not have a legal bond of nationality with
any state, and included persons who had never acquired citizenship of their birth
country, or who had lost their citizenship, and had no claim to citizenship of another
state. Children of stateless people often were born into statelessness and only few
managed to escape that status. Even today, one of the biggest problems in the life of a
refugee is, that by the observers, he or she will be seen as a refugee through the entire
lifespan regardless of the own experience of assimilation and adaptation to the present
home country and its culture.31
Today, the world refugee problem is very much a problem of developing countries,
bothering mainly areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America32.  In the 1920s and 1930s,
Europe was in the focus of the refugee issues. As an overall observation, it seems that
the scientific research and other reporting in this respect was quite intensive just before
the Second World War. The authors were Europeans and Americans, often people with
connections to international organizations. The time was Europe-centred. Although
there definitely were refugee problems in other parts of the world as well, the attention
was entirely on Europe.
The intergovernmental as well as the non-governmental agencies have traditionally
taken initiatives only after a situation has reached the point where it raises international
attention. This has been the “post-event” approach, which has been questioned as a
method of intervening the situations only recently.33 The expulsion of refugees is, and
was in the 1920s and 1930s the darkest and most frustrating feature of the refugee
30 OJ, Vol 2, September 1921, 747
31 Zahra Abdulla in Kuikka, Maisa (ed.): Réfugiés. Pakolaisten ääniä Suomessa. (Ahmad Khasib, 19-23 and Zahra
Abdulla,  69-73). Keuruu 2002,  72-73
32 Hakovirta 1991, 8
33 Loescher, Gil: Refugee Issues in International Relations. Introduction to Refugees and International Relations.
(ed.by Gil Loescher and Laila Monihan. Oxford University Press, New York 1989, 2
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problem. A large number of fugitives were thrown back from countries of their refuge.
The result was that these people were often arrested when they went back because it
was illegal to return after the expulsion order. There were countries, however, where
refugees were able to move back to their country of origin without consequences. In
some cases, however, the process led to severe prison sentences.34
Handling a refugee crisis can be seen as a process. Once the emergency phase of
the refugee crisis was over, it was time to start to think about the possible sustainable
solutions. In the second phase of the basic assessment, it was necessary to consider
whether the relief should have been continued or whether there were possibilities to
find more permanent solutions. On a general level, regardless whether in the past or
today, certain variables can influence the solution of the refugee problem: the attitude
of the refugees themselves, the attitude and policy of the country of first asylum, the
attitude and policy of resettlement countries, the attitude and policy of the country of
origin, as well as the “hidden forces”.35  Ultimately, the decision concerning the
protection of refugees in any of these cases was, and today still is, a matter of host-
country policy.36 The political key to create such a protection is also a question of
domestic consensus in the receiving country.
The practical problems faced by refugees and the solutions to them have been
divided into two main categories. As a consequence, we would then logically see a
duality in responsibilities while trying to solve the problems of the refugees:  1. Legal
problems, with legal and political protection, and 2. material problems, with material
assistance.37 These are mostly connected to each other and it is not theoretically
possible to follow this distinction in a study like this. In many connections, there is a
parallel drawn between the material problems and humanitarian assistance. One factor
in common for all possible solutions is how to approach the country of first asylum.
Intergovernmental authorities must always be careful to maintain low profile. There is a
danger that assistance programmes may result in local resistance, if it becomes
obvious that the schemes are ostentatious.38
34 Hansson, Michael: Nansenkontoret for flyktninger. Foredrag i Nobelinstituttet, Oslo 10.12.1938 i anledning av
overrekkelsen av fredsprisen for 1938 til det internasjonale Nansenkontor for flyktninger under
Folkeforbundets autoritet. Oslo 1939. In English version; Nobel lecture, www.nobelprize.org
35 Cuénod, Jacques: Refugees: Development or Relief? Refugees and International Relations. (ed.by Gil Loescher
and Laila Monihan. Oxford University Press, New York 1989, 219-220
36 This contemplation, see: Pitterman, Sally: International Responses to Refugee Situations: The United Nations
high Commissioner for Refugees. In: Refugees and World Politics. Ed. by  Elizabeth G. Ferris. New York 1985, 58
37 Vernant, 14
38 see Cuénod, 241
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This research will not scrutinize deeply the flows of refugees. It is however,
important to condense and simplify the possible destinations of the refugee movements
in order to use it as a framework for the perusal. The refugees can either a) go back
home b) get temporary settlement in the first country of refuge c) get permanent
settlement in the first country of refuge d) find resettlement in third countries.39  These
were also roughly the remedies that the international community was able to offer in
the 1920s and 1930s.
Today, there is a rather wide consensus over the fact that the state has duties to its
subjects.  If a state cannot, or will not, fulfill its obligations to people, a question can be
raised whether another state should then take charge of those duties.40  The
international refugee policy and the refugee work recognize the importance of political
will of states to address the root causes of the problems. It is primarily the community
of states which must take initiatives in the matter. Violent conflicts, serious internal
disorders, and human rights violations can be tackled by a collective approach.41 This
idea was not very crystallized when the early steps towards global intergovernmental
administration were taken after the First World War. The solution-oriented approach
can be successful only if it is able to touch upon the concerns and interests of all
stakeholders: the host states, the donor states, as well as other important states in the
region. There are always links between the issue of refugees and the broader range of
state interest. It was necessary to build on motivation among states in resolving
refugee situations in order to get political support for such an international approach.42
After the First World War, democracy and human rights were not standardized items as
they are now. Therefore, the treatment of refugees can give us a useful insight into the
political thinking of the time.
39 Background for this presentation Hakovirta, Harto: Valtioiden konfliktit, pakolaisvirrat ja pakolaisongelmat.
Eräs lähestymistapa ja empiirinen analyysi. Tamp. yliopston politiikan tutk. laitos. Tutkimuksia 67/1981, 49
40 More on this subject: Dummett, Michael: On Immigration and Refugees. London and New York 2005, 22-45
41 Hocké, Jean-Pierre: Beyond Humanitarism: The Need for Political Will to Resolve Today’s Refugee Problem.
Refugees and International Relations. (ed.by Gil Loescher and Laila Monihan. Oxford University Press, New York
1989, 45
42 Loesher,  Gil  and  Milner,  James,  II:  A  framework  for  responding  to  protracted  refugee  situations.  (In
Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications. Edited by Gil Loescher, James
Milner, Edward Newman and Gary Troeller. United Nations University Press. Hong Kong 2008), 368
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1.2. Previous Research
The historical research during the first decades of the United Nations took the
standpoint of “why the League failed”. Only after applying larger variety of sources and
facing a new era of international situation with the end of bipolar system historiography
turned back to the Inter-war period with new view of transnational history. The more
properly historical question of what the League really did and meant over its existence
was then brought into scrutiny. And indeed, the footprints of the League leading to
modern international and intergovernmental establishments were more visible than
earlier assumed. The narrative of the League is found to be concerning the shifting
boundaries between state power and international authority. This takes form especially
in the fields like managing epidemic disease, drug trafficking, sex trafficking and
refugees.43
Much has been written about the refugee problems of the 20th century and the
solutions to them. It is possible to identify three different lines of research that may give
guidance to the handling of the task of this project. There are studies on the subjects
themself, the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization, bringing
about the different aspects of the work during the life span of these organizations.
Secondly, the refugee problem as such has been widely studied both from international
and national perspective. There are also studies on the organizations, governmental as
well as non-governmental, which have been dealing with the refugee questions. All
these lines give their own valuable support to this research project, and it has been
deemed necessary to use as many pieces of each category as possible in order to
avoid unbalanced perspective.
The standard works on the histories of the League and the ILO are silent in respect
of refugee policies of these World organizations. The picture must be produced using
various sources available. There are, however, studies and research material that can
43 Pedersen, Susan: Back to the League of Nations. Review Essay. American Historical Review. October 2007,
1091-1092
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give both hints and impetus to this project. It was not until the mid-1930s when the first
analytical studies on refugees and their helpers emerged. A number of research
projects have been conducted during the past 60 years. None of them, however, has
concentrated on the historical evolution of the refugee work of the League or the ILO.
The following is to explain how this research project will complement and improve the
historical picture regarding the international refugee work during the Inter-war period.
A sight to an analysis of the problem is offered by an example from 1939: “An
analysis of the problem of the Refugee or the Man without a Country requires a
thorough understanding of the sociological and psychological factors which crated this
problem, together with authentic factual data which deal with its historical and present
aspect”.44  Most of the analyses have been made with the solution of the problem in
mind and sight. This was a predominant feature in the studies of the Inter-war period.
The international community was searching for a solution to the refugee problem.
Previous research has also pointed out that the 20th century has been characterized as
century of the refugees, whereas the previous century was branded as the century of
(voluntary) migration.45  This is to emphasize the coercive nature of the refugeeism.46
We have no reason to challenge these findings. It doesn’t, however, tell us much about
how the historical development of this phenomenon manifested itself after the First
World War.
The research on refugees was somewhat sporadic and non-theoretical47 until the
past two decades.  It concentrated mainly on sociological, psychological, and legal
aspects. Some works from the viewpoint of international politics have also been
introduced during the recent decades. The last mentioned aims at giving answers to
the question how modern governmental and international conflicts are connected to
refugee problems. Much of the literature belonging to this category is descriptive, with
scholars generally concentrating on refugee situations and the policies of individual
countries.48
Researchers have produced detailed examinations of refugee movements and the
role of international organizations during and after both World Wars. Some of these
studies were sponsored or commissioned by the post-war refugee institutions thus
having the shortcoming of being insufficiently critical on either the states or the
44   Schaufuss;  Tatiana:  The  White  Russian  Refugees.  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social
Science, Vol. 203, pp 45-54. May 1939,  45
45  Hakovirta, Harto: Valtioiden konfliktit, pakolaisvirrat ja pakolaisongelmat: Eräs lähestymistapa ja empiirinen
analyysi. Tamp. yliopiston politiikan tutk. laitos. Tutkimuksia 67/1981, 3
46  Hakovirta1981,  40-41
47  Hakovirta1981,  8-9
48  Loescher, 4
23
intergovernmental agencies which formed the international refugee regime during that
period. They do, none the less, provide detailed information both about refugee
movements and about the international agencies established to protect and assist the
refugees. Some of the earlier interpretations of past refugee problems have also been
challenged by the modern examination just lately.49
In refugee work there are the refugees and the helpers. Looking into the vast
amount of research material it is easy to see that most effort has been put on the first
element. This research project pursues to concentrate to the latter, not forgetting the
refugees themselves.  However, some references to the organized refugee regime in
the aftermath of the First World War have been made very creditably. As the collapse
of old empires and creation of new states produced huge refugee problems, it was
imperative to the new world order to respond. Although it is clear, that the inter-war
refugee regime was relatively informal and highly dependent on the ad hoc
contributions of individual states, it has been shown by the academic studies that it,
nevertheless, set out structured international rules to ensure the protection of
refugees.50  This research project has been inspired by this particular clue.
A distinguished category of studies concerned with the refugee problem has been
written by researchers concentrating mainly or exclusively to the Jewish refugees from
Nazism. This category of literature has not much to say about the general development
of international refugee assistance policy. These studies, concentrating to their specific
target group, are also in general quite critical towards the organizations and their
alleged failure to provide real help for Jewish refugees.51 Previous research has
noticed that throughout the Inter-war period there was more emphasis on the need to
find solutions to their plight than on why people had sought refuge.52  This has been
considered a weakness, and thus, lots of emphasis has been put on the causes of
refugee problems during the recent decades.
The classic survey conducted by Sir John Hope Simpson in the late 1930s is
especially important because so many later researchers have been using the material
produced by the survey process, as well as the results presented in the reports. Its
49 Loescher, 5-6
50  Betts, Alexander and Loescher, Gil: Refugees in International Relations. (In Refugees and International
Relations. Ed. by Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher. Oxford University Press. New York, NY 2011).  8
51  Sjöberg, Tommie: The Powers and the Persecuted. The Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees (IGCR) 1938-1947. Lund 1991, 20-21
52  Harrel-Bond, B.E.: The protection of refugees in the “least-developed” states. (In The Living Law of Nations:
Essays on refugees, minorities, indigenous peoples and the human rights of other vulnerable groups: in memory
of Atle Grahl-Madsen. Ed. by Gudmundur Alfredsson and Peter Macalister-Smith.) Kehl 1996.  49
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multiplicative effect has been enormous. It was the only comprehensive refugee study
made during the interwar period. The reports came at the end of the decade; the
preliminary report was published in1938 and the major report in 1939. The survey
covers thus practically the whole interwar period, which was also the lifespan of the
League’s refugee work. The results of the survey have been cited for over seventy
years now. The survey and its findings have also been among the momentums leading
to the scope and the perspective of this study, because the writings cover almost all
possible aspects of the refugee situation of the time. This is to say, all, with the
exception of the refugee policy of the League of Nations and the International Labour
Organization.
The major report of the survey contains well over six hundred pages of results found
by the team of people conducting the work. The report is not a study pursuing to
scientific presentation. It is rather a compilation of facts organized from parts to entities.
It does not follow any analytical formulation or a chronological order. The presentation
reflects the fact that there had been a large number of people working as independent
teams involved in the research process.
The survey headed by Simpson was performed under the auspices of the Royal
Institute of International Affairs. It received financial assistance from the Rockefeller
Foundation as well as from two other sources. The survey was conducted in 1937 –
1939. A preliminary report was published in July 1938. The final report was produced
on material collected up to October 1938. The project was carried out in the middle of
the actual events. This was manifested also in the preface of the final report, where
Simpson stated: “Recent events have altered the situation in various ways” (since end
of survey project itself).53  The biggest change during those months was the reshuffle of
the whole international organization working with refugee questions. It concerned the
League’s organization; the High Commissioner and the Nansen Office, as well as the
new player in the field, Intergovernmental Committee established in Evian, which was
undergoing changes already few months after its birth.
The best contemporary research available on the topic at hand is definitely the one
written by Claudena Skran. The work, “Refugees in Inter-war Europe” describes and
analyses the emergence of the refugee regime. The book examines the origins of
refugee movements of the time as well as the international responses to them. The
research of Skran sees the efforts of various parties; the League, the NGOs and the
governments, as forming a combined and coherent system.
53  See Simpson, John Hope: The Refugee Problem. A Report of a Survey. London 1939. preface
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The method of Skran is to use a multidisciplinary approach on explaining
international responses to refugee movements. This is done by applying a theoretical
concept of international regime. The theory is used to explain why international co-
operative efforts began. Regimes were inspired by principles and they, in turn, were
often centered on formal institutions like the League of Nations54.
Skran attempts to contribute to the field of refugee studies by understanding of
contemporary refugee problems. The regime theory allows contemplations how
regimes matter and which are stronger; national interests or international norms and
rules?55  The problem of this work from the historical point of view is, that it talks about
the emergence of the system as a one sudden and simple phenomenon, thus leaving
the evolution of the policy of the intergovernmental world organizations untouched. It is
not very clear, what the concrete appearance or the phenotype of the regime was.
League of Nations was part of it, but the role of it is not defined. The ILO is not present
in that picture, although it seems to have played a very central role, especially in the
1920s.
The book of Skran gives a valuable perspective to the problem itself. It describes the
magnitude and the significance of the refugee problem, as well as analyses the
different political and other forces forming the driving factors in the international arena.
Written in 1995, it has the necessary distance to the times and actors of the project. It
goes deep into the background and possible reasons, but ends up with no analysis on
the evolution of the strategies and consistencies of the work of the intergovernmental
world organizations. It very much reflects similar thinking with Simpson’s work,
conducted sixty years earlier, in a sense that according to it, the various actors formed
an invisible network with its rules and guidelines. Nevertheless, the work of Skran is the
only comprehensive study on the subject after the Second World War, and therefore
has an indispensable value to this research project helping to put many pieces in their
right places.
Norwegian Atle Grahl-Madsen has studied refugee questions from the legal point of
view while working himself with refugees in the UN regime. His studies cover the
developments during the League era as well as the creation of the modern refugee
work apparatus. This material gives a valuable view to the development of the legal
system, and of course, pays a tribute to the work of the author’s countryman Fridtjof
Nansen.
54 Skran, C. M.: Refugees in Inter-War Europe. The Emergence of a Regime. Oxford; Clarendon Press 1995, 7-8
55 Skran, 8-9
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One of the most prominent contemporary refugee researchers is Gil Loescher, a
visiting Professor at refugee Studies Centre and Senior Research Associate at Centre
for International Studies at the University of Oxford, and Emeritus professor of Political
Science at the University of Notre Dame. Professor Loescher is an author and co-
author as well as a leading editor of several books on refugee questions and
international relations. He is also a Co-Director of larger research projects on refugee
situations and solutions. The books produced by the projects in which Professor
Loescher has been the leading character, have helped especially in forming mental
structures in researches mind when it comes down to basic facts; who the refugees
are, how they become refugees, and most specifically, what can and should be done in
order to help them. These structures are necessary to be kept in mind when looking
into the multiplicity of source material.
In general, the researchers have never failed to point out that where migration takes
place, there are push-factors and pull-factors. As the push-factors in the case of
refugees are more essential than other causes, classical refugee research has come to
the following classification of the reasons for taking refuge in foreign countries: 1)
ethnic problems, 2) religious and racial problems 3) ideological and political
confrontations. These motives often occur mixed with each other.56
Refugee questions and forced migration have also offered opportunities to engage
in normative analysis to examine how states’ responses to refugees should look like.
This is clearly an addition to analytical attempts to understand and explain responses
to refugees.57  There are different roles for the science. “To be practically useful,
academic research of the world refugee problem should contribute to the accumulation
of such generalizations from the historical past which would help governments and
refugee aid organizations put each new refugee situation and the whole world refugee
problem into their proper contexts and thus improve the possibilities for effective
management and solution projects….academic research can only play an auxiliary role
….. It should do what it can.” 58
Refugees have been used as a vehicle to promote disciplinary ideas and theories.
This has especially taken place in fields like sociology, international law, and
international relations. The reason has probably been the fact that refugees represent
56  Europa und die Deutschen Fluchtlinge. Wissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe des Instituts zur Förderung
öffentlicher Angelegenheiten E V. Band II. Frankfurt am Main 1952, 10
57  Betts and Loescher 2011, 20
58  Hakovirta, Harto: Third World Conflicts and Refugeeism. Dimensions, Dynamics and Trends of the World
Refugee Problem. Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium 32.1986. Societas Scientiarum Fennica; The Finnish
Society of Sciences and Lettrs. 1986, 152-153
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an object which can be approached from several directions. Therefore, refugees have
also been even in a scope of scientific discussions where prominent researchers have
been trying to influence each others’ assumptions.59 This type of approach can be
useful only in a limited sense for a project attempting to promote understanding with
the methods and the sources typical to history research.
The key findings of the previous research seem to support the conception that the
range of activities must be considered as parts of a comprehensive solution. The
success of such an approach, however, depends on the level of commitment of state
actors. Only sufficient amount of cooperation will make it successful.60. Statelessness
was considered as one of the most severe problems during the inter-war period. In
general, the solutions offered as remedies were: reducing the number of stateless
people, and alleviation of the consequences of statelessness.61 This research project
cannot go into deep considerations on the theoretical grounds on any of these
possibilities. The League of Nation tried to do what could be done to alleviate the
situations within the limitations described later throughout this study. Thus, the scope of
this project is clearly on the alleviation side.
It has been mentioned in many connections that the present legal regime and
organizational framework for the provision of protection and assistance to refugees has
its background in the 1920s, as it was initiated and instituted under the auspices of the
League of Nations after the First World War.62  This has been considered a given fact,
but no previous research has explained how, when, and why all this was done. The
approach to refugee questions before the United Nations framework, and the measures
taken on behalf of refugees, have been considered typically ad hoc measures. It is,
however, important to see that there was a pattern towards a policy.
In modern days’ language the word “policy” would be often replaced by the word
“strategy”. As we are looking into this particular period of time, the word policy in this
connection fits in better. In this context, policy on refugees means broader guidelines
aiming at the solving of the refugee problem. This policy can be intentional or
unintentional. It can also be coherent or incoherent. The guidelines form the frames for
59  See e.g. Brown, Chris: The Only Thinkable Figure? Ethical and Normative Approaches to Refugees in
International Relations. (In Refugees and International Relations. Ed. by Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher.
Oxford University Press. New York, NY 2011), 152
60 Loescher, Gil and Milner, James, II, 368
61  Francois, 339
62 See e.g. Helton, Arthur C.: The Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers: A Misguided Threat to Refugee
Protection. Refugees and International Relations. (ed.by Gil Loescher and Laila Monihan. Oxford University
Press, New York 1989, 137
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the assistance of the refugees in its various forms. It means agenda and procedures for
the refugee help. In order to form a picture of the refugee policy of the world
organizations, it is necessary to scrutinize the practical measures taken by or on behalf
of the organizations, funding, target groups, as well as the results.
A policy is typically described as a principle or rule to guide decisions and achieve
rational outcomes. The term is not normally used to denote what is actually done.
Policies are generally adopted by boards or governance bodies within organizations
whereas procedures and protocols would be developed and adopted by executive
levels. Policies have usually both intended effects as well as unintended effects. Policy
addresses the intent of the organization. It is intended to affect the real world by
guiding the decisions that are made.
A further question is, whether the work was mostly reactive or proactive. Preliminary
assumption on the basis of the previous research is that it must have been reactive,
since the refugee situations mostly were sudden and unpredictable. A certain pattern in
the reactions throughout the time between the wars would again refer to consistency
and thus to a policy thinking.
Implementation is the realization or execution of a plan or a policy. Very often this is
done through the guidelines. In political science, implementation refers to the carrying
out of public policy. Factors impacting implementation include the intent, the
administrative capacity, interest group activity and opposition, as well as executive
support.
Research on refugee problems and its solutions must be carried out also because
refugees constitute a significant problem. Michael Hansson said in his Nobel lecture
1938 that “The refugee problem has, all in all, become the greatest social problem of
our time. This problem can be solved, but only by energetic cooperation with the
League of Nations by Governments aware of their responsibility to mankind.”63
Over the past six decades a transnational response to the world refugee
phenomenon has been institutionalized in the countries hosting refugees. This
development has resulted in an extensive structure of private and public international
organizations, sufficiently equipped to provide refugee assistance and promote
resettlement. This international refugee regime was created by the leading western
powers as they bore the responsibility of the activities. It has been shown, however,
that it was considered appropriate only in so far as the system served their particular
63  Hansson II
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interests or needs64, which in many cases were political. But all this has its roots in the
League era, with its principles and shortcomings. In the 1920s, all this was created
from almost nothing. Therefore, because the historical picture of the evolution of the
intergovernmental respond to refugee questions is still incomplete, this work aims to
add to that side of general understanding using the principles and methods described
below. “We have much to learn by going back to the League of Nations”.65
The activities of the prominent individuals as well as the variety of organizations and
autonomous bodies connected to the League and the ILO have received sufficient
attention by historians. The biggest gap in research concerning the LON has been the
lack of synthetic studies on particular sectors. Only recently some reassessments on
various branches of League’s work have been published. This continuation provides
the position also for this study.
1.3. Scope, Task, Methodology, and Presentation
The word ‘policy’ can have various meanings. Normally it refers to principles and
rules to guide decisions and actions. In this work, ’policy’ means continuity in these
principles. It means will and consistency that was shown by the people who were in the
position to promote things and to advocate the cause of refugees. It also means
interest expressed and plans which were supposed to systemize the approach. It
means spending public funds and making decisions how this money should be used. It
means decisions made by the people who had the capacity to make them. It means
showing responsibility. Moreover, it means a vision held by individuals who dedicated
their strength and skills to the work on behalf of the destitute people.
The basic task of this study is to try to verify whether the refugee work of
intergovernmental organizations had enough consistency and continuation, which
would justify the use of the word ‘policy’. This study will concentrate on the policy of the
League. It doesn’t pretend to be a comprehensive account of the refugee work of the
Inter-war period. The approach of this project will include a slight touch upon the
64  Loescher 1989 ,  9.
65  Pedersen 2007, 1116
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strategies and programs of the individual organizations. The scope of this research
project does not allow the researcher to go deep into the implementation and the
consequences of the policies of these organs. In this respect, the project provides
possibilities for further studies.
The presupposition is that all the above mentioned elements existed throughout the
Inter-war time, although historiography so far has not been able to articulate this
distinctly. The intention of this intervention is to show how certain norms and
administrative practices existed and developed in connection to the refugee assistance
during those two decades. This study will demonstrate how the abovementioned
emerged and manifested itself in the intergovernmental forum. Presenting the lines of
evolution of the refugee work will perform as a general account of the refugee policy as
well as a tool to analyze and provide evidence for the consistence and continuity.
In the 1920s the world was still far away from the present thinking in which
“internationalism is generally presented as something positive, and globalization is
depicted as the current of modern history”.66 The post World War system was
dominated by national thinking, and the fuel for that, as well as the power behind the
LON, was a kind of an utopianism, which gave the few activists “energy, support and in
certain circumstances valuable political capital” in their transnational approach.67
International cooperation was determined largely by imperial internationalism which is
one of the descriptive definitions attached to the dominance of the Great Powers during
the Inter-war period.68 In these circumstances one would not necessarily expect
effective refugee policy. There are facts, however, which suggest the contrary.
Most of the academic studies on the LON have primarily been concerned with the
fate of the peace activities of the League. The work of the League has been described
and judged as inefficient and finally leading to a complete failure. However, the
measures taken in connection with refugees have even been praised in those few
presentations that have considered this work important enough to be mentioned.
Refugees were sometimes even seen as the biggest threat to the world peace. There
is an apparent disharmony between different statements evaluating the efforts of the
world organizations. Even on the often praised work of Fridtjof Nansen, the semi-official
history of the League written by F.P. Walters concludes that the results were small.
According to Walters, Nansen convoked a number of conferences in the hope of
66  Mazower,  Mark:  No  Enchanted  Palace.  The  End  of  Empire  and  the  Ideological  Origins  of  the  United
Nations. Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 2009, 5
67  Mazower 2009, 6
68  See e.g. Mazower 2009, 19-23
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securing a common policy on refugee matters. The only that really received some kind
of consensus, was the general introduction of the Nansen passports.69
The inspiration and starting point for the scope derives from previous studies.
According to the well-known work of Simpson (1939), there were three fairly defined
periods in the history of the work provided by “the Nansen organization” for the
Russian, Armenian and other refugees.
1. 1921-1924. These years were covered by the work of Dr. Nansen himself,
concentrating on Russian and Armenian refugees, but also intervening in the early
stages of Greek and Bulgarian movements.
2. 1925-1929. Division of functions between Dr. Nansen as High
Commissioner directly responsible to the Council and the Refugee Service
incorporated in the International Labour Office.
3. 1930-1938. The Refugee Service was temporarily incorporated in the
Secretary for a year, then the creation of the Nansen International Office for Refugees
which then worked fairly autonomously. During that period, a High Commissioner for
refugees coming from Germany was established. The HC was responsible to the
League, but with an autonomous office.70
The works accomplished after the Second World War show the periodization in a
somewhat different light. According to Atle Grahl-Madsen the refugee work of the
League of Nations can be categorized in three distinct phases of about equal length as
follows71:
The first was the formative phase. Nansen worked as the High Commissioner
(1921-1930 and the Refugee Service was established within the ILO (1925-1929). The
period saw ad hoc solutions, but there was also optimism and hope that the refugee
problem could be solved. The second period covered by the Nansen International
Office for Refugees (1931-1938) and the High Commissioner for Refugees coming
from Germany (1933-1938). The leaders of the League wanted to keep distance to the
question of refugees which seems to have been considered somewhat embarrassing.
There were timeframes for the work. The third phase started with the creation of the
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (1938-1947) and the establishment of the
single High Commissioner for Refugees under the protection of the League of Nations
69 Walters, F. P.: A History of the League of Nations. London 1952, 189
70 Simpson 1939, 197-198,  214-215
71 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 365-366
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(1939-1946). The period experienced the decline of the League, and finally the war.
New organizations were formed as a result of the reasoning that the previous
measures had not been successful, and there were new serious problems in sight.
The divisions described above give some tools for this research project for making a
proper disposition. 1921 is a self-evident starting point. The first decade marked a start
for the intergovernmental refugee work as such, and despite the formal changes in the
structure of the apparatus, it seems to form a relatively solid entity from a historical
point of view. The 1930s, after the death of the Fridtjof Nansen, seems to be a quite
different era for the refugees.  There was also a quite different playing field for the
organizations dealing with the problems of refugees during the latter decade.
There were no Inter-Governmental Organizations before the First World War in the
same sense as the LON existed. Therefore, what was done internationally for the
refugees, was almost exclusively conducted by International Non-Governmental
Organizations. There simply was no forum for international political deliberations and
actions. The extension of the reference period has been done in several connections
by some researchers already, especially by Tommie Sjöberg in his doctoral dissertation
on the Intergovernmental Committee of Refugees.72 The scope of that project has been
to try to find the trends manifesting how the modern refugee service was first
developed and conducted as well as how it survived the Second World War.
Although modern transnational history has a tendency to blur chronological
boundaries73 it has been deemed necessary to refrain from innovative solutions in
timeframes. Since Europe is in the focus of the project and the Inter-war period in
Europe means the years from the First World War to 1939, it is the frame in this work.
The judgment for choosing the particular period from 1920 to 1939 is guided also by
other “natural causes”. This was the actual and effective life span of the League of
Nations and the organizations attached to it. It is also advisable to divide the period into
two naturally distinctive sections, since the preliminary supposition is that the two
decades were somewhat different, due the nature of the problems to be responded to.
The same applies to the actors dealing with the questions.
In general terms, the needs and the reasons for the more coherent attention to
refugee matters can be identified in a situation where the structure of the populations is
72  See Sjöberg 1991; the time span over the research is until 1947
73  E.g. the beginning of the Japanese hostilities in China in 1937 as the beginning of the Second World War;
see Clavin, Patricia: Time, Manner, Place: Writing European History in Global, Transnational and
International Contexts. European History Quarterly 40(4) 2010, 627
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naturally changing.74  That was happening beneath the political processes in Europe
after the First World War. There was a predicted lack of working force in some
countries. The refugees were welcome when they were capable of working. Today we
talk about the ratio of certain age group to another. This correlates to the need of
comers. During the Inter-war period this discussion did not take place openly.
Nevertheless, the fact is that there was a need to handle the refugees who were able
and willing to move somewhere else and to take care of those who were not able and
willing to do so.
Politics is a process primarily concerned with the allocation of values and resources.
The behavior of states is often presumed to be motivated and driven by the pursuit of
national interests.75 Nobody would normally challenge the assumption that all states
have their interests. At least a part of the interests is assumed to be legitimate.
The refugee problems of the Inter-war time had many features which made them
also politically significant. The cases of Russia and Nazi-Germany were self-evident.
The Armenian genocide has in some connections been compared to the holocaust.76
Armenian refugees had been “on the list” of the LON more than a decade before the
Jewish problem emerged. There were many competent analyses carried out by the
LON, as well as other institutions, on the causes as well as the consequences of the
Armenian genocide. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum has made efforts
to identify, copy, and store every possible document from the archives of the world
concerning the holocaust.
There have been some attempts to fill the gap between the studies of international
relations and political history. Although international political history has looked at
refugees, it has not taken full advantage of the concepts that have been developed
within International Relations theory. Only selective works have emerged. It seems that
these have not been sufficiently integrated with one another.77  Although this individual
project has been conducted independently and separately from any coherently
integrated research project, it aims from its small part to bridge the disintegration
between the disciplines in so far as it concerns refugees.
Policies are typically promulgated through official written documents which can be
named in various ways. Policies are followed by guidelines. Normally, a guideline is a
74  Jaakkola, Magdaleena: Maahanmuuttajat Suomalaisten näkökulmasta. Asennemuutokset 1987-2007. City of
Helsinki Urban Facts. Research Series 2009/1. Helsinki 2009,  7-11
75  Kent, Randolph: Emergency Aid: Politics and Priorities. Refugees and International Relations. (ed.by Gil
Loescher and Laila Monihan. Oxford University Press, New York 1989,  64-65
76  There is a section designated to Armenians in the Museum of Tolerance, LA, CA; see e.g. Rautkallio, Hannu:
Holokaustilta pelastetut. Juva 2004,  21
77  Betts and Loescher 2011,  21
34
document or a set of statements that aim to streamline particular processes according
to a set routine. Refugee policy is something bigger. It covers all “normal” measures
concerning refugees. That includes the refugee administration, which is normally
supported by governmental authorities in the states. Moreover, it covers guidelines for
assistance.
The President of the Nansen Office Michael Hansson wrote in 1937 that the criticism
towards the refugee work of the League was derogatory. In his words, this criticism
was produced by those who knew least about the work of the League, and were least
interested. He pointed out that the world organization had existed only for a short time
and the dimensions of its work had never been tested before.78 This testimony as such
can well be used as one of the further justifications for the attempt to reconstruct the
refugee policy, as sufficient number of years have now passed since those days.
The inter-war efforts have been described as efforts to help the refugees on a
temporary basis. Refugee problems were considered separate and non-continual
events. When a new refugee situation suddenly developed, a temporary organization
was established to deal with that particular problem.79  This is a justified perception
made by several scholars. It doesn’t, however, change the fact that the organization
existed in a form or another through the entire period of the 1920s and 1930s. Beneath
the visible agenda the refugee problems were constantly existent, regardless whether
or not they were widely recognized and internationally addressed.
Refugees are usually created as the direct result of political decisions taken by
sovereign states, with consequences that extend beyond national borders. The
existence of refugees makes things worse in many connections. It affects foreign
policy, intensifies inter-state conflicts, and influences international attitudes.80 Today
the international refugee policy and the refugee work coordinated by the UN recognize
the importance of political will of states to address the root causes of the problems. By
this optimistic view, it is primarily the community of states which must take initiatives in
the matter. Further to this thinking, the collective approach can alleviate the
consequences of armed conflicts, serious internal disturbances, and all kinds of human
rights violations.81 This idea was not very crystallized when the early steps towards
global intergovernmental administration were taken after the First World War.
78  Hansson, Michael:  Flyktningsproblemet og Folkeforbundet. Foredrag i Nobelinstituttet, Oslo 7.1.1937. Oslo
1938,  5
79  Sjöberg 1991, 14
80  Loescher 1989,  8
81  Hocké,  45.
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The best solution to all refugee crises would be the prevention of conflicts producing
refugee flows. Since this has not been a realistic viable solution so far, the international
community has been compelled to resort to the second best, which is working properly
with the existing refugee population. This basis alone speaks for the demand for a
proper coherence in approach and action.
Recent research on the history of the Inter-war period has had a gradually
increasing tendency to combine and integrate political, domestic, and international
history, instead of keeping the political developments separate from economic and
social evolution as it has been done traditionally.82 This research project doesn’t try to
bring about sociological or political explanations explicitly. Nevertheless, those factors
are used in the analysis as a platform for argumentation. In the network of science, this
presentation may produce material for scholars representing other fields in order to find
models for solutions to the modern refugee questions. It describes the earlier attempts,
thus providing an example how the work was sometimes successful and sometimes led
to disasters. This research utilizes contemporary archive material as the primary
source for building the outline of the story. Research literature as well as other printed
material is used in analyzing the bulk of information rising from the primary material.
The work itself is assembling pictures from fragments as well as disassembling large
disorganized entities to be reassembled again in an appropriate and functional way.
The preliminary hypothesis provides guidance.  Here the assumption is that there was
more consistency and continuation in the intergovernmental refugee work than
previously ascertained. In order to verify this, only the most relevant sources have been
used to collect the facts and observations. Previous studies on the subject by the
author of this, as well as the works of other writers have given the impetus to the view
being used as the basis for this research. This project is not source oriented in a sense
that the preliminary hypothesis guides to choose only those primary sources that are
deemed necessary.
Inasmuch as we can presume that there was no well-defined and orderly formulated
“official” policy document, we need to look into the possible guidelines as well as the
procedures of implementation to the extent which is necessary in order to be able to
verify that a strategy existed. In the absence of an official “doctrine” and a formal policy
declaration, it is obligatory to follow how the refugee regime worked in different sectors
in order to draw conclusions whether a policy really existed. There is a need to make a
82  Clavin, Patricia: Great Depression in Europe, 1929-1939. St. Martins Press, New York, NY 2000, 3
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chronological analysis through the whole Inter-war period, using the sectors as cross-
cutting issues or themes. This will reveal the consistency or alternatively the
inconsistency in the work. The basic assumption is, that coherence in the action will
speak for the existence of a policy. A lack of coherence would, in turn, indicate
something else, even a panic in reactions.
Transnational approach has been used above all to find patterns in such
phenomena as international migration and ethnic diasporas.83 International refugee
work can also be understood as a chain of authorizations. Since it is known, that the
non-governmental organizations (Red Cross and others) were involved in the refugee
work on the spot at a national level as soon as the problems emerged, it is interesting
to follow how these agencies turned to intergovernmental organization through their
own international bodies. Then the authorization to take uniform measures travelled
back to the national level through the coordinating role of the intergovernmental
refugee agencies. And again, in most cases at the end of this circle, there were the
same voluntary organizations taking care of the field work. It could be noted, that by
combining transnational and comparative approaches, even more fruitful explanations
can be found and more plausible trends discovered. The overall picture of the
treatment of refugees requires parallel studies of nations and societies during the time
between the wars.
The essential perspective of the project is chronological. The chronology running
through the work supplies links between the pieces and records significant
developments. The focus is to concentrate to the cross-cutting themes. Within these
systematic items, one must scrutinize the evolution and change in order to verify the
existence or alternatively the absence of coherence in the action. In order to
accomplish this, it is necessary to follow whether the aims and measures were
consistent through the two decades which are in the focus of this project. Funding is
the most essential indicator when assessing the seriousness of the intervention. We
must appraise how the principles of the action were articulated, if they were in place.
Also the structure of the organization and its permanence must be scrutinized. This
practical approach is reflected in the disposition of the work.
Transnational history is rather a state of motivation than a unique methodology. The
meaning of the term is broad. Its roots lie partly in the study of migrations.84 Quite
naturally, this particularly wide and liberal approach can be applied to study of
83 Tyrrel, Ian: http://iantyrrel.wordpress.com/what-is-transnational-history/ 11.6.2013, 1
84  Clavin 2010, 625
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refugees, as a background picture in order to put tide of events to the right scale and in
order to avoid jamming into corners at the multiplicity of the individual deliberations.
Transnational approach does not bring much new as such. All history has always been
border crossing, in a way or another. But in the flow of larger entities of historiography
all this eventually contributes to the tendency by which we gradually build a picture
helping us to understand where the modern ideas on humanitarianism derive from. It
seems to offer means to avoid fragmentation caused by nationalism and national
history. This approach can bring cohesion to the argumentation, simply because of not
being a theory, but an attitude.
Norway had a special role in supporting international cooperation during the time
between the wars. The claim to moral power in international relations translated into
engagement in the humanitarian agenda of the LON. All this was personified in Fridtjof
Nansen and later created the “Norwegian peace tradition”.85 Finland, on the other
hand, offers an example of another development. Finland was a receiving country, and
through different experiences from Norway, also inherited divergent views on
international and intergovernmental cooperation.
Inasmuch it is necessary to demonstrate how the national and international levels
worked in interaction, Finland has been used as a case study example. This has been
possible and desirable for several reasons. The refugee situation in Finland in the
beginning of the 1920s was one of the gravest in whole Europe, when measured by
numbers. Although Finland was a newly independent state, there was a rather well
functioning public administration which was able to produce documents on the refugee
administration. Finland was a typical recipient country in the sense that it was a
democratic state, receiving refugees from a war zone under dictatorial chaos. The laws
were in place, and the authorities were trying to implement them as they could in the
rapidly changing situations. The look into the Finnish case gives a fresh reminder that
the refugee work was not just politics and policies, but also struggling in the field with
the hungry and homeless people.
Regime theory, applied for example by Claudena Skran, explains defectively how
institutionalized ideas and even instructions were adapted to Finnish circumstances.
Transnational history aims to put national developments in context, and to explain the
situations in terms of cross-national influences.86 Finland can be used as an example in
order to demonstrate the interdependence in more concrete terms.
85  Clavin 2010, 634
86  Tyrrel, 1
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Another way to describe transnational history is to understand it not as a theory or a
method but as an angle, a perspective in order to reveal links and flows.87 It has been
documented that “In the Great Depression European countries faced very similar
problems and dilemmas, but opted to tackle them on their own. There was much talk of
the need for international cooperation … … but very little action”.88  From  the
perspective of transnational history, it appears only natural that an individual country is
used as a sample in order to demonstrate the flows and links mentioned above. This
reflects the “onion model” as a construction between local, regional and national history
on the one hand, and the international as well as the global on the other.89 With this
logic of layers, the local can be directly connected to the international and definitely to
the intergovernmental level. For this project, the most natural sample would be Finland,
because of its proximity and availability of the source material. The visible advantage of
this approach is that interactions spanning borders can make the policy actions
tangible and understandable. Finland has been chosen as an example also because it
has been evaluated by researchers of the League, notably by Paul Kennedy, that
Finland was one of the few countries that especially rejoiced at the promise the League
offered and “felt that at least they had some place at high table”.90
A few strong personalities have a central role in this study. According to our
understanding, historical persons have causal powers to affect intentionally or
unintentionally their own actions, and bring about changes in the world. Only people, in
groups and as individuals, are the moving forces of history, so we must look into the
behavior of historical personalities to discover the “causes” of historical developments.
We need a viewpoint from both individualism and holism; a historical process in its
various dimensions.
Observation and theory interact in a selective sense. Theories determine to certain
extent what we choose to observe and study and how we understand it. Observations,
in turn, have influence to the content of our theories.91 History as a science looks into
social change. In this context we also include politics in this entity. We must, however,
bear in mind that there are no necessities in history. In practical terms this is to say that
87  Patel, Klaus Kiran: Transnational History, in : European History Online (EGO), Leibniz Institute of
European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. URL: http://www.ieg.-ego.eu/patelk-2010-en URN:
urn:nbn:de:0159-20100921314 (2013-06-11), 2
88  Clavin 2000, 5
89  Patel, 2
90  Kennedy, Paul: The Parliament of Man. The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations. New York,
NY. Vintage Books, 2006, 10
91  Lloyd, Christopher: The Structures of History. Oxford; Blackwell, 1993,  198-199
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the international refugee policy in modern times is not necessarily any better than it
was during the Inter-war period.
Whereas the work of Skran concentrates on describing and analyzing the
ideological background, the emergence and the effects of the regime through a
designated theory, this work is trying to find consistent features in the behavior of an
essential part of that regime over the years through a historical analysis. The work of
Skran tries to understand refugees. Skran has described in her study the emergence of
the regime. This project goes further: It shows that the actions of the LON formed a
continuation that can be called a policy. This study also shows and describes the
evolution of the work in a historical perspective. One should always be cautious in
using terminology crossing the limits of different scientific disciplines. However, since
the term “evolution” has been used in modern history writing92, it has also been applied
to this project, merely because of the specific formulation of the research rationale
requiring mental tools which allow handling of development of the two decades under
scrutiny.
The structure and the presentation of this work is constructed in a way that gives the
reader a possibility to follow the evolution in a chronological order. Chapter 2 contains
the discourse on the establishment of the international refugee regime and the
beginning of the refugee work of the intergovernmental organizations by presenting the
situation at large, the requirements posed to the organizations, as well as the
responses to those demands. It provides the background for the description and
analyze of the interventions which are then discussed in the chapters 3 and 4. This
background includes the projection of the essential principles applied in the work.
In order to answer the central question the two main working chapters (3 and 4) are
devoted to the examination of the evolution of cross-cutting issues. They follow the
development mainly chronologically, as it is necessary to draw an outline of a
perspective throughout the whole reference period. The aim is to understand why the
work was done in the first place and what led to a strategic behavior that we would call
a policy. The analysis deals first with the enormous challenges faced by the
organizations, and then discusses the possibilities the actors could imagine and see for
themselves. It analyses the principal justifications which were found for the
interventions and then for the formal authorizations expressed publicly. Chapter 3
brings about the initial circumstances. Chapter 4 discusses the essential change in the
92  Kennedy 2006, 51-239
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international political climate, which inevitably had an influence to the evolution of the
policy.
These chapters also discuss the refugees, inasmuch it is necessary for the context
to know, who they were and why they were selected to be assisted. A central question
in following the evolution of the refugee policy is to make an examination of the
administrative arrangements, organizations as well as funding of the activities. The
organizations confronted obstacles and difficulties, and it is necessary to bring those
forward in order to understand how all this effected the work. After this discourse the
presentation leads the reader into the work enabled by the principles and premises.
This is to say, what could be really done?
The practical field work must be discussed in order to provide hard evidence for the
existence of a policy at a concrete level. These practical measures are often connected
to each other. The distinction in the presentation has not been made according to the
division of official measures derived from policies. These measures can be singled out
from the mass of deliberations carried out in the 1920s and 1930s. The division is
made in this way in order to enable a better analysis. In political discourse many terms
and categories are also often used to cover the real facts; i.e. to cover or justify
inefficiency and reluctance. In Munslow’s words, historical narrative has a duty. Its key
concern is to denote or reference what actually was, and then connote or suggest what
it meant.93
The summaries at the end of the chapters 3 and 4 offer analytical accounts on the
respective decades in order to make it easier for the reader to follow the narrative. The
immediate message of those summaries is “what has been found now”. These
analyses are summarized in chapter 6, which represents the final conclusion and
synthesis on the policy formulation in the refugee work of the intergovernmental
community during the Inter-war period.
A short general assessment offered by chapter 5. is required in order to provide a
platform for the evaluation of the policy, which is done in chapter 6. The necessity of
this analysis can be validated in an inverse manner: if no achievements can be shown,
it is rather difficult to prove that there was a consistent policy in place. According to
Paul Kennedy’s testimony historians have big problems in discovering general theories
because the evidence of the past is almost always too varied to allow for “hard”
scientific conclusions. Some clear and valid assumptions, however, can be made while
93  Munslow, Alun: The new history. Harlow: Longman, 2003,  192
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admitting that there may be exceptions.94 Those assumptions will be presented in the
concluding part.
1.4. Sources
A study of this kind is a formidable scholastic challenge, not less because there are
masses of material which touch upon the subject of this project. The quantity of
preliminary material is definitely more than one researcher can go through. A
tremendous amount of published source material has to be collected and scrutinized.
The selection has no self evident guidelines. It must also be emphasized that the scope
of the questions in this project is not source-oriented.
Because the Inter-war period is already distant past, we cannot get support from
today’s contemporary political discussion. We can only rely on sources produced
during those decades. The period between the Wars is well covered in the studies of
political history, which means that it is not difficult to find explanations for phenomena
and facts emerging from source material. This is an advantage as well as a burden.
Refugee as an issue was mostly neglected and forgotten as “the big events” were
rolling to the scene in the 1930s.
International organizations produce a huge amount of material. It is impossible to go
through all what was marked down and printed during the reference period. The most
essential question then is to decide how to predefine and decide what is really relevant
for the research project. The language of the documents, like always in the case in
multi-diplomacy, is lavish. This means that in most connections little is said in many
words. What was really meant is still another question.
The biggest problem is that if the researcher doesn’t know when to stop looking for
new facts from new material, the project will never be finished. The logical guideline
here is to remember that the research project must be a logical entity. We must stop
when we evaluate that new sets of material do not change the conclusions anymore.
All in all, the basic method for the selection of relevant sources is: 1) asking the
question 2) considering where the answer may be 3) selecting the best sources from
the viewpoint of the work economy 4) going for the answers in the selected material.
94  Kennedy 1989, xxi-xxii
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Caution is necessary in the process in order to avoid being carried away with the
abundance of the sources.
Similar inadequacy applies to both the LON’s and the ILO’s primary materials: They
don’t reveal much about the efficiency or effectiveness of the practical work conducted
in the field. Meanwhile the policy guidelines can be outlined and constructed quite
clearly. Most of the material used as primary sources consists of published documents.
The League of Nations and the International Labour Organization have been in a
position to make all sources relevant to this research project published.
The most active and timely accurate discussion of the League on these issues took
place in the Council. Therefore the material connected to those deliberations and
decisions is the most essential for this project. Being the principal executive body of the
League, the Council was always the first to know about new matters. The Council
prepared the matters to the Assembly’s agenda. It also seconded all relevant decisions
and resolutions of the Assembly before the actual implementation.
The Official Journal of the League (OJ) provides a good practical solution for
seeking information on League deliberations. It has excellent indexes which makes it
easy to handle as a source of information for refugee questions. The OJ contains
reports and other corresponding material. They summarize the projects concerning e.g.
the organizational arrangements. They also contain information on replies of the
member states to different questionnaires. The most important entity is, however, the
records of all meetings of the Council of the League. These records contain the official
minutes of the meetings with their annexes.
The arrangement of the Official Journal is by year, counting from the establishment
of the League. There are annual volumes, approximately one per month, numbered
each year separately by a running number. Each issue is easy to distinguish. A
substantial part of the material of the Official Journal is designated to the meetings of
the Council of the League. In those cases the whole numbered issue consists of the
Minutes of the Sessions of the Council.
The Minutes are copies of the official minutes in a printed form. They contain the
documented proceedings of every meeting of the sessions in chronological order. It
seems that different sessions had very distinguished lengths and weights. Some
sessions lasted for several weeks, some only a couple of days. The chronological
setting provides a possibility to follow the progress of items on the agenda. All
speeches and proposals are documented, which would give the possibility to draw
conclusions on matters which are not in the scope of this research project. This project
is more interested in the general picture of the refugee agenda, trying to draw
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conclusions on the matters considered most important, which, in turn, forms the basis
for the policy of the League.
There seem to be no thematic issues of the Official Journal as such. The issues
which are not designated to the Council meetings, have content of varying items.
Typically, items under heading “refugee questions” contain circular letters from the
Secretary General to the member states of the League as well as replies from the
governments to these numerous inquiries. All documents are presented in their original
or their translated (in English) form. Dates are there, and so are the signatures. This
represents a very clear example of pure power of evidence of the sources on the
attitudes of the members to various issues connected to refugee questions. Some of
the replies are almost illegible. Not because of the condition of the material, nor the
quality of the translation, but purely because the author of the document has been
trying to hide his real position on the matter. It is evident that the weight the
governments were putting on these issues varied a lot. Some replies were signed by
Prime Ministers, whereas some others by unknown civil servants.
The “undesignated” issues of the Official Journal contain all kinds of reports
produced by the International refugee regime. Most of the reports were established by
the intergovernmental organizations, typically the High Commissioner or the various
mixed commissions and committees. Some others, produced by e.g. non-governmental
organizations are to be found as well.
A selected portion of the same reports can be found in connection with the sessions
of the Council. In those cases there are references to them in the descriptions of the
proceedings and the documents are annexed to the issues of the Journal.  In some
cases, the discussions taking place during the meetings can be understood only by
having the annexes at hand parallel with the text concerning proceedings. The
proposals for resolutions and recommendations are clearly distinguished and itemized.
At the end of each meeting it is stated whether the resolutions have been adopted.
Opposing statements are also recorded; it is difficult, however, to draw conclusions on
required support to proposals. There is no evidence on any votes taking place.
The system of the documentation as described above is clear and makes it easy to
follow. It is necessary to examine all the issues chronologically through in order to draw
conclusions and make assumptions on the basis of the material. The explicit and
systematic indexes in case of the Minutes of the Council as well as the simple and
clear contents of the undesignated issues makes it rather unproblematic, although
labour intensive, for the researcher to find what is necessary in testing the ideas of the
task of this project.
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Another justification for the selection of the source material comes by the “official”
History of the League of Nations. The author of the book, former Deputy Secretary
General of the LON,  F.P.Walters, confirms that the official publications of the League
form the most important set of sources needed in order to reconstruct the work and
intentions of the League. Walters writes in 1952: “This immense mass of material
covers practically all the direct work of the League, whose business was carried on to a
very large extent in public. Even when meetings were held in private, the minutes and
the reports were usually published in full. .. The archives of the Secretariat contain little
that was secret at the time, and nothing that need any longer be so considered. The
records. . [Archives]. . are not complete.”95
The Assembly was not much involved with the refugee questions, since the issues
often required quick decisions. Within the Assembly, committees generally performed
the substantive work during the annual session, which usually occurred for three weeks
in September. In fact, the Council had here a great advantage over the Assembly: it
met four times a year, while the Assembly only once. Consequently, the Council was
better positioned to follow refugee issues and had much more accuracy through the
year.96
The most important set of the ILO’s material is the Minutes of the Governing Body of
the ILO. They contain the proceedings of the meetings including the entries of the
delegates. They also contain the report material issued for the meetings. Most reports
in the 1920s have been prepared by the Director General Albert Thomas who was
known to be very active in working with the refugee questions.
Another entity is the Reports and Records of Proceedings of the International
Labour Conferences. There are proposals for resolutions and drafts of agreements
attached to this material. It sheds light on the overall attitude as well as on the
relationship of the organization to the refugee question on the whole.
Official Bulletin gives the researcher a possibility to get a compact picture of the
processes, which otherwise would be laborious to form into a logical package because
of the long proceedings. International Labour Review has very much similar value as a
source, although its nature seems to be aiming the messages inside the organization.
The reports presented to the Governing Body as well as to the International Labour
Conference were quite much the same as were presented to the League Bodies. The
reports are often lengthy and very detailed.
95  Walters, F. P.: A History of the League of Nations. London 1952, 816.
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One specific character in the ILO’s material is that some of the content which could
have fallen into the category of refugees, has been placed under the headline
“migration”. The overall impression is, that many materials categorized as refugee
material in the League’s context, were classified in a different way in the ILO. Clear
reason for this is challenging to find, but some reference could be absorbed from the
discussion in general; in the ILO there was a constant prejudice against politicizing the
matters on the agenda of the ILO organs. This, in turn, is a reflection of initial nature of
the Labour Organization. It was established to walk aside the League, and take care of
the social and economic matters, leaving the political side of international diplomacy to
its big brother.
The material on the sessions of the Governing Body is very detailed. It includes all
possible discussions. This is of the utmost importance in the process of tracking the
initiatives in order to transfer the main responsibility of the refugee aid from the League
to the ILO just before the mid-twenties. The weight of this material as evidence is
manifesting. It becomes clear that there was indeed an opposition inside the Labour
Organization not willing to undertake the “dangerous” responsibilities brought about by
the refugee regime.
What the material doesn’t tell us about is the background work outside session
chambers. It becomes evident from the material that some procedures and
undertakings were very carefully prepared by those who were actively propagating the
greater role of the ILO in the international refugee regime.
Besides the material produced by the LON and the ILO, it has been necessary to
take into account some other printed sources in order to reveal the special features of
Finland as a case study. This has been done to see whether the policy principles had
any correspondence in the field, i.e. the refugee work conducted in the Member States
of the League. The historical archives of the Finnish Red Cross (FRC) contain
references to the work conducted by the American Red Cross (ARC), which was the
most covering refugee work operation in Europe after the First World War.
The annual reports of the ARC are to be found in the historical archive of the FRC,
as well as the minutes of a special conference of ARC commissioners held in Venice in
1920. The material produced by the FRC consists of the annual reports of the FRC
connected to the minutes of the meetings of the Central Board of the FRC. There are
also a considerable amount of different documents on various international meetings of
the international bodies of the Red Cross.
The only entities of unpublished material useful to this research project consists of
the archive material on East Carelian refugees in Finland, which is a part of the
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archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, as well as the archives of the
State Refugee Relief Centre (Valtion Pakolaisavustuskeskuksen arkisto; VPAKA)
located in the National Archives of Finland.
Some of the most important examples of the source literature were produced just
before the Second World War, which makes them authentic evidence. The Royal
Institute for International Affairs in London was able to establish financial cooperation
with the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s and as a result of that, a creditable survey
was carried out concentrating on the statistical side of the refugee problem. The survey
became known by its infamous report edited by Sir John Hope Simpson.97
“The Refugee Problem”, the survey report prepared by Simpson, is definitely the
most quoted book among the researchers who have studied refugee matters of the
Inter-war period.  The project was made possible under surveillance of The Royal
Institute of International Affairs and with financial support of The Rockefeller
Foundation. Simpson was a member of the Council of the League for the most of the
Inter-war time. This makes him an expert on decision making procedures as well as a
prominent authority in mastering the complicity of the source material produced by the
LON and other organizations. Simpson also was close to the field operations in his
capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Greek Refugees Settlement Commission starting
from 1926. His original one year appointment was renewed in 1927 by the Council as
well as for another one year assignment from 16.1.1928.98  All  this  makes  him  a
competent rapporteur of international refugee work. On the other hand this close
distance to the actions made on behalf of the refugees makes it obligatory for the
modern day’s researcher to reassess the results of the writer of the celebrated survey
report. The historical distance for this task is now right.
It is notable that so many later researchers have been using the material produced
by the survey process led by Simpson as well as the results presented in the reports. It
was the only comprehensive refugee study made during the period under examination.
The reports of the survey came at the end of the decade. The preliminary report was
published in1938 and the major report in 1939. The survey covers thus practically the
whole Inter-war time which was also the lifespan of the League’s refugee work and
refugee regime. The results of the survey have been cited for over seventy years by a
large number of scholars bringing the author of this at the end of that line.
97 See e.g. Hansson, Michael: Flyktningsproblemet og Folkeforbundet. Foredrag i Nobelinstituttet, Oslo
7.1.1937. Oslo 1938,  13
98  Minutes of the 48. Session of the Council 5.-12.12.1927/ OJ, 9th year, No 2, February 1928, p. 183 + Minutes
of the 53. Session of the Council 10.-15.12.1928/OJ, 10th year, No 1, January 1929,  42
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A great number of prominent academics as well as various authorities took part in
the investigation during the Simpson’s survey. The teams travelled in all parts of the
world gathering material. It was impossible to print in full the reports of these
investigations. The detailed, voluminous, and invaluable reports have been deposited
in the archives of Chatham House, and they are available for study or for reference.
The survey got much assistance from various governments as well as from
personalities such as Neil Malcolm (High Commissioner for Refugees coming from
Germany) and Michael Hansson (President of the Nansen International Office).
The survey was conducted in 1937 – 1939 in the middle of the events it describes.
This was reflected also in the preface of the final report, where Simpson stated:
“Recent events have altered the situation in various ways”.99  The report of Simpson is
much more useful for this research project than the “official” history writing of the
League of Nations. The most prominent of the books written from this formal point of
view is the covering issue by the former Deputy Secretary General of the LON, F.P.
Walters. The History of the League of Nations was published in 1952. Again, this was
made under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and again, the
project was financially supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. The value of the
massive 2-volume work is that it helps the researcher form a mental framework or a
rack where the facts discovered during the research process can be hanged. The
proportion and importance given to the refugee matters in this work reflects the overall
perception of the lack of a proper analysis as the justification of this project: only less
than three pages of the total of over 800 pages are dedicated to refugee work of the
League.
The composition of some of the studies may refer to the importance of the matter
under scrutiny. The basic work on the ILO is the “History of the ILO” by Anthony Alcock
(1971). It provides the best possible background for the deliberations of the
organization and the author has had all possible first hand sources available during the
processing of the book. Refugees are mentioned only after Second World War, which
may refer to the fact that these questions were not very highly ranked on the agenda of
ILO after all, despite the diligent work of some individuals in top positions in the
organization.
The research literature on refugee matters produced after the Second World War
gives us more theoretical possibilities than pure facts. There are, however, some
exceptions. One of those is Tommie Sjöberg’s dissertation. Sjöberg’s book does not
99  See Chapter 1.2. and Simpson 1939, preface
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concentrate directly to the League’s work, but it gives helpful hints when attempting to
understand organizatorial jungle.
There are a few good examples of short and clear-cut analyses made either during
the Inter-war period or some time after it. The writings of Atle Grahl-Madsen and
Norman Bentwich deserve to be mentioned. Professor Bentwich wrote in 1935 a
summary of the League activities in 16 pages. It is a concise analysis and evaluation of
refugee work done in 1921-1935. It forms a valuable description of the situation as it
was seen during that time. As such, it is not a source of new information or facts, but
can work as an organizer of thoughts. It is a mirror through which a researcher can
control whether the situation unravels itself in a same manner when studying the
abundant sources. It can either reconfirm or contradict the various ideas and
formulations constructed in researchers mind.
Remarkable help at the last stages of this project has come from a number of
scholars100 who have researched and written about Inter-war history in general as well
as about the LON and the ILO specifically during the time between the wars. Many of
the scholars have applied views of transnational history, which seem to fit to this
particular period of time in history as it has been distinguished as the time when
development towards intergovernmental and transnational cooperation was
accelerated. Most of these studies don’t bring new facts to the picture, but rather help
to particularize some of the initial research questions as well as itemize assumptions
which could serve as solutions to the questions.
The resignation letter of James McDonald is a very exceptional document.
McDonald held the post of the High Commissioner Refugees coming from Germany
only for two years until he saw that it was impossible for him to continue in that high
office without a proper political authorization. The text of the letter is very political and it
must have been clear that it was not possible for him to continue the work after the
letter was published. The letter contains political comments reflecting the deep dismay
Mr. McDonald must have been feeling while writing it. The text is very straight forward
which was unusual in those circumstances and on those days. He also appended to
the letter a comprehensive analysis of the German legislation, administrative decrees
and jurisprudence, as well as of their effects on the problem of refugees. The analysis
is one of the best in its own category.
In most refugee studies and in migration studies in general, the approach of the
explanations has been mostly descriptive. Where displacement has been analyzed,
100  Sandrine Kott, Patricia Clavin, Susan Pedersen, Mark Mazower, Paul Kennedy; Ian Tyrrel, Klaus Kiran Patel
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this has been made largely in isolation from the broader and deeper context. The
consequence is that the causes and dynamics of forced migration seem to have been
left mostly unaddressed and unanswered.101 The same applies to historical
explanations and the studies concerning the political attempts to find solution to the
refugee situations in historical perspective.
Despite all theoretical and analytical innovations, a limitation in migration and
refugee studies is the tendency to isolate migration or displacement as a distinct
phenomenon. This is perhaps a clearer way towards analysis, but it fails to understand
the phenomenon within its social, political, and economic relationships.102 A
fundamental observation is that during the Inter-war period, academic studies
concerning refugees and refugee work did not exist until the late 1930s. This was
perhaps one of the things that contributed to the fact that the League of Nations as well
as other bodies presumed that the refugee problems would always be temporary. As a
result of this the League’s refugee policy was dominated by the view that refugee
problems were merely outcomes of acute crises.
There is a cluster of research projects seeking to translate normative wishes into
policy recommendations and prescriptions for comprehensive actions. An example of
modern refugee research literature contains a chapter dedicated to “policy conclusions
and recommendations”. It reflects the purpose of the study, which is to try to find
models for solutions for the decision makers and administrators. It reflects the
challenges brought about by refugee situations and presents elements of a framework
for resolving them. The main value of these projects is that they help us to understand
the origin, evolution, and diverse nature of refugee situations as well as the impacts
and implications of international interventions.
This type of research material is completely based on the experience gathered after
the Second World War, and mostly during the past couple of decades. As such, it does
not shed much light to the situations and conditions prevailing during the time of the
League of Nations. It can be used as a reference material inasmuch there are certainly
some universal principles concerning humanity and treatment of human beings.
However, the difference is that during the Inter-war period those principles were not
articulated as clearly as they are today. The studies produced in the 1920s and 1930s
were of the opinion that help should be available for destitute people. The motivations,
101  Collinson, Sarah: Forced Migration in the International Political Economy. (In Refugees and International
Relations. Ed. by Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher. Oxford University Press. New York, NY 2011),  306.
102  Collinson,  309.
50
however, were not as politically and skillfully formulated as they are nowadays, and
they were not scientifically substantiated either.
International Labour Review announces that it doesn’t take responsibility on the
views of the writers. This is only natural since there are a number of independent
writers on whom the Review depends as a specialized professional issue. Even in the
1930s it was recognized that it was impossible to get fully reliable statistics on refugee
matters. All statistical work was done in cooperation by the High Commissioner’s
Office, the Nansen Office and their representatives, as well as national authorities and
various kinds of organizations in numerous countries.103
The LON’s policy is an entity which is not completely reducible to its parts. However,
the sources reveal the course of discussions which is important for the forming of the
whole picture. This project does not try to construct the viewpoints and opinions of the
individual countries, unless it is absolutely crucial in order to understand the outcome of
the strategic discussions. It is important to note that the deliberations can be divided
into two: there are the political deliberations on one hand, and the technical discussions
on the other. Both are important in the sense that the representatives of the Member
States conducting the political discourse form the basic motivation for the forming of
the policy.  The technical discussions bring out the framework for the practical work,
making the establishment of final policy feasible. Without financial means and the
necessary competent personnel the strategy would have been merely empty words.
The focus of this research project is in the policies. It does not particularly focus on
the execution of the programs. It is therefore not necessary to review the designated
archives of the special agencies working under auspices of the LON and ILO. The
consequences of the deliberations are most essential when they form a background for
a policy. The guidelines for the implementation were created on lower platforms, i.e. in
the agencies. It is a general understanding that the agencies never during their
existence exercised their own agendas. At least there are no indications to that end,
and it would have been quite clear that regrettable developments such as these would
have been discussed in the LON’s sources used here.
The relevant sources for this project have been published. They are available for the
researchers in the Library of the Parliament of Finland. There has been thus no need to
travel to Geneva to see the League of Nations Archives which are located in the United
Nations Office at Geneva. Nansen’s personal input to the humanitarian work between
the world wars is the best known part of the activities of the intergovernmental refugee
103  Hansson I, 13
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regime. Much has been written about Nansen and his personal track record. It is known
that the Nansen Fonds in UNOG Archives in Geneva are available and contain material
which certainly would be valuable if one would like to go into more detailed questions
which must have taken place in a form of deliberations between Nansen and his
“employers”. However, the scope of this research rationale doesn’t allow for increasing
the asymmetry which already exists between the Nansen time in the 1920s and rest of
the Inter-war period. The same applies definitely to the Nansen’s personal Archives in
Oslo.
 Nevertheless, it has been deemed necessary to conduct an e-mail exchange with
the UNOG Archives in order to ensure that the scope is on the right track. The
exchange confirms that the published material used in this work seem to cover the
need of material as the scope is in the policy questions.104 The additional material
would not change the scope or the results and thus the conclusions of this work.
 The LON archives system provides possibilities for further studies on remaining
questions as well as those produced by this research project. At the conclusions of this
presentation there will be references to opportunities for additional questions
discovered and to be scrutinized by scholars. It should be noted that despite all
possibilities provided by the internet, it seems that all these further studies should be
conducted in the archives in Geneva.
The activities of Nansen and his followers are well known. There are definitely lots of
details and interesting incidents that should be analyzed and documented by
researchers. That is, however, not the scope of this project. This research is concerned
with the evolution of the policy exercised by the League.  The Nansen Fonds would
certainly give answers to important questions on modalities of the refugee work. But
those questions are not asked by this project. The researcher, who asks those
questions, will also go equally for the Files of the Greek and Bulgarian Settlement
Commissions as well as other bodies. When consulting the Guide to League of Nations
Publications, it seems that almost all relevant documents concerning the refugee
organizations of the League, as much as they can be considered policy documents,
can be found printed in the Official Journal.105
104 Copies of the e-mail exchange are in the possession of the author of this
105 For evidence, see  Aufricht, Hans:  Guide to League of Nations Publications. A bibliographical Survey of the
work of the League. 1920-1947. New York 1951, 190-197
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1.5. The League of Nations and the International Labour Organization
The First World War created the modern age with its ideas of universal association
of humankind inasmuch as it stimulated the revival of the old principle that people
simply had to bring their nations together before they destroyed the world.106 Diplomacy
was the traditional way of handling international issues. Nevertheless, it was
insufficient. The necessity of organizing new procedures better adapted to the
demands of emerging situations was apparent. The League of Nations and the
International Labour Organization were established to fill a straightforward need:  the
need for completing the traditional system of diplomacy and of performing certain tasks
which diplomacy was unable to handle.107  The division of responsibilities was in some
domains clearer and in some others less explicit. The two organizations had
responsibilities on the field of social order which required close cooperation. The
functions and the division of work of the two world bodies took somewhat different
forms during the time of the strong ILO-Director General Albert Thomas compared to
the times of his successors.108
The League's primary goals were stated in its Covenant. They included preventing
war through collective security, disarmament, and settling international disputes
through negotiation and arbitration. The prevention of the war was seen as the primary
purpose of the League from the beginning of its subsistence. Therefore, the Articles
concentrating on the maintenance of peace as well as the Articles concerning
protection and security to the small countries against the ambitions of the great may be
described as the hard core of the Covenant of the League.109
All states, great or small, had equal rights in this mindset. All Members were
represented on a footing of complete equality in the Assembly, since they each had
only one vote. This was direct participation by the Members, and made the Assembly
106 Kennedy 2006, 8
107 Bourquin, Maurice: Dynamism and the Machinery of International Institutions. A Critical Study of a Twenty
Years' Experiment. Geneva Studies, Vol XI. No 5. Geneva Research Center. September 1940, 13-14
108 More about this: Tortora, Manuela: Institution spécialisée et organisation mondiale: étude des relations de
L'OIT avec la SDN et L'ONU. Bruxelles 1980, 75-114
109 Walters, F. P.: A History of the League of Nations. London 1952, 52
53
the constitutional organ of the League of Nations, which defined its general policy by
resolutions.110
Other goals in this and related treaties included labour conditions, just treatment of
native inhabitants, trafficking in persons, and drugs, arms trade, global health,
prisoners of war, and protection of minorities in Europe. The diplomatic philosophy
behind the League represented a fundamental shift in thought from the preceding
hundred years. The League lacked its own armed force and so depended on the Great
Powers to enforce its resolutions and decisions.
The League held its first Council meeting in Paris on 16 January 1920, six days after
the Versailles Treaty came into force. In November, the headquarters of the League
moved to Geneva, where the first General Assembly was held on 15 November 1920
with representatives from 41 nations in attendance. At its greatest extent from
September 1934 to February 1935, it had 58 members.
International political system was very much or almost exclusively European before
the First World War. Europeans, white, Christians, generally male, and for the most
part aristocratic or upper-middle class had been in charge of it.111  The War did not
change this situation much. The League was founded and established on these
premises after the War. Some European powers had lost their influence to certain
extent, but the only dramatic change was the growth of the political weight of the United
States.
Super-state idea was never in the design while establishing the League. The new
organization was based on national sovereignty and all its implications. The League
existed merely to help states do together what they could not so easily do alone. It
seems that it never wanted to do more. States were free to join the League if they
wished and free to leave. The decisions of the League bodies were recommendations
only and carried no binding force.112 While judging the achievements of the League as
an organization, it has to be noted that this was the closest the world had ever come to
creating a “parliament of man”, and its exercises created much excitement and
hopefulness throughout the Inter-war period. It has been only the evaluation of later
days which brought about the idea that the League experiment was worthless.113
110 The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations. Secretariat of the League of Nations. Geneva 1935,
32
111 Northedge, F. S.: The League of Nations. Its life and times 1920-1946. Leicester University Press 1986, 4
112 Northedge, 52
113 Kennedy 2006, 9
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The rules for the League which the Covenant comprised were more than just rules;
they also were hopes as to how this apparatus would work. The system was something
that the world had never seen before. The Covenant was a result of bargaining and
compromising, and that process continued for two decades as the League existed and
worked. It was not, however, aiming to a formation of a world state.114  The decision
making in the League organs was based on the rule of unanimity in general, with some
exceptions described in the Articles 1, 4, 5, 6 and 15 of the Covenant.115
When the League came into existence in 1920, it faced a skeptical world and even
the very existence of it was not universally accepted. Up to the countries where the
support for the League was strongest (Britain, Scandinavia), powerful sections of
opinion were indifferent, sometimes even arrogant. France and new East European
states trusted more on their armed forces in preventing new German aggressions.
Germany was left out in the early arrangements.  The Bolsheviks in Russia were using
their own typical rhetoric and spoke of the League as a “band of robber nations”.116
This was the playground when the world organization started to deal with refugee
questions.
The Assembly was the place where political and ceremonious discussions took
place. The Council, in turn, was the organ that had to take action. The Council and the
Assembly were both organs of political direction. The Secretariat was not placed under
same footing. The permanent element of the League, represented by the Secretariat,
had little influence as far as politics was concerned. It seems that institutionally there
was no suitable means of filling the gap between the sessions of the Council and the
Assembly.117
The Assembly consisted of representatives of all Members of the League. Each
state was allowed up to three representatives and one vote. The Assembly met in
Geneva and, after its initial sessions in 1920, sessions were held once a year in
September. A special session of the Assembly might be summoned at the request of a
Member, provided that a majority of the Members concurred. The special functions of
the Assembly included the admission of new Members, the periodical election on non-
permanent Members of the Council, the election with the Council of the judges of the
114 Northedge, 68
115 Erich, Rafael: Kansainliiton oikeusjärjestys. Otava, Helsinki 1926, 59-60; Northedge, 53
116 Northedge, 70
117 Bourquin, 43
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Permanent Court, and the control of the budget. In practice the Assembly was
considered to be the general directing force of League activities.
The League Council acted as a type of executive body directing the Assembly's
mission. The Council began with four permanent members (Great Britain, France, Italy,
and Japan) and four non-permanent members which were elected by the Assembly for
a three year period. The first four non-permanent members were Belgium, Brazil,
Greece and Spain. The United States was meant to be the fifth permanent member,
but the US Senate voted on 19th of March 1920 against the ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles, thus preventing American participation in the League.
The composition of the Council was subsequently changed several times. The
number of non-permanent members was first increased to six in 1922, and then to nine
in 1926. Germany became the fifth permanent member of the Council in 1926, giving
the Council a total of fourteen members. Later, after Germany and Japan both left the
League, the number of non-permanent seats was increased from nine to eleven. The
Council met, on average, five times a year and in extraordinary sessions when
required. In total, 107 public sessions were held between 1920 and 1939. The papers
of the Council form the main bulk of the League material used in this project.
The Permanent Secretariat, established at the seat of the League at Geneva,
comprised a body of experts in various spheres under the direction of the General
Secretary. The principal Sections of the Secretariat were: Political; Financial and
Economics; Transit; Minorities and Administration (Saar and Danzig); Mandates;
Disarmament; Health; Social (Opium and Traffic in Women and Children); Intellectual
Cooperation and International Bureaux; Legal; and Information. Each Section was
responsible for all official secretarial work related to its particular subject preparing and
organizing all meetings and conferences held in that connection. The staff of the
League's secretariat also carried the responsibility for preparing the agenda for the
Council and Assembly as well as publishing reports of the meetings and other routine
matters, effectively acting as the civil service for the League.118
The League oversaw the Permanent Court of International Justice and several other
agencies and commissions created to deal with imminent international problems.
These included the Disarmament Commission, the Health Organization, the
118 See Appendix I;  “General Structure of the LON” and Appendix IIIA, IIIB on memberships
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International Labour Organization, the Mandates Commission, the International
Commission on Intellectual Cooperation (precursor to UNESCO), the Permanent
Central Opium Board, the Commission for Refugees, and the Slavery Commission.
The ILO had a working system which was in many respects autonomous and self-
sufficient. The ILO may therefore be defined as a branch of the League, but possessing
a greater degree of autonomy than any other similar organization. On the one hand it
was under the League administratively. On the other, it was independent in respect of
its external action.119
International labour legislation was built on development of national regulations.120
The first attempts were made in considering working hours and salaries. Later also
questions like position of alien labour force came to the picture. As a result of series of
international meetings during the 19th century, two organizations were established.
These were the International Labour Protection Union as well as the International
Federation of Trade Unions, which could be considered as the predecessors of the
ILO.121  While building the peace after the First World War it was recognized that the
reasons for the war were partly social and economic by their nature. It was also
recognized that the working population had been rather loyal to the governments of
Allied Powers.122
During the peace talks a special work legislation committee was constituted. This
committee finally made a proposition for the establishment of the ILO. The proposition
was adopted in the peace conference and the constitution was attached to the Treaty
of Versailles.123  In the broader League of Nations system the task of the ILO was the
enhancing of the social justice. The members of the LON were also automatically
members of the ILO. One of the handicaps of the LON and the ILO was that the US
119 Walters, 194-195
120 Mahaim, Ernest: The Historical and Social Importance of International Labour Legislation. In: The Origins of
ILO (ed. by James Shottwell). New York NY 1934, 5
121 Alcock, Anthony: History of the ILO. New York NY 1971, 10-17
122 Suomi ja Kansainväliset järjestöt. Turun yliopiston pol. hist. laitoksen julkaisuja C 4. (toim. Juhani Mylly)).
Turku 1970, 84-85
123 Alcock, 18-37; de Lusignan, Guy: L'Organisation International du Travail (1919-1959). Paris 1959, 21-23;
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was not a member. The same concerned another significant power, the Soviet Russia,
which was very reluctant to participate in any official international dealings.124
The ILO, although having the same Members as the League and subjected to the
budget control of the Assembly, was an autonomous organization with its own
Governing Body, its own General Conference and its own Secretariat. Its constitution
was different from that of the League: representation had been accorded not only to
Governments but also to representatives of employers and workers’ organizations.
The Governing Body is the executive organ of the International Labour Organization.
It meets three times a year, in March, June and November. It takes decisions on ILO
policy, decides the agenda of the International Labour Conference, adopts the draft
programme and budget of the organization for submission to the conference, and
elects the Director-General. During the Inter-war period the Governing Body had in the
beginning 12 members (then later in the 1920s 16) who were government
representatives, 6 (later 8) employer’s representatives and 6 (later 8) worker’s group
representatives.
From the beginning the ILO organized every year the International Labour
Conference in Geneva, where conventions and recommendations were crafted and
adopted. The conference also made decisions on the ILO's general policy, work
programme and budget. Each member state was represented at the conference by four
people: two government delegates, an employer delegate and a worker delegate. All of
them had individual voting rights, and all votes were equal, regardless of the population
of the delegate's country. The employer and worker delegates were normally chosen in
agreement with the "most representative" national organizations of employers and
workers. Usually, the workers' delegates coordinate their voting, and the same applies
to the employers' delegates.
The third permanent body was the International Labour Office, which represents the
executive element of the organization. During the Inter-war period there were 400
members or employees in the Office representing 35 different countries. The agency
worked as a secretariat preparing the issues to be handled by the Governing Body and
the Conference. It also had research capacity and was responsible for the publishing.
124 For this see Osakwe, Chris: The Participation of the Soviet Union in Universal International Organizations. A
Political and Legal Analysis of Soviet Strategies and Aspirations inside ILO, UNESCO and WHO. Leiden 1972, 52-
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The Labour Office was the permanent secretariat of the International Labour
Organization and focal point for the overall activities that it prepared under the scrutiny
of the Governing Body and under the leadership of the Director-General.125
The ILO was in fact able to develop norms and administrative practices during the
Inter-war period, although its actions were rather invisible.126 The activities and
achievements of the ILO extended beyond national policies in a form of promoting
bilateral state agreements concerning social standards as well as migrant workers. The
organization had a special transnational dimension through its tripartite system,
representing forces that were sometimes able to counterbalance narrow state
interests.127
125 See Appendix II “Structure of the ILO”
126 Kott, Sandrine: Constructing a European Social Model: The Fight for Social Insurance in the Interwar
Period. In: ILO Histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World
During the Twentieth Century. (Edited by Jasmien Van Daele, Magaly Rodrígues García, Geert Van Goethem,
Marcel van der Linden). Peter Lang, Bern 2010, 174
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2. REFUGEE SITUATIONS AND THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF REFUGEE WORK
2.1. Refugee Situations requiring Measures
The circumstances before the First World War allowed the exiles to stay fairly
invisible. The troublesome legal status of refugees did not present major problems
before the Inter-war period. Since the number of people concerned was moderate,
states could easily absorb the refugees and incorporate them into their own legal
systems. The traditional legal framework proved to be inadequate when the number of
refugees, for various reasons, reached the millions in the early twentieth century.1  The
challenges were recognized both on national and international level.
The beginning of the 20th century saw some radical changes in the character of
refugee movements: The size of the waves of displaced persons became greater than
the world had ever seen before. There was a new form of homelessness; the refugees
found themselves entirely outside the web of national community, partly because
borders collapsed and partly because new ones were drawn. Also the duration of the
displacement became longer than before, and some were stuck to the refugee status
permanently.2
For the first time in the history, migration and refugees were at the heart of the
political debate in Europe during the Inter-war period. Europe was still at that time a
region of emigration but started also become one of the main destinations for
international migrations. One explaining matter is the emerging of rich, democratic and
stable European states, where asylum could be sought, and, on the other hand, non-
democratic, poorer, less stable states with young and fast growing populations as well
as ethnic and political imbalance. This particular theme also plays a central role in this
research project.
The refugee problem in Europe became known initially as the problem of Russia. It
was the Russian emigrants explicitly that alerted the relief organizations to recognize
1 Skran, 101
2 Marrus, 3-5
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and tackle the problem. The neighboring countries to Russia were the ones that had to
absorb most of the shock. Russian emigrants were fleeing to Europe already long
before the First World War. Before the War it was the opponents of the Czarist regime
who were moving. The Russians were the most remarkable group of immigrants for a
long period of time.3  When the Russian Revolution escalated to its full scale, the
number of movers increased radically. Russia was plunged into a fierce civil war. The
real mass emigration from Russia took place in 1918-22. People had various reasons
for fleeing, but the concern about security and even life was the most important. When
the Bolshevik regime got the upper hand in the struggle in Russia, the soldiers of the
white armies and the civilians attached to them formed the main part of the streams of
people struggling their way towards the borders and other countries.4
Some Russians came with their passports issued by the Czarist Government. Most
of the people, however, had no papers or any proof of identity. A large number of
comers crossed borders without any permission. Some of them had money and
valuables, some of them had nothing but the clothes on themselves.5  Most of the
refugees came randomly, in small groups or alone, many of them on foot. In some
instances there were also mass transportations of people wanting to leave the country.
First it was thought that all movements were only an indication of a temporary
situation, and the immigrants will go home as soon as the conditions in Russia have
settled down. It soon became clear, however, that the Bolsheviks would take over the
whole country. This meant that a large majority of the people seeking for a temporary
asylum in Europe became permanently refugees. For the people, who had openly
opposed the Bolshevik regime, it was practically impossible to go back safely.
The number of the refugees who came from Russia is not known. Some were
registered while some went hiding. Some were naturalized in their new home countries
whilst some went back to Russia even after a considerably long sojourn in another
country.  Latest research estimates that the total number of comers from Russia must
have been over a million.6   In some Eastern Europe countries the Russian refugees
joined the existing Russian populations and quickly formed the largest minority group.
3 Nevalainen, Pekka: Viskoi kuin luoja kerjäläläisiä. Venäjän pakolaiset Suomessa 1917-1939. Hämeenlinna
1999, 16; Leitzinger I, 17
4 Simpson 1939, 65-85
5 Leitzinger, Antero II: Ulkomaalaispolitiikka Suomessa 1812 – 1972. Helsinki 2008, 162-163
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This development was even considered to be threatening the homogeneity of the newly
independent nation-states neighboring Russia.7
In Balkans, as a result of several border arrangements before, during and after the
First World War, masses of Greeks, Bulgarians and Turks were moving across new
jurisdictions, some of them trying to avoid losing their lives. The first intergovernmental
treaties on the exchange of populations in modern history took place in this context.
The refugees of the Balkans and Anatolia had a different situation from other refugees;
they all had new homelands. However, there were millions of these refugees, and an
international or rather an intergovernmental guarantor was required since the bitter
tensions were there, underneath despite the letters on the agreements.
The Armenian refugee problem had its roots in the time before the World War. The
killings and expulsion of Armenians were carried out by Turkish authorities during the
War in an extent that has brought about the concept Armenian Genocide. The
Armenian refugee problem became the most mystified and politically important of all
refugee movements during the Inter-war period. What is known is that large numbers of
Armenians were massacred throughout the Ottoman Empire. The Genocide was widely
condemned by the international community in 1915.8  It is impossible to say anything
affirmative about the numbers of the people who got killed or even the numbers of
refugees who had the opportunity to escape the atrocities. The estimates for the people
who perished during the Genocide vary between 150.000 and one and half million. The
most common estimate on the number of refugees settles between 100.000 and
350.000 people, scattered mostly in Europe and in the Middle-East.9
Some earlier experiences of forced population movements in Europe help to put the
twentieth century refugee movements into perspective. Although it is impossible to
generalize or say anything definite about the reception of the groups of migrants in
earlier times, it can be stated that they moved within a Europe in which the central
organs of governments usually considered that adding to working population was
rather an asset than a liability. Governments mostly favoured controlled movement of
people into their jurisdiction. New inhabitants were most often considered potential
contributors to the strength of the society. 10  People didn't carry any passports on
those days anyhow.
7 Skran, 39
8 Later the events have been defined as a crime against humanity; during the Inter-war period this terminology
was not well established
9 Simpson 1939, 26 and 43; Vernant, 57
10 Marrus, 5-6
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Immigration policy was motivated and justified by economic terms even before our
modern days. Generally speaking, in the beginning the admission of refugees leads to
costs and trouble. However, experience has shown that immigration, especially when it
takes place gradually, provides for new source of wealth and energy.  Many countries,
with the USA as the most evident illustration, provides us with an example how the
capacity to absorb foreign elements leads to remarkable development and progress,
both intellectually and economically.11  Central governments pursued their own
interests by facilitating immigration as well as discouraging or even forbidding
emigration. When the times were good, it was naturally easier to accept comers.
Foreigners were welcomed to work and pay taxes. They were wanted to contribute to
the economic growth and commerce, to offer specialized knowledge and skills, or even
to join the military.12
In 1924 an article in the International Labour Review touched upon the matter of
asylum and also reflected importantly the views of contemporary thinkers on the issue.
According to the article there were two alternative approaches. One claims that
sovereign states have no obligation what so ever to the asylum seekers. States can
supervise their borders as they please. The consequence of this is that the refugees
have no legal status according to the international law. Another, individualistic view
states that people must have the right to move from a country to another in reasonable
manner and measure, and no state should limit this right unnecessarily.13
The difficulties in responses of countries and international authorities reflected the
political considerations which closely link refugee incidents and the conduct of
international relations. Foreign policy and economic considerations were involved in
both the international responses to refugees and in the root causes of refugee flows.
The relationships between nations could easily be affected by sudden massive
movements of refugees. Tensions between countries could influence the way refugees
are treated. Refugees may also have been used by governments and rulers in pursuit
of geopolitical ambitions and ideological objectives.14  All these considerations can help
to explain the positive response shown towards refugees. This generosity has been
less obtainable in cases where no gain is at stake.
11 Hansson II
12 Marrus, 6-7
13 Fauchille,P: The Rights of Emigration and Immigration I.L.R. Vol IX, No 3, 1924, p.317, The author is an expert
on international law and assumes the latter view
14 See Loescher, 11
63
The acceptance of the refugees in certain countries was dependant on many things.
Different groups and nationalities got different reception by different circles of the
recipient country.  Jews confronted racism and opposition by right wing thinkers and
ultra-nationalists in certain countries. In the same countries some groups of refugees
coming from Russia were met with biased attitudes by the socialists and communists
some years earlier. Both right wing supporters and left wing supporters had their own
motivations and political mythology.15  It is therefore fair to say that no recipient country
was completely benevolent, but there were no totally unfriendly states either. In the
1920s and 1930, it was considered normal to show political attitudes within democratic
system in more open ways than in the democratic host countries of today. In this
sense, neutrality and political correctness, including consensus, was shown in a
different manner during the Inter-war period than it is today.
Refugee camps undoubtedly existed in the 1920s in many receiving countries. A
common phenomenon was that asylum seekers were being detained in significant
numbers around the world. In research literature, this has also been called
“administrative detention”, since it occurred without specific criminal allegations (other
than perhaps unlawful border crossing). The length of the detention varied a lot. The
principal motivation was often deterrence. States could use detention in order to make
the existing aliens to leave their territories or to discourage others from ever even
attempting to come in the first place.16  Remarkable thing is, that there are very few
references to refugee camps of the 1920s or 1930s in the primary sources. The
literature of that time recognizes few facts, and later research has been able to
discover some incidents connected to this phenomenon.
In the beginning of the 1920s, most of the countries receiving large amounts of
Russian refugees were newly independent politically more or less unstable countries
struggling with economic problems. Non-Governmental entities had to take
responsibility on the humanitarian aspect. The reception of the refugees depended on
the prevailing political convenience. Foreign-policy considerations can heavily influence
decisions, especially concerning the determination of which persons should be granted
and which denied refugee status. A generous admission and benefits to be obtained
can also even encourage people to flee. All these elements can be used in
propaganda, sometimes to demonstrate how people are voting with their feet or
15 E.g. Finland, see Leitzinger II, 536-537
16 Helton, 135-136
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choosing side in an ideological conflict. In modern thinking, a decision not to accord
refugee status will often imply support for the sending government.17
There have been situations in democratic countries where immigration and
questions concerning foreigners in general have been decisive in national elections.
The political leaders could not underestimate their voters, even if the opinions of the
people were uncomfortable for them. It has been reported that some countries
neighbouring the Soviet Union didn’t want to grant entry to refugees coming from east
at all. Latvia, Poland, Roumania and Estonia have been mentioned in this connection.18
Furthermore, the international governmental and non-governmental organizations were
powerless in this respect. Decisions on asylum and the quality of care for refugees
remain the domain of sovereignty of individual states. The intergovernmental
authorities or other agencies simply didn’t have the mandate to intervene or even
protest.19
The previous refugee research has characterized the period between the two world
wars as “era of democratic solutions”. This refers to the fact that democratic states
were receiving refugees from undemocratic countries, and the recipients tried to solve
the problems in a democratic manner.20  Sometimes, however,  the extensive flows of
refugees directed the decision making to more rigid practice than otherwise in a
democratic and open system would have been required.21 Despite the problems
created by the number of people, the receiving countries could not close their eyes
before this huge humanitarian problem.22
One of the fresh features of the refugee problem in the post World War  world was
the economic crisis which was the aftermath of the destruction of the war. This was one
of the driving factors when the international cooperation was called for to deal with the
movements as well as the settlement of the masses that quite suddenly had become
homeless. As a consequence, the League of Nations came to help national and
international philanthropic bodies.23  States were considered to have a legal obligation
to support refugees on their own territory, but this thinking excluded the obligation to
17 Loescher, 15
18 Nevalainen, 81
19 See Loescher, 19
20 Nathan-Chapotot, Roger: Les Nations Unies et les Refugies. Paris 1949, 46
21 Thompson I, 7
22 Thompson I, 11
23 Bentwich 1935,  115
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support refugees on the territory of other states.24  In theoretical terms, if a person had
a right to live in the country of his citizenship, then, as a logic consequence, he had the
right to live somewhere.25  From this follows that a state should not impose penalties
for illegal entry on those misfortunate individuals who seek refuge.  Moreover, this was
supposed to prohibit the state from sending refugees back to the oppressors.26 These
considerations were parts of the substance of the international refugee aid networking
during the Inter-war period.
In some cases, countries which just before were origin and transit countries became
host countries. However, these countries were not always sufficiently resourced. Their
infrastructure and staff in charge of managing migrations were inadequate for coping
with the situations. Destination countries were trying to develop specific policies to
manage the refugee problems and to promote its social and economic dimensions.
However, it was obvious that to be effective and efficient, these policies require wider
international cooperation, including the countries of (origin and) transit. The emigration
of high-skilled workers can be a loss of human resources for the countries of origin. At
the same time, in some destination countries (e.g. France), it was recognized that
immigrants can be an asset and even contribute to the general development of the
society.
Basically, there was a motivation to accept immigration when done in a coordinated
manner. Receiving people from abroad may be considered an asset and this may
encourage and motivate the long-term work towards assimilation and resettlement of
refugees which always requires planning and patience.27 One of the principal
characteristics, and in fact, the original meaning of the refugee organization of the
League, was to combine the philanthropic action of private bodies with the international
governmental action which could be seen as the real back bone of the philosophy. The
League Offices formed the bridge between the various existing elements.28
How serious the refugee situation in Europe really was after the First World War?
The seriousness of an individual refugee situation is traditionally measured in terms of
total numbers of refugees. Seriousness is considered to increase in direct proportion to
the number of refugees, especially their number relative to the population of the host
country. In addition to that there are other relevant criteria: the urgency of the situation,
24 Betts and Loescher, 19
25 Dummet, 28
26 Dummet, 32
27 Hansson II
28 Bentwich 1935, 120
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its duration, and its solution.29 Then, while processing the contemplation on this basis,
it is easy to say that in the 1920s the numbers of the refugees in Europe were huge.
The situation can be considered serious also with any other possible measurement.
The anxiety of the people responsible for the refugee work seems to have been
justified. In the 1930s the situation can be considered serious by the political nature of
the refugee problem and with all implications deriving from that.
The urgency of the situation is often measured by the speed of developments. The
more suddenly a refugee crisis developed, the less prepared were the recipient
countries and the international aid organizations to provide for the refugees.30  At least
when estimated by the preparedness of the recipient communities, the situation was
grave: nobody expected those amounts of excess populations to be handled by the
war-torn economies and societies.
One more relevant criterion, when estimating the seriousness of the Inter-war
refugee situations, was their duration. The longer the situations lasted, the more
prolonged were the refugees’ difficulties and the more they created pressures on the
resources of host countries, aid organizations, and even the international community in
general.31  Here we can search for a reference from the situation of the Russians and
the Armenians. The refugee problems were created during and immediately after the
First World War. At the end of the 1930s there were still hundreds of thousands of
these refugees waiting for a permanent solution to their position.
Altogether some 3-4 million refugees were to be handled in Europe after the First
World War.32  Refugees encountered high level of unemployment, had poor health and
housing, and achieved limited access to welfare services. In addition, many suffered
from social isolation, discrimination, and marginalisation. The remedy for this would
normally be a granted permission to stay and integration to the surrounding society.
This would, in turn, promote to a transition from dependency to self-support and
sufficiency.33   Being a refugee is an experience that people carry through their life, and
even from a generation to another. Those who were born in exile, were rootless since
the traces of the past end at the border of the old  homeland.
A sight to an analysis of the problem is offered by an example from 1939: “An
analysis of the problem of the Refugee or the Man without a Country requires a
29 Hakovirta 1991, 20
30 Hakovirta 1991, 36-37
31 Hakovirta 1991, 38
32 Cf. Chapter 1.1.
33 Dummet, 42
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thorough understanding of the sociological and psychological factors which created this
problem, together with authentic factual data which deal with its historical and present
aspect”.34  This formulation itself constitutes a major problem and obstacle for
understanding, which, in turn, should form a basis for reasonable action towards a
solution of the problem. This kind of analyses, however, were not used extensively
when motivating international relief actions after the First World War. A proper
motivation for refugee help was simple; people were homeless and hungry. They
needed help. No sociology or psychology was then involved. The problem itself was
not philosophical or scientific. It was mostly political and practical.
Many of the asylum seekers were desolate individuals with no means of making a
decent existence. This could easily drive them to unlawful actions, which, in turn, did
cost the hosting society more than modest assistance to the needy people on foreign
soil. This fact was realized by those who conducted the refugee work, although it is
impossible to evaluate whether this had any practical consequences.35 The masses of
people staying abroad were numerous. New and old states after the World War were
involved equally. The economies of the countries were more or less devastated by the
War. This meant that in many instances, the refugees were staying in poor or even
miserable conditions.36  It was in this situation that the Red Cross appealed to the
newly established League.
The declining birth rates formed a topic of discussion already during the Inter-war
time in Western Europe. This was one kind of an argument in order to motivate the
acceptance of immigration.37 The demographic effects of immigration are generally
positive. Countries like France and Czechoslovakia realized as early as in the 1920s
that without immigration there will be a drop in populations. The worries about aging
populations were also there and all together these factors were considered a menace
to the success of nations.38  In a longer run immigration could bring economic benefits
to the receiving country. Before this acceptance of the foreigners, many legal, political,
and practical matters had to be solved. The League was needed for that. The
governments wanted to use the refugee problems for their own political ambitions.39
34 Schaufuss, 45
35 Hansson II
36 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 358
37 Hansson II
38 See Dummet, 64 and HanssonII
39 In case of Finland see Nygård, Toivo: Suur-Suomi vai lähiheimolaisten auttaminen: aatteellinen heimotyö
itsenäisessä Suomessa. Helsinki. Otava 1978, 102-158; generally Nathan-Chapotot, 46
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The League and the ILO consisted of those states. All this was inevitably manifested in
the policies of the world organizations.
Political and humanitarian situations generated by refugee movements may get
international attention in different ways. They tend to build up political and military
activities in conflicts from which they arise. In some instances, they may induce wider
attention in the international media, intergovernmental debates, negotiations between
states etc. These two processes tend to reinforce each other. Firstly, even a sizeable
refugee situation may pass relatively unnoticed until it becomes a major object of
dispute between the parties of the conflict. Secondly, the wider international attention
may, in turn, favor one party and disfavor the other and thus turn into an extra element
of the conflict.40  During the Inter-war period, the Armenian refugee situation with its
silent and non-transparent genocide was an example of the first type, the Russian
refugee situation, with the wide foreign support to the White Armies, of the second.
The use of political power and justifying political action are based on requirements
rising from normative claims. Refugees and their treatment in Inter-war world provide a
very clear example of this.41 Sometimes refugee issues could be used as a justification
for military action. Military action as a response to violation of human rights and
humanitarian norms, including situations leading to refugee flows, has a long history.
Military intervention was used by the French and the British governments against
Ottoman rule as a consequence of reported Turkish atrocities already in the 1820s
during the independence war of the Greeks.42  The same kind of intervention to protect
Armenians was discussed in the 1920s, but the political ambience and the timing after
the sufferings of the First World War were not favorable for such undertakings.
The countries that had to face the refugee problem most  severely created different
strategies for the management of the question. The sources and the research suggest
that there was a kind of distinction between two categories of states in this respect.
Some countries were more favourable towards the comers than others. Although it is
difficult to categorize states by their national policies, it is necessary to shed some light
to the various cases.
France has always been mentioned as an example, both in good when the country
was receiving refugees in large amounts, as well as in evil, when it was deemed
necessary to impose restrictions. France has been described as the promised land of
40 Hakovirta 1986, 137
41 Hurrel, 88
42 Roberts, Adam: Refugees and Military Intervention. (In Refugees and International Relations. Ed. by
Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher. Oxford University Press. New York, NY 2011),  218
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asylum in many connections. During the Inter-war period the actions and the policy of
the Government and authorities of France were admirable compared to many other
countries. After France had recognized the Soviet Government in Russia (1924), a
special agency designated to the matters of the Russian refugees was established in
France in 1925. The officials of that agency were recruited among the Russians, who
previously had been working with the diplomatic missions of the imperial Russia. The
agency issued documents; refugee certificates to the Russian emigrants. The
international refugee relief organizations have recognized that particular “national”
document since that, even after the Second World War. Similar arrangement was
made in case of Armenian refugees. France and Belgium signed an agreement on
harmonizing refugee policies and practices in 1930.43  During the Inter-war period,
France was mentioned in international connections as having the most liberal
immigration policies.44 It has been revealed in studies, however, that towards the end
of the period, some laws in France practically prevented refugees from getting
employment.45  It was reckoned that a quarter of all the Russian refugees entering
France were naturalized by the end of the 1930s. In 1938, France started to admit all
factual political refugees to the country.46  The refugees were reported to be entitled to
all social services, including unemployment benefits.47
Britain seemed to believe in intergovernmental solutions. Many prominent British
politicians and diplomats held important positions in the League system. The
Government was supportive to the cooperation with the League and other
organizations attached to it after the First World War. The country was also the largest
single contributor to League.48  It has been written, however, that the negative attitudes
of the people in Britain to asylum seekers have been “deeply rooted in the history of
British racism”.49  Considering the worldwide or even European situation, the latter
must be seen as a national statement, and should be proportioned. Most of the
countries having less heterogeneous populations do not compare to Britain in this
respect. On the other hand, John Hope Simpson has found that his home country and
the British Government cannot be counted among those which were liberal to
43 Vernant, 266-267
44 See e.g. Records of Proceedings of the 17th Sessions of the I L C 1933, 427
45 Thompson I, 39
46 Simpson 1938, 611
47 Simpson 1938, 613
48 Northedge, 71
49 Dommet, preface, xii
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refugees.50  It clearly depends on who is making the judgment; Ernst Toller considered
that in England the situation of the German emigrés was by no means as desperate as
it was in France. 51
The United States had the tradition of strong self-sufficiency and it wanted to limit
international influence over national migration and refugee policies. It generally favored
institutions with specifically designed functions based on international negotiations52,
and this must have been the underlying motivation in its dealings with the League’s
refugee organs.  The US was the biggest recipient of migrants and refugees at one
stage but there was a national policy to take the wanted and reject the unwanted. The
US wanted elements that would easily become “Americans”. The US had a tradition of
deep distrust on the force and effectiveness and just of the international law. This was
mixed with another tradition, namely the principle that the duty of a country is not
merely to accept the immigrants, but also to settle them.53  In  the  US  this  was
sometimes interpreted in a reverse manner; unless we are able to settle them, we
won’t accept them.
The Czecko-Slovak Government presented a Memorandum to the Secretary
General in January 1922 on the work of the Czecko-Slovak Republic for the benefit of
the Russian Refugees and the starving population of Russia. The Government didn’t
regard the present famine in Russia as an unexpected and transient evil, but a direct
consequence of the disastrous economic conditions in Russia.54  The Czecko-Slovak
Republic was recognized internationally for its magnificent work on behalf of the
refugees in the country, as well as for the assistance delivered directly to Russia.
During the time of President Masaryk, Czeckoslovakia had an organization which
was called Action Russe. The Government invited large numbers of Russian
professors and thousands of Russian students to come to Czeckoslovakia. The country
invited also other professionals, trained them and maintained them at the expense of
the government. That was done, because President Masaryk thought, as everybody
else on those days, that the Bolshevik Government was not going to last.55 The efforts
50 Simpson 1938, 611
51 Toller,  Ernst:  The  Refugee  Problem.  The  Political  Quarterly  Vol.  VI  (Nos.  1-4)  1935.  MacMillan  &  Co  LTD.
London 1935, 394
52 Karatani, Rieko: How History Separated Refugee and Migrant Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins.
International Journal of Refugee Law 2005, Vol 17, Number 3, summary
53 Dummet, 71
54 OJ, 3rd year, No3, March1922, 274-275
55 Simpson 1938, 611
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of the Czeckoslovak Government were used by Nansen as an example of justification
for the hope that these ideas would be favorably received by the governments.56
After Fridtjof Nansen started in his position as the High Commissioner for Russian
Refugees, he mentioned Bulgaria several times in the beginning of the 1920s. It was
then estimated that Bulgaria treated Russian refugees extraordinary well.57 Nansen
wanted to record the particularly generous action of the Bulgarian Government in
connection with the reception of the invalid Russian refugees from Constantinople in
the summer 1922. This arrangement involved payment of a certain sum per head as
entry money to the Bulgarian Government. Same kind of arrangement was in place for
the Russian refugee children. The source of the money was defined in the report more
precisely.58
The Netherlands gave an asylum to German Emperor Wilhelm II after the First
World War and refused to extradite him to the winning powers of the war for a war
tribunal as they wanted. Poland and Serb-Croate-Slovene State were also mentioned
by Fridtjof Nansen. They had generously endeavored, each with its own manifold
problems, to solve the issues and to absorb tens of thousands of refugees.59  Later in
Yugoslavia60 the Russian refugees were treated generously. They obtained all civil
rights as ordinary citizens. They got work, and even pensions were granted for the
wounded officers and soldiers. Refugees were absorbed by Yugoslavia also because
of another promoting factor; according to the national legislation, every child born on
Yugoslav soil became automatically a citizen of the country.61
Most of the Russian refugees, who fled to China, finally ended up to Shanghai. They
were reportedly doing very well in their new environment. Shanghai was an
international megacity on those days and there were areas where Russian small
enterprises were dominant. The situation in Harbin was described in very similar way.62
It was reportedly easy to see the Russian distinctive character in the city. However,
these circumstances changed considerably when the Japanese made their military
intervention.
Norway did much in various ways to alleviate the suffering of the refugees. The
number of asylum seekers in Norway was not extremely high in comparison with some
56 OJ, 3rd year, No 4, April1922, 339
57 Simpson 1938, 611
58 See e.g. Minutes of the 22. Session of the Council of the LON, OJ, Vol 3, November 1922, 1226
59 E.g. OJ, 34rd year, No11 (part I), November 1922, 1137
60  The country assumed the name Yugoslavia in 1929
61 Simpson 1938, 611-612
62 Simpson 1938, 613
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bigger countries. However, it is fair to say that Norway was one of the superpowers of
refugee work after the First World War because of the activities of certain individuals.
The Government of Norway made an initiative proposing that the League should form a
single organization with responsibility for all refugees. The proposal was not particularly
well received in the Assembly of 1935.63
Relief committees were established already in 1918 to take responsibility of the
refugees in Finland. In the beginning of the 1920s there were several separate official
organizations and committees for assisting the non-Russian refugees coming from
Russia, operated under the Ministry of Interior.64 In some connections, Finland has
been considered as a traditional safe haven for individuals persecuted in neighboring
areas. Finnish people were known to keep it as matter of honor to receive and
accommodate those who couldn’t stay in their home territory.65  Indeed, in the
beginning of its independence after the First World War, Finland received, and
supported for, large amounts of needy aliens which could be thus held as an example
for other countries.66  It was necessary for the Finnish government to have the country
being compared to liberal western states and belonging to the western juridical
traditions.67
Simpson wrote on Finland in his report: “Social assistance to the Russian refugees
in Finland is on a remarkably generous scale. Those who are employed are insured, as
the Finnish nationals, against accident, industrial disease, and incapacity. There is no
unemployment insurance, but unemployed refugees in need are entitled to relief from
the communes under a law of 1 January 1922. As late as in 1933 assistance was still
provided for 1120 refugees, in 1934 for 1087 refugees. The State refunds these relief
payments to the communes.” The data was based on the report of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the Nansen Office in 1936.68
Russian refugees attempted to form “refugee governments” while in exile.  The
refugee community was not indeed very united in this respect and activities lead to
competitive attempts. When European states gradually started to recognize the Soviet
regime in Russia also officially, these committees and communities fell into
insignifigance. In some countries the government cooperated with these political
63 See Hansson II; Grahl-Madsen 1983, 364
64 Leitzinger II, 413
65 Fol, J.-J.: Les refugies etrangeres en Finlande durante la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Revue d'histoire
diplomatique 4/1969
66 Simpson 1939, 375; Frietsch, C.O.: Suomen kohtalonvuodet. Helsinki. Tammi 1945, 454
67 Suominen, Elina: Kuolemanlaiva S/S Hohenhörn. Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa. Porvoo 1979, 170
68 Simpson 1939, 287
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activists. In Finland, the government even submitted a monetary allowance for the
operation of the organization.69
Other groups of refugees coming from Russia got even more generous political
reception in Finland. Those who were classified as Finnish-related refugees could rely
on the help of some enthusitic political circles whose goal was to unify the people
across the Russian border with the “Finnish kindred nation” under a single regime in a
greater state. A  number of different organizations were established, some with a
narrow sectoral goal, some under more extensive political aims. Public funds were
used with a variable success.70
In the middle of these contemplations it must be understood that in question of
Finland, a small state received and accomodated a number of refugees that
corresponded about one percent of the total population of the country. That was a huge
effort for a state that had just recently got its independence and was only beginning to
practice the duties of a responsible goverrnment. The people were only starting to feel
their way as citizens of an independent nation.
The importance of the legitimate control of the borders of a country can never be
denied, and in the post-war situation it was even more pronounced. That was
considered as a duty of the newly independent states in order to maintain the security
for the inhabitants. The presence of illegal immigration was also on those days
considered as one of the biggest problems.71 The Finnish Government, along with
others affected by the mass emigration, had put lots of hope and effort to the
cooperation with the new intergovernmental organizations. The new state had become
a member in 1920.72  There was reportedly high optimism in Finland concerning the
possibilities of the LON. The problems between Finland and Soviet-Russia on border
arrangements were touched upon in the LON at the same time as the refugee
organization was created.73  It was clearly understood also in Finland, that any country
had the right to limit immigration if its indigenous people were in serious danger of
being rapidly overwhelmed. A common observation was that the gradual influx of
people poses little threat to the native culture, since the immigrants in large part
69 Nevalainen, 212-213
70 See Nevalainen, 214-218
71 Considerations on this subject, see Dummet, 71
72 See Kansainliitto. Muutamia kirjoituksia. Helsinki 1920, 179-187; Broms, Bengt: Puolueettomuuskysymys ja
Suomi Kansainliitossa. (teoksessa: Itsenäisen Suomen ulkopoliittinen alkutaival; Historian aitta XV). Porvoo
1962, 147
73 See Jääskeläinen, M.: Suomen suhteet Neuvostoliittoon Tarton rauhasta pohjoismaisen suuntauksen
omaksumiseen. (in: Itsenäisen Suomen ulkopoliittinen alkutaival; Historian aitta XV). Porvoo 1962, 93
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acquire the manners of their new home.  In case of Finland, comers did not wholly
assimilate into the indigenous culture, but rather contributed new elements to it.74
It was widely recognized that “by giving up the problem would explode”.75  It  was
predicted that if the strong currents of migration continued to push anarchically upon
the states open to immigrants, there would be a catastrophe ahead. It should have
been regarded as a problem of international politics rather than one of international
charity. A strong organization was definitely required.76
All things considered it can be concluded that there were more than enough reasons
for the international community to try to find solutions to the refugee problems during
the Inter-war period. The political, economic, and social impacts of the mass
movements of people were visibly endangering the delicate balance of the network of
nations.
2.2. Non-Governmental Multilateral Attempts to find Solutions
The post-world war situation was marked by the rise in the absolute numbers of
migrants and refugees, including the number of women and children. The growth of
diasporas meant, in turn, integration challenges for the refugees and the host
countries, the diversification of destinations and origins of refugees, as well as the
multiplication of refuge routes. Today it is recognized that the reasons for refugee
problems can be abolished by enhancing good governance, democracy, and human
rights. During the Inter-war period the discussion was somewhat different, yet some
elements to this were similar. It was emphasised that the refugee problems were
created by non-democratic governments and regimes.77
Immediately after the First World War, the arrangements for solutions lay on the
shoulders of the non-governmental organizations (NGO). Typically, a non-
74 In principle: Dummet, 52
75 Hansson II
76 Thompson, Dorothy: Refugees: A World Problem. Foreign Affairs. An American Quarterly Review Vol. 16, No
3. April 1938. New York NY, 377
77 Nathan-Chapotot, 46
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governmental organization is a legally constituted, non-governmental entity created by
natural or legal persons with no participation or representation of any government. In
the cases in which NGOs are funded totally or partially by governments, the NGO
maintains its non-governmental status by excluding government representatives from
membership in the organization. Unlike the term "intergovernmental organization",
"non-governmental organization" is a term in general use but is not a legal definition. In
many jurisdictions, these organization are defined as "civil society organizations" or
referred to by other names. International NGOs typically are non-profit organizations
that operate politically and administratively independent of governments. They have
members (national NGOs or individuals) from more than two countries. An INGO
operates locally, regionally, or globally in several countries.
The roots of the work of the most NGOs were in the humanitarian thinking and
activities. This brought them to warzones and other similar places where people were
suffering in need of assistance. These organizations developed quickly in nineteenth
century as they built capability to and proficiency in bringing large quantities of material
and qualified help in difficult conditions to places where it was needed. All kinds of
different reasons and motivations for humanitarian activities can be expressed.
However, many people engage themselves in humanitarian activities together with
NGOs with a less clearly formulated set of reasons. Simple desire to help or “common
decency” is a good and prevalent motivation.78
The range of work of the NGOs has varied tremendously. It extends from advocacy
work to field activities. It can be encouraging governments to adopt more liberal
admission policies, providing material assistance in refugee settlements around the
world, and facilitating resettlement of refugees in third countries. In the 1920s the
NGOs had many human and material resources which they could bring to this work.
They frequently had access to information which was difficult to obtain by authorities,
governments, and international organizations. Moreover, food and clothes make a
powerful tool; NGOs had constituencies which could be mobilized to affect public
opinion and government policies.79
78 See Knudsen, Anne: The Humanitarian Imperative. (In: NGOs and Refugees. Reflections at the Turn of the
Century. Ed. by Morten Kjaerum, Klaus Slavensky and Finn Slumpstrup). Danish Center for Human Rights.
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After the First World War the NGOs did what they had been doing for decades. Red
Cross was already channeling help when governments were still negotiating. The
history of charitable international organizations was not long on those days. The Red
Cross had been active only for less than hundred years. The NGOs have sometimes
been called the “third system” referring to their nature between the official quarters.
During their existence, they have been able to prove their abilities in developing low-
cost, flexible responses to emergency situations.80  The NGOs were often in the best
position when there was a need to alert authorities and assistance networks nation-
and worldwide to refugee situations that needed attention.81  In addition to the ones
already existing, some of the organizations active during the Inter-war time were
established on ad-hoc basis, as the refugee problems emerged.
Researchers have emphasized that voluntary organizations and generous (private)
donors of many nations played a great role. The League of Nation’s bodies could only
assume a planning and coordinating role in material assistance. The others
implemented the effective work in the field.82  Their idea was to conduct their work on a
neutral ground, without governments’ involvement. The organizations soon realized,
however, that the challenge of the refugee problem was too immense. In the 1920s, it
became obvious that the task was far beyond the capabilities of charitable
organizations unless there was help from governments.83
Nevertheless, charitable and voluntary organizations made a huge effort in servicing
the needy refugees after the First World War all over Europe. There were large
numbers of voluntary helpers involved in the refugee work in Finland. Some of them
were private individuals, but most of the help activities had been organized within
different domestic or international non-governmental organizations. Most of the
domestic organizations had their example in the corresponding international
movements. The Russian Red Cross in Finland (the Finnish Branch) was involved.
The American Red Cross donated its funds to the Finnish Government in 1921.
International Save the Children (kv. Lasten Apu) Finnish Branch took care of the
refugee children. Duodecim (Doctor’s Association) was responsible for the medical
80 Ruppesinghe, Kumar: The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in Early Warning and Conflict Resolution.
(In: NGOs and Refugees. Reflections at the Turn of the Century. Ed. by Morten Kjaerum, Klaus Slavensky and
Finn Slumpstrup). Danish Center for Human Rights. Copenhagen 1993, 133
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attention given to the refugees. The Central Union of Agricultural Societies made
efforts to facilitate employment services. Finnish Red Cross and some Christian
voluntary charity organization had their hands on delivering clothing for the refugees.84
Churches and parishes have also assisted refugees and other destitute people as
long as we know. But it was only during and after the Second World War that churches
organized specific agencies to help refugees. Thus these organizations didn’t have the
same relevance in the 1920s and 1930s as other NGOs. The churches and church-
related agencies have consciously emphasized their humanitarian and non-political
nature. This development, working in the field, has also stimulated the ecumenical
movement.85  On the whole, in the aftermath of the First World War the churches seem
to have had only a sporadic role in the international refugee work.
The biggest and the most important general-purpose organization was the Red
Cross. The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) had been founded already in
1863. The principles of the duties and work of the organization laid down then obliged
the ICRC to join the refugee work later when the problems occurred.86  It was explicitly
the ICRC, that gave the impetus to the League’s responsibilities on refugee relief. The
tenth International Conference of the Red Cross adopted a resolution in 1921 taking
the refugees to the official agenda of the organization. Every (national) association of
the Red Cross was bound to pay attention to people who could be categorized as
refugees.87
The Red Cross emphasized the temporary character of its work and concentration
to purely relief activities. In this consideration, the definitive solution of the problems
was supposed to be left to the League of Nations.88  Many national associations took
part in international refugee relief, of which, the campaigns of the American Red Cross
(ARC) form the best-known examples.  The ARC was in the field in Europe already
during the First World War. The refugee programs were at their largest during the
beginning of the 1920s. The ARC assisted Russians, Armenians, and refugees in the
Balkans. It started to withdraw from Europe in 1924, yet some limited activities
continued still after that.89  The responsibility in relief work was transferred from
International Committee to national associations during the 1920s. The actions of the
84 Leitzinger II, 414
85 Ferris, 162
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Red Cross formed also an example how NGOs are needed when gathering general
acceptance for the refugee operations. In some cases the local population may be
reluctant to accept the new people, and this can even lead to hostilities. International
cooperation between the NGOs was particularly important when forces had to be
gathered to support the attitudes and activities. Although there are known examples of
rivalry situations between organizations, it may be safe to state that private
organizations stood out firmly as counterparts to internationally developed cooperation
between governments.90
Save the Children organization was established just after the First World War. It
cooperated with the Red Cross organizations on refugee relief. Later the International
Union of the Save the Children worked also together with the ILO in Greece.  There
were several other American organizations in the field, especially in the Near East and
Asia Minor. One of the most prominent was the Near East Relief which was in fact a
limited liability company formed by a decree of the US Congress. Its duties consisted of
deliveries of material goods and medicines for the refugees in its operating territory. It
managed in the difficult task of establishing working relations with the governments of
Turkey and Soviet-Russia.91
There were several others, religious-based organizations conducting relief work.
Many Christian sections had their own agendas. The common nominator was the
deliveries of humanitarian assistance.92  It has also been remarkable in many
instances, how the NGOs can provide protection to refugees simply by rendering their
presence. They represent a believable reporting constituency with a credibility which
potentially abusive authorities can never ignore.93
Most of the NGOs were formed and operated by others than the refugees
themselves. These organizations were not selective on their target groups. There were,
however, organizations established for certain groups of refugees. Some attention
should be given to the organizations of the Russians and the Armenians. The Russian
refugees were active in their own organizations, and so were the Armenians. In
addition, the Armenians got a lot of sympathy by other nationalities. Associations and
foundations were established to help the refugees. Probably the best known was the
90 Gammeltoft-Hansen, Hans: NGOs – a Bridge between National and International Society. (In: NGOs and
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Union Générale Arménienne de Bienfaisance in Paris.94  The Russians had numerous
sectorally, politically, and professionally defined organizations. Some of those
organizations were focused particularly on preserving the Russian culture abroad.95
It has often been considered that non-governmental organizations need strong and
visible individuals in their leadership. Otherwise they would be left without support and
funding. This is how the official politics of governments and the guidelines of the NGOs
can be merged, in most cases without major public attention. The leaders of the Red
Cross were politically close to the Governmental circles in Finland. In the Finnish civil
war the Red Cross was acting on the side of the “Whites”. The Red Cross was
approached by the Army in 1919 when the medicinal corps made an inquiry whether
the RC could operate in medical service tasks at the border should there be a war.96  In
the beginning of the 1920s, the organization focused its attention on General C.G.E.
Mannerheim, who had stepped down as the provisional Head of State of Finland.
Shortly after his political retreat, he was asked to start as the president of the Finnish
Red Cross. General Mannerheim accepted the offer. He supported the development of
international activities which would bring the organization up to “international
standards”.97
Governments and INGOs have created partnerships in certain fields. Today the
INGOs form a supplementary channel for governments’ official development aid. The
main motivation for this cooperation is that NGOs can reach the needy people in a
grass root level better than governments. Moreover, it is easier for them to form
successful link-up with the recipients of the aid. Therefore, the INGOs frequently
become the actual deliverers of supplies and services to refugees. The INGOs are
often the element of the refugee assistance network most in touch with refugees and
their needs, since they have their delivery role in the field. In the eyes of the public,
voluntary international organizations are the most visible links in the assistance chain,
even in cases where the funding for the activities may come from intergovernmental
agencies or from governments.98
The ICRC made an appeal to all national associations when the Committee was
working to assist the prisoners of war. Assigned by the League of Nations, Nansen was
responsible for those actions. Some 15.000 POWs were repatriated via Ino lager in
94 Simpson 1939, 184-185
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Finland.99  Red Cross organized an exchange where Finnish citizens from Russia
returned to Finland, in exchange for Russians in Finland. Also Russian former POWs
residing in Denmark were attached to the deal.100  The Russians used the Red Cross
organization to send clothes and other relief material to their countrymen in other
places of Europe.101
The American Red Cross and the Finnish RC began their cooperation in 1921 when
the Kronstadt incident materialized, bringing fugitives from Russian military to
Finland.102  The ARC had started a massive program to assist needy people in Europe
during the war and continued it in the early 1920s.The ARC had motivation to
strengthen the moral and the courage of the nations and new states especially in
Eastern Europe. A so called Commission for Western Russia and Baltics was formed in
1919 in Berlin with its headquarters in Riga and Colonel Edward W. Ryan as the head
of the office. The Commission was to continue the work of the POW committees. It had
offices and representatives in several countries bordering Russia.103
The refugees coming from Russia were famine striven at the end of the 1920. The
ARC originally had schemes to take the stocks in Finland to inner Russia when the
situation would allow it.104 It seems that ARC Commissioners were unified in opinion
that the ARC should not cooperate with the Bolsheviks.105 With this background it is
understandable that the supplies of the ARC were finally used in Finland, instead of
taking them to Russia.106
The ARC ceased its operations in Europe in the spring of 1921. The stations were
closed and the supplies were transferred to local authorities and organizations. In some
cases it has been reported that the local Red Cross and the ARC did not have any
cooperation, but the ARC was working together with the local authorities.107   In Finland
the ACR was in relationship with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.108
It was evident that the ARC had close contacts with the White Armies of Russia.
There are things suggesting that the stocks of supplies were supposed to be used in
99 Rosen, 245-247
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102 Rosen, 249
103 Rosen, 254-256
104 ARC, Annual Report 1920, 120
105 Minutes of the Conference of ARC Commissioners. Venice 18.-22.6.1920, 78-81
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operations of military takeover of the City of Sankt Petersburg. It was defined that the
transfer of the stocks could be done only with the consent of General Yudenitsh.109
ICRC and the new League of Red Cross Associations held a joined international
Conference in 1921 for the first time. The refugee matters were publicly and essentially
addressed during the meeting.110
The national associations had their own forms of mutual cooperation. The Finnish
RC formed its relations to other Scandinavian RCs through General Mannerheim. The
Swedish Red Cross donated funds to the FRC for the assistance of refugees.111  The
biggest individual donation was remarkable 121.000 Finnish marks with an explicit
condition that it should be used for helping Russian refugees.  A committee formed by
the RC allocated the funds mainly to “white Russians”.112  The members of the
committee reportedly had traditional connections to former Russian aristocracy who
could have been considered counter-revolutionaries.113
Red Cross movement had difficulties with the Russian Red Cross occasionally. The
Soviet Red Cross was established already in 1918 by Lenin. The Council of National
Comissars had decided to recognize all Geneva and Hague Conventions and to take
responsibility on all commitments previously made by the Russian Red Cross. The old
Russian Red Cross therefore changed into an organization in exile. These two were
competing for recognitions.114
The situation in Finland was special, since the Finnish Red Cross was previously
subordinated to the RRC, and the leaders of those organizations were old colleagues.
This certainly helped the RRC personnel to obtain asylum and sojourn permits in
Finland. The existing relationship was in some connections problematic, since many
organizations, notably the ARC, expressed their support to the new Soviet Red
Cross.115  There are clear signs that the RRC had influence to some extend when it
comes down to the allocation of relief work conducted in western countries. In some
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110 X Red Cross Conference 30.3.1921
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cases, however, their actions were prohibited when it became obvious that recruitment
of men to White troops was among their services.116
The old RRC had its headquarters in Paris. In the same city, there were several
other organizations, having activities in many countries. One of the most notable was
The Federation of Russian War Invalids and Wounded Abroad. It had local “unions” in
several European countries. It was reported that many governments supported these
unions financially.117  There are indications that the cooperation between the RRC and
local authorities as well as national association was not completely unproblematic.118
National associations occasionally received some private donations from other
countries, which they supplied further to refugees.119  They also organized campaigns
to collect funds for refugees in other countries.120  The Red Cross had an International
Relief Committee, with Gustave Ador as its chairman, to coordinate the humanitarian
work.121  In Finland the FRC had colonel Schwindt as its representative in the relief
project in helping the famine striven people of Russia. The same person represented
the High Commissioner in Helsinki. Colonel Schwindt acted as the Minister of Defense
of Finland for a short period, and he had acquaintances at the highest political
leadership of the country.122
The Red Cross had broad cooperation with the League in several other fields
besides refugees.123  The specific nature of the refugee problem compared to others
was that the people were crossing borders of sovereign states. Therefore, interventions
by an intergovernmental body were needed. And yet, for the first time in modern world
history, there was the proper body, the League of Nations.
The work of NGOs was very different from the work of IGOs. The NGOs
concentrated on humanitarian activities and relief work. Many recipient countries had
similar policies, especially in case of Russian refugees.  Nothing permanent was
considered in this respect.  One of the reasons was that no one in the west seemed to
116 Rosen, 253-254; The “Ryska Röda Korset I Finland”,  a Swedish language old Russian Red Cross association
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believe in the final victory of the communist revolution in Russia.124  The  Advisory
Committee of Private Organizations discussed a number of matters connected to the
refugee problem in its meeting in May 1922. Several resolutions were passed in order
to advise the High Commissioner.125  In the name of honesty it must be noted that none
of those seem to have had much importance from the practical point of view.
After the large scale emigration of the Russian refugees emerged in Europe, only
very few governments were in a position to offer necessary amount of help to those
destitute people, who came suddenly and in big masses. Private organizations were in
the key role. The financial burden was borne this way for some time after the War. This
changed only after governments stepped forward to share the responsibility. It is fair to
say, that a major part of the material assistance was provided by private organizations,
some of which were set up ad hoc after problem emerged. This applies especially to
the countries neighboring Russia, where the philanthropic institutions took on the
responsibility before the governmental and international help was mobilized.126
As far as both two decades are concerned, great numbers of NGOs were involved in
the refugee work. Some studies on that work have been carried out over the years. It is
possible to categorize the organizations according to their orientation for target groups,
as well as according to their willingness and ability to cooperate with the
Intergovernmental organs.127
There were different arrangements in different countries. Several ministries and
administrative branches were involved. After the war, especially in the new states, it
was somewhat unclear who should be responsible for the matter. In Finland the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior had their discussions and
exchanges about refugees. The responsibilities were sometimes defined by other
criteria than purely constitutional.128
Also matters of entry were often separated from other duties concerning refugees. In
Finland, in the very beginning of the independence, the armed forces took care of the
supervision of those issues. They were already in 1919 transferred to the Secret Police
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(EKP) which was a subordinate to the Ministry of Interior.129  This illustrates the variety
of the national authorities in the field which the officials and representatives of the
International and Intergovernmental Organizations would face.
An important side of refugee work was the exchange of information and funds,
which is a two-way traffic.  Normally the refugee problems exist in one part of the global
scene, whereas the funds necessary to solve them are found in another part.
Information must be delivered from countries producing and hosting refugees to
donating countries, whereas funds should move in the opposite direction.130  This was
also valid during the Inter-war period. Financial issues were crucial to the effectiveness
of the refugee mechanism. In order to establish a credible refugee regime, the
international community had to take some financial considerations into account. The
big and powerful countries carried the biggest responsibility, as always. For the first
time, however, it seems that smaller states were contributing to the activities through
the League in a manner never seen before. The system could not have worked without
sufficient backing by the governments of all the contributing states.131
In the prevailing political situation after the First World War, when old and new
nation-states were competing in all possible fields, this approach was definitely
challenging. Countries were exhausted by the War, many states had new political
structures, and materially there was lack of everything. The most crucial innovative
aspect in cooperation between projects is the direct transnational exchange of
experiences by the individual projects and the transfer of methods both within and
outside the overall programmes. The activities of the international refugee regime can
be seen as an Inter-war example of this development. The transnational approach has
proven very cost-effective compared to purely national programmes. These activities
deliver large amounts of important knowledge in relation to work with the aliens and the
results of such innovative approaches may be identified.132
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The intergovernmental organizations were incapable without the political and
publicly funded support. States responded to forced migration not only by offering
financial assistance. They also contributed to durable solutions for refugees in terms of
supporting resettlement, local integration, or repatriation during the Inter-war period. In
our modern days, however, states within the UN system have been increasingly
reluctant to provide resettlement and local integration to refugees, and have instead
promoted repatriation as “the preferred durable solution”.133
There was the possibility available for the Russians to establish their own relief
organizations, since there were some rich families as well as political and cultural
activists among the refugees abroad.134  It was specifically the problem of the Russian
refugees, being the biggest one, which started the chain reaction from governments
and private organizations towards the involvement of the League and ILO.135
While refuges often constituted a substantial share of the political community of a
post-conflict territory especially in countries neighboring Russia, they were rarely
participants in the negotiations taking place between the international political actors.
The possible talks leading to a political settlement were most often conducted without
the representatives of refugees. The refugees were represented in the institutions
implementing the aid neither.136  During the 1920s and 1930s, it was considered
important in many instances that the refugees should not be represented in the
international organs deciding and channeling refugee aid.137
Voluntary organizations held many valuable functions, but lack of authority was their
problem. Significant shortcoming was the insufficient ability of private organizations to
provide leadership for the international refugee regime. The most important constraint
was that they lacked the mandate necessary to deal with governments holding the
political power which was needed in the work.138  When the first international
conference on refugee matters was convened in the summer of 1921, the participants
were various: the LON, the ILO, International Red Cross, Save the Children
Organization, as well the representatives of the following states: Bulgaria, China,
Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, Croatia and
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Switzerland. The agenda of the conference contained the start of new relief projects as
well as forming of the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees.
2.3. New Initiatives
The first quarter of the twentieth century was affected by a wide process of growing
interdependence throughout the globe. Countries were no longer isolated. This was
shown in the developments around the intergovernmental cooperation centered in the
League of Nations. Governing arrangements were created by a group of countries to
deal with particular issues in world politics. These arrangements reflected shared
principles and norms, and aimed to established rules and decision making procedures.
The regimes formed in this manner are not as strong or comprehensive as a world
government would be, but they indicate a pattern of international cooperation.139
Peace was declared to be at the focus of the League. Refugee work was seen to be
contributing to this end. The Assembly paid tribute to Nansen after his death for his
efforts “to unite the nations in work for the cause of peace”.140 The importance of the
publicity in the international diplomacy and cooperation should not be forgotten. The
procedure of conferences is also characterized by the atmosphere which necessarily
surrounds it.  The traditional diplomacy made it a rule to act with discretion and really
important proceedings were done secure from the public. Nevertheless, in the 1920s
the press became more active and public opinion in general began to explore the
international social questions critically.141  This was necessarily reflected in the
handlings concerning such a grave issue as the refugee problem.  It was not possible
to leave the issue behind and pretend it was not topical.
There seems to be essential differences in the shares of the attention received by
different refugee situations in the international media. The attention focuses clearly on
a few cases interesting to the public for some reason. Most cases receive, however,
only minimal attention or no attention at all.142  This goes for the global scale of refugee
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situations. In the 1920s international politics, as well as international news media, was
very much Eurocentric. The big masses of refugees located in European countries
could not go without attention. This attention created pressures and something had to
be done.
The international media might significantly improve the prospects for the successful
management and solution of the refugee problems. Widespread and more objective
international attention to refugee situations may help them by attracting sympathy as a
form of public opinion.143   In the present source material, however, there are no
references to any direct pressure to take action from the media’s side. This would
undoubtedly be an interesting question and offer new possibilities for history
researchers.
Small nations seem to have an incentive to trust Intergovernmental Organizations
provided that the benefits can be clearly identified. After the First World War they had
the possibility to do so for the first time.144  Countries like Finland and Norway being
newly independent states can be displayed as examples of this attitude. Especially
Norway showed extraordinary activism in many fields, but especially in humanitarian
work in general, and by trying to solve the refugee problems explicitly.
On February 16-17, 1921 the Red Cross organized a meeting summoning together
the most prominent relief organizations dealing with the problem of Russians abroad.
The meeting gathered at the same table the ILO, the Save the Children Fund, the
League of Red Cross Societies, as well as the Russian Relief Associations (Lwow
Committee, former Russian Red Cross). They all recognized the urgency of the
measures to take intergovernmental action in order to help the Russians. As the
League of Nations had already been working on the question of the prisoners of the
war, “it should not abandon the refugees who likewise were victims of the scourge of
war”.145
On 20th February 1921, the President of the ICRC, Gustave Ador, appealed to the
Council of the League of Nations. The principal argument in his letter was that the
League was “the only supranational political authority capable of solving a problem
which is beyond the power of exclusively humanitarian organizations”.146  The letter
was accompanied by a Memorandum which drew the attention of the Council to the
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situation of the Russian Refugees dispersed in different countries of Europe. The
Council was requested to attempt to find some kind of solution to the problem and to
appoint a “general commissioner” whose task would be: a) definition of the legal
position of the refugees b) repatriation of these refugees to Russia, or their
employment outside Russia c) coordination of the efforts already undertaken for the
assistance of the refugees.147
The letter presented a proposal that the League should appoint a Commissioner for
Russian Refugees. The Commissioner should provide ways to consolidate the
measures already undertaken by the voluntary organizations.148  On 26 February 1921,
the Council passed its first resolution on refugees. In June 1921 the Council decided to
summon a Conference on the Question of Russian Refugees. The real concrete first
step was the fact that the President of the Council was authorized to appoint a High
Commissioner for Russian Refugees.149
The Council sent a letter including a resolution concerning the establishment of the
High Commissioner to all members of the League as well as “to various countries
which do not belong to the League”. A number of replies were received, including those
from members and members to become. These all were considered official replies. It
was noted that, apart from these, the Secretary General of the League often received
letters and appeals from various Russian organizations and associations. The request
for statements on the matter of appointing the High Commissioner resulted in e.g. a
letter from Lwow Committee acting on behalf of Russian citizens abroad asking for
money.150
In 1921, when there already was a decision in principle to establish the High
Commissioner, there were some deliberations whether the Commissioner needs funds
for carrying out its far-reaching and costly operations. It was concluded that in the
beginning the Council authorizes the Secretary General to charge all the expenditure
incurred in connection with the Russian refugees to Article 27 of the second chapter of
the Budget (Unforeseen Expenditure). The League relied on the Governments’
financial support, but it was also mentioned that it might be of interest to check whether
147 OJ, Vol 1, March-April 1921, 225
148 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 359; OJ, Vol 1, March-April 1921, 228
149 See Grahl-Madsen 1983, 359; discussions and developments can be followed in OJ, Vol 2-3, June-October
1921
150 OJ, Vol 2, July-August 1921, 485-509
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any funds belonging to former Russian Governments at that time deposited in various
countries could be devoted to use of the Russian refugees.151
The ILO got involved with the refugee matters already in 1921 before the nomination
of the High Commissioner.  When the League called an international meeting on
refugee matters, the Labour Office was among those invited.152   It  was the first time,
when the two world organizations sat together because of the theme of refugees. The
employment situation of Russian refugees in receiving countries was among the first
tasks of the newly appointed High Commissioner.153 It was therefore not surprising that
Nansen shortly after his appointment turned to the ILO for the technical assistance to
the projects. In the deliberations of the Governing Body it was emphasized that the
Labour Office had undertaken the duties by the explicit request of the High
Commissioner.154
The ILO took distance from the actions taken by relief organizations in the field right
from the beginning of the refugee work. The role of the Labour Office in practice was to
coordinate the field work done by others. The Labour Office was usually represented
by the Director General Albert Thomas.155  The Migration Commission established by
the first International Labour Conference delivered data to the Director General on the
basis of their surveys in different countries.156
Ten Member states were represented in the Refugee Conference which took place
in August 1921 in Geneva. Those were Bulgaria, China, Czecko-Slovakia, Finland,
France, Greece, Poland, Romania, Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Switzerland. In
addition, the Conference was assisted by the representatives of the International
Labour Office, the International Committee of the Red Cross, The League of Red Cross
Societies as well as the International Save the Children. The Conference adopted a
memorandum with several recommendations. These concerned the legal status of
refugees (including passports), the relief work, employment, as well as cooperation of
the coming High Commissioner with different States and religious communities.157
151 OJ, Vol 2, September 1921, 757-758
152 OB, Vol 4, 1921, 198-199
153 ILR, Vol 6, No 1, 1922, 101
154 Minutes of the 12. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1922, 179
155 See e.g. OB, Vol 3, 1921, 103 and 547-548
156 OB, Vol 3, 1921, 547-548
157 OJ, Vol 3, October 1921, 899-902
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In connection to this “Conference of Enquiry”158 , states and other actors were asked
to submit information concerning the numbers and conditions of the Russian refugees
in their respective territories. 13 responds were received. These included ten
Governments of Member States, but also reply from Russian, Armenian, and Georgian
Delegations to the League. It was noted that the British Government which was unable
to participate to the Conference had sent a very detailed Memorandum on the subject
to the Secretary General.159
This phase was closed at the beginning of September 1921 when Fridtjof Nansen
sent a letter to Secretary General Eric Drummond acknowledging the invitation of the
Council to act as a High Commissioner on behalf of the League in connection with
Russian Refugees. Nansen replied simply: “I have much pleasure in accepting this
invitation”.160  As a term and title, High Commissioner refers to various high-ranking,
special executive positions. Nansen held the position for almost nine years until his
death in 1930.
By the title it was emphasized that the work was directed explicitly to Russian
refugees. It was his other duties in Russia, which took Nansen closer to the refugee
problems in the first place. The agenda of the High Commissioner was to issue
passports and other id-certificates, to secure asylum and employment for the refugees,
as well as to coordinate and harmonize the work of the NGOs.161
The League took responsibility by these decisions and actions. In a way, this was a
deliberate rearrangement of the division of responsibility, because nothing in the
Covenant or in the general work scheme of the League obliged its Members to
undertake any such liabilities. But the Council had already shown its readiness to listen
to appeals made to it. The attitudes can be seen symbolically, reflecting the willingness
to be in a position to enhance international unity.162
The League, together with the ILO, was considered to be the best to tackle the
problems of employment, settlement, and migration, which were the most essential
questions connected to the refugees.163  The role of the new international refugee
regime was to encourage governments to grow positive attitude, as well as to accept
and take responsibility for refugees. In question of Russian refugees, it was obvious
158 OJ, Vol3, November 1921, 1006
159 OJ, Vol 3, November 1921, 1006-1027
160 OJ, Vol3, Novemberr 1921, 1027
161 Frings, 21
162 Walters, 187
163 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 362
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that the League and especially the ILO could use the refugees as an example to
convince the working class in western countries that the consequences and the
outcomes of the Russian socialist revolution were not entirely positive.164 Assumptions
on the success of the Soviet Union with its socialist economy were very much based on
mystification and lack of real knowledge in the West. The overall notion was, that
communism was turning the war-torn Czarist Empire into a major industrial power
within a short time. People of Europe had to ask whether communism began to emerge
as an alternative to the international capitalism. On the other hand, reported famine
and millions of refugees were telling another story.165
According to Skran “The most obvious explanation for the formation of the
international refugee regime is that a consensus on humanitarian principles inspired
the international community to deal with the pressing refugee problem”. The Council of
the League formulated its responses to the appeal of the ICRC from this basis.166
Another usable explanation that could be adopted by a historian is that governments
built the international refugee system because they expected to benefit from it.167
The developments discussed above show indisputably that the LON rather quickly
after its establishment assumed a leading role in finding solutions to refugee problems,
despite the fact that this was not specifically a part of its design. At that point, no
explicit hesitation was shown, partly because no one could predict how difficult and
prolonged the situations can be. The initial optimism of the founders of the League was
still prevailing and certainly this was a magnificent vehicle for the few individuals who
already had dedicated themselves to work on behalf of homeless refugees.
164 Varis, Juha: Neuvosto-Venäjän kysymykset ILO:n toiminnassa ja järjestön suhtautuminen Neuvosto-Venäjään
1920-luvun alkupuolella. Yl. hist. pro-gradutyö. Joensuun yliopisto 1984, 15-25
165 Mazower 1999, 115-116
166 Skran, 85
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2.4. Fridtjof Nansen as a Project Leader
The biographies of Fridtjof Nansen reveal that he regarded himself a scientist and
explorer. However, probably the most far-reaching of his activities was the international
political career. He became initially known from his ski-treks in northern parts of the
globe. Nansen was famous of his courage and strength, but it was his diplomatic
achievements that made him world famous. 168  His physical stamina and mental
character were definitely needed when he was working with minimal funds and means
in attempt to help the masses of destitute people.169  On the grounds of his qualities of
leadership as described by the authors the step from scientist to diplomat and
statesman was not too long.
Nansen didn’t only talk loudly, he also took concrete action. He was a frequent
visitor in Geneva and he spoke on behalf of the refugees who were suffering around
Europe. According to his character, he also went to the people and worked with his
own hands for their relief. He was an impertinent advocate of the homeless and had
the talent to lash the consciences of those who expressed sympathy but gave
nothing.170  Nansen also took part in the work on legal questions concerning the
constitutional matters in League procedures. This was seen in the 1920s when
Nansen, like the Norwegian Government in general, was defending the rights of the
smaller nations in the League system.171  In 1919 Nansen became the President of the
Norwegian Union for the League of Nations. Already in the Peace Conference in Paris
he was lobbying for the adoption of the League Covenant and for recognition of the
rights of small nations. Nansen was a delegate of his country from 1920 until his death.
Nansen was a scientist and diplomat and representative of Norway in the League.
He organized repatriation of POWs and on the mitigation of famine in Russia before he
was assigned to his tasks on refugees.172  The influence of Nansen to the refugee work
of the League can be divided in three different periods. 1. 1921-1924 when Nansen
168 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 359-360
169 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 359. Norway gained its independence in 1905. According to widespread rumors,
Nansen was requested to become either president or king of Norway, but he declined both offers
170 Scott, George: The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations. New York NY 1973, 77
171 Scott, 152-153
172 Here  see  e.g.  Sonntag,  Wolfgang:  Nansen.  Löytöretkeilijä  -  Rauhan  sankari.  Riihimäki  1947,  311-415;
Reynolds, E. E.: Nansen. Edinburgh 1932, 205-236
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took personal responsibility of the whole refugee organization, 2. 1925-1929 when
Nansen still was responsible to the LON, but there was a parallel organization Refugee
Service operated by the ILO, 3. Post-Nansen period, when the independent Nansen
Office, established by the League Assembly, was again parallel to the High
Commission of the LON.
The international career also brought the Nobel Peace Prize to Nansen in 1922 “in
recognition of his work for refugees and famine-stricken”. He donated the money to
international relief efforts and continued his work with the League. It goes well into the
same category of interests, as Nansen played a role in securing the adoption of a
convention against forced labour in colonial territories.
Nansen’s first real diplomatic task took place at end of First World War when he
arranged shipments of food and other essential supplies from the USA to blockaded
Norway. Nansen was approached by several institutions, mainly because of his
visibility. First, in the spring of 1920 the League asked Nansen to undertake the task of
repatriating prisoners of war. The refugee work came into picture in the summer 1921.
Nansen was also asked in 1921 to take a task of directing relief for millions of people
suffering from famine in Russia.
In his role as the League’s High Commissioner for the repatriation of the prisoners of
war, Nansen could state in early 1921 that the bulk of his task had been performed. By
the completion of his work in autumn 1922, Nansen could report that 430.000 POWs
had been repatriated.173  In this, as well as in his later assignments, Nansen hesitated,
but finally could not say no. After assuming the task, he would put all his heart and
strength to it. It must be kept in mind that in the beginning of the work of the League of
Nations it was understood that also the refugee problem was a temporary one and the
High Commissioner should be able to finalize his work in few years.
On 15.-16. August 1921 delegates of 48 voluntary agencies and 12 governments
met in Geneva to organize the food operation for the starving in Russia. U.S. Secretary
of Commerce, Herbert Hoover was at the conference with his friend Nansen, but did
finally not involve himself in the actions. However, Nansen was appointed by the
Conference as the High Commissioner for Aid to Russia. Nansen concluded
agreements with the Soviet Russia and thus managed to undertake the huge task of
bringing food to the starving. Reportedly, Mr. Herbert Hoover was asked to accept the
assignment as the High Commissioner for the Relief actions in Russia, but he declined.
His fresh posting as the Secretary of Commerce in USA was probably the final
173 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 359
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disincentive.174   Nansen might never have become High Commissioner at all if the
search for a candidate had taken another course. Beside the American candidates
(e.g. Hoover) there were suggestions for the appointment of a High Commissioner from
one of the Great Powers. All these projects failed for a reason or another.175
In 1920-21, Nansen arranged repatriation for 450.000 prisoners of war. In 1921-22
he gathered and distributed supplies to save several million starving people in Russia.
Yet, the most far-reaching of the projects was the work on the refugee problem, which
was only discontinued by his death in 1930. Nansen personally was especially involved
with the most serious and visible refugee questions in the 1920’s. The first was the
Russian refugee question; someone was needed to coordinate the negotiations that
concerned many different countries and governments close to the USSR.  The second
was the problem of the Greek refugees who poured to Greece from their previous
homes in Asia Minor. The third was to save the remnants of the Armenian people from
extinction.
The Conference on the Question of Russian Refugees was convened at Geneva in
August 1921. Few days after the Conference, Nansen accepted the appointment as the
High Commissioner.176  By choosing Nansen to these operations, the League wanted
to emphasize the humanitarian and non-political character of its operations.177  The
Norwegians were naturally proud of Nansen’s reputation, and Norwegian authorities
believed that their country had a special duty to speak on behalf of refugees. Nansen
himself saw his work as a real contribution to peace in addition to its humanitarian
aspects.178
Nansen seems to have been personally very concerned about the fate of the
Armenian people.  The question was his major preoccupations for the last few years of
his life, and moved him to travel to sites where the Armenian question was tackled. The
hesitation in taking measures shown by politicians was one of his great
disappointments. For that, he also expressed his bitterness openly.179  Nansen’s
thinking was labeled by the basic principle that there are some things that are
everybody’s due. All people should have the right to live a fully human life just in virtue
174 ibid.
175 Skran, 289-290
176 OJ, Vol 3, November 1921, 1027
177 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 360; see e.g. OJ, Vol3, December 1921, 1247-1248
178 Hansson II
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of existing as a human being.180  Nansen held the High Commissioner’s post until he
died in May 1930 at the age of 68 years.
During the initial exercise in 1921 Nansen and the Director General of the ILO Albert
Thomas became partners with a mutual trust and respect.181 Thomas was a useful
companion for Nansen with his relations to political circles and representatives of
economic life. Thomas had acted as the Cabinet Minister of War in France during the
First World War.182  Their cooperation has been evaluated to be the most important
driving force for the international refugee work in the the 1920s.183 The other
personalities that deserve to be mentioned are listed by Atle Grahl-Madsen.184
Many manifestations on the role and significance of Fridtjof Nansen have been
published over the decades. As a contemporary reaction, the President of the Council
put the situation in words in his Tribute to the Memory of Nansen stating: “one of the
greatest figures of the League of Nations during the ten years of its existence has just
passed away”.  In the same occasion the President didn’t  hesitate to confess:  “…Dr.
Nansen often felt it his duty to criticize the policy adopted by the League – although the
decisions of the Council and the Assembly often seemed to him not to go far enough or
fast enough – yet his criticism in such cases  was never bitter”.185
Nansen began his work after his nomination by gathering a small group of trusted
colleagues to make a function as his cabinet. He appointed delegates in asylum
countries with the job of keeping headquarters informed on all developments and to
keep in touch with the host government officials and the refugees.186  Nansen was
given “a rather free hand” (as it has been described). He took an expansive view of his
role as High Commissioner and broke new ground for what we would call an
international civil servant by receiving representatives of governments as if he were
180 On the definition see Dummet, 26
181 Soessinger 1956, 16
182 Fine, Martin: Albert Thomas: A Reformers Vision of Modernization 1914-32. Journal of Contemporary
History. Vol. 12, No 3, 1977, 549
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plenipotentiary, and by sending his own representatives to be received in various world
capitals.187  Nansen himself established the basic institutions of the refugee system.  It
is especially remarkable that the host governments were all accepting the delegates he
appointed. By his actions, Nansen also “helped to translate the regime’s norms into
concrete rules”.188  He also simply showed leadership.189
Nansen recognized in the beginning of his duties that charitable organizations had
been carrying out admirable work. He invited these organizations to form a special joint
committee to advise him on all matters in connection with the refugees in which they
had special knowledge and competence. The organizations represented in this
Committee were the following: Near East Relief, Comité International de la Croix-
Rouge, League of Red Cross Societies, European Student Relief, Comité des
Zemstvos et villes russes, Russian Red Cross (old), Jewish Colonisation Association,
Conférence universelle juive de Secours, “Save the Children” Fund, Armenian
Refugees Fund, Union international de Secours aux Enfants, Russian Famine Relief
Fund, Imperial War Relief Fund, Russian Relief and Reconstruction Fund, International
Committee of American Y.M.C.A., The World’s Committee of Y.M.C.A.190   In addition
to that Nansen expressed his deep gratitude to women’s organization of Sweden,
Norway, Denmark and Iceland for their financial contributions in helping Russian
refugee women.191
Refugee strategies emphasize the importance of dialogue between different sectors
and segments. It is fair to say, that contrast to single-sector management, this kind of
interaction on technical level also during the Inter-war period lead to a variety of
advantageous developments. These formed a basis for an appropriate response and
were also cost-effective in the situation where Nansen did not have abundant funds.
Multi-disciplinary social action has always matched with the idea of good value of
money.192  The refugee regime in the 1920s and 1930s automatically was applying
these principles to certain extent, without knowing anything about the modern strategy
concepts. This was manifested in many committees and task forces, where the seats
187 Sieverts, Frank Arne: The refugee definition and vulnerable groups. (In The Living Law of Nations: Essays on
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were occupied by diplomats, soldiers, as well as aid professionals equally, and as a
response to the expertise needed.
The most far-reaching obligations of the League of Nations were prevention of
violent conflicts and mitigation of the consequences of those which take place. It was
considered that when the countries, even smaller, get their voice raised in a forum like
that, it would be easier to control the global problems. The Members of the League
considered the refugee problem very serious, peace-threatening phenomenon. Many of
the Member countries suffered from the consequences of the refugee flows. These
exiles, in turn, were considered the severe result of the World War.
When the ICRC appealed to the League of Nations to undertake the tasks
connected to the international political protection, the incentive was that the League
was the only possible and most suitable organization for the task. The foundation of the
League was to handle political matters, which were beyond the capacity of the
NGOs.193  Certainly there were plans and good will to create international cooperation
under the leadership of a single international organization.194  Fridtjof Nansen had his
role in the initiatives which led to the communications between the Red Cross and the
League.
It became obvious that the representatives of the Red Cross and the Save the
Children were experienced people needed by the High Commissioner. Nansen also
expressed his gratitude to these organizations for the help of their personnel.195  The
HC of the LON would try to maintain as close relations to governments as possible, but
the governments were not always so enthusiastic. Nansen suggested that
governments should establish national committees to take on some responsibilities of
the High Commission on a national level. A model committee had been established in
the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Very few governments even sent a reply
to the appeal, and all of those who did, didn’t consider it necessary or possible to have
such a committee.196
The High Commissioner needed professional assistance in different fields of his
work from the beginning. The Labour Office was a natural companion in this respect.
Although the ILO wanted explicitly to keep distance to the field work among the
refugees, its services were required in the coordination of the activities which was the
193 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 358
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main duty of the High Commissioner. ILO rendered technical assistance to the projects
connected to employment and related matters. The concrete outcome of the work was
to be the data gathered by the Labour Office on the basis of the studies in various
countries.197
Moreover, Albert Thomas made visits to the member states of the ILO frequently.
He used to arrange meetings at a very high political level during his visits and thus
make a follow-up of situations concerning ratification of certain agreements.198  There
were, however, only few agreements on refugees which would have required formal
ratification. Recommendations were normally not ratified, but governments had to
provide evidence to the ILO on the actions taken to execute the arrangements.199
The contacts were reinforced at various levels and instances. The representative of
Finland in Governing Body of the ILO presented the gratitude of his government for the
work done by the HC and to the organization of Nansen when the transfer of the duties
from the LON Council to the ILO was discussed.200  When the Refugee Service was
established to continue High Commissioner’s work, many of Nansen’s representatives
continued at their post, just assuming new duties as the contact point and as the
representative of the Refugee Service as well.201
Successful opening of the refugee work required contacts to the countries where the
problem of Russian Refugees had emerged. The contacts were seen to be essential
for the coordination of the efforts. The problem was international, so had to be the
solutions. After Nansen was assigned to his office, he quickly requested the
governments involved to nominate a representative, who would act as a middleman
between the High Commission and the Government.202  Mr.  Esko  Heilimo  from  the
Ministry of Interior was assigned by the Finnish Government in autumn 1921. By April
1922, altogether 12 governments had their representatives in place.203
The descriptions above tell something about the connections between the national
governmental organs and the international organizations.204  As  said,  the
representatives of Nansen and the Red Cross were in many cases same persons. As
an illustration of this, Colonel Schwindt took on the role In Finland. He was nominated
197 See e.g. OB, Vol 3, 1921, 103 and 547-548
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already in mid-October 1921, which was right after the assignment of the HC.205
Schwindt himself had his background in Ingermanland (born there), and thus
presumably nurtured some sympathy towards this refugee group.
2.5. The Making of an Intergovernmental Establishment
The launch of the refugee assistance was followed by consecutive stages of
organizational developments. The League had several different arrangements for the
refugee work during the Inter-war period, as later documented in this dissertation work.
The attitudes and reactions also changed. There are, however, some characters that
can be followed throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Three main principles have been
identified and recognized by several authors of studies concerning the refugee work of
the Inter-war period. Those principles were: 1. only selected groups could be helped;
there was never an attempt to start a universal coverage. 2. The LON intervention was
provisional. The same principle was followed by the ILO and later the Nansen Office.
There was no attempt to create a permanent organization for refugee work during the
Inter-war period. 3. The funds provided by the LON were to be used for administrative
purposes only, not for field operations.206
An interesting aspect is that the collective institutions like the League were also
notable centers of information. Only the specialists who used the services of the
League and the ILO in this capacity could realize the extent and practical benefits to be
derived from the activity. These two institutions gathered together immense quantities
of data. It was collected and concentrated in one place, and held at the disposal of the
public.  This was definitely an incomparable amount and variety of documentation
which no other institution could compile.207  All this was necessary in the refugee work,
and in fact, an essential precondition for the solution of the problem. Without this
feature, it would be almost impossible to conduct any assessments on the
effectiveness of the work either.
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The two international institutions also promoted mutual understanding on each
other, as well as between them and “outsiders”. The same applies to the promotion of
understanding between nations and states. This was invaluable for common action,
since normally the nations found it difficult to sympathize with one another, even when
powerful interests should logically bring them together. The collective institutions were
able to contribute to creation of consensus, especially in the social and economic
sector208, which is essential in finding solutions to refugee problems
The expertise of the League and the ILO became obvious when people were
considering the aspects connected to the need and supply of the personnel. The
procedures of social and economic cooperation require a personnel differing
considerably from that employed by diplomacy. The need for technical experts in
refugee work is evident, and the collective institutions were responding to that
demand.209
Simpson makes a division of the League’s organizations which were accredited by
the League for the protection of refugees in three categories: the autonomous Nansen
International Office for Refugees ‘under the authority of the League of Nations’, the
High Commissioner for Refugees, and ad hoc organizations formed from time to time
to deal with urgent problems, such as the Greek, Bulgarian and Assyrian settlement
schemes.210
Although the forms of League protection and assistance differed, the main principles
laid down expressly on Nansen’s appointment in 1921 did not change much during the
two decades of the League. In the very beginning it was decided that the League took
responsibility only on certain categories of refugees, not all. The work was considered
temporary, and it was supposed to be ceased whenever considered finalized or
politically suitable. The League organs for refugees could use funds only for their
administrative expenses. Relief and settlement of refugees had to be left to the hands
of the NGOs, but these activities were supposed to be coordinated by the League
officials without spending money for those purposes.211
It was considered that the intervention of the world organizations should be
provisional, but the conflicts and the new flows of refugees kept coming. The mandate
of the refugee organs had to be renewed time after another. The same situation
prevailed for the entire Inter-war period. The problem turned out to be all but
208 Bourquin, 21
209 See Bourquin, 23
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temporary. Provisional became in practice permanent. The League and the ILO were
required to act accordingly.
The principal international actors were eager to create a legal framework which
would define the status of refugees in international law. On the other hand, the refugee
organs of the League attempted to protect chosen groups of refugees through
provisional interventions.  This was conducted in two-fold manner: with host
governments, as well as on their behalf.212  The organizations were connected and
disconnected. They merged and were separated. All was due to the current political
situation and atmosphere. The changes were, of course, in an attempt to respond to
the challenges and requirements. There were huge numbers of Commissions and
Committees. It is very challenging to try to conclude the real roles and the capacities of
the organizations from their nominal qualities.
As an illustration of this development, the intergovernmental bodies were still
working on these same questions of organizing the work as late as at the end of the
1930s.213  The latest mandates of the refugee organs were due in the late 1930s, and
the Assembly as well as the Council examined the possibilities to extend the
assignments through the work of a designated Committee.214   The conclusion was that
the refugee problem was anything but solved. Therefore, the role of the designated
League organs coordinating the work was seen crucial in connection with the
trustworthiness of the activities. Centralized coordinating work was at the aim of the
establishment.215 In time, new demands for the refugee organizations were addressed,
but one thing remained, presumably deriving from the example given by Fridtjof
Nansen. The direction and coordination of the work was supposed to be placed in the
hands of persons with international reputation and reliability.216  This development
represented continuity in the course of changes. As later in this work documented, the
evolution of the organizations provides an example of the consistency that was
apparent in the work of the League and the ILO throughout the Inter-war period.217
When the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees was formed at a later stage, it
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was still considered necessary to have the League and the Labour Office close to the
developments of the new universal body.218
218 Simpson  1939,  226;  Les  Réfugiés.  Le  activités  de  la  société  des  nations,  9.  Section  d’information.  Geneva
1938, 32-39
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3.  THE REACTIVE PHASE 1921-1930; NANSEN’s TIME
3.1. Competence and Principles fitted into the Impartiality of the League
System
               3.1.1. The LON’s Authority and Guidelines
The 1920s saw creation of the international refugee regime and formation of the
policies of the intergovernmental community, which the League and the ILO
represented. The masses of refugees were enormous, and this was reflected in
handlings of the world organizations. The system was developed from almost zero.
This is the reason why this decade deserves major attention when studying the topic at
hand.
At first sight, it seems natural that the League was involved with the refugee
questions. However, in order to understand the basis for the competence and
legitimacy of the League’s refugee work, it is important to set the context first. The
basic premise is that the refugee problem was a worldwide phenomenon, and it was
inseparably linked with other major international problems of the time. Because it could
not be seen as a problem particular to a country or a region, there was a need for
global approach. The refugee problem was not only about individuals or groups in their
relations with states and governments, but it also concerned states in their relations
with each another.1  This is why there was a compulsive need for initiatives and
approaches aiming to international comprehensive solutions.
During the 1920s, it was understood in some deliberations of international justice
that the League had authorized itself to conduct certain measures connected to general
obligations that could be compared to modern concept of human rights.2  It  was quite
obvious that purely national interests and exclusively domestic considerations would
only direct the problem from one country to another. These may have served short-
term national goals but could never have contributed to a more permanent solution to
1 Hocke, 41
2 See Erich, Rafael: Kansainliiton oikeusjärjestys. Otava, Helsinki 1926, 176
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the underlying humanitarian problem. A comprehensive policy meant that states
consulted with each other on existing intergovernmental platforms, which in turn
prepared the way for a coordinated action.3
When the League of Nations was established, there was a profound international
discussion on which questions are “political”, and which, in turn, “non-political”. These
discussions were soon converted into political debates. However, despite this partly
unintentional development of the situation, there was in the background the assumption
that political questions should be separated from legal ones.4  It was considered that
the real task of protecting refugees lay with the League of Nations although there was
no explicit obligation. The Covenant of the League contained nothing dealing directly
with the assistance of refugee.5
According to Skran, the structure of an international regime consists of four major
elements: principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. Principles are
core beliefs held by the members of a regime. Norms are standards which define the
rights and obligations of the actors in the regime. Rules are derived from the principles
and norms and are often more easily identified since they are usually codified and their
implementation and enforcement can be observed. Decision-making procedures
involve the members of the regime, primarily states.6
The motivations for the humanitarian action of the League can be excavated from
the text of the Covenant. The reasoning for the humanitarian work for the homeless
and stateless was then found in the Preamble to the Covenant: “To promote
international cooperation by the maintenance of justice.” In the Article 23 (a) of the
Covenant formulated that “Members of the League will endeavour to secure and
maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children both in
their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial
relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain necessary
international organizations”. Assistance of refugees was contemplated as a definite
part of the new intergovernmental thinking. Keeping this philosophy in the background,
that action became one of the most important social undertakings of the League.7
There was an opposition to the refugee work coming forward with its own agenda. A
3 Hocke, 42; Skran, 264-267
4 Palonen, Kari: Pakolaisuuden poliittisuus käsitehistorian perspektiivissä. Jälkisanat teoksessa Riila, Anu 1991,
68
5 Toller, 397
6 Skran, 66-67
7 Bentwich 1935, 114; see also Toller, 397
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commonly held assumption was that ‘charity’ should not be on the agenda of the
intergovernmental organizations, and should be held exclusively as the domain of
private agencies and national governments. Any international initiatives in the
humanitarian field had to be clearly justified because funds were needed.8
The first authorization for the League as an organization represented by the High
Commissioner to act internationally on behalf of refugees was acquired through the
Refugee Conference arranged by the League in August 1921. Ten Member States as
well a number of non members and organizations were summoned together in Geneva.
Most of the States were those that were burdened by large numbers of Russian
Refugees. Unanimous resolutions were adopted in the Conference, and the general
outcome was that the problem could be best helped by League through nominating a
High Commissioner to act on behalf of the international community.9  The competence
of the League of Nations was questioned many times during refugee operations of the
1920s and 1930s. This was inevitably reflected to the status of the High Commissioner
in different times during its existence.10
The founders of the League of Nations entrusted the powers and tasks to it. Those
who drafted the Covenant had a supranational institution in mind on the one hand, a
platform and level playing field for negotiations on the other. The ultimate purpose of
the institution was to create favorable conditions for cooperation in order to maintain
peace and security. The importance of social and economic conditions was recognized
as an essential building block for that goal. The idea was that the League will be
entrusted general supervision powers over certain international arrangements
concerning just and decent treatment of people.  However, protection and assistance of
refugees were not included in the Versailles package of 1919.11
The Article 25 of the Covenant of the League was the paragraph used in order to
make the member states cooperate with the Red Cross organizations for the alleviation
of destitution throughout the world. This Article provided the opening which the Red
Cross used when appealing to the League for measures to help the refugees.12  It was
clear that also the refugee work of the League suffered from the fact that the US was
not a Member.13  In the beginning of the work of the League, however, the working
8 Skran, 86-87
9 E.g. OJ, Vol 3, Dec 1921, 1114-1115
10 E.g. Grahl-Madsen 1983, 364
11 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 358
12 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 358
13 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 364
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relations to the Americans were close and routinely. This was to be seen especially in
dealing with the question of Armenia.14  Under the authorization by the Article 23, its b-,
c- and f- items, the League was able to undertake certain tasks which were categorized
as “interests on humanity”. By broad interpretation these tasks on humanity could also
include the work on behalf of refugees.15
In general, countries wanted to take part in the intergovernmental activities of the
LON and thus strengthen international justice. The League was part of the strategy of
their foreign policy. It was understood that the care for refugees was an element of that
international responsibility.16  With whom the League was supposed to negotiate? The
answer was: mostly with legitimate governments. The League faced this difficult
dilemma already in the very beginning of its existence. In 1920-1921 the League took
measures to provide support to the newly independent Armenian state. In the
beginning of 1921, the Council had to face the fact that the State and the Government
did not exist anymore. What could be done in order to help the Armenian nation under
these circumstances?  The scope was turned into the Armenian refugees.17 This is how
the international political machinery adjusted to changing circumstances.
Nansen reportedly believed that the High Commissioner for Refugees should carry
out the responsibilities in a non-political and humanitarian way. He was not a politician,
and behaved accordingly.18  Based on the information obtained from the League
documents the different roles and duties of Nansen were mixed to certain extend in the
beginning of the 1920s. It must be remembered, that Nansen had been working on the
prisoners of war and Russian famine for some time before he was appointed as the
High Commissioner for Refugees. In his report in the capacity of the High
Commissioner for Russian Refugees he reported on facts and plans that would easily
fall into a category of “political interference in Russia”. It could be estimated that his
reports went sometimes far beyond normal relief work. Nansen saw the children and
young people among the refugees “as soldiers in the economic army designed for the
work of reconstruction” of Russia. The young people should be cared for and educated.
When the time was right, they should be helped to return to Russia.19   When Nansen
was dealing with the masses of Russian refugees at Constantinople, he probably
14 See e.g. OJ, Vol 1, March-April 1921, 152-153
15 Erich 1926, 176
16 Leitzinger II, 172
17 OJ, Vol 1, March-April 1921, 152
18 Skran, 288
19 OJ, 3rd year, No 4, April 1922, 338-339
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exceeded his mandate. He had been appointed to deal with the legal protection,
repatriation, and employment of Russian refugees which sounded nonsense to his ears
when people were actually starving.20
As shown, there were certain gaps between the jurisdiction and the timing of the
political organs of the League.21  The consequences were obvious. The collective
action which took place under such circumstances showed the weaknesses of
improvisation. There was the evident risk of making serious mistakes. The personnel
had to be appointed in hasty situations. Sometimes the people in the field or in the
headquarters were simply not able to accomplish what was expected.22   Nansen,
Thomas, and their staffs provided policy-makers with options that became the fuel for
political debates and bureaucratic actions within governments. In doing so, they
deviously combined national interests with their own humanitarian goals and convinced
the Great Powers to do something that they otherwise would not have done.23
Policy guidelines are, in general, developed by a community to clarify principles and
describe best practices.  Policies and guidelines are intended to reflect the consensus
of the community. Policies have wide acceptance among editors and describe
standards that all users should normally follow. Research literature has even seen the
refugee situation and the remedy to it in simplified terms, familiar to us from the
medical science: first there is a diagnosis, followed by a prescription, and the work is
finalized by a policy formulation.24   This will be followed by the guidelines and the
management phase.25
There was a constant debate on the widely supported best practices for the refugee
work throughout the Inter-war period. The biggest difficulty in setting guidelines for
refugee work at any given moment is that no two refugees and no two refugee
situations will ever be the same. Some principles may be available, but these will not
necessarily support useful conclusions resulting in solutions.26  The Secretariat of the
20 Skran, 186
21 See Chapter 1.3.
22 Bourquin, 43
23 Skran, 183
24 Morris, Eric and Stedman, Stephen John: Protracted refugee situations and security: The need for better
diagnosis and prescription. (In Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications.
Edited by Gil Loescher, James Milner, Edward Newman and Gary Troeller. United Nations University Press. Hong
Kong 2008, 73
25 see Appendix III; ”Implementation of Integovernmental Refugee Work”
26More about the issue:  Goodwin-Gill, Guy: Voluntary Repatriation: Legal and Policy Issues. Refugees and
International Relations. (ed.by Gil Loescher and Laila Monihan. Oxford University Press, New York 1989, 283
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League provided leadership by developing some innovations leading to proposals that
would be acceptable to governments. In practice, that meant watering down the
solutions. The proposals asking for limited commitment were easier to adopt.27
Nevertheless, diligent and regular work was carried out to establish the guidelines
during the entire decade.
One of the most comprehensive principles of the work was that there is always a
distinction between a) political and legal protection of the refugees on the one hand
and, b) humanitarian work on the other. This distinction could not always be
maintained, especially during the period of Nansen Office, which had to intervene in
capitals through its representatives, the resource that the League was lacking.28
As a demonstration of the initiative of the League, the Council requested the
Secretariat to transmit the recommendations of the first Conference on Refugee
matters in August 1921 to all Members of the LON, and recommended that each of the
Members should consider whether it was possible to adopt the proposals, especially
those concerning passports. These recommendations were supposed to be
communicated also to the States which were not Members of the League of Nations.29
The Council was active from the beginning. The League’s Assembly did not concern
itself much with the refugee questions. It took, however, some actions in a form of
annual resolutions e.g. concerning the question of states punishing refugees for illegal
entry and residence, which forced them to move again towards neighboring countries30.
There are some indications that even the Assembly occasionally gave instructions to
the High Commissioner. An example of this was the precaution stating that the High
Commissioner should not embark on any initiation with regard to any scheme for
establishment or colonization without the agreement of the Government concerned.
Further, the High Commissioner should only carry on negotiations with the
Governments of the countries of refuge.31 Sounds self-evident, but it must be kept in
mind that the construction and the working methods of the Assembly made the
processing of the resolutions very cumbersome. After reaching a consensus, the
unanimously adopted documents may sound even frustratingly non-informative and
meaningless.
27 Skran, 99
28 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 363
29 OJ, Vol 3, Dec 1921, 1116
30 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 364
31 The League from year to year (1936). Information Section.  League of Nations, Geneva, 234
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Three norms were prevailing in the international refugee regime during the Inter-war
period: asylum, assistance, and burden-sharing. The asylum norm was the most
ancient of these and had already a long history in both state practice and international
law. The assistance norm gave states an obligation to help refugees because of their
desperate position. The burden-sharing norm posed guidelines on the financial
obligations towards refugees. The deliberations in the League stressed the importance
of burden-sharing, maintaining that the solution to the refugee problem required close
cooperation between the members and non-members of the League.32
John Hope Simpson has summarized the principles laid down directly or indirectly
when Nansen was appointed High Commissioner in 1921. They were followed faithfully
for the entire existence of the League. Four main principles can be identified and
separated from the mass of resolutions and other declarations.
The principles were:
-The League took responsibility for protection of certain groups of refugees only.
There was never serious official support for suggestions to extend the League
protection to all categories of refugees
-The obligations of the League were temporary and were due to be terminated at a
given point
-The funds commissioned by the League could be used only for administrative
expenses of the Central Office (High Commissioner) and in some cases for local
offices
-The organizations attached to the League were expected to coordinate relief and
settlement efforts, but League funds could not be spend for such purposes.33
Support to Nansen was tentative, and so was his mandate. He was given only
administrative capacity and support by the League; NGOs provided the personnel and
material needed for assistance.34 This was the premise as well as the consequence in
the same package. Nansen was an idealist. He was not chosen to his position by
chance – he was known of his stamina and determination. Those who recommended
him and persuaded him personally certainly nourished the hope that Nansen would be
the one who could accomplish the job if it could be managed and accomplished at all.
Peace was always in mind when deliberations took place in the League. In 1926 the
Council adopted a resolution concerning the assistance to Bulgarian Refugees. In that
32 Skran, 68-71
33 See Simpson 1939, 192-197 and Grahl-Madsen 1983, 366
34 Joly, 7
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connection the Rapporteur added to the discussion after the adoption of the document
that the successful solution to the refugee problem in Bulgaria would add one of the
finest jewels that the LON could put into its crown and would certainly have a beneficial
effect on the maintenance of the peace in the Balkans.35
The refugee organs were constantly reminded of the cross cutting principles. The
Advisory Commission to the High Commissioner for Refugees set up by the invitation
of the Assembly stressed in its first report on 12.6.1929 the importance of the idea that
the refugee work of the League should only be considered as temporary.  It should not
be prolonged indefinitely, and it should be brought to a final conclusion. The
Commission’s report further made a certain number of recommendations with regard to
the measures to be taken for the continuation and the liquidation of the refugee work
under satisfactory conditions.36
The Advisory Commission recognized in its report the impossibility of a radical
solution. This expression referred to three models of final solution which had been
contemplated by the League during its refugee work activities. The three had been the
guiding principles for the whole work. They were: a) Naturalization of refugees. The
Commission noted with satisfaction the generous reception afforded by various
countries to the requests for naturalization of refugees. b) Recovery by refugees of the
nationality of their country of origin. c) Return of refugees to their country of origin.37  It
was softly admitted that none of these worked really effectively.
Refugee work was definitely seen as a process. An essential part of it was
networking. Nansen was a champion in this respect. His activism was at least
sometimes productive. That is merely the reason how he gained his success and
reputation. The validity of these skills as powerful lobbying tools became demonstrated
in case of the 1928 arrangement and recommendation.38  Yet the significance did not
show itself until after a longer period of time. If the comments were not properly
adopted and ratified in the member states and other parties of the agreement, they
were without practical value. On the other hand, some countries may have followed the
letter of recommendations without a formal ratification.
The recommendations of the Governing Body of the High Commissioner, which
were made in 1930, were not enforced or implemented by any diplomatic instrument.
They had no binding force either. They were simply recommendations of practice to the
35 Minutes of the 41. Session of the Council of the LON (2.-7-9-1926)/ OJ, 7th year, No 10, Oct 1926, 1246
36 Minutes of the 55. Session of the Council of the LON (10.-15.6.1929)/ OJ, 10th year, No 7, July 1929, 984
37 Minutes of the 55. Session of the Council of the LON (10.-15.6.1929)/ OJ, 10th year, No 7, July 1929, 1078
38 See Chapter 3.3.4. and Bentwich 1935, 117
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state authorities concerned. That character applied equally to the most important
features of the existence of the refugees. These were the proposals concerning permits
of residence and permits of work which were required in several countries.39  A general
remark is that through the existence of the intergovernmental refugee regime, agencies
had to turn to the Council and Assembly of the League for money and political support,
and to the Secretariat for proficiency. The Council was a great platform and an
opportunity for involvement in refugee issues for the permanent members of it.40
The practical recommendations also consisted of pleas urging e.g. that states
should not expel refugees from their territory before it was ascertained that they have
been permitted to enter another country.  Intergovernmental bodies were seen as a
platform of persuasion and consultation by many governments. One side of the value
of the League organizations was merely that they could convey information and
knowledge through government delegates to the government offices on specific
matters.41
 3.1.2. The ILO’s Competence and Restrictions
It was self-evident that the League was intervening in the refugee problems,
although some voices of opposition were also heard. Less clear is, how and why the
ILO got involved. At first sight, the ILO doesn’t seem to be the international body that
comes first in mind when we are talking about refugees. In order to understand this, a
brief glance to the history and background of the organization is needed. By doing that,
it is actually possible to find logical grounds for the work. The general principles of the
organization also reveal something about the motivations of the ILO. The competence
and the capacity can be derived indirectly from those foundations.
The initial motivation for the existence of the Labour Organization was humanitarian.
The bad condition of workers was becoming less acceptable. The workers were more
numerous and exploited with no consideration for their health, their family lives, and
their advancement. This preoccupation appears clearly in the Preamble of the
Constitution of the ILO, where it is stated: "conditions of labour exist involving ...
injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people."
39 Bentwich 1935, 127
40 Skran, 76
41 Bentwich 1935, 127
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The second corner stone was political. Without an improvement in their condition,
the workers, whose numbers were ever increasing as a result of industrialization, would
create social unrest, even revolution. The Preamble notes that injustice produces
"unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled."
The third premise was economic. Because of its inevitable effect on the cost of
production, any industry or country adopting social reform would find itself at a
disadvantageous compared to its competitors. The Preamble states that "the failure of
any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other
nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries."
A further reason for the creation of the International Labour Organization was added
by the participants of the Peace Conference, linked to the war to which workers had
contributed significantly both on the battlefield and in industry. This idea appears at the
very beginning of the Constitution: "universal and lasting peace can be established only
if it is based upon social justice."
In 1926, an important innovation was introduced when the International Labour
Conference set up a supervisory system on the application of its standards. The ILO
created a Committee of Experts composed of independent jurists responsible for
examining government reports and presenting its own report each year to the
Conference. This kind of mechanism was most definitely considered as an asset while
estimating the competence of the ILO for the refugee work.42
As it became obvious that the tasks of assisting the refugees in Europe were
beyond the resources of the Red Cross and other voluntary organizations, the League
and the ILO were invited to participate. The League responded positively, and so did
the ILO. The ICRC approached the ILO for the first time already at the end of 1920.43
The Governing Body of the ILO had the matter on the agenda in its sixth meeting. The
proposal made by the ICRC was well itemized and contained three parts. The first one
was the competent help of the ILO in creating an Emigration Office which, in turn,
should make surveys on which countries could be able and willing to receive refugees
capable to work. Another item was the establishment of labour exchange services in
Eastern Europe. The third one was the coordination of the work of the private
42 All these principles are well described e.g. by Anthony Alcock in his book; they can also be found on any
website presenting the principles of the ILO
43 OB, Vol 3, 1921, 547
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organizations in the field of international labour questions as far as refugees were
concerned.44
The initial discussion reflected the trends for the whole Inter-war period: Director
General Albert Thomas pointed out that the organization did not have funds for the
activities described in the proposal. The president of the GB Arthur Fontaine (also a
Frenchman) reminded, however, that these activities would not require funds, since the
purpose was only to coordinate and supervise the work of others. The representative of
Poland was very much in favour of accepting the proposal, since Poland was suffering
immensely from the huge emigration of Russian refugees. He pointed out that the
proposal should have been more carefully defined.45  This address very well
manifested the attitude of the entire discussion: favourable in principle, but hesitant.
The outcome of the initial deliberation was that the first and the third item could be
adopted easily, but establishing a labour exchange service was beyond the (financial)
capacity of the organization, because it would mean practical field work and require
money.46  As a result of the proceedings, a resolution was adopted. According to that,
the International Labour Office was called upon to provide informative aid for the
alleviation of the unemployment among the refugees as well as technical assistance in
establishing an Emigration Office. It was clearly defined that the executor of this
operation was Director General Albert Thomas.47  It must be kept in mind, that the
refugee organization of the League was then only at its planning phase.
The three items all got reservations; the ILO could not take the main responsibility of
the establishment of the Emigration Office or the operations of it. The labour exchange
was not realistic and the coordination activities could be continued only until the system
was operational on its own.48
Director General Albert Thomas, later recognized as a full-hearted advocate for
refugees, appealed to the meeting by stating that according to the Constitution of the
ILO incorporated to the Peace Treaty of the First World War, the organization was
responsible for the protection of foreign labour force and thus must respond to the
44 Minutes of the 6. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1921, 51
45 Minutes of the 6. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1921, 19-20
46 OB, Vol 3, 1921, 547; Minutes of the 6. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1921, 51
47 Minutes of the 6. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1921, 20
48 Minutes of the 6. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1921, 51; OB, Vol3, 1921, 103
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appeal of the Red Cross.49 This was well in line with one of the basic tasks of the ILO
which was to advocate sufficient income and decent living of workers, including
foreigners.50  The international regulation of labour conditions and position of workers
should be developed according to same principles as national legislations.51  It was
obviously assumed that international regulation and agreements were the best ways to
help the refugees in their new home countries.
In the beginning the talks within the ILO concerned only Russian refugees. The
countries which had formed the ILO had their suspicions on the Bolshevik government
and the feeling was definitely mutual.52  It was clear that western powers considered
the Russian refugee problem a product of the Bolsheviks. At the end of 1921, Nansen
made a proposal on cooperation to the Labour Organization. Nansen pointed out in his
memorandum that many of the Russian refugees were not capable for physical labour,
and therefore remained unemployed. Those who were able to work had previously
been employed mostly in agriculture. International Labour Conference had the matter
on the agenda of its 3rd meeting. The Conference decided to make an appeal to
Governments of the countries which could have agricultural jobs available.53
The international refugee conference held in Geneva in August 1921 gathered up
representatives of governments, NGOs as well as the ILO. The resolution of the
conference called the High Commissioner together with the Labour Office to collect
data on refugees, classify and process it into a useful form, as well as use it for
alleviating the problematic employment situation of the refugees.54  The International
Labour Office soon after this conducted some statistical operations among the
refugees. Besides the above mentioned, the Office also listed facts on the treatment of
the refugees in different countries.55  That can be considered a remarkable
achievement from the organization which was just established and struggling with
matters of principle of its work and existence.56
49 OB, Vol 3, 1921, 103; Reference to the principles and obligations, see Alcock, 34-35
50 See also de Lusignan, 67-75; Alcock, 35
51 Mahaim, 4-5
52 Osakwe, 67
53 Records of Proceedings of the 3. Session of the ILC, 1921, 830-831
54 OB, Vol 4, 1921, 198-199
55 Simpson 1939, 194; Stoessinger 1956, 16
56 For this see Alcock, 49-66
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In 1921 when ILO still was without any merits, it was considered useful and
profitable for the organization to participate in the international refugee work together
with governments.57 Another internal motivation was that the ILO was the only
international organization representing all possible levels and classes of societies.58
Albert Thomas wished a designated paragraph concerning refugee work to be
added into one of the Council’s resolutions in of 1925. That was necessary, according
to Thomas, for the following reasons: Although the universal character of the ILO was
well known and it was ready to deal with any questions entrusted to it, its competence
was nevertheless limited. The Governing Body had again emphasized this position
during the previous year. The ILO had been given the authority to deal with the
questions of settling the Russian and Armenian Refugees. Nevertheless, certain
political questions were outside its competence, and the Governing Body made it clear
as their interpretation that such questions were outside the sphere of the Labour Office.
In the final resolution it was stated, that as certain questions, especially the passports,
had not been transferred to the ILO, the Council should authorize the High
Commissioner to take necessary steps for summoning of an inter-governmental
conference in order to improve the system of identity certificates for refugees, as well
as to create and administrate a revolving fund (for resettlement of refugees).59
When the ILO was carrying the main responsibility for the international refugee work
through the Refugee Service, the motivation seemed to be dual. On the one hand, the
ILO had special competence for successful handling of the problems connected to
employment and settlement. On the other hand, the Organization also had a
responsibility to protect the rights of national workers against unplanned and
uncontrolled immigration of foreign workers.60  The background thinking obviously was
that when the foreign workers satisfy themselves with lesser benefits, it inevitably
affects the conditions of other workers.
It can be read in ILOs documents that there were worries about the refugees getting
at the mercy of private employment exchanges and other even more suspicious
entrepreneurship.61  The overall motivation must have been to encourage the refugees
57 Minutes of the 6. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1921, 51
58 Records of Proceedings of the 4. Session of the ILC, 1922, 420
59 Minutes of the 35. Session of the Council of the LON (2.-28.9.1925)/ OJ, 6th year, No 10, Oct 1925, 1401-1402
60 Minutes of the 39. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 342
61 Records of Proceedings of the 11. Session of the ILC, 1928, 201
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to become valuable individuals rather than burdens in their new societies.62 Again, all
this comes down to the basic principles of the ILO as outlined in the Constitution.
In the package of the League system the tasks and obligations for the ILO were
much narrower than those of the League itself. The mission was to concentrate on
social and economic questions. This could also be described as a division of duties
between the two world organizations. The League undertook some projects concerning
the countries of departure of the refugees, although these projects were motivated in
various other ways as well. During the 1920s, the relationship to the Soviet-Russia was
very problematic. The connections to the Nazi-Germany came to the picture in the
1930s.63
The refugee problems of the time were connected to political and armed conflicts.
The flows of refugees developed sometimes suddenly, and their management required
high-grade international preparedness and considerable resources. The League was
considered to be the right institution. There was automatically a connection to the ILO
since it was an integral part of the system. The ILO was not supposed to participate in
political deliberations according to its initial ideas and the constitution of it. In this
respect, the position of the Labour Organization was a bit more complicated than the
status of the League itself. The fact was, however, that these matters came inevitably
to the attention of the ILO in any case.64
The most prominent inconvenience for the ILO was the attitude of the workers of the
recipient countries towards the refugees. Sometimes they were experienced as
competitors in the labour market. Questions were asked in the ILO bodies whether it
would create even antipathy against the ILO among the workers of the recipient
countries, if the organization continues its resettlement activities.65  This materialized
mostly in France, which had a tradition of strong labour movement and was the biggest
recipient of refugees in the 1920s. The French workers representative Leon Jouhaux
emphasized that it had always been necessary to negotiate with the trade unions
before providing jobs for refugees.66 There is, however, no evidence according to the
source material, that the workers’ groups inside the ILO would have opposed the
resettlement and employment operations more than other groups. In fact, it was the
62 E.g. Minutes of the 24. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1924, 330
63 Here, see e.g. Walters, 255-260
64 Landelius, 104-120
65 Minutes of the 40. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 416
66 Minutes of the 40. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 417
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employers’ group that expressed some doubts when the responsibilities of the Refugee
Service were discussed as a part of the transfer of duties of the High Commissioner to
the ILO in 1924.67
In practical terms, the workers and the employers could best advocate their interests
in the Governing Body, since the countries were not represented by complete tripartite
delegations as they were in the Labour Conference.  Thus the national interest was not
so imminent. The employers’ group for example appeared unified when the discussions
on shortening the working time was discussed.68  It must be said however, that the
attitudes of the groups on refugee questions don’t reveal themselves easily on the
basis of the source material available.
The internal disagreements came up sometimes in the Governing Body by taking a
form of discussion on division of duties of different bodies of the ILO. The advocates of
the refugee work referred to the constitution incorporated in the Peace Treaty.
According to certain statutes, the International Labour Conference can define specific
tasks for the Labour Office.69  The definition of duties was quite clear when it came
down to the “ordinary” tasks of the ILO.70  Refugee work was obviously considered to
be something out of that range, since it invoked feelings and intensive debates.
It was also argued that the work on behalf of refugees was executive work which
was against the spirit of the Constitution of the ILO.71  Director General Albert Thomas
counterargued that there was nothing in the Constitution that would forbid executive
work. Besides, the refugee work was not executive work by its nature, but rather
administrative and coordinating.72  There was no evidence, according to Thomas, that
the League of Nations would have any more executive power than the ILO. Further to
him, another wording should be used when talking about the practical refugee work.73
By these examples one can notice that the discussion sometimes took peculiar lines,
which were perhaps out of proportion as well as difficult to follow.
Albert Thomas sometimes had to put all his prestige and authority on the table while
advocating the continuation of the work on behalf of refugees. It seems that many
individuals in the Governing Body, as well as in other institutions of the organization,
had difficulties in living with these inaccuracies in the profile of the ILO.
67 Minutes of the 24. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1924, 331
68 Alcock, 51
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71 Minutes of the 23. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1924, 258
72 Minutes of the 23. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1924, 263
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When the Refugee Service was incorporated to the ILO, the funds of it were not
integrated with organization’s normal budget.74  At the end of its existence, there were
proposal to extend the budgetary periods of the Refugee Service, which is difficult to
understand since the mandate was coming to its end.75  Great anxiety was experienced
when the discussion turned into the division of labour between the High Commissioner
and the Refugee Service of the ILO. It was strongly argued that the political and
economic aspects of the work belonged exclusively to the High Commissioner.76  Some
speakers warned the Labour Office to undertake “…responsibilities which might be of a
dangerous character”.77
Despite the prevailing hesitation, the advocates of the refugee work had their voice
heard. In fact, it all came down to the conclusion that the ILO was after all the best and
the most competent international body to tackle the problems. Albert Thomas was in
the opinion that as the ILO was a part of the League system, it could not reject the
cooperation on refugees.78  The competence of the Labour Office was evaluated not
only by the ILO itself, but by the LON as well.
The selection of the target groups of the refugee work of the ILO was done in
collaboration with the League organs. As the focus groups of the refugees
(“nationalities”) of the Refugee Service were fixed, the Director General expressed as
his opinion that selecting or including any new groups would be a political matter, and
thus beyond the competence and capacity of the Governing Body of the ILO.79  At this
point (1927) there was no imminent crisis in sight which would compel the
organizations to take actions on behalf of any new refugee groups.
The ILO didn’t want to entangle the funds of the Refugee service with the regular
budget of the organization. The underlying philosophy here was that the refugee
activities were temporary, extraordinary, and additional. Also towards the end of the
original mandate of the Refugee Service there were opinions that refugee work was
always political by nature and thus unsuitable for the ILO.80  In the internal discussions
of the ILO, the passport issue was considered a political activity which should be
74 Minutes of the 35. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1927, 175
75 Minutes of the 38. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 66-67
76 ibid.
77 Minutes of the 38. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 176
78 Minutes of the 23. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1924, 259; Minutes of the 43. Session of the GB of the ILO,
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avoided.81  It was seen as the liability of the High Commissioner exclusively. In 1925
Nansen called an international refugee conference with passport matters on the
agenda. In the Governing Body this provoked again a debate on the possible political
nature of the work.82
The British and the Canadian Governments seemed to have the most dubious
attitudes on the refugee work conducted by the ILO. They sometimes were in
confrontation with the Director General Thomas. In the Governing Body, the British
Government even demanded the termination of the refugee work.83  For  the  British
Government, Mr. Thomas sometimes appeared to be too anxious to continue and even
expand the work. Sometimes these fears have probably been somewhat justified.84
The British Government argued that the work had lost its temporary nature, and that
the Refugee Service had to be subordinated more closely to the Governing Body.85
This would have had, of course, secured a better supervision of the work.
There were scenarios in 1926 on the establishment of a permanent Migration
Service, with refugees as one of the target groups. Mr. Thomas had his role on the
background of the scheme. At least British and Canadian Governments were against
the involvement of the ILO. The representative of Canadian Government, Mr. Riddell
was upset because in his mind, Canada had been made a scapegoat for the
unsuccessfulness of the attempt to establish the Service, although many others had
resisted it as well.86
The attitude of different nations and states can be followed better through the
documents of Labour Conference, since the tripartite system formed by governments,
employers and workers was less prevailing there than in the Governing Body. In 1925-
1926 the German and Austrian delegations required actions by the refugee
organizations. The requirement was rejected by coexistent procedure by the countries
of the British Empire.87 The situation was indeed the opposite during the 1930s, when
the organizations were acting for the benefit of the refugees coming from Germany.
The original idea of the ILO included the advocacy of the position of the working
people at an international level. Therefore it was only natural that the matters
connected to employment and working in general were close to the ILO’s competence.
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Already in the beginning of 1921 Director General Albert Thomas was authorized to
approach governments on behalf of the ILO in an attempt to contribute to the
employment of Russian Refugees in Eastern Europe.88  Nansen needed the help of the
Labour Office right from the beginning of his duties. In practice, the Labour Office
provided the High Commissioner with reports and statistics concerning employment
exchange services and employment in general. The services of the Labour Office also
included contacts with the countries in Latin America to explore the possibilities there.89
ILO conducted census and prepared different types of statistics during its first year
of active existence. Refugees were classified by their professions and their present
countries of residence. This was to help the Office and the High Commissioner to
conduct proper planning for the future actions on employment.90  Thomas and Nansen
had shared views and one of the schemes they were working on was the plan to
resettle Armenians close to their original home. They formed a delegation to negotiate
with the Soviet authorities on this.91The consultations didn’t lead into any visible or
permanent results.92  The biggest colonization schemes were made for Americas.93
That continent was receiving great numbers of emigrants during the period and it was
thought that there was plenty of room for the refugees as well. The ILO had broad
contacts which could be naturally utilized in resettlement plans for refugees.
The relation to the passport system created by the High Commissioner was
problematic to the ILO. The organization was supposed to keep out of politics. The
Polish Government threatened to expel all refugees without the Nansen Passport after
15.4.1923. Labour Office noticed the matter, but nothing could be done.94  The painful
contradiction was that it was reportedly very difficult for the refugees to get employed
without this precious and well recognized document.95
Avoiding political deliberations led to situation where the non-political nature of the
activities was knowingly emphasized. In those circumstances the ILO highlighted the
technical nature of its work. The wording “technical assistance“ was regularized in the
deliberations of the ILO. Normally technical assistance means help provided by experts
and special advisors to developing countries and systems. In case of ILO the specific
88 Minutes of the 12. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1922, 179
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meaning was also the assistance given to governments in their processing of national
legislation on some of the sectors of the ILO competence. Many states created their
social security system with the help of the ILO after the First World War.96
The use of the term was not well established during the Inter-war period. The
meaning and the significance of the term have been regularized only during later
decades.97 The term also seems to have somewhat different connotations in different
languages.98  While planning the structure of the Refugee Service before the mid-
1920s, the technical nature of its duties was emphasized in several connections. In the
terminology of the Labour Organization, ”technical assistance” has an essential role. It
describes the refugee work in practice. It reflects the possibilities and the tools that the
ILO had, since the Labour Organization had a tradition of technical service from its
creation, and assistance was rendered in many fields of the competence of the ILO.
When the Refugee Service was established, it was agreed that its main tasks would
be investigation, coordination, and information on a) employment offers made to
refugees b) conditions where the refugees could benefit from those and c) estimating
how large amount of refugees can be employed. It was clearly noted that the expenses
of travelling of the refugees cannot be paid and immediate humanitarian help cannot be
provided.99
Technical assistance was in most cases channeled through, or in connection with,
other organizations providing refugee relief. The working field was diverse, but when it
comes down to the basics, the activities can be divided in two main categories:  The
first one is statistical services and support services for measures aiming at employment
of refugees.  The second one is more far reaching international arrangements and
projects aiming at the resettlement of the refugees. These two targets were most often
overlapping and interdependent.
In the modern refugee aid contexts technical assistance is specifically connected to
practical humanitarian help. In this sense, the expression has totally changed its
meaning. In the handlings of the ILO the term “technical assistance” was particularly
used in a sense which would explicitly exclude all emergency relief and humanitarian
work.  In modern development cooperation the term is used very much in the same
manner as it was used by the ILO during the Inter-war period. It is used to express the
idea that a partnership should exist between donors and recipients, rather than the
96 Alcock, 134-150
97 Alcock, 209-234
98 Engl. technical assistance or technical services; French Tache technique, swed. Teknisk Bistånd
99 OB, Vol. 9, 1924, 201-202
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traditional situation in which the relationship was dominated by the wealth and
specialized knowledge of one side.
The ILO has provided technical assistance in the field of migration questions
throughout its existence.100  The Labour Office has conducted remarkable work in this
sector and it can be assumed that parts of the benefits of the work have directed
themselves to the refugees as well. This form of technical assistance was especially
substantial during the period of the Refugee Service of the ILO.101 The ILO also
provided technical assistance for the preparations of international agreements.
According to some interpretations within the ILO itself, contributing to the
employment of refugees was technical by nature as such. In some connections,
however, this concept seems to have been split; there were also discussions about the
technical components in these activities.102   It is obvious that this terminology was not
well established during the reference period as it is today.103  Although it is almost
impossible to separate politics and technicalities, emphasizing the technical nature of
the work in the public discussions was considered to provide justification for the
refugee activities of the Labour Organization.
The research has in many connections expressed that it was Nansen in his capacity
as the High Commissioner, who approached the ILO and gave impetus to the refugee
work of the organization.104  It is evident, however, that the refugee problem was
recognized in the ILO even before the assignment of the High Commissioner. The
representative of the Polish Government brought forward his concerns in the
Governing Body on the situation in the countries neighbouring Russia in 1921.105
Poland suffered from the problem immensely, and it had just been in an armed conflict
with the Soviet-Russia. The Polish Government took also later part in the discussion in
connection with the Jewish populations. At that time, the attempts to establish a
migration service in Eastern Europe were on the agenda.106  In 1922 the Foreign
Minister of Czechoslovakia appealed to the ILO, claiming that the members of the
100 Alcock, 209-234
101 Simpson 1939, 204-205
102 Records of the Proceedings of the 12. Session of the ILC, 1929, 219
103 Alcock, 209-234
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Labour Organization were under an obligation to share the responsibility of the burden
caused by the large numbers of refugees.107
The role of Albert Thomas has been emphasized by many. He had indeed travelled
in Russia, as well as in the neighbouring countries. He reportedly wanted the Soviet
Government to join the work of the ILO.108  This ambition didn’t, however, materialize in
the case of the Labour Organization, as it later did in the case on LON. Thomas was a
trade union man, characterized as a reformist socialist.109   He shared the opinion of
many other ILO’s leaders that the working class in Western countries had unrealistic
impressions on the Russian revolution and its results and thus the conditions of the
workers in the Soviet State. This was seen to have a negative impact to the sentiments
of the working class in the West. Thomas himself reportedly didn’t have any illusions on
the real state of affairs.110
The flows of refugees from Russia were an excellent opportunity for the critics of the
socialism to start to demonstrate that the result of the revolution were not exclusively
positive. The Labour Office made constant surveys on the conditions in Russia. A
designated Russian Service was established for collecting and analyzing material as
well as for communication. The material produced by this Body was often quite hostile
towards the Soviet Government. The material was partly gathered from refugees.111
The refugee work conducted by the ILO had also reportedly some very concrete
consequences. It has been calculated that some 60.000 refugees were able to find
employment during the period of 1924-28 as a result of the efforts of the Labour
Office.112
107 Minutes of the 12. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1922, 190-191
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109 Fine, 545-558
110 ILO and the First Year of its Work. Geneva 1921, 22
111 Varis, 62-66
112 Tortora, 84
125
3.2. Organizing and Funding according to arising Challenges
               3.2.1. Millions of Refugees; Different Premises but similar Problems
The background and real impetus for the creation of refugee protection system were
constituted by the refugee problems. In this respect, the 1920s was a unique era in the
history of Europe with the mass movements of homeless people. It all begun from
worries about the huge amounts of Russians crossing the borders, and soon it was
realized that there were even millions more, representing a variety on nationalities.
There were Russian refugee movements even long before the First World War and
the revolution. Before the war, it was the opponents of the czarist regime who were
fleeing. After the war, the situation went upside down. Being a member  of the old
regime or a supporter of the Czar could be life dangerous after the revolution.113  In
Russia, travelling and travel arrangements has traditionally been complicated, both for
Russians and for foreigners. During the era of the Imperial Russia, it was almost
impossible to travel completely legally to the country or from it. Heavy corruption was
always involved.114  And yet, the Russian refugees formed the most remarkable
international immigration problem politically as well as quantitatively.
The mass emigration from Russia took place during several years in 1918-22. The
movement started already during the war. The revolution and the separate peace
caused the most important impetus for the big refugee movements. It could be
summarized that the Russians were driven out of the country by the revolution as well
as by the counter-revolution. The motives for the movements were various, concern
about personal security being the common nominator. Three main causes for the White
Russian refugee movement have been presented by the researchers of this migration
movement. The process started with the overthrow of the Czarist regime and the
establishment of the Bolshevist rule in 1918. It continued when the White armies
collapsed in European Russia in 1919-20 and in Siberia in1920-22. The gravest single
catastrophe was the famine in 1921.115
After the movements which overthrew the Romanov Dynasty in 1917, Russia was
plunged into civil war. As a result, the Russians started to flow to neighboring countries
113 Nevalainen, 16
114 Leitzinger I, 17
115 Schaufuss, 45
126
soon after that. By that time, the Finnish Government also started issuing visas for the
people who came116. One third of the comers crossed the border without any
permission. In 1919 there were already over 15.000 Russian refugees in Finland. In the
beginning, the comers obviously didn’t have to leave in a rush. They had assets with
them, since it was reported that the refugees were filling all hotels in the big cities.117
There were also mass transportations of people wanting to leave Russia. Best
known is the one carried out in 1920 when General Wrangel and his supporters left
Crimea and were transported to Turkey.   Most of the refugees wanted to go west. For
some people this was not possible, and in China the were 200.000 Russians by the
end of 1922, most of them in Harbin and Shanghai.118
The refugees came from all ranks of the society. Politicians and civil servants fled
because they felt that they have their own reasons to do so.  Land owners and other
people with economic wealth had other reasons. Representatives of the military had
probably the most life threatenig circumstances.  Many poor people left Russia with no
other specific reason than a hope for better. The people who were living in other
countries formed a cross-section of the Russian society, although the educated were
over-represented in this respect. The only unifying thing was their personal history in
the Russian Empire.119  Most of the refugees were russians by their internal nationality.
Many descendants of germans, polish, baltic, and others who had moved to Russia
during the previous centuries, were now fleeing to west. There were large numbers of
ukrainians, caucasians, cossacks, as well as jewish. In some cases a “Russian
refugee” could be a moslem who spoke no word of the russian language.120
The lives of Czar’s family and their court were also in danger as it became clear that
the Bolsheviks would eventually take over the whole country.  Aristocracy and land
owners were targeted by the Bolshevist terror. However, peasant class formed at the
end of the day the majority of the Russian refugees, since they formed the bulk of the
soldiers in the White armies. Therefore, all ranks of the society were represented in the
masses of refugees that crossed the Russian borders. The upper classes attracted the
most of the attention of public opinion in Europe because of their qualities and abilities.
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The famous Russian intelligentsia was more visible than could have been expected by
their numbers.121
It seems that the remaining prisoners of war, Russian troops captured in Europe,
were classified as refugees at the point when it became obvious that there was no
returning to their ancient homeland after the revolution took place. An Arrangement of
May 1926 laid down a definition of Russian refugees which was also adopted by the
LON and the ILO.122
When the establishment of the High Commission for Refugees was under
preparation in the League, the Council received letters from member state
governments as statements on the proposal concerning the intended Commissioner. It
was not surprising that the member states neighboring Russia were the most eager
ones to send replies. They also were in favor of the suggestion that something must be
done quickly and that an intergovernmental intervention was the best option. Same
applied to the countries like France which had received Russian refugees in large
quantities.123 The most remarkable geographical channels for fleeing were the regions
of Crimea and Odessa as well as the Baltic district.
It is unclear how many refugees came from Russia during the period between the
world wars.  The estimates have been moving between one million and three millions.
Registration and census were impossible in most of the countries receiving refugees.
Some returned, some traveled on rather quickly. People got naturalized and a few went
hiding.124 The number of people who were classified as ”Russian refugees” was
declining over the years. There were some natural reasons for that: Soviet Russia had
more or less closed its borders which made it impossible for any new groups of people
to become refugees.  Also the mortality among the Russians staying abroad was high
on relation to the birth rate.125
There is no exact truth on the amounts of the refugees even after decades of
research. The numbers depend on which people were classified as refugees and also
on the schedule and volumes of the returning. The most common estimate presented
has been around 1.5 million.126 According to the latest research, the best approximation
121 Simpson 1939, 85
122 See Chapter 3.3.4.
123 OJ, Vol. 2, July-August 1921, 485-509
124 Nevalainen, 34
125 Hansson II
126 Salomon, Robert: Les Réfugiés. Paris 1963, 17; Thompson I, 20; Stoessinger 1956, 13-23; Simpson 1939, 80
128
could be a little over one million.127 The earliest estimate made by a researcher in 1922
resulted to a somewhat greater number, which was almost three million. This contains
also the refugees in China.128  According to compilation based on different works of
researchers the most credible estimate was between 800.000 and 900.000 refugees in
1922. By 1930 the figure was still as big as around 600.000 people.129
The Soviet Russian Government gave a statute in December 1921 which ordered a
loss of the Soviet citizenship for those who had been staying abroad without a passport
for five years, unless they register themselves at a Soviet Embassy 1st July 1922 at the
latest.130  Soviet Government granted several amnesties for those who had fled abroad
as a result of the conflict with the Bolsheviks. Some of the amnesties were more
general, some of them specific, e.g. covering rebel soldiers from Kronstadt. It is not
very clearly known, how many refugees took the chance and went back. From Finland,
the number was probably over 10.000, including the Eastcarelians and Ingrians.131
Not many believed in the stability of the Bolshevik regime in the beginning. As it
started to seem more evident that the Soviet state was a permanent fact, the recipient
countries of the refugees had to face the (for them partly unpleasant) burden of new
comers. The attitudes became harsher. Most of the comers were lacking identity
papers, some had old papers issued by the Czarist regime. It was not an easy duty to
accomodate large numbers of unknown individuals. Many host countries were torn
apart by the war. The best the states could do was to provide humanitarian assistance,
in order to avoid famine among the comers.132
It is very clear that foreign powers wanted to utilize the help and possibilities
provided by the Russian refugees abroad. The goals and purposes were various. Few
refugees were recruited to carry out intelligence missions to Soviet Russia.  These
activities caused constant headache to the leaders of the Kremlin. However, none of
these attempts was well organized or seriously carried out. The Soviet system survived
all these ambitions. These developments increased the distrust between the Soviet
regime and the neighbours. Russian refugees had a number of newspapers and
magazines issued all over Europe. It was calculated that there were 142 publishing
127 See Nevalainen, 34
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enterprizes abroad  concentrating in Russian language products.133 Many of them
reflected the narrow purpose of the publishers, but some were concentrated in
preserving Russian culture in general.  Not many of the papers were able to survive
long.
The terms used were “refugees (coming) from Russia” or “Russian Refugees” in
cases where it was necessary to emphasize the origin of the refugees. When
classification by their language or ethnicity was needed, other terms were used. An
example of this is the classification made by ARC in Finland in 1920: there were
separately named groups as “Ingermanlanders, Carelians and Russians”.134
Apparently, this kind of distinction wasn’t made in many other countries but at least in
Rumania the Ukrainians were classified separately.135  It can be concluded that the
international statistics were compiled according to the information provided by national
authorities. For example in case of Finland, when the source is identified in Simpson’s
survey, it normally is the Finnish Tilastokeskus (Governmental Statistics Centre of
Finland).136
The Finnish government sent a note in the summer of 1921 to the representatives of
the Bolshevik government with a notion that promised amnesty for the returning
refugees has not been implemented. On the contrary, refugees returning from Finland
had been detained in large numbers.137  In 1921 there was a de facto uprising in the
Eastern Carelia. The fighting between the guerilla groups and the army of the
Bolsheviks turned finally to the point where the Carelian fighters had to retreat. The
whole warzone was evacuated, and masses of refugees poured to Finland. In 1922
there were already some 33.000 aliens in Finland, half of which were Russians and
another half Carelians and Ingrians.138
The situation was very different when thousands of refugees from Kronstadt fortress
started to flee suddenly to Finland in March 1921. Those refugees consisted of soldiers
and their families. They had to leave practically with empty hands and the Government
had to take bigger responsibility of servicing them. There were reportedly great
133 Nevalainen, 253
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difficulties in settling these exiles. Only some 1600 people of the 8000 who came,
settled in Finland permanently. Others went back or continued to third countries.139
The specific feature of the emigration to Finland was presented by the people who
spoke languages which could be classified as dialects of the Finnish language. There
were several thousands of Eastcarelian and Ingrian refugees in Finland in the early
1920s. These people came from Russia 1917-1922. For national and cultural reasons,
these comers were registered separately from (ethnic) Russian refugees.140
Altogether, Finland seems to have received some 44.000 exiles from Russia during
1917-1939.141 The biggest individual incident producing refugees was the uprising of
Kronstadt in 1921.142
Number of refugees in Finland 1921-1928143
1921                          no exact data available
1922                           33 500
1923                           22 000
1924                           23 500
1925                           21 500
1926                           19 000
1927                           18 000
1928                           18 000
It was calculated that in early spring 1922, there were 33.500 refugees from Russia
staying in Finland. 15.000 of them were russians and 18.500 other nationalities (mostly
Eastcarelians and Ingrians). Also after that, the flow of refugees from east was
continuous, but there were no mass movements in the late 1920s and the 1930s
anymore.144  The situation was somewhat awkward. Tens of thousands of Russians
were enjoying the hospitality of the neighboring country in Finland. However, it has
been reported that the leaders of the White Russian in exile were not prepared to
recognize the independence of Finland.145  In the 1930s, most of the comers were
those who couldn’t, for a reason or another, settle to the collective agricultural
139 Leitzinger II, 166-167
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141 Nevalainen, 34-35; Leitzinger II, 171
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production system that was established in Russia during those years. These refusals
led normally to a conflict with the Stalin’s regime. After 1935 the flow of refugees was
almost non- existant, due to the intensified border superevision at the Soviet side. Also
most of the “enemies of the nation” had been “taken care of”.146
From 1922 many refugees returned to Russia. Among them the Viena-Carelians
formed a significant group. About 4000 of them were repatriated. In the mid-1920s the
amount of refugees were settled at a certain level. The situation in the Russian side of
the border was stabilized and this was well known among the refugees. Those who
were determined to stay didn’t make any attempts to return.147  Eastcarelians were
more important for Finland when they were fighting against the Soviet regime, and less
important when they were trying to adjust themselves to the life in Finland as
immigrants. The authorities tried to handle the refugee situation with least possible
political and social adverse effects, as well as with minimized amount of publicity.148  It
was reported in some cases, that Russian refugees took advantage of the asylum
granted by the neighbors, and planned, or even tried to carry out armed interventions
to Russia against the Soviet Regime from the foreign soil. This had also consequences
to the official proceedings between the countries.149
The remains of the Turkish Empire were in focus of the world politics even before
the First World War.  The shrinking Ottoman State and the Turkish control over broad
areas was accompanied by uprooting of local populations. During the Greek war of
independence, several incidents led into massive displacement of people. In the 19th
Century Bulgarian revolutionaries as well as peasants from Bosnia and Herzegovina
fled from their domiciles to neighbouring areas. As a result of several border
arrangements, refugees tramped across new jurisdictions in a desperate effort to avoid
random violence. There were, in theory, two separate main lines among the
arrangements: the voluntary moving and the coercive moving. In practice, it is almost
impossible to keep these two lines separated on a researcher’s desk.
The Convention of Adrianople between Turkey and Bulgaria in 1913 has been
named as the first intergovernmental treaty on exchange of populations in modern
history. The objective was to settle the consequences of the refuge of the 50.000 Turks
who left the Bulgarian territory as well as the same number of Bulgarians who moved to
146 Nevalainen, 31-32
147 Nygård 1978, 95;  Nygård 1980, 73
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the opposite direction. The Convention confirmed the situation and provided rules and
procedures to regulate the consequences of what had happened. A Mixed Commission
was established to settle outstanding property claims as well as many other things of
the people who were forced to move.150  A similar treaty was negotiated with the help of
European Powers between Turkey and Greece. The outbreak of the First World War
postponed the implementation these plans.151
The Greeks and the other refugees in the Balkans had a special and different
situation compared to the other categories of refugees. They had new homelands.
They came as refugees, but they came home where they were supposed to be
resettled without having to roam from a country to another country without documents.
They were not in a need for international alien’s documentation. They came to be
assimilated, politically protected, and documented by their new home countries. They
received, however, humanitarian aid for their needs from their home governments, with
the help of the League and the international community.
In the Balkans the First World War finally completed the long disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire, which indeed had represented multiplicity of ethnic, linguistic, and
religious groups in an unusual manner. In that situation, conflicts were inevitable and
extremely violent. As a result, people fled.152  A Convention between Greece and
Bulgaria concerning reciprocal emigration was signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on
November 27, 1919. On the basis of that, a mixed Greco-Bulgarian Emigration
Commission was established under the supervision of the League of Nations to
deliberate and facilitate the reciprocal emigration between the countries. The original
mandate of the Commission was prolonged (for the first time) in July 1922 until October
1923.153
Populations were more or less forcibly resettled in Greece and Turkey under the
Lausanne treaty. Some of these refugee situations have remained as politically open
wounds for decades. The refugee problems described in this chapter offer an example
of post-conflict statebuilding and its connections to forced migration. The disintegration
of the Ottoman Empire forms one of the best examples of the statebuilding and state
formation processes, and, in particular, the creation of nation-states in twentieth-
century Europe. These processes have complicated and often tragic associations with
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forced migration. Through the past hundred years, the creation and consolidation of
states has been closely associated with large numbers of refugees.154
The League received statements of the progress made in the application of the
conventions. Detailed regulations for implementation were required especially as
regards the “former refugees”, whose right to recover their properties was recognized
by the mixed Commission. It was considered necessary to follow spcifically the
legislative measures taken by the respective Governments. Confiscation had taken
place earlier, and compensations were difficult to arrange. The results that were
anticipated from the application of the Convention were diverse: emigration of racial
minorities still remaining, permanent settlement to places where people were
“connected by race”, and to recover lost property or its equivalent value. It was
estimated by the Greco-Bulgarian Commission that the numbers of persons included in
this particular arrangement amounted to 30.000 Greeks and 150.000-200.000
Bulgarians.155
Nansen undertook personally some responsibilities concerning the reciprocal
exchange of ethnic minorities between Greece and Turkey. He had personal
correspondence with the leaders and the governments of both countries, including the
“Commander-in-Chief” Mustapha Kemal in Turkey. Nansen listed questions to be
discussed between the two governments. In the same connection a draft of an
Agreement between the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the
Greek Government was also introduced. The essential idea of the Arrangement was
written in the first paragraph of the Draft: “The High Contracting Parties accord to their
nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities the right to emigrate freely
into their respective territories”.156
The Mixed Greco-Bulgarian Emigration Commission designated by the League
Council was a manifestation of the special nature of the refugee question of the
Balkans. The President of the Commission was Colonel de Reynier.157  In 1925 a
Conciliation Commission for the Greco-Bulgarian frontier was set up under the
authorization of the Council of the League. The Commission consisted of Greek and
Bulgarian military officers as well as others. Two Swedish officers were acting as
neutral partners of the Commission for the years 1925-1927.158  The Mixed
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Commission for Greco-Bulgarian Emigration had some 45.000 cases on its desk. In the
51st Session of the Council it was reported that 34.000 of the cases had been dealt
with. The compensations were based on an Agreement between the Governments,
reached on 31.12.1927.159
Some parallel exercises took place. The Mixed Commission for the Exchange of
Greek and Turkish Populations was in some cases unable to find a solution to the most
difficult problems concerning the interpretation of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.
Therefore, the Council was needed to act as a mediator. What the Council could do in
practice, was to obtain an advisory opinion on the dispute regarding the interpretations
from the Permanent Court of International Justice.160
The Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations gave
periodical reports to the League Council starting in December 1924 as desired by the
Council in October 1924. The reports contained descriptions of internal work of the
Commission, achievements according to the several Articles of the treaties and
conventions, as well as the numerical results of the evacuation activities.161  The
Greek-Turkish Commission continued its work throughout the 1920s. The Council
handled the nomination of a new member to the Commission to fill the post vacant due
to the death of previous member still at the end of 1929. 162
By the Council’s resolution in September 1926, the League noted with satisfaction
the progress being made in the execution of the recommendations which it had given in
December 1925. There was also a wish that the Greek and Bulgarian Governments will
continue to keep the League informed of the progress achieved in this work.163
It was defined that the mandate of the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of
Greek and Turkish Populations covered the compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals
of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals
of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. The practical work of the Mixed
Commission consisted of the supervising and facilitating the emigration, as well as
carrying out the liquidation of certain movable and immovable property. The
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Commission closed its proceedings in October 1934. The Commission prepared its
final report to the League, which was presented to the 84th session of the Council.164
Later, in the 1930s, it was estimated that the machinery of the League worked
helpfully, effectively, and constructively in the populations exchange processes of the
Near East. The governing principle of these migrations was to unify and homogenize
the populations of each country of the Near East, which would tend to promote the
pacification of the region.165  One of the key aspects of post-conflict statebuilding is the
creation and strengthening of political and administrative institutions. In order to
legitimate them locally, statebuilding operations have engaged in constitutional and
institutional design, which sometimes also includes creating political parties. The
capacity building of administration and the holding of elections are similarly sometimes
required.166  This was exactly how things unraveled in supporting the states of Bulgaria
and Greece in the1920s. Both operations had also huge undertakings with new
populations that were called “refugees”. Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria similarly
naturalized the refugees of same ethnic origin rather quickly. Only the task of
resettlement could not be accomplished overnight.167
The problem of the Greek refugees has been best covered among the refugee
movements in the Balkans, both in the field as well as in the research. The Greeks had
formed an upper class among the minorities of Turkey. The position of the Greeks in
Anatolia started to change in the 19th century because of the immodest irredentism of
the newly formed Greek State.168  The final change to the status of the Greeks in
Turkey emerged in 1912-23, when Greece was constantly belligerent. As a result, the
territory of the Greek State was increased. The first exchanges of people took place at
the same time.
In the beginning of the 1920s the Greek State had reached the upper limits of its
strength. Previous sympathy of Western Powers emerged during the fight for the
independence was also fading out. Defeated by the Turkish army, the Greeks had to
face oppression and violence in Anatolia. The Greek population had to flee to Aegean
islands and to continental Greece with all possible means of transportation. The truce
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was concluded in October 1922 and the final peace negotiations were conducted in
Lausanne in 1923.
Between the years 1912 and 1923 Greek State received several waves of refugees
form Anatolia, Macedonia and Thrace. The moving was partly controlled, and partly
uncontrolled.169  In addition to that, Greece received some 55.000 individuals from
Russia during 1919-20, mainly from Caucasia.170  Agreements on population exchange
were established already 1913-1914 between Greece and Turkey. The Treaty of
Neuilly laid down the terms for the exchange of people between Greece and Bulgaria.
In the Lausanne treaty, signed in January 1923, Greece waived the right to return the
orthodox population to their origin zone in Asia-Minor and Thrace. At the same time
Greece became obliged to receive rest of the Greek-orthodox people from the Turkish
side. Turkey, in turn, was committed to receive the Turkish-Moslem people from
Greece (except from Western Thrace).171  It could be stated with a reason that the
religions seemed to play an important role while defining the status of people in these
arrangements.
The magnitude of the Problems becomes illustrated by scrutinizing the demographic
development of the Greek State. In 1912 there were about 2.5 million inhabitants in
Greece. The warfare in the Balkans increased the number up to 4.5 million. The
massive population exchanges in the beginning of the 1920s brought about 1.2 million
additional people to the Greek State. As a result of the process, a demographically
more homogenous Greece was formed.172
The “Greek question” was addressed by the League in February 1921 when the
Council had to take supervisory responsibilities as the exchanges of Greek children
and Bulgarian prisoners took place. Nansen took personal responsibility in order to
safeguard satisfactory arrangements. It had become obvious that the partly hostile
situation would not unravel without the involvement of intergovernmental authority.173
In that connection there was no mentioning of Greek or other “refugees”.
The Greek refugees came to the agenda of the League Assembly and the
International Labour Conference in 1922. The Assembly submitted funds for the High
Commissioner for actions in Greece. The International Save the Children and the ICRC
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approached Director General Thomas at the end of 1922. They appealed to the difficult
unemployment problem in Greece and invited the Governing Body to advice the Labour
Office to take actions.174
Albert Thomas worked energetically in order to have the Greek Refugees on the
agenda in the same way as the Russians. He was in the opinion that the funds for the
operations should come from the High Commissioner’s budget.175  The Governing
Body decided to start actions anyhow according to the decision of the ILC.176  The
Labour Office started its activities in Greece in April 1923.177
It has been reported that the Greek Government under the leadership of the Prime
Minister Venizelos did not like the coercive nature of the population exchange
connected to the Lausanne Treaty. Voluntary movement was their baseline. The Big
Powers, however, seem to have wanted to put an end to the settling of the First World
War. The Convention on the population exchange was published already before the
final Treaty. Nansen was personally strongly involved in the population exchange
attempts between Greece and Turkey in 1922. Since the complicated deliberations did
not produce much outcome, the political matters were transferred to the Lausanne
Conference.178
It was not possible for the LON to sit idle and see the Greco-Turkish armed conflict
to come to the point where hundreds of thousands of Greek inhabitants had to leave
their homes in Asia Minor. The LON was compelled to intervene. According to the
report of the Secretary General, Greek Refugees were collected in camps and finally
transported to Greece with the assistance of Nansen in his capacity as the High
Commissioner of the LON. That marked the beginning of the Greek Refugees
settlement scheme. This programme included the establishment of an independent
settlement commission supervised by the League as well as large scale loan
arrangements to the Greek Government.179
The Council appointed in July 1923 a small committee composed by Nansen, with
one representative of the American relief organizations, and one representative of the
Greek Government. The duty of this Committee was to consider what measures the
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Greek Government might take for the temporary relief of refugees until funds become
available for this purpose from the yield of the proposed loan.180
Similarly with the Greeks, the work for Bulgarian refugees was also attached under
a League Commissioner.181  In the materials of the League and the ILO the Bulgarians
did not receive quite same amount of attention as the Greeks did. The same concerns
contemporary research. The reason for this is not easy to discover. What we know,
however, is that there was a great enthusiasm among the European nations to help the
Greeks already during their war of independence in the 19th century.
Bulgarians were mentioned for the first time on the League agenda in connection to
the exchange of prisoners and children in 1921. The Bulgarian Government seemed to
have done anything in order to comply with the arrangements safeguarded by the
League and its representative Nansen: the local authorities took “away from their
Bulgarian husbands Greek wives who were under age”, to be returned to Greece.182
The Greek Government reported to the League in December 1923 that it had been
necessary to deport Bulgarian families from Western Thrace for “military reasons”. The
Greek Government reported having placed a sum of 5 million drachmas for the
purpose of assisting those inhabitants financially. According to the report the refugees
were at that moment being repatriated.183  In question of Bulgaria, the refugees were
included into a larger package of official assistance that was extended to the Bulgarian
State in the 1920s and 1930s. At some point, the whole country was under some kind
of supervision of the international organizations.
Turkish refugees were not on the agenda of the League. However, according to
Nansen’s report in 1927 there were 150 Turkish refugees referred to as “Friends of the
Allies”. Those people were located in Greece and in the Near East. The report says
that these refugees “state that they have been proscribed by the Turkish
Government”.184  Later these families obtained a legal refugee status as a result of
international political deliberations.
The League did not, however, make particular efforts to help the people who were
moving to Turkey from the European side. The reason for this was simple. Turkey did
not ask for help. These people could have easily been categorized as refugees in the
same manner as Greek and Bulgarian movers. The Turkish Government had ways and
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means as well as political will to handle the situation. A large part of these people were
assigned to the lands and properties left by the Greeks in Anatolia while moving to the
Hellenic State.
The question of Albanians was not specified as refugee questions in the League
handlings. Albanians were mentioned in several documents connected to the treaties
on the Protection of Minorities and the Convention on the Exchange of Populations.185
It seems that the Albanians were not really properly included in any of the treaties or
protocols. In League documents they become known as “the Moslems of Albanian
origin in Greece”. The interpretation was, that this population was exempted from the
exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations.
Since the Moslems of Albanian origin were excluded from the regular programme of
populations exchanges arranged between Greece and Turkey, the League had to
return several times during the 1920s to the question of the protection of the Albanian
minority in Greece. The League assigned “mandatories” to supervise the execution of
the protection statutes. The duties of these mandatories included informing the Greek
Authorities of the persons whose exemption from exchange they have secured and to
advice the Greek Government that such persons should consequently enjoy the same
rights as other Greek citizens.186
The Albanian Government presented a request for assistance on the refugee
problem in their country. According to the Albanian authorities, there were 7.500
emigrants in Albania in 1925, and some 30.000 were waiting for a favourable
opportunity to enter the country. The Albanian Government didn’t have the necessary
means for the settlement of these persons. Albania therefore asked for a loan of 3
million gold francs under the guarantee of the League of Nations, “on the analogy of
the loan issued by the Greek Government”. The Council decided to forward the request
to the experts whose duty was to examine the question.187 This did, however, never
lead to any larger programmes in order to assist movers to settle themselves in
Albania.
The Armenian refugee problem was the most mystified and politically weighty of all
the refugee situations during the Inter-war period. The atrocities committed against the
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Armenian people in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War have been referred
to as the Armenian Genocide. Genocide normally means organized killing of people in
order to put an end to their collective existence. Genocide requires central planning
and a machinery to implement it. This makes genocide a state crime because normally
only a government has the necessary resources to carry out such a scheme of
destruction. The Armenian Genocide was said to be centrally planned and
administered by the Turkish Government against the entire Armenian population of the
Ottoman Empire. These matters are still disputed even today.
A massacre took place in 1909 at Adana, and 30.000 Armenians were killed. For a
few years after that, the situation was reasonably calm, and the thought was that
Armenians and Turks may even get along together. As the First World War broke out, it
gave the Young Turks the opportunity to fulfil a Turkish desire that had continued for
centuries: to wipe out all Armenians from the soil of Turkey.
The killings and expulsions were carried out during the First World War between the
years 1915 and 1918 when the rest of the world was mainly occupied with incidents in
the main war fields of Europe.  Deportation, torture, murder, and starvation took place.
The great bulk of the Armenian population was forcibly removed from their homes to
Syria, where the vast majority was sent into the desert to die of thirst and hunger.
Large numbers of Armenians were methodically massacred. Women and children were
reportedly abducted and abused. The legal property of people was taken away from
them. After only a little more than a year of calm at the end of the First World War, the
atrocities were renewed between 1920 and 1923, and the remaining Armenians were
subjected to further massacres and expulsions. The incidents have been condemned
by the international community as a crime against humanity.
The formal reason to the Turkish campaign against the Armenians was alleged
traitorousness and revolt against the Government. Turkey was allied with Germany and
Austria in war against Russia during the First World War. There was a considerable
amount of Armenians living in Russia. It was alleged in Turkey that the Christian
Armenians were cooperating with the Russians against the Ottoman government and
thus having a religious conspiracy. As a result of the pre-war movements to west, many
Armenians fought and fell in the armies of the Allied powers. Despite that, it was
impossible after the war for the western countries to protect the Armenians in their
home land. The political leaders of the Great Powers simply didn’t have enough
motivation or determination to form sufficiently strong military expedition.188  The
188 Thompson I, 26-27
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remarkable fact is that the events went on despite the reassurances by the Armenian
community on their loyalty to the Turkish authorities, which seems to refer to strong
resolution to get rid of all Armenians.189
It was not until the end of the First World War that the peacemakers were faced by
the Armenian Question. The American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry
Morgenthau Sr., had a role in this. The Armenian Genocide was well-reported by the
international news media, especially in the American press, and the U.S. Senate even
held hearing which affirmed its reality. Many Armenians, originally Gregorian
Christians, converted to other churches in a hope for help.190  Some circles in the west
considered the defeat of Turkey in the First World War justified, mainly because the
atrocities became known right after they happened.191 There are still some 350.000
people with Armenian background living in France. Many of the Armenians living in
France today are descendants of the refugees who came to the country through Syria
and Lebanon to work in local textile factories in Southern France.
The Armenians had their own state when the Democratic Republic of Armenia
(DRA) was established in Erevan on May 28, 1918. Since then, the political conditions
were constantly changing in the area where Armenians were living. The Soviet Russian
troops marched into Erevan already in 1920, but still some parts of the country were
held by Turkey. The delegation of DRA was in the Peace negotiations in Paris after the
World War. The Sevres Treaty was concluded in 1920, but not ratified. The League
Council considered the matter to belong to the competence of the signatories of the
Peace Treaty.192  After several Russo-Turkish arrangements, Armenia lost its
independence in 1922 and became a part of the Soviet Union. It took however, more
than a decade until Armenia became a Soviet Republic. Before that, Nansen and the
League of Nations had some room for their maneuvers on refugee questions in the
area.
It is difficult to say anything definite about the amounts of the Armenian refugees.
The exodus was uncontrolled and happened during a long period of time. It was
directed to several places. There are estimates from quarter of a million to half million
refugees, when figures of the refugees after the World War are scrutinized. The most
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common account is around 350.000.193  These figures don’t normally include the
refugees who moved to Russia.
The Armenian question was brought to the attention of the League Council already
in December 1920, when the acting US Secretary of State Norman Davis approached
the President of the Council Paul Hymans with a request of support by the League to
the American High Commissioner at Constantinople. The High Commissioner, Henry
Morgenthau was conducting a mediation task in Anatolia on behalf of the Armenians. In
the same connection also the Prime Minister of Great Britain commented the situation
of Armenia. Some other Member state governments also regretted that they had no
chance to render any help to the Armenians.194 As an example, the reason for the
Polish government was that “…Poland…..needs all her strength to cure her own
wounds and to begin the reconstruction of her own political and economic life.”195
In his communication to the League, the US President Wilson considered that it was
the Treaty of Sevres that appeared to be the immediate cause of trouble between
Armenia and Turkey. Since the Allied Powers were responsible of the drafting of the
treaty, they also should take responsibility of the consequences.196  The League took
the Armenian question seriously. In 1920 the Assembly requested the Council to
“safeguard the future of Armenia”. The League followed the political and military
developments in Armenia with great interest and scrutiny. In this endeavour the
Americans were the most significant source of information.197  Secretary General Eric
Drummond sent a letter to the British, French, and Italian Governments concerning
Armenia on February 25, 1921. In this letter the Secretary General asked for support to
the Council’s efforts in trying to manage “the noble and humane task” of helping
Armenia.198
Since the representatives of the United States were actively following the Armenian
question, it had been hoped that the US would take formal responsibility for the entire
problem by accepting a mandate for Armenia. That became impossible after the
League was rejected by the US Senate.199   As the League could do nothing for the
events that made the Armenian state vanish, there was not much more left than to
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concentrate the efforts on the Armenian refugees. Several appeals were made on the
subject of Armenia in 1921. Armenian authorities wrote to the Governments of the
Principal Allied Powers in order to awake their attention. French Government took
concrete measures to protect the Armenians in Near East. It appears that also some
British professional soldiers served in the Armenian Army during the incoherent
occasions that took place when Armenians were trying to establish their independent
state.200
It became obvious to the international community that it was impossible to give the
Armenians a national home. This was clearly recognized by the League. It became
even more important to assist the Armenian Refugees scattered throughout the
world.201   Bentwich makes an interpretation that the Armenians were made homeless
and stateless by the action of the Turks in execution of the provisions of the Treaty of
Lausanne.202  It may have been for this reason that the Council of the League decided
in September 1923 to assimilate the Armenians to Russian refugees, and to place
them under the care of the High Commissioner.203
The Armenians themselves were constantly active in the international platforms. The
President of the Armenian National Delegation sent a letter to the League making an
appeal to get help in executing a scheme for the settlement of 50.000 Armenians in the
Caucasus.204  The Council was not able to recommend anything else but a request to
Nansen to consider the possibility of issuing identity certificates to Armenian Refugees
as requested by the Armenian National Delegation.205
The League paid attention to the Armenian problem, although it was not until 1924 it
started in practice to extend the official passports and other programs to Armenians.
The relief work was undertaken by private organizations. In 1923 the Council of the
League made a decision on the legal protection of Armenian refugees. Nansen was
assigned to extend the passport system to the Armenians. At the same time France,
Belgium, and Italy formed national committees to undertake the Armenian relief
work.206
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The Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees sent a letter to Albert Thomas in
1924 making an official request for help to Armenian refugees.207  That was the time of
the making of the Refugee Service of the ILO, and due to that Albert Thomas made a
suggestion to the Governing Body that also the Armenians should be included to the
programme of the new organization. In the deliberations the problems of Greek
refugees were considered to have been removed to the domain of domestic policy of
Greece208  so there should have been enough room for actions on behalf of the
Armenians. The ILO had internal debates on the funding of the activities.209  The
Labour Conference of 1925 could, however, confirm the final decision to undertake
measures for the Armenian refugees.210  At that point the League had already made its
own decision to include Armenians refugees to its programmes.
In his report to the League Council in 1927, Nansen was still nominally talking about
“Armenian Government” and “Republic of Erivan”. The British Government had
established a considerable number of Armenian Refugees from Baghdad to Erevan
with the money of the British Treasury. Nansen had his own plans, but he was
extremely frustrated since not many of his proposals and plans were materializing
because of the lack of support by the League and its Members. He therefore proposed
that League should disengage itself from the Armenian campaign.211  Nansen was a
humanist, not a politician. Even if he understood the facts of the political, economic,
and military struggle going on in the Middle East between the Great Powers, he was
not able to interpret the information in order to make the right conclusions.
An Inter-Governmental Conference was able to generate a definition for an
Armenian refugee in 1926. The definition was adopted by the LON and the ILO.
According to the definition an Armenian refugee was: “Any person of Armenian origin
formerly a subject of the Ottoman Empire who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the
protection of the Government of the Turkish Republic and who has not acquired
another nationality.”212
The Assyrian and Assyro-Chaldean people (a.k.a Assyrians, Syrian Christians,
Chaldeans, and other variants) are an ethnic group whose origins lie in the Fertile
Crescent. Their ancient territory has been divided to several nations and states. The
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Assyrian and Assyro-Chaldean people have been minorities under several different
rules for centuries in many areas. They have traditionally lived in northern Iraq, Syria,
northwest Iran, and Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia. Many have migrated to the
Caucasus, North America and Europe during the past century.  A common nominator
used in a connection of these refugees in the 1930s was “Eastern Christians”.213
Different religious groups in the Near East have traditionally tolerated each other
and even respected each others’ beliefs. The balance has, however, always been very
fragile.  For that reason there has been an unwritten agreement between the fractions
that no missionary work will be conducted. When Chaldeans have been forced to leave
Iraq because of the atrocities committed by the extremist Moslems, the refugees
coming to Jordania, Lebanon and Syria have not turned to the local or international
officials to get help, but instead they have been accommodated and serviced by the
local Churches.214
Emigration of the Assyrians and Assyro-Chaldeans was triggered by very similar
reasons as was the case with the Armenians: atrocities before and during the First
World War and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. On those days, the people who
were classified Assyrians, spoke Aramean which was said to have been the native
language of Jesus of Nazareth. Aram is also the ancient biblical name for Syria. Today
the catholic Christian population of Iraq is called Chaldeans. The definitions of the
Assyrian and Assyro-Chaldeans are somewhat difficult and non-specific. It can be
compared to the definition of Carelians. Everyone who claims to be one, can be one.
A conclusive fact is that Assyrian and Assyro-Chaldean refugees were brought to
the agenda of the world organizations in the 1920s. They remained there as an issue
and an item of handlings although they never obtained the same attention as the bigger
refugee groups.  According to a High Commissioner’s report to the Council of LON in
1927, there were 150 Assyrians in Marseilles. Those were people who were forced to
abandon their homes in 1922 and thus in need of passports. The same report
recognized some 19.000 Assyro-Chaldeans in Caucasus and in Greece. These people
came from regions south of Lake Van.215
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               3.2.2. The High Commissioner for Refugees
The Red Cross had its role in launching of the refugee work of the League.
Consequently, there were clear connections between the Red Cross and the High
Commissioner at the international level through the whole Inter-war period. The
President of the International Red Cross Committee, Gustav Ador sent a letter to the
President of the Council of the League of Nations accompanied by a Memorandum in
February 1921. Reference was made in the letter to the invaluable work of Dr. Nansen
in connection to the prisoners of war. The Memorandum addressed the importance of
an intergovernmental intervention on the difficult matter of Russian refugees. The Red
Cross came out with a suggestion to establish a “General Commissioner” whose tasks
would be: 1) definition of the legal position of the Russian Refugees, 2) organize
employment for the refugees, or preferably, repatriation to Russia, 3) group up together
all the efforts  made by the various private organizations.216
The League considered it necessary to consult various institutions in addition to the
Member states during the initial process. The Council sent a letter including a
resolution concerning the establishment of the High Commissioner to all Members of
the League as well as “to various countries which do not belong to the League”. A
number of replies were received, including those from members and members to
become. All these were considered as official replies. It was noted that apart from
these responses the Secretary General of the League often received letters and
appeals from various Russian organizations and associations.217
In its meeting in June 1921 the Council of the League concluded that the replies and
statements of the member state governments support the initiative to appoint a High
Commissioner to deal with the question of Russian Refugees. The Council also
recognized that the appointment of a High Commissioner must be preceded by a
practical study of the political, legal, and financial problems involved in any definite
settlement of the refugee question. The Council called upon its President to take care
of the practicalities of the appointment of a High Commissioner as well as the staff
assisting him.218
The steps taken by the League were summarized in the report of M. Hanotaux on
June 27th, 1921. According to the report, the reactions of member states would indicate
216 OJ, Vol 1, March-April 1921, 228-229
217 E.g. OJ, Vol 2, July-August 1921, 485-509
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that the appointment of a High Commissioner was seen as one of the most promising
methods of finding a solution to the prevailing difficulties. Although the appointment of a
High Commissioner appeared to be “the solution most generally in favor”, it also
offered some difficulties, especially as regards the selection of an individual who would
possess the necessary qualifications for successful execution of the coming tasks.219
One of the first priorities for the High Commissioner was to appoint a network of
representatives in capitals, to communicate with Governments as well as with the
NGOs. Many governments designated also their own officials to keep in touch with the
High Commissioner.220  Since Nansen was also appointed to organize the repatriation
of the prisoners of war and famine relief in Russia, he had a permanent representative
even in Moscow. The High Commissioner could look into the possibilities for
repatriation of the Russian refugees and for the safety guarantees required for that
end.221
The network of the High Commissioner in the principal countries with a considerable
amount of refugees to be dealt with was twofold.  As Nansen invited all interested
governments to designate representatives, they could communicate directly with him
and he, in turn, could make proposals to governments for action. High Commissioner’s
representatives were to keep in touch, not only with the Government officials, but also
with refugees themselves. Many of the High Commissioners representatives were
supplied by the missions of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants. 16 States assigned a special officer.
There was a High Commissioner’s representative in 14 countries.222
Many countries took almost immediate action in their cooperation with the High
Commissioner. The Finnish Government rather quickly assigned a liaison officer for the
High Commissioner.  In addition to that, there was also another person in Finland who
was assigned by Nansen. The holder of that position was Colonel Viktor Schwindt, who
at the same time was a member of the Council of the Finnish Red Cross. After his
death 1929 the assignment was awarded to major Michael Gripenberg.223  It  seems
that also in national level the Red Cross organizations and the High Commissioner had
close connections, which undoubdetly was a precondition when cooperation was
needed in the field operations.
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The High Commissioners local offices had a very visible role in the setting of the
refugee work. In February 1923, Nansen reported that his office in Constantinople had
become “by far the largest refugee institution” in that town. The office summoned
together representatives of all important local relief organizations at its weekly
meetings. It had gained the necessary confidence of the Allied Forces representatives,
various Embassies and Legations as well as the refugees themselves. As a tangible
result of the activity, the office had secured the evacuation of 17.000 refugees at the
price of approximately £2 per head by February 1923.224
Although Nansen was assigned to work for the Russian refugees, he very soon got
to notice that it was impossible to avoid tackling the problems of other refugee groups
too. There was a clear demand for broadening the mandate of the High Commission.
The plans and hopes for finding a permanent solution to the problem of Russian
refugees through the repatriation schemes turned out to be unrealistic by 1924.  The
High Commissioner had to make a shift and put more weight to the following tasks
which were considered to be more feasible: 1) to regulate the legal status of stateless
persons and 2) to assist them to find permanent homes and work in their new
domiciles.225
The Assembly of the League passed a resolution under the heading “Greek and
Armenian Refugees” on September 19th, 1922, recommending the High Commissioner
of the LON to be authorized to utilize the services of the Russian Refugee Organization
to assist in the relief of refugees from the Near East. At the same recommendation it
was noted that the League undertakes no final responsibility for these refugees and
that this additional activity will be considered as temporary by its nature.226  As  it
became obvious that the Russian refugees could not all be successfully repatriated,
Nansen deleted the word “Russian” from his title. From 1923 he was the High
Commissioner for Refugees.227  The problems of Greek and Armenian Refugees were
obviously the most burning and topical at that moment.
Nansen had established a Delegation in Moscow in order to maintain liaison with the
Russian Government. He had to struggle in 1924 in order to continue the activities in
Moscow, mainly for budgetary reasons. The costs of living had risen greatly in Moscow,
224 Minutes of the 23. Session of the Council of the LON (29.1.-3.2.1923), Annex 472/OJ, 4th year, No 3, March
1923, 388
225 Bentwich 1935, 115
226 Minutes of the 20./21. Session of the Council of the LON (31.8.-4.10.1922)/OJ, 3rd year, No 11,(part II), Nov
1922, 1195-1196 and 1415
227  The situation faced by the organization  was illustrated by deleting the word “Russian” from the title, see
also Grahl-Madsen 1983, 361
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and it was impossible to continue without a special contribution by the League. The
Council agreed in 1924 to issue additional 11.000 francs for these purposes. The funds
were transferred to Item 25 of the budget (“High Commissariat for Refugees”) from
other Items (Item 16 - “Economic and Financial Organisation”; Item 15 –
“Administrative Commissions and Minorities”; Item 17 – “Mandates”).228
Attempts to provide political guidance to the High Commissioner took place
occasionally. The Council of the League adopted a resolution in December 1928
inviting the appointment of an Advisory Commission for the High Commissioner
according to the Assembly’s proposal. The Advisory Commission was to be composed
of representatives of 14 Member States of the LON.229  This probably reflected the fact
that the term of the Refugee Service of the ILO was coming to its end at that time.230
The composition of the Commission was as follows: the representatives of Bulgaria,
China, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Poland, Romania, Switzerland and Yugoslavia.231 The Advisory Commission held its
first meetings in the first half of 1929 and was able to produce an extensive report on
its deliberations with some serious recommendations. The most important practical
solution which led into recommendation to the League, was that the work of the High
Commissioner could not be ceased in the immediate future. The Commission,
however, laid stress on the necessity of fixing at once the maximum period within which
the High Commissariat should be entirely liquidated.232
The Advisory Commission provided guidance and produced advisory services to the
League and the High Commissioner in almost all possible sectors of the activities. The
maintenance and the duration of the High Commissariat was one of the foremost
questions, recognizing that it was practically impossible to reach permanent radical
solutions to the complicated problems. Although the liquidation of the activities was
discussed, the administrative measures recommended told a different story. According
to a report in 1929, the High Commissioner should still have a central service in order
to place the international activity on a more regular basis. External agents should be
228 MInutes of the 30. Session of the Council of the LON (20.8.-3.10.1924)/OJ, 5th year, No 10, Oct 1924, 1376
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hired, but refugees should not be employed in the services of the High
Commissariat.233
The League had originally decided that the work for refugees by the High
Commissioner shall be carried out for a certain number of years, not exceeding ten. In
1929 Nansen indicated to the Council that he is willing to continue as the High
Commissioner, but a Deputy High Commissioner was needed in order to secure the
successful termination of the duties. His notion was motivated by the fact that he had to
carry all the responsibilities now that the ILO had decided to terminate its refugee
Service.234  The Council noted that Nansen had decided on his own to associate Mr. T.
Lodge with him to the work.235  There was no mentioning how the position would be
funded.
After Nansen’s death, there was no immediate nomination for a new High
Commissioner, but the position was considered to be “vacant” or “non-existing”.  The
Nansen Office was considered to be the successor of the High Commissariat for a
couple of years.236  Some researchers have interpreted the situation as a sign of
determination of the League of Nations to abolish Nansen’s post. New circumstances
changed these considerations, and in 1933 it was necessary for the League to revoke
its decision because of the new movement of refugees.237
Funding of the High Commissioner was a constant topic of debates from the
beginning. When preparing for the original appointment of the High Commissioner the
Council of the League recommended that “should lack of financial support necessitate
the consideration of general measures for obtaining funds for the High Commissioner,
the latter should submit the question for examination to the Financial Committee of the
League of Nations”.238  A month after his appointment in 1921 Nansen had to make an
appeal to the Powers responsible for the provisional Government of Constantinople
(Britain, Italy, and France) to render financial assistance for maintaining the remaining
Russian Refugees and to save them from starvation. In that connection, it was made
clear that one of the reasons for the appeal was the resolution by which the Council of
233 Minutes of  the 55.  Session of  the Council  of  the LON (10.-15.6.1929)/OJ,  10th year, No 7, July 1929, 1077-
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the League appointed him as the High Commissioner. The resolution made it
impossible for the High Commissioner to use funds at his disposal for relief work.239
The High Commissioner was quite dependant on ad hoc funding. The Secretary
General of the LON in his Memorandum at the end of 1921 quoted Nansen by stating
that with a small sum of money (“e.g., £ 30.000”) he would be able to keep the
refugees in Constantinople alive until such time as his plans for setting them elsewhere
have been brought to maturity. Therefore it was necessary for the Council to invite all
interested Governments to render the High Commissioner all the assistance in their
power in connection with the solution of the refugee problem. This concerned in
particular the transport of the refugees to other countries and finding of the means
necessary to their maintenance.240  In its 16th Session in January 1922 the Council was
informed by the Secretary General that Nansen had been able to collect considerable
sums of money for his work. It was noted that the League had not put any funds at his
disposal. Nansen wanted to open an office in Constantinople whereby he hoped to
expedite the supply of relief to refugees.241
The obstacle for Nansen to conduct coherent planning for action was that the
financial allocations were often made for highly selective purposes. In March 1922,
Nansen was still begging to obtain a sum of £ 30.000 in order to be able to complete
the evacuation of Russian Refugees from Constantinople and to maintain his office in
that city as well as the representatives in the countries to which the refugees are sent
and through which they pass.242  In May-June 1922 some governments (e.g. Brazil,
Switzerland, Belgium) were able to inform Nansen and the League on their positive
response to the High Commissioners appeal to render funds in varying amounts for the
evacuation.243  Nansen reported to the Council in July 1922 that required £30.000 for
the evacuation purposes was now collected.244   Half of the sum was guaranteed by the
American Red Cross. The following Members of the LON had contributed: Great
Britain, Belgium, China, Japan, Brazil, Czeckoslovakia and Switzerland.245  It  must be
understood that these contributions were merely pledging. In other remarks by Nansen
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it was further specified that only a small proportion of these pledged funds had actually
been made available.246
The British Government offered the League £ 150.000 for taking charge of refugees
in Malta, Cyprus, and Egypt in the spring of 1922. The British Government was very
anxious to be assured that the organizations dealing with this money be effective and
prompt and that there would be no further call on the Government for supplies after this
money had been spent.247
The financing of the High Commissioner and its refugee operations remained a
continuous problem throughout the Inter-war period. The League of Nations had
promised to pay only for administrative expenses. For the ten years of 1921-30 the
administrative budget totaled less than 2.8 million Swiss gold francs. Special
arrangements were needed even to raise extra 100 francs for some purposes.248
Nansen got an allowance from the LON for expenses of the staff which was to be
working in his own agency partly, as well as in other countries as his authorized
representatives.249
A researcher must ask what these “administrative expenses” were; what did it
constitute of? In his report to the Assembly in September 1922 Nansen listed them:
great numbers of people were conducting their work in different countries; supporting
delegates whose services were essential. There were charges for telegrams, for
travelling, for office supplies, and other items.250   In September 1922, the Assembly
passed a resolution recommending that the Council should consider whether it can
place a sum sufficient to enable the necessary administrative measures to assist Greek
and Armenian refugees in Asia Minor from the Item “Unforeseen Expenditure”.251   The
Council decided “to put at the disposal of Dr. Nansen” the sum of 100.000 Swiss
Francs to enable necessary administrative measures connected to these refugees for a
period which would allow for adequate arrangements to be made from other sources.252
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The Council decided in its 23rd Session to set aside from the item “Unforeseen
Expenditure” a sum of 50.000 Swiss Francs in order to enable Nansen to liquidate the
various administrative engagements which he had assumed in his dealings with the
refugees in Near East. Nansen was worried about the disease situation among the
refugees and had planned cooperation with the Epidemic Commission of the League in
order to reply to the situation. It was feared that epidemics in large scale would soon
appear unless something was done quickly.253  In comparison, in the same Council
session the Greek Government, being unable to cope with the refugee situation with
the financial resources at its disposal, considered that a loan was absolutely
indispensable. The loan would have amounted to the sum of 10 million pounds
sterling.254
In its 24th Session the Council voted the sum of 50.000 Gold francs from the amount
set aside in the Budget for 1923 for “Unforeseen Expenditure” with the understanding
that this sum would be considered as the first charge of the loan designated for the
settlement of the Greek refugees. This sum was to be repaid out of the loan which was
supposed to be issued by the League for the work on behalf of the Greek Refugees in
Western Thrace.255  Nansen received the loan approved by the Council in 1923 for the
establishment of the work.  It was originally assumed that the loan will be repaid when
the Greek Refugees Settlement Commission gets its own regular financing. As the
Commission was formally founded and the loans for its work were floated, there was a
mentioning on the obligation to repay the loan on behalf of the High Commissioner.
Therefore, the Council concluded in June 1925, that it will not insist on the repayment
of the loan.256
Norwegian researcher Atle Grahl-Madsen has interpreted the situation in a very
blunt manner: the League assumed no responsibility for the funding of the concrete aid
for refugees. Funds for those purposes were needed from individual Governments,
voluntary organizations, and private individuals. The only real and normal source of
revenue was coming from the Nansen stamps. The stamp was supposed to validate
the Nansen passport and had to be renewed periodically. The price for the stamp was
five gold francs and it was paid by the refugees themselves, although there was an
exemption from the fee for the poorest. According to Grahl-Madsen “from 1926 up to
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31 July 1930 the sale of Nansen stamps brought a total revenue of 406 775 gold
francs.”257
In the 1920s, the LON was offially responsible for the financing of the High
Commission exclusively. In practice, however, some private organizations were
subsidizing the activities, while being in cooperation with the High Commissioner.  The
same seems to apply to some Governments in their local joint activities.258
   3.2.3. The Labour Office and its Refugee Service
The ILO got officially involved with the refugee work in the early 1920s when the
High Commissioner was appointed, and the services of the Labour Office were needed
to ascertain the professionalism of the activities. Not so well known fact is, that the ILO
was among those organizations that prepared the appeal to the League Council in
February 1921 for the establishment of the High Commission for Russian Refugees.
ILO participated in the unofficial meeting preceding the appeal.259   Any further
documentation on the role of the ILO in these events has, however, not been found.
The authors of the history of the ILO are also silent about these episodes.
The Director General of the ILO was responsible for the relations with the
Governments as well as information matters.260  It was specifically Albert Thomas, who
received requests for help from governments and other bodies.261  The Labour Office
was the executive arm of the organization.  It took care of the daily work and handled
the assignments given by the administrative bodies. Thus it was among the duties of
the Labour Office to handle the refugee matters in practice.
The Governing Body was the most important decision making authority. It
sometimes gave great liberties to the Labour Office in its assignments.  During the first
years the Labour Office had no specific organization or personnel for the refugee work.
Thus, there was no designated budget for these activities. The funds required were
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included in the “normal” administrative costs of the Labour Office. The High
Commission was struggling with the lack of funds, and it hardly could have been able
to finance the activities of Labour Office.
On the other hand, it seems262 that no one ever asked ILO’s help because of its
available funds. The reasons for turning to the ILO remained elsewhere. The Labour
Office was dealing with financial questions as far as it concerned arrangements for
creating revenues and developing lending systems. A representative of Labour Office
was with a delegation (“mission of inquiry”) already in 1922 when the organizations
responded to the request of the Greek Government. Their task was to explore
possibilities for financial and other solutions together with the Greek Authorities.263
The LON seemed to have had three different scenarios in 1924 for the future of its
refugee work organization. The first was to close down the High Commission
completely, the second to continue the work as business as usual, and the third to
push the refugee work to the ILO.264  This was noticed in the Governing Body which
means that the members of it were aware of the options. Thus they knew what was
expected from them, as well as that there were options.265
The year 1924 marked a new chapter in the international refugee policy. The first
shock of the masses of refugees was over.  The work had been well established. The
High Commission had been working under the supervision of the League Council.
However, its administration was considered more or less improvised and thus
insufficient to tackle the continuation of the work on the serious problems in a
systematic way. In 1924 new refugee groups were included to the working programme.
The emphasis lay in the shifting from humanitarian aid towards solutions which could
be considered more permanent.266
In the spring of 1924 Nansen suggested to the League Council that the ILO should
take responsibility for some tasks of the refugee work, because they were suitable for
the Labour Office. The idea of an improved efficiency was behind the deliberations.267
A formal request was sent to the Labour Organization in April same year. The letter
addressed to the Director General of the ILO contained references to the improvement
of status of the Russian refugees due to the passport system introduced previously.
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However, the appeal to the ILO was based on the fact that the employment situation
continued to be the biggest problem at hands. In order to solve that issue, a more
permanent organizational basis was needed.268
Albert Thomas presented to the Governing Body, as his own view, that the
challenge should be taken on since the League Council and its Secretariat were behind
the appeal.269  According to Simpson’s view, the Council approved the principle of the
transfer of duties without delay, but the Governing Body of the ILO was reluctant.270
Thomas encouraged the Governing Body to approve the arrangements during the
summer 1924271, but the decision was further delayed because of the disagreements
on some principal questions as well as the obscurity of the financing.272  After  the
decision-in-principle of the League Council, there were several unclear parts in the
deal, mainly concerning the division of duties and the structure of financing.273
The 1924 budget of the High Commissioner was 153.000 Swiss francs. Together
with private contributions it came to 304.000 francs.274   From the beginning, the idea
was that the refugee budget must be kept separate from the regular budget of the
Labour Office, although it must be supervised by the Office.  The headquarters of the
High Commission had to be removed from the League Secretariat and placed under
the supervision of the ILO.275
The situation was somewhat frustrating for the decision makers of the League, as it
became clear that the refugee problems could not be solved as quickly as the task
covering the prisoners of war. This was obviously one of the reasons why it was
decided to transfer the technical problems of employment, settlement, and migration to
the International Labour Organization.  While the preparations for the transfer were in
progress, the Governing Body of the ILO appointed a Committee of four members to
coordinate the planning. The Committee consisted of representatives of each tripartite
groups and the Chairman of the Governing Body.276  This was done at least partly in
order to show that the matter was seriously considered.277 The Council of the League
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decided in its 29th Session to invite Nansen or his representative to give all information
of administrative or financial character to the Committee. Legal or constitutional
counseling was to be given by the Secretary General or the President of the Council.278
This designated ILO’s Committee prepared its Memorandum for the Meeting of the
Governing Body in the autumn. The outcome of the work of the Committee, as
recorded in the Memorandum, was that services could be rendered only to Russian
and Armenian refugees. Other refugees should remain on the liability of other
organizations. The High Commission should be closed down. Nansen should put his
personal input to the use of the ILO. It was supposed to be a temporary arrangement,
and the organization had to be dissolved as soon as it became possible.279 The
Governing Body approved a resolution in October 1924. According to it the ILO took
partly responsibility for the refugee work of the LON, with certain conditions.280   The
resolution urged Albert Thomas to prepare for a plan for employment services within
the means granted by the League. The Director General was to appraise the adequacy
of the budget; the League had budgeted 203.000 Swiss francs for the refugee work for
1925.281
The Governing Body of the ILO was invited to take a final decision-in-principle at its
forthcoming session whether it would be disposed to agree to the eventual transfer of
the Russian Refugee work to the International Labour Organization. The “traditional”
premises for the plan were the capability and capacity of dealing with the questions
concerning employment and emigration conditions. Additional reason given at the
Council Meeting was the Labour Office’s ability to guard the refugees from
exploitation.282
At this stage the matters concerning the transfer were dealt with in the Council
under heading “Russian Refugees”. In the same meeting the matters of Greek and
Armenian refugees were handled as well, but separately, without mentioning the
transfer of responsibilities.283  Later same year, the matter came to the agenda under
heading “Transfer to the International Labour Office of the work for Russian and
Armenian Refugees”. It was then understood, according to the background
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documentation, that in case of any questions involving political considerations, the ILO
should consult the Council of the League.284
The Committee of the ILO indicated that if the Governing Body agreed to the
transfer it would require an adequate budget. Only this would enable the work for the
refugees to be carried out to a satisfactory conclusion. The (planned) budget of
150.000 Swiss francs would be hardly sufficient for the Russian refugee work alone,
and quite inadequate if work for other refugees was added.285
The Council approved the necessary recommendations providing for the transfer of
the refugee work for Russian and Armenian Refugees to the ILO. The question was
then referred to the Assembly for consideration since the budget of 1925 was affected.
The Assembly adopted the Council’s decision and decided to place at its disposal
sufficient funds specially set aside for the administrative services required to deal with
the establishment of the refugees during the year 1925. The designated sum was
203.000 Swiss francs.286
The transfer of the refugee work was financially sealed at the end of 1924. Nansen
presented a report on the future execution of the work for Russian and Armenian
Refugees. The Council of the League approved the proposals contained in the report in
its last Session of the year in December 1924.287  It was agreed that the ILO would take
responsibility of activities from the beginning of 1925.288  The changes in the practical
form of the organization were not dramatic, but they held significance in principle,
which made them something more than just a formality.289  The first regular budget for
the Refugee Service was prepared for the year 1926. The Council decided that it was
not necessary to handle the budget as a separate item on the Agenda of the Assembly.
Instead, it could be considered by the Assembly under Agenda Item 21; Budget for
1926, including the budgets of the ILO and of the Permanent Court of International
Justice.290
The report of the ILO for the first months of the operations of the Refugee Service
included also the estimates for the budget of 1926. It was not possible to submit to the
284 Minutes of the 30. Session of the Council of the LON (20.8.-3.10.1924), Annex 669/OJ, 5th year, No 10, Oct
1924, 1468
285 Ibid.
286 Minutes of the 30. Session of the Council of the LON (20.8.-3.10.1924)/OJ, 5th year, No 10, Oct 1924, 1365
287 Minutes of the 32. Session of the Council of the LON (8.-13.12.1924)/OJ, 6th year, No 2, Feb 1925, 122 and
178-179 (Annex 702)
288 OB, vol 9, 1924, 201-202
289 Simpson 1939, 204
290 Minutes of the 34. Session of the Council of the LON (8.-11.6.1925)/OJ, 6th year, No 7, July 1925, 891
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League anything else but provisional approximations. The figure on the proposal was
the same as for 1925; 203.000 francs. It was given not as a final sum, but it was
believed to be necessary in order to cover the obligatory expenses.291
The position of the High Commissioner still existed. The relations between it and the
ILO were conducted on a personal level, since the Assistant High Commissioner (from
1923) Major T.F.Johnson was at same time the Head of Department of Refugee
Questions of the ILO.292 The High Commissioner’s staff, headed by Major Johnson,
was transferred from the League Secretariat to the ILO (Labour Office). Thus, the
Refugee Service was formed.293  The organization formed a part of the Diplomatic
Division of the Labour Office. This practical arrangement made possible the
cooperation with the Migration Section of the Labour Office, as well as with the agents
in different countries.294
Nansen retained his position as the High Commissioner in this disposition. He was,
however, increasingly absorbed by the Armenian resettlement in Erevan and Soviet
Armenia, as the planning and even implementation of the scheme was underway.295
Nansen represented the LON in the new organization. He was still directly responsible
for his actions to the Council of the League.296  He was mandated to take the lead in
matters with a political nature and act as a liaison between the LON and the ILO in
those matters which fell into the competence of the League and therefore were outside
the domain of the ILO.297
The personnel brought continuity to the work. Albert Thomas took still responsibility
for coordination between the local agents of the High Commissioner and the Labour
Office.298  Hereby, the large network of the representatives of the ILO could be best
utilized. The Labour Office made inquiries on employment matters of the refugees in all
European countries.299  Albert Thomas gained reputation as a protector of refugees
291 Minutes of the 34. Session of the Council of the LON (8.-11.6.1925), Annex 780/OJ, 6th year, No 7, July 1925,
1000
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during those years.300  He was personally involved in all major arrangements in the
administration of the refugee work.
The Advisory Commission, which was formed earlier, continued its duties in
connection with the Labour Office. The Commission consisted of the representatives of
many different private and semi-private organizations. (Save the Children, Lord Mayors
(Armenian) Fund, Jewish Colonization Association etc.).301 Coordinating the activities
of the Commission also underlined the Labour Office’s role as an umbrella
organization.
The administration of refugee matters in the ILO was quite clustered. Some persons
held several positions and the highest leaders of the organization were always at the
front line. Some overlaps were apparent. In the beginning of the Refugee Service there
was a designated liaison between the Service and the Governing Body; it was the Sub-
committee of Refugee Matters, which later was changed into a Permanent Committee
by the decision of the Governing Body.302 The committee was nominated by the
Governing Body, and the Chairman of the Governing Body acted as the Chairman of
the Committee.303  The Committee prepared memorandums and recommendations for
the refugee administration and thus acted as an advisory body.304
The LON was responsible for issuing the financing of the Refugee Service. The
Governing Body of the ILO approved the budget proposal of the League Council before
it was submitted to the General Assembly for final confirmation.305  The Labour Office
had sole responsibility and thus great liberties on the use of the funds issued in the
budget.306  Sometimes the Refugee Service made proposals to the League for
additional budgetary funds. An example of this was connected to the plans on the
revolving fund for refugees in 1926.307
It was the Finance Committee of the ILO, which prepared for the regular budget
proposal of the Labour Office to the Governing Body and Labour Conference. The
refugee budget was separate from this, but in some connections it was brought forward
300 See Phelan, Edward: Yes and Albert Thomas. London 1949, 196
301 Minutes of the 25. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1925, 94; Records of Proceedings of the 7. Session of the ILC,
1925, 934
302 OB, Vol 13, 1928, 14
303 Minutes of the 37. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1927, 413
304 E.g. Minutes of the 38. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 177
305 Minutes of the 33. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1926, 451
306 Simpson 1939, 206
307 E.g. Minutes of the 33. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1926, 389; Simpson 1939, 205
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in the Governing Body, that the Finance Committee should also take into account the
refugee expenditure.308   In 1927-1928 there seems to have been an active discussion
on whether the Governing Body should take bigger role in the preparation of the
refugee budget. It was usual during those years, that the costs overrun the budget.309
The belief on the temporary nature of all refugee problems was always at the
background.  The League Assembly urged in its resolution of September 1926 the High
Commissioner and the Labour Office to intensify their measures for helping the
Russian and Armenian Refugees. The Assembly invited the High Commissioner and
the Governing Body of the ILO to consider the possibility of making effective response
to the appeals for their co-operation in the permanent settlement of these refugees and
of coordinating the activities of private organizations working for the refugees.310   It is
difficult to interpret whether this was direct criticism or indirect praise, since this was
exactly what these organizations were supposed to be doing in the first place! In his
response, Albert Thomas informed the Secretary General that the Governing Body has
particularly instructed the International Labour Office to endeavor to respond to any
appeals which it may receive with a view to improving the precarious position of the
refugees.311
In the same connection the Assembly also urged the Governments of the Member
States to intensify the settlement of unemployed refugees and to contribute to the
replenishment of the working capital fund (“revolving fund”) of the refugee
organizations. The Assembly further invited the Governing Body of the ILO to appoint a
co-trustee to be responsible jointly with Mr. Nansen for the administration of the
revolving fund. In his response Albert Thomas informed the Secretary General that the
Governing Body had appointed Mr. Jean Monnet as the co-trustee of the fund.312
The Headquarters of the Refugee Service was in its “natural” place in Geneva.  The
administration of the organization was partly old, partly new. Besides the central office,
the Service had agents in several countries. The agents had terminable contracts and
in the administration they were compared to correspondents. Some of the agents were
former  local representatives of Nansen, some of them old correspondents of the
308 E.g. Minutes of the 35. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1927, 175
309 Minutes of the 40. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 441
310 OJ, 7th year, No 12, Dec 1926, 1667
311 OJ, 7th year, No 12, Dec 1926, 1668
312 OJ, 7th year, No 12, Dec 1926, 1667-1668
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ILO.313  The task of the agents was to form committees consisting of the authorities of
host countries and (local) voluntary relief organizations. These were supposed to act as
advisory boards and take responsibility for the communication between the Refugee
Service and the refugees.314
Refugee Service had a proper office in some countries which were suffering most
from the problems of the massive emigration of Russians. The network of
representatives and offices was largely inherited from Nansen’s organization.315  It may
be considered extraordinary that it was possible to uphold an office also in Moscow. By
1926 Refugee Service had established several delegations overseas as well. In Latin
America (Argentina, Brazil) the offices had a clear function: to prepare and implement
the resettlement plans.316  In Finland, the “Secretary General”(although this was a
wrong title) of the Finnish Red Cross, Colonel Schwindt was regarded as the honorary
delegate of the Refugee Service.317
There were attempts to get other official refugee organizations under the umbrella of
the Refugee Service as well. The Greek Refugees Settlement Commission had been
formed under the supervision of the League, but it was working in quite an independent
manner. The representative of the workers’ delegation of Greece made a proposal at
the 7th Labour Conference with a view that the Commission should be attached to the
Refugee Service.318  The representatives of the Labour Office considered, however,
that the Conference was not a proper forum to decide such matters, and the proposal
was never advanced.319
During the period of the Refugee Service the LON and the ILO jointly organized a
few international conferences on refugee matters. Nansen was normally the formal
initiator, and the practical arrangements were taken care of by the League Secretariat
and the Labour Office in collaboration.320
The following is to demonstrate the level of expenditure of the refugee apparatus of
the intergovernmental organizations in the 1920s.321
313 Minutes of the 25. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1925, 94; Records of Proceedings of the 7. Session of the ILC,
1925, 934
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316 See Chapter 3.3.5.
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Figure 2.
The expenditure of the Refugee Service was annually slightly over 300.000 Francs.
The sum is slightly higher than the one used by the High Commissioner in the
beginning of the 1920s. The expenditure on the whole seems not have been raised
dramatically despite the plans for refugee resettlement at that time. There is no clear
indication, how the budget and the expenditure of the Refugee Service and the High
Commissioner were separated. This is definitely something that gives opportunity for
further studies.
When comparing these sums to the total budget of the League system, it can be
stated that the amounts were considerable. It is very difficult to make exact
comparisons, because the official budgets were usually defined in US dollars and in
Sterling Pounds, and the refugee expenditure was in Swiss Francs and the rates
fluctuated during the decade. It seems, however, that the total budget of the League
(including ILO) during the 1920s was slightly over 20 million Francs annually.322
In the deliberations in 1928, it was clear that the next year will be the last year of the
ILO’s responsibility. The Governing Body made public the following reasons for the
refusal to continue the work:  a) The remaining tasks were more suitable for the High
322 Another comparison can be made to the salaries of the leaders of the organizations: The annual salary of the
Secretary General of the League was 200.000 gold francs, and the salary of the Director General of the ILO was
72.000 gold francs; see http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1921/nov/10/league-of-nations-budget
+ http://www.indiana.edu/~league/pictorialsurvey/lonapspg30.htm)
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Commissoner, b) desire to avoid the duality of the existing activities.323  The
recommendation at that time was that the work should be continued by the High
Commissioner under the supervision of a Mixed Advisory Committee assembled from
the representatives of the League Council and the Governing Body of the ILO.324
During the year 1928 it became obvious that the latter of the above mentioned two
excuses was even more legitimate. At the same time, the Labour Office had to provide
the Governing Body with a clarification on the definition of the division of duties.325 The
reason given to the unclear administrative situation is a natural one, personality: the
same person was acting as the Head of Refugee Service and as the Assistant High
Commissioner.326 This was connected to the fact that the Labour Organization, even
from the beginning, was not willing to get involved with politics. Therefore the ILO
considered all activities provisional. All these things contributed to the determination of
the ILO leaders to discontinue the managing role in the refugee work.
The ongoing difficulties with financing definitely did not encourage the ILO to
continue the assignment of the Refugee Service. Nansen approached the Governing
Body with a suggestion that the task of evacuating the refugees from Constantinople
had to be accomplished, or the organizations should surrender. If the American private
financiers would take over, the control of the actions would be on their side.327 There
must have been a question, how it would turn out, if the private sources were
supervising the work of the world organizations.
Further reasons for the determination to conclude the activities of the Refugee
Service were found. A joint memorandum of the Refugee Committee and the Finance
Committee of the ILO noted in 1928, that the refugee work had been political by its
nature from the beginning.328  In addition to that, it was contradictory to the benefit of
the organization to continue the resettlement programmes to the new continent. It
would deteriorate the relationships with the workers’ organizations of the recipient
countries.329
323 Frings, 24; Simpson 1939, 206
324 Simpson 1939, 206
325 Minutes of the 38. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 172
326 Minutes of the 39. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 343
327 Minutes of the 38. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 174
328 Minutes of the 40. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 415-416
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This signified a proposal for a new organization, including the model for next
administration, as well as a mixed commission to assist the High Commissioner.330
The proposal was adopted by the Governing Body unanimously.331  The decision was
passed to the Council of the LON. The Council probably did not have any opportunity
to oppose the decision. While saying goodbye to the Refugee Service, the Director
General noted that there had been mistakes in the work despite all possible
precautions.332  In the background, there was the deepening economic recession that
prevented all resettlement activities.333  At that point also even Albert Thomas was
skeptical on the work.
The year 1929 was a time of uncertainty for those who were involved in the
international refugee work.  The ILO was still in theory liable for the annual budget of
the refugee organization, but in practice the whole organization was at a standstill.
There was a provisional arrangement, according to which the League Council took
responsibility for the temporary administration.334  The work for creating a whole new
administrative model for the refugee work organization was under way at the same
time.
According to the decision of the ninth Assembly of the League, an advisory
commission consisting of representatives of governments was formed. The official
name of the body came to be the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee (IAC). The
task of it was to see how the refugee work could be continued.335  The High
Commissioner requested for the advisory help of the ILO. The appeal was quite
naturally presented to Albert Thomas.336  The Governing Body assigned a delegation
consisting of the representatives of the workers’ group as well as the employers’ group.
The team was supposed to act as the technical advisory section of the Committee.337
The Refugee Service was able to achieve some remarkable result during its active
existence. Although some objectives were not reached, the Refugee Service could
accomplish quite much, especially in the fields of resettlement and integration of
refugees.  The staff of the Refugee Service had to show loyalty to both ILO and the
High Commissioner, and this seemed to have created some problems. There may
330 Minutes of the 40. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 415
331 Minutes of the 40. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 417
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335 Simpson 1939, 207
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have been some lack of clarity in the responsibilities. By the end of 1929, it was found
practical and convenient to follow the original plan of impermanence, and transfer the
functions undertaken by the ILO back to the High Commissioner and ultimately to the
LON.338  Director General Thomas suggested to the 12th Labour Conference that the
cooperation with Nansen should be continued, but only at a consultative level.339  It was
defined that the responsibilities of the Labour Organization will be discontinued on
January 1, 1930. From that on, the League Council took the lead.340
               3.2.4. The Greek and Bulgarian Refugees Settlement Commissions
The exchange of populations between Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria were
supervised by Commissions organized by the League. They all had similar features.
Bentwich described the role of the Commissions in the 1930s in following way: “It was
the function of the Commissions to supervise the migration, to facilitate the transfer of
the movable property, and the valuation and liquidation of the immovable property of
the emigrants, and to make arrangements for the sum due to the exchanged population
in each country on account of the property liquidated to constitute a government debt to
the country to which the proprietors emigrated”.341
This facilitation started when the Greek and the Bulgarian Governments asked for
help in solving their extensive refugee situations. The Turkish Government didn’t make
the same explicit request. As a consequence, in 1923 the League decided to form an
autonomous Greek Refugees Settlement Commission which was supposed to help the
refugees to settle and get employed in their new home lands.342  The Greek Refuge
Settlement Commission was set up under a Protocol approved by the League Council
in September 1923, by which the Greek Government agreed to establish the
Commission according to the Organic Statutes attached to the Protocol. The
338 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 362
339 Records of Proceedings of the 12. Session of the ILC, 1929, 220
340 Records of Proceedings of the 12. Session of the ILC, 1929, 218
341 Bentwich 1935, 124
342 Frings, 27-28
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Commission was ultimately accountable for its activities to the League Council.343
Walters describes the events in his History of the LON: “The great majority (of the
refugees) were Greeks and their settlement in Greece was a problem of vast
magnitude indeed, but different in kind of from that of foreign refugees: the League
played a major part in its solution, but after the first weeks of wild confusion were over,
the work was entrusted to a special organization and not to the High Commissioner.”344
The original Protocol was signed in September 1923 in Geneva. Further
modifications were made in September 1924. The Hellenic Parliament ratified the
original text in June 1924 and the alterations to it in October 1924.345  By the Protocol,
the Greek Government assigned to the Commission 500.000 hectares of land to be
used for the purposes of settlement of the Refugees. The Government also agreed that
all financial advances will be placed at the disposal of the Commission.346
It was stipulated in the original Geneva Protocol for the establishment of the Greek
Refugees Settlement Commission, that the Hellenic Government will as soon as
possible raise a loan or loans of 3 – 6 million pounds. As the circumstances in the
beginning of the Commission were not favorable, the Commission had to exist on
advances. Later, the Commission estimated that at least 20 million pounds would be
required to establish the refugees properly. The Commission had to, however, adjust
the scheme according to the existing possibilities and decide to request loans totaling
10 million pounds from the League of Nations. The text of the convention was also
altered to correspond with this reality.347
The total loan scheme was drawn up in 1923-1924 under the auspices of the
League. The programme was then finally agreed and issued with a great success in
the markets of London, New York, and Athens in December 1924. The Council of the
League was in a position to state in its resolution in March 1925 that the Commission
was at last provided with the necessary financial means.348
According to the organic statutes of the Commission it was established as a legal
person. The Commission was independent from the Greek Governments executive or
administrative authority, and thus considered as completely autonomous. The
343 Simpson 1939, 222-223
344 Walters, 189
345 OJ, 5th year, No 12, Dec 1924, 1795
346 OJ, 5th year, No 12, Dec 1924, 1795-1796
347 Minutes of the 33. Session of the Council of the LON (9.-14.3.1925)/OJ, 6th year, No 4, April 1925, 504-505
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Commission was composed of four members. Two of them were appointed by the
Greek Government and approved by the League, one member was appointed directly
by the League, and finally, the chairman of the Commission had to be a national of the
United States of America and a person representing relief organizations.349
Henry Morgenthau350, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Greek Refugees
Settlement Commission, reported to the Council in March 1924 that the Commission
had £ 1.000.000 at its disposal, which would enable it to demonstrate what could be
done, provided that sufficient funds were forthcoming. According to Morgenthau’s
report, £50 would suffice to settle a family on a farm. It would have been necessary,
however, to obtain 6 - 8 million pound sterling in order to be able to solve the entire
problem. It was estimated, that the problem could have been solved within two years
with that sum. According to the estimate of Morgenthau, Greece could be self-
supporting after that.351
The nominations of the Commission were formally approved by the League Council.
The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs submitted proposals to the Council for the Greek
members of the Commission.352  There is no visible record of any disputes concerning
these appointments. According to the Protocol of 1924, the work of the Greek
Refugees Settlement Commission was supposed to be liquidated in 1928. For that
reason, the Council decided in 1927 to appoint Mr. Charles Eddy provisionally for three
months only as the President of the Commission, whereas the normal term of the
Presidency was one year. It seems, according to the Council documents, that the
Greek Government had a certain influence to these appointments at least during the
later years of the existence of the Commission.353
The Settlement Commission issued quarterly reports to the League of Nations on its
operations. In its report in May 1924 it was stated that a further advance of one million
pounds sterling was obtained from the Bank of England on May 7th  and steps were
taken to allocate this sum, in suitable proportions, to the agricultural and urban
settlements in the different provinces of Greece. This was the second proportion of the
loan to the Greek Government. In the same report the Commission informed the
Council on the use of the first proportion, also amounting to one million pounds.
349 OJ, 5th year,No 12, Dec 1924, 1797
350 The US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire 1913-1916, later in many positions connected to the questions
of Middle East
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According to the expenditure performance reporting, it seems that generally taken, the
money had reached its original targets, which were the settlements. The Project cost
table shows that the proportion of various administrative costs appears to have been
reasonably small.354
The quarterly reporting system seems to have been quite disciplined, at least in the
beginning. In its third quarterly report in August 1924 the Commission informed that the
total sum put at the disposal of the Commission so far was three million Pounds. The
first million was advanced by the Bank of England in November 1923, the second
million by the same institution in May 1924, and the third million by the Government of
Greece in July 1924. All these loans were issued through the National Bank of Greece.
Advantage was taken of sharp rises in the value of the pound sterling to lay in a stock
of drachmae. It was decided to have the accounts for 12 months ending on December
31st, and audited by persons nominated by the Ministry Finance and the National Bank
of Greece respectively. The detailed reporting gives a possibility to follow the
expenditure in practice: how, where and when the money was actually used.355
An auditors’ report was given on the last day of the year 1924 on the entries of the
books of the General Accountants Office of the Greek Refugees Settlement
Commission and the vouchers and receipts of the Treasury from establishment of the
Commission up to that date. The Auditors found that all entries had been made in good
order, the balances of the general and auxiliary books were as per attached
statements, the vouchers and receipts were duly audited, and the balance at hand was
exact.356
The Financial Committee of the League also received summaries of the reports on
the position of the Greek Committee. The summaries published in the Official Journal
of the League don’t allow us to have a deep insight of what was discussed in this
connection. The summaries as such are brief, neutral, and declaratory. The chairman
of the Financial Committee was Mr. Gustave Ador, who also had a long career in the
Red Cross and thus experience on refugee matters.357
The task of the Greek Refugees Settlement Commission was not so unpleasant and
desperate by position, as was the case in many other international refugee operations.
354 OJ, 5th year, No 8, August 1924, 1069-1070
355 OJ, 5th year, No 11 (part II), Nov 1924, 1719
356 OJ, 6th year, No 8, August 1925, 1059
357 Minutes of the 35. Session of the Council of the LON (2.-28.9.1925)/OJ, 6th year, No 10, Oct 1925, 1498 and
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The Chairman of Commission Mr. Howland said in his address at the Council in 1925,
that the attitude of the people of Greece towards these refugees had been most
admirable. Despite the heavy taxes caused by the refugee operations, the citizens had
never shown anything less than the greatest hospitality, and their attitude carried
evidence of homogeneity among the Hellenes.358  A typical handling of a Greek
Commission’s quarterly report of the League was the one of the Financial Committee in
case of the 12th report at the end of 1926. The Committee stated “No questions arise
for decision”.359
The League seems to have had quite a lot of involvement to the internal matters of
Greek State in these connections. In the beginning of 1927 the Financial Committee
raised two points: the stabilization of the state budget and the request for certain
additional information regarding the financial position of Greece. The representative of
Greece in the Council assured that the present Coalition Cabinet was doing its utmost
to put the country on a sound financial basis.360  The Council noted in its 56th session
that the work of the settlement of the refugees will come to an end before long. For this
reason the liquidation of the Settlement Commission had been under consideration for
some time. The Greek Government also had decided to give its proper attention to the
matter.361
During the final phase of the Greek Refugees Settlement Commission in 1930 the
acting President of the Commission Sir John Hope Simpson made a presentation to
the Council on the situation. According to his proposal, the Council took note and
approved the Convention signed by the Hellenic Government and the Settlement
Commission at Geneva on January 24, 1930, also noting that a law had been passed
by the Greek Parliament, empowering the Government to ratify the Convention. The
Council recognized in the same connection that necessary arrangements had been
made, which will enable the Commission to be dissolved.362  The Financial Committee
recommended that the Greek Commission can be dissolved and there was no action
required on the basis of the reporting of the commission.363
The complete Termination Convention included statutes to transfer all property of
the Commission, real and personal, to the Hellenic Government. This included real
358 Minutes of the 35. Session of the Council of the LON (2.-28.9.1925)/OJ, 6th year, No 10, Oct 1925, 1359
359 Minutes of the 43. Session of the Council of the LON (6.-11.12.1926)/OJ, 8th year, No 2, Feb 1926, 173
360 Minutes of the 44. Session of the Council of the LON (7.-12.3.1927)/OJ, 8th year, No 4, April 1927, 383
361 Minutes of the 56. Session of the Council of the LON (30.8.-6.9.1929)/OJ, 10th year, No 11, Nov 1929, 1675
362 Minutes of the 59. Session of the Council of the LON (12.-15.5.1930)/OJ, 11th year, No 6, June 1930, 520
363 Minutes of the 59. Session of the Council of the LON (12.-15.5.1930), Annex 1209/OJ, 11th year, No 6, June
1930, 671 and 680
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estate, movables, cash, securities, as well as all rights and claims of every kind.364
The 26th Report of the Settlement Commission included the practical substance of the
financial aspects of the Convention. The terms and conditions of the termination from
the standpoint of individual debts were well anticipated and documented in detail.365
The Council finally decided in its 60th Session, that in accordance with the Article XIX
of the Organic Statutes of the Commission, the Greek Refugees Settlement
Commission shall be dissolved on December 31, 1930.366  This signified the last step in
the liquidation plan.
During its existence, the Commission was a considerable employer. At its maximum,
in the year 1928, the personnel employed by the Greek Refugee Settlement
Commission amounted in number to 2042. On dissolution, the Commission was still
employing 623 persons, who were transferred to the Greek Government and the
Agricultural Bank.367   It must be noted, that these counts include the Greek personnel
working in the field, and any comparisons to the regular League staff would be
incompetent.
In its 27th Report in August 1930, the Greek Commission, and Sir John Hope
Simpson on behalf of it, stated that “This work is not yet finished”. The colonies had not
yet reached a degree of consolidation allowing them to be finally emancipated from the
guardianship which the Commission had exercised over them. That work had to be
carried out in the future by the Hellenic Government.368
After the official decisions and agreements concerning the termination of the
Settlement Commission, several supplementary agreements were concluded between
the different parties concerned. A Special Agreement in November 1930 between the
Commission and the Greek Government further defined the terms and conditions of
valuation of the land issued for the refugees. A Supplementary Contract between the
Chairman of the Commission and the Representative of the Hellenic Government
concerning the collection of debts from urban and agricultural refugees was signed also
in November same year.369
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The International Financial Commission decided to accept the arrangements by
which the National Bank of Greece and the Agricultural Bank (later changed for Bank of
Greece) will be in charge of repaying the principal of the refugee loan to the Financial
Commission. Previously the Settlement Commission had been responsible for that.370
It can be concluded that after the Greek Government appealed to the League, the
Financial Committee at once drew up a plan for an international loan to be
administrated by an autonomous organization. It was expressively provided that the
yield of the loan should not be devoted to temporary charitable purposes, but to lasting
measures for the settlement of the refugees. The corresponding principles were
applied to Bulgarian refugees, and the same success was achieved.371
The first glance in the situation, and the work of the Commission as illustrated by the
primary sources of the League, would suggest that it was not exactly well defined or
organized in the very beginning. It was not named as ad hoc commission, but its
approach and working methods would correspond very much with any ad hoc based
work. Whatever shortcomings the Commission may have had, it was able to conduct its
work and also accomplish some very tangible and concrete results. It is possible to
conclude that the at end of its work the achievements were considered quite
remarkable. It appears that the Greek Refugees Settlement Commission was properly
founded and established despite some minor inaccuracies. It was mandated with
sufficient authority. The Commission was also properly financed, administrated, and
accounted for. The settlement activities seem to have been managed in a very
professional manner compared to the ad hoc nature of many other attempts under the
umbrella on the League of Nations.
The Peace Treaty of Neuilly bound the Bulgarian government to receive the
Bulgarian emigrants moving from neighboring countries. At first, the refugees moved
more or less spontaneously, but soon the League jointly with the Bulgarian government
formed a Commission for Bulgarian Refugees in 1926.372  In Bulgaria the work of
refugee settlement was carried out under the supervision of a Commissioner appointed
by the Council, rather than by the settlement commission with a mixed composition.
The plan was somewhat similar to the operation going on in Greece at the time, but a
number of things made the settlement in Bulgaria more difficult. The refugees arrived in
370 OJ, 12th year, No 3, March 1931, 600
371 The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations. Secretariat of the League of Nations. Geneva 1935,
133-134
372 Frings, 29-30
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a series of small waves during three decades, the area was smaller, and the land
suitable for agricultural settlement in Bulgaria was already more or less occupied.373
For the work with the Bulgarian refugees, the executive machinery established was
quite independent. By the Protocol approved by the League Council in September
1926, a High Commissioner was appointed by the Council. His approval was
necessary for all plans for refugee settlement, and he had complete powers to refuse to
advance funds from the proceeds of the settlement loan if he doubted the conditions of
the settlement scheme. He had to report to the Council at least quarterly.374
Since the Commissioner of the League of Nations for the Settlement of Bulgarian
Refugees was obliged by the League to provide quarterly reports, they were naturally
screened by the Financial Committee, which gave its inspection accounts with possible
remarks and comments to the Council of the League. The first report of the
Commissioner was submitted to the League at the end of 1926, covering the first two
months of the operations. The report included the general plans for settlement,
execution of a programme of urgent works, matters concerning legislation related to
refugees, accounts, revenues, and loans.375
The Commissioner was involved with the legislative work by drafting laws in liaison
with relevant Bulgarian authorities. The first Commissioner’s report contained the law
on the National Bank of Bulgaria passed by the Parliament, as well as the draft law for
the settlement of the refugees on the land with the aid of the proceeds of the loan
authorized by the League of Nations.376
The second report of the Bulgarian Commissioner contained relevant information on
the loan authorized by the Council of the LON. The loan was issued simultaneously in
London and in New York on December 21st, 1926, with great success, as the report
has it. The block in pounds sterling amounted nominally to £2.400.000, of which, a part
was offered for public subscription on the London market and the rest was subscribed
by financial undertakings in Italy, Switzerland, and Holland. The American block
amounted nominally to $4.500.000. In conformity with the Protocol establishing the
373 Skran, 169
374 Simpson 1939, 223
375 Minutes of the 43. Session of the Council of the LON (6.-11.12.1926), Annex 920/OJ, 8th year, No 2, Feb 1926,
189-194
376 Minutes of the 43. Session of the Council of the LON (6.-11.12.1926), Annex 920-Appendix IV+V/OJ, 8th year,
No 2, Feb 1926, 196-213
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Commissioner, the terms and conditions of this issue were submitted to the Chairman
of the Financial Committee for approval.377
From November 1928, the structure of the reports submitted to the Council reflected
the changed roles of the organizations and the development in the operations. The
office was now the Commissioner of the League of Nations in Bulgaria. The reports of
this official were divided in two parts. The first one continued to report the progress
made in the settlement of refugees by means of the loan issued for this purpose in
December 1926 on the basis of the Protocol signed in Geneva on 8.9.1926. The
second part dealt with the Stabilization Loan of the Kingdom of Bulgaria based on the
Protocol of 10.3.1928 and the Additional Act 8.9.1928.378  The  structure  of  the
organization was changed according to the requirements of the operations.
The Financial Committee noted the 17th Report of the League Commissioner for
Bulgaria in January 1931 and heard a statement by him on progress made with the
work of refugee settlement. The Committee could conclude that the greater part of the
work had been completed. There remained but a relatively small balance from the loan,
nearly all earmarked, for the remaining work to be carried out during next few
months.379
The office of the Commissioner of the League was combined by a personal linkage
with the post of the Adviser to the National Bank of Bulgaria during the period when Mr.
René Charron held the two public positions.380  The Financial Committee concluded in
its report in the Official Journal in December 1931, that the work of the LON
Commissioner for Bulgaria is almost completed.  The last of the loan funds had been
expended, and the work was at an end, except for a few points which would be
completed by the spring following year.381
In retrospective, it can be reviewed that the difference between the two respective
Commissions derived from the their background: The whole state of Bulgaria seemed
to be under supervision of the League from time to time, whereas the Hellenic
Government was able to stand on its own feet. Therefore, the role of the Bulgarian
Commission achieved much broader scope than just taking care of the matters of
refugees.
377 Minutes of the 44. session of the Council of the LON (7.-12.3.1927)/OJ, 8th year, No 4, April 1927, 526
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3.3. Refugee Aid made possible under the League’s Umbrella
         3.3.1. Emergency Relief
The challenges in the beginning of the 1920s were enormous. There was not much
intergovernmental experience on this kind of work but it was realized, however, that
when it comes down to helping refugees in the field, emergency relief is definitely the
first step to be taken. Humanitarian aid (or emergency relief as a synonym) is material
or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, typically in response to
humanitarian crisis. By commonly accepted definitions, the primary objective of
humanitarian aid is to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity. It is
therefore different from development aid, which seeks to address the underlying
socioeconomic factors which may have led to a crisis or emergency. Development aid
aims at more fundamental developmental change. The operations are funded by in
various ways. It may include donations from individuals, corporations, governments,
and other organizations. During the Inter-war period the funding and delivery of
humanitarian aid was increasingly organized at an international level. This was a
change to the previous national approach and facilitated faster and more effective
responses.382
Refugee camps are always in need of assistance. Although not much documented
knowledge is available from the Inter-war period, it is obvious that food, medicine,
shelter, machinery, sanitation, and the expertise to provide them, were required. The
Red Cross and other NGOs providing such assistance were often seen simply as the
conduits of international aid. These units and organizations were largely depending on
those who controlled the resources. This normally meant governments and private
donors, as well as the intergovernmental institutions as coordinators.383
The source material of the League does not reveal much about the practical
humanitarian aid in the field. We mostly have to satisfy ourselves with descriptions by
earlier researchers. The work took place in the receiving countries. Therefore it is
382 For this see e.g. Skran; Simpson; Sjöberg
383 See Kent, 76
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necessary to look into those places; what was going on at national level. In the
beginning of the 1920s there were emergency situations in several countries bordering
the Soviet Union. Refugees were threatened by famine in Constantinople. Nansen, as
the High Commissioner, was faced with the need of finding funds for the maintenance
of these refugees. Moreover, the High Commissioner enlisted and coordinated the
active field assistance of voluntary organizations and some Governments.384
Humanitarian aid was what the refugees mostly needed first. They were people who
were abroad, mostly without identity, and often without food or even water. The word
humanitarian derives from humanity. The questions of responsibility and support for
refugees in need were linked with central questions about human society which was in
centre of considerations while arranging the services for refugees.385
Shortly after his appointment in September 1921, Nansen had correspondence with
the French Government on the funding of certain relief activities. France considered its
input larger than could be expected within reason. Therefore it wanted to discontinue
the rationing of Russian refugees in Constantinople. Nansen made an appeal to the
French Government to postpone its decision which would, in turn, give some room for
the High Commissioner to concentrate all his efforts on measures needed for the final
settlement of the problem. This appeal met its point, and finally France only reduced its
supplies by an amount corresponding to the number of refugees leaving
Constantinople.386   The events also reflect the idea of the division of duties that existed
between the different actors according to the original idea of the refugee work
undertaken by the world organizations.
The Secretary General of the LON listed in January 1923 countries that had made
contributions, paid or promised, for the purpose of relief work helping the refugees from
Asia Minor. Altogether 13 countries were on the list. Most donations were small sums
of money, but also items, such as tents, were donated.387  The division between
political and legal protection and the humanitarian work could not always be maintained
in practice. At least later, in the 1930s, it was sometimes the Nansen Office instead of
the Secretariat of the League, which had to make political interventions, since the NO
had representatives in capitals, although this was not the purpose according to the
statutes of the organizations.388
384 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 361
385 Knudsen, 43
386 OJ, Vol 3, Dec 1921, 1247-1249
387 OJ, 4th year, No 1, (part II), Jan 1923, 126
388 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 363
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Although the League made serious attempts to assume a leading function in refugee
work through the entire period under examination, it was clear that most of the time
they had merely a planning and coordinating role. In the field they were totally
depending on outside financing and on others doing the concrete work.389  It was also
quite common phenomenon, that the refugees, who had arrived earlier and settled
already, were helping the new comers.390  Some refugees coming from Russia were
definitely not in a need of any kind of help. On the contrary, some upper class
emigrants had large sums of money and other assets on them. In this respect, Finland
offers a special example, as a newly independent state and former Grand-Duchy of the
Czarist Russia, with lots of former experience on Russian upper class people residing
in the country. There were complaints in Finland in some towns that the aliens were
buying the shops empty with their bunches of cash money. This doesn’t change the
fact that many were coming with empty pockets and urgently needed assistance. There
were some voluntary assistance organizations established in Finland already, when the
refugees started flowing to the country. However, they were not very well organized
and their work was sporadic.391
Prolonged involvements in the field were normally challenged by the pressure to
achieve more permanent solutions, although the operations may have resulted in
sympathy. The normal depiction was that a disaster like refugee problem should be an
isolated phenomenon with short duration.392  The American organizations delivered
large amounts of supplies to Finland, as the Americans had the quick victory of the
anti-bolsheviks in their sight. When this vision faded away, the stocks were there, and
already paid by the Russian Red Cross. It became obvious that the right address to the
supplies was the refugees. The Russian organizations were assigned to take care of
the deliveries and distribution. As could be expected, constant allegations on
misconduct were reported.393
The role of the American help was significant, especially in food supplies.  In 1921
the ARC withdrew from Europe, and left the supplies behind. The national
organizations were supposed to continue the relief activities with those stocks. As the
work was established and in progress, it was the government that provided for the
funds and supplies, and the voluntary organizations that took care of the
389 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 367; see also Appendix IV
390 Leitzinger II, 416-417
391 Nevalainen, 104
392 Kent, 77
393 Nevalainen, 106
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implementation of the distribution.394  American Red Cross had been delivering clothes,
shoes, and food to Finland (as well as all over Europe) since the First World War.
Another active organization was the American Relief Administration. This agency was
largely connected to Herbert Hoover who cooperated with the White Generals. The
existence of the Americans symbolized the general relief work in Finland, and the
supplies were used to assist also the refugees coming to Finland.395
The Finnish Government established a State Refugee Relief Centre (VPAK) in
March 1922. All previous organizations and materials were subordinated to it.396  The
work of VPAK was financed by the government. The work took several forms:
relief/assistance, boarding schools, refugee information, distribution of clothes and
food, health care, mental services and employment exchange services.397  Although
many voluntary organizations were also active, the significance of the VPAK for the
refugees was in its own class.
It was  the new flows of refugees in 1922 which brought about the necessity to
create a centralized refugee aid organization for the coordination of the activities and
thus establish the State Refugee Relief Centre. The basis of the work lay on the stocks
left by the Americans.398  The first reception centres (“vastaanottokoti”) and childrens’
homes for refugees were founded. Some of the reception facilities were in fact not very
diefferent from prison camps. The Centre was a kind of a headquarters. It received
provisions from the Ministry of Interior and acted accordingly, conveying orders to the
departments in the field. There were some simple criteria for the relief work. Those who
were able to work and make their own living, should not be assisted. The guideline of
the humanitarian work was ordered to follow the same principles as were applied in
normal municipal assistance of the poor.399
A general phenomenon in Finland seems to have been that there was an
abundance of relief supplies in the beginning of the 1920s. This led to profiteering
among the refugee community.400  When public assistance was finally established and
American supplies vanished, the abundance changed into shortage. The 1920s saw,
however, diminshing numbers of people in a need of aid, thanks to the improving
economic situation. The circumstances went into worse again in the beginning of the
394 Nevalainen, 107
395 Nevalainen, 106
396 Nygård 1980, 90
397 see Nygård 1980, 87-115
398 Nevalainen, 111
399 Nevalainen, 112
400 Nevalainen, 110
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1930s with the economic crisis. The number of people in need increased again,
although on the whole, the activity was merely marginal compared to the acute crisis in
the beginning of the 1920s.401  The refugees received emergency relief in form of food
in Finland until 1925. Thereafter the aid was monetary assistance. The officials seemed
to be quite satisfied with the non-Russian refugees coming from Russia since many
working age adults had been able to get employed gradually, and humanitarian aid
could be concentrated for those who were not able to work because of their age and
studies.402
There were also orphanages and several nursing homes for the needs of refugees
in Finland. Some of them were supported or even run by the government, some had
private and voluntary background.403  It was the most vulnerable individuals and
families who had to take refuge in these establishments. The same phenomenon could
be seen in all countries that received large numbers of Russian refugees.404 The
general level of the social security in each respective country was reflected in the living
conditions of the most vulnerable aliens.
The relief work in the beginning of the 1920s was always trading between the
various actors. This was the situation especially in the beginning of the existence of the
organizations, when the numbers of the needy refugees were at highest. The difficult
circumstances definitely required cooperation. In October 1921 the Acting President of
the League Council described well these ad hoc based arrangements in his
Memorandum. The Council appealed to British, French, and Italian Governments in
order to obtain financial means for supporting the remaining 15.000 Russian Refugees
in Constantinople. The Memorandum made it clear, that the charitable organizations
had now come to the end of their resources. Moreover, the Governments had
diminished their assistance. The High Commissioner had at his disposal no funds for
his work, except those accorded to him by the Governments interested. Even if he had
had funds, under the resolution by which the Council of the League appointed him, he
would not have been able to utilize those funds for purposes of charitable relief. The
High Commissioner made an appeal through the Acting President of the Council to
make available £ 30.000 which would have been sufficient to maintain the refugees
and to save them from starvation.405
401 Nevalainen, 114-115
402 Leitzinger II, 415
403 Here see Nevalainen, 116-124
404 Nevalainen, 124
405 OJ, 3rd year, No 1, Jan 1922, 57-58
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It can be observed from the League sources, that Nansen took his work in
coordinating the relief efforts very literally. He brought forward detailed reports from
various sources before the League Council. In case of Greek Refugees, this meant
reports from private charitable organizations as well as local (Greek) authorities.406
These documents included very precise plans; it could be brought into question
whether this was out of proportion from what was expected from Nansen according to
his original mandate as the High Commissioner.
         3.3.2. Legal Status and Travel Documents
The most formidable part of the League’s refugee policy was the work in the sector
of enhancing the legal position of refugees. All this goes to the basic elements of the
phenomenon, since in a compact form a refugee is a person seeking asylum in a
foreign country in order to escape persecution. Asylum is a form of protection that
allows individuals, who are in the country of refuge, to remain there, provided that they
meet the definition of a refugee and are not discounted from asylum.  Asylum as a
modern term was not in use in the beginning of the refugee work of the League. In
various connections the matters connected to practical asylum were included into a
larger package which was covered by the term “legal status”.
In everyday spoken language an asylum means approximately that it is allowed for a
refugee to stay and live in a country which is not his or her home country. It is a place
of refuge that is safe for the comer. States have the capacity to grant an asylum
according to the principle of sovereignty on their own territory. According to this
principle, no other state should be allowed to exercise any physical control over the
individuals staying on that territory.407
Person’s right to receive political and legal protection is problematic almost by
definition. It is quite commonly approved idea that people who have been persecuted in
their home country for political grounds, should be able to get asylum and protection in
another state. Then we come to a difficult clarification, whether individual cases can be
classified as political pressure, or as escape from justice based on justified criminal
allegations. These are practical matters the refugee workers meet in cases where the
406 E.g. Minutes of the 24. Session of the Council of the LON (17.-24.4.1923) Annex 515/OJ, 4th year, No 6, June
1923, 696-703
407 Riila, 40-41
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comers are in dispute with the present legal government of their own country on how,
and by whom, the country should be ruled.408
Even long before the present declarations of the human rights advocated by the UN,
there were exercises aiming to the same end. In 1917 a “Fundamental basis of the
human rights” was published under the umbrella of the American Institute of
International Law. It presented eight categories of international rights that could be
considered universal. In 1929 the International Institute of International Law issued a
Declaration on International Human Rights, in which the main arguments sound very
modern; people should have equal rights regardless of their race, sex, language or
religion.409  It should be recognized, however, that these declarations were not created
by intergovernmental institutions, and were weakly known by national decision makers.
Asylum seekers were returned to the place where they came from when it was
considered necessary and politically viable. This happened often regardless of the
possibilities to consider of letting them stay, and without studying the legal grounds of
the decision.410   Countries have traditionally used measures to prevent the asylum
seekers from arriving, and treated them harshly when they come. The Federal
Government of Switzerland presented a full account of the situation of the Russian
Refugees in the country in 1921. This contained a clarification on the legal status of the
refugees which was in principle determined by a convention of 1873 between Russia
and Switzerland. It became clear, that a number of federal stipulations had taken place
since the refugee problem appeared in Switzerland in 1919.411  The federal stipulations
were issued to instruct the local (Cantons) officials in their dealings with the Russian
and Armenian Refugees.
Expulsion is an order to leave the territory. In case of a refugee without a legal
nationality and passport, an expulsion can produce a situation where he or she is
confronted by an impossible equation: there is no other place to go anymore.412  In the
beginning of the 1920s, the High Commissioner tried to influence governments in order
to prevent expulsion of refugees. He had to intervene and find reasons for
postponements until other solutions could be found. That time Nansen still hoped that
408 Riila, 25-27
409 Francois, 316
410 Cf. Dummett, 125
411 OJ, Vol 2, July-August 1921, 494-496
412 Francois, 321-326
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the biggest of the problems, the issue of the Russian refugees, could be solved by
repatriation.413
The Inter-Governmental Conference on the Status of Refugees in June 1928 was
able to produce a document which covered almost all possible aspects concerning the
legal status of refugees. The most relevant recommendations were the ones
concerning the refraining from expulsion measures, fiscal equality with nationals,
facilities for freedom of movement, and most importantly, change in the passport
formula making it possible for the holders of the Nansen passport to return to the
country which issued the certificate. 12 States signed the Arrangement quite quickly
before the end of 1928, some with reservations.414
The 1928 Arrangement was related to the legal status of Russian and Armenian
refugees. The Convention concerning the International Status of Refugees 1933
created a legal status for those categories of refugees who were covered by the
Nansen Passport arrangement of 1928. Passport holders obtained thus a legal status,
although only few states respected it.415  Important step from theoretical point of view in
the 1933 Convention was the recognition of the rights of the refugees to obtain legal
treatment equivalent to the citizens or other residents of the country of sojourn.
According to this refugees should be entitled to legal aid. The Convention further
stipulated that refugees should not be exposed to extraordinary taxes or other
additional charges compared to ordinary citizens.416
The Russian and the Armenian refugees seem to have had a special position and
status during the Inter-war period. They had a legal status throughout the 1920s and
1930s, defined by international agreements. In Finland, the Russians crossing the
border were “refugees” in 1918-22. Later they became Russian “emigrants”.417  In
principle, the legal status of a refugee is generated approximately in the same way
today as it was established during those decades: there is an accepted international
definition on who is a refugee,418  and the individual states decide whether the status
can be granted. There are, however, some differences as well. Today the system is
clearer and more covering. On those days the system was only taking its initial steps.
413 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 361
414 OJ, 10th year, No 3, March 1929, 483-484
415 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 363
416 Francois, 363
417 The Finnish language doesn’t make the distinction on ‘emigration’ and ‘immigration’ as the English language
does.
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183
Therefore, there were only few countries that were really committed to the system on a
political level.
Granting asylum was mainly a humanitarian issue. Nevertheless, there were also
security considerations as well as social and economic consequences that
governments took into account in their decision making.419  Administrative detention
has been used to promote immigration control, either by facilitating expulsion, or by
ensuring that the aliens subject to immigration proceedings do not run off. The logic
has been that those in detention will be encouraged to leave the country. Further to this
goal, others will be discouraged from coming to the territory.420
The counterpoint to asylum and legal status of refugee is the return. If it is voluntary,
the normal term would repatriation. Involuntary return is often called expulsion. This
means that unwanted persons are forced to leave the country. Sometimes refugees
can be turned back already at the border. If the persons are already in the country,
banishing means a denial or cancelling of an asylum. Extradition happens on a request
of another state.421  The common thing for all these cases and terms is that a person
cannot stay in the country where he or she had fled to.
From a foreign policy view point, the decision to accept refugees was influenced by
the relations with other states, including international alliances, military pacts and trade
agreements. Western countries often saw themselves as “terre d’asile” in order to
demonstrate the superiority of western democracy compared to dictatorships.422  Many
countries have definitely granted asylums to unwanted refugees, because expelling or
returning them would have been, not only inhumane, but also harmful to the country’s
reputation.
It has been reported that several thousands of Russians were returned from Finland
to Russia in the beginning of the 1920s secretly, without any contact or cooperation
with the Soviet authorities. This was considered better since the people who wanted to
go back home didn’t normally want to deal with those authorities. In many cases more
official dealing could have meant severe punishments after getting back. Only a small
number of the “Kronstadt refugees” went back to Russia, even the Soviet Government
had granted a general amnesty for them.423
419 Cf. Joly, 32
420 Helton, 136-137
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The legal status and the right to asylum was widely contemplated in international
connections, although the situation varied from a country to another. In Finland, there
was no mentioning  about “asylum” in the national legislation during the 1920s. The
concept was vague; refugees could get protection, i.e. practical asylum for
humanitarian reasons. Asylum was considered to be an international arrangement, but
the protection was granted on purely national grounds. Justification for the protection,
“asylum”,  was derived from the general sense of justice.424  It was reported that the
local authorities or the border control sometimes took the matters into their own hands
regardless of the laws.425  The new decree of 1930 defined the granting of an asylum to
a refugee so that it was estimated what the real need for legal protection was. This
need was considered by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. In a negative case
the applicant of an asylum was to be expelled.426
Generally speaking, in the 1920s and 1930s there seems to have been very little
concern on the asylum and the legal basis of it. After the Second World War this aspect
has been addressed more frequently. Although some scholars expressed as their
opinion that the refugees should have a universal right to obtain asylum when
needed,427  the governments never widely recognized such principle. Normally
governments would reserve themselves the right to decide whether asylum can be
granted or not. As an illustration from the Inter-war period, a joint meeting of
Scandinavian countries’ officials on refugee matters came to the conclusion that
governments can use their sovereign right to consider the asylum matters and make
decisions of their own. Refugees did not own a subjective right to obtain the desired
status.428
Most of the asylums granted were so called territorial asylums, which means that
they were not based on e.g. diplomatic status.429  Another basis was extralegal
principle, i.e. the status was not based on any national or international legislation.430  In
practice, the refugees were often treated as any other foreigners.431  In many
connections, asylum was compared to a political status. The situation was manifold
and unclear. Some might have been classified as political refugees for the reason that
424 Nevalainen, 74
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they had fled the Bolsheviks, but some had also escaped from the British troops
operating in North-Western Russia.432  Some countries had specific laws concerning
aliens in general and refugees in particular. In some other countries, however, officials
were using ordinary legislation when making decisions on expelling aliens.433  The legal
and political protection reached the refugees in most cases only on a formal level. That
official protection could not change the reality that the refugees had hard times in
economic terms, in their everyday life.
In connection to the 1928 Arrangement, the League Assembly particularly urged that
states should not expel a refugee from their territory until it had been secured that he
would be received into another country.  This was seen important, because the worst
was happening in many incidents, as the people had to travel from a country to
another. The aim of the appeal of the Assembly was to underline that a refugee should
not be put in a position of an outlaw. This appeal was repeated annually in the
resolutions of the Assembly, but unfortunately neglected by the governments. The
1933 Convention had provisions on expulsion and non-admittance at the frontier.
However, no significant change was proven during the years.434
On the whole, it can be said that the validity of the 1928 Arrangement as a legal
instrument was questionable. For example, France had signed the document. When
finally discussed among the proper authorities in France, it was not endorsed. It was
realized that that the definition of the legal status of the refugees and of their protection
required something more categorical than benevolent recommendation as a
demonstration of the good will of the ones who drafted the texts.435  During the next
decade, the 1933 Convention repeated and put together the principles laid down in the
previous agreements concerning juridical conditions. On paper, refugees were
supposed to have access to the courts of law and be able to obtain legal assistance
without any obstructions.436   Ratification and compliance with this kind of
arrangements was always a problem throughout the period under examination.
It can be stated, however, that the World Organizations did their utmost to try to
avoid overpoliticizing of the refugee questions. This was an inevitable consequence of
the nature of the organizations.  The League, and especially the ILO, wanted to
432 Churchill, Stacy: Itä-Karjalan kohtalo 1917-1922: Itä-Karjalan itsehallintokysymys Suomen ja Neuvosto-
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emphasize the neutral, technical and impartial nature of the work in all possible
connections.  Because the principle of national sovereignty was followed, it was left to
the states to grant or refuse asylum to refugees.  Nation-states created the de facto
practice of non-refoulement. Nations would not normally insist the return of a political
refugee in the absence of specific extradition treaties.437  This means generally that
refugees in practice have been protected from the country where they were likely to
face persecution or danger to life or freedom.438
The refugee question in Finland was politicized to certain extent. The right wing
parties showed sympathy for Finnish related Carelians and Ingermanlanders (or
Ingrians). They were seen as potential allies in the struggle against the common
enemy, Russia, with its expansive history. On the other hand, the left wing parties saw
the refugees as competitors in the labour market.  In the Finnish Parliament this was
manifested in the discussion where the left wing parties wanted to wash their hands
when the bill had to be paid, since according to their thinking, the whole refugee
problem was a creation of irresponsible expansive politics of the right wing activists. In
principle, both the left and the right, took a humanitarian attitude towards the refugee
problem as such.439
The biggest obstacle for conducting a normal life for a refugee was often the lack of
identification and travel documents. Therefore it has been necessary to establish
provisional arrangements in order to tackle the issue and alleviate the problem. In our
modern world a special certificate of identity, sometimes called an alien's passport, is a
travel document issued by states to foreign nationals who are unable to obtain a
passport from their state of nationality. Some states also issue certificates of identity to
their own nationals as a form of emergency passports. Holders of these certificates of
identity are not automatically entitled to go back into the state which issued the
certificates. A refugee travel document is normally more potent. It is issued to a refugee
by the state in which he or she normally resides, allowing him or her to travel outside
that state and to return there. It can be estimated that most refugees are not able to
obtain passports from their states of nationality (from which they have escaped) and
therefore need some type of document.
437 Plaut, 79-80
438 Maluwa, Tiyanjana: Recent developments in refugee law and policy in Malawi. (In The Living Law of Nations:
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Major part of the Russian exiles lacked any kind of identification document. Some
had old identity cards issued by the Russian Empire, but no other country would accept
them as legal identification. Some states, like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Finland
issued identity cards for refugees, but these documents were not accepted outside
these states. This was a clear handicap and an obstacle for reasonable existence.
Other countries would not like to receive aliens who were unidentified.440  If a person
managed to enter into a country without an identity, his or her life would not be much of
a joy, since it was difficult for unidentified persons to get a job or find lodging.441
Some kind of an identity document was required by most countries for people who
were resident on the soil of the state. This meant that something had to be done for
people without a legal and valid identity. States had internal identification systems.
Moreover, in many countries (like Finland) refugees needed an internal passport for
moving from a place to another inside the country. In Finland, this kind of travel
document (“passi”) could normally be issued by local police or representative of
Refugee Relief organization.442  Similarly, authorities could also issue certificates that
ensured the departure from a country. These documents, however, were not normal
passports. The Soviet authorities also required some kind of a passport or travel
document from those who wanted to go back to Russia in order to settle there.443
The actions taken by the Soviet Government to denaturalize its former citizens, who
were refugees abroad, were also contributing to the initiatives towards the international
refugee passport system. In July 1922 an international conference on Russian
refugees and their passports was convened. Sixteen governments attended the
conference. The conference adopted a simplified passport formula which substituted
the former insufficient national documents. It contained all “normal” passport features,
also stating that the bearer of the document was a person of Russian origin with no
other nationality or any citizenship. One of the motivations that Nansen seemed to
have in creating the passport system was the better prospects that some western
countries could offer to the refugees, compared to the impoverished neighbor
countries. The system made the resettlement possible for those who were willing to
travel on.444
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In the planning phase of the arrangements for the conferences which established
the identification document system in the 1920s, it was realized and recognized that
the system could never be universal and binding. The conferences recognized the
different conditions prevailing in different countries concerning the issuing of
documents as well as the acceptance of them. It was necessary to allow certain
flexibility, which was needed since many states were applying the system in their own
way, deriving from the legislative ground and administrative practices.445
The most significant achievement in this line of international work was the
identification system which became known as the Nansen passport. Nansen passports
are internationally still recognized identity cards first issued by the League of Nations to
stateless refugees. Approximately 450,000 Nansen passports were issued during the
Inter-war period, helping hundreds of thousands of stateless people to immigrate to a
country that would have them. It has been widely considered as one of the great
successes that could be attributed to the League of Nations
 As early as in March 1922 Nansen was able to present a proposal for a special
form of certificate of identity to the Governments of the Members of the LON for their
consideration. Nansen appealed to the Governments to agree to grant such certificates
to refugees in their territories who may desire them and to provide visas to the
certificates as they would grant visas to ordinary passports. In the same special report
Nansen also appealed to the Governments of the Member States to grant visas free of
charge, since it was seen pointless to use the relief funds for the refugees’ visas. The
High Commissioner wished that the Governments would instruct their consular
representatives to grant the visas without delay and free of charge.446  By May 1922,
several countries had responded and started issuing free visas. Nansen was able to
report on favourable responses in case of Great Britain, Greece, France, Switzerland,
Austria, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Poland.447
A Conference of government representatives adopted a simplified form of identity
certificate in July 5, 1922 as an “Arrangement with regard to the issue of Certificates of
Identity to Russian Refugees”. Sixteen countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Romania,
the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) were represented
445 Francois, 359
446 Minutes of  the 17.  Session of  the Council  of  the LON (24.-28.3.1922),  Annex 321a/OJ,  3rd year, No 5, May
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in the Conference. The new simplified form resembled in all important respects those
already issued by certain countries, e.g. Germany and Czechoslovakia. The proposed
document contained all information usually included in a passport and stated that the
bearer was a Russian national by origin and has acquired no other nationality.448  This
arrangement was finally adopted by 53 States. This is how the famous Nansen
Passport became as a central element of the international refugee work.449  This type
of document was not totally unprecedented, but certainly innovative at that situation. In
1927 the Third General Conference on Communications and Transit adopted a
Recommendation relating to Identity and Travelling Documents for Persons Without or
of Doubtful Nationality. This recommendation signaled the introduction of modern
alien’s passport.450
Nansen’s staff was involved in the designing work of the passport formula, and
representatives of the Russian refugees’ organizations in a similar manner. League
Council sent an appeal to Member states for approving the system after the July
conference.  The first Government to reply was Finland on 15.8.1922. In the reply, the
Government of Finland informed the League that the passport system has been
approved, and that it will be applied from 1.October same year. Soon after that, also
France and Britain replied positively.451  Consequently, many other announcements by
Governments started to take place. In January 1923 there were already 21 states
applying the passport arrangement.452
When the Nansen Passports for Russian refugees were introduced in 1922, it was a
matter of national authorities to ratify and execute the measures connected to the
arrangement. As an example, in Finland it was not set into force by a normal decree,
but instead there was a decision by the President of the Republic assigning the
executive power to the secret police EKP.453  The EKP wanted that Nansen Passports
should be granted only to refugees who needed it for travelling abroad.454  Finnish
authorities cooperated with the Soviet authorities in order to double check whether a
Soviet citizenship had been granted to the applicants of Nansen Passports. There were
reports by local police authorities that some holders of the Nansen Passports had not
448 See the document form;  Minutes of the 19. Session of the Council of the LON (17.-24.7.1922)/OJ, 3rd year,
No 8 (part II), August 1922, 926-927
449 See Appendix V A and V B, forms of the Nansen Passport
450 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 360
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453 Leitzinger II, 173-174
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actually travelled, but obviously wanted to have the document for other (security)
reasons. These passports were considered to secure the asylum and residence better
that ordinary permits granted by governors.455
The South African Government replied in October 1922 that the proposed identity
certificate form for Russian refugees could not be applied in South Africa as such, but a
similar form named as “Emergency certificate of Nationality” is in use for same
purposes.456  This example shows how governments accepted the identity certificate
system by February 1923, either in practice or in principle. There were, however, also
examples of states (Belgium, Canada, and Estonia) that had indicated being not
prepared to issue these documents.457  In his report in July 1923, Nansen stated that
almost all Members of the LON interested in the question had adopted the identity
certificate system.458
In 1924 the National Armenian Delegation informed the High Commissioner that
approximately 320.000 Armenian refugees in various countries are in an urgent need of
identity certificates. Nansen presented a plan according to the Council resolution made
in September 1923. The plan was submitted for the consideration of interested
governments. In the proposed form it was clearly stated that the certificate was not
valid for return to the country which issued it. It was also supposed to cease to be valid
if the bearer entered Turkish territory.459
The High Commissioner and his staff drafted an official “Plan for the issue of a
Certificate of Identity to Armenian Refugees” in 1924. This time no conference was
deemed necessary. Instead, the plan was circulated to governments for their approval.
Since the procedure was seen already in case of Russian refugees, 39 states were
able to recognize the plan of Nansen Passports for Armenians.460  The Council adopted
a resolution in its 30th session in September 9, 1924, deciding that the convening of a
special conference for consideration of the question appears not necessary and the
plan drawn up by the High Commissioner can be regarded as definitive. The Council
455 Leitzinger II, 175
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also invited the Governments interested in the question to consider giving their formal
adhesion to the plan.461
Meantime, governments indicated their support for the plan. Most countries were in
practice prepared to adopt the system. There were some states, however, which could
not show unreserved favourable attitude for a reason or another. Most governments
didn’t find it necessary to convene a conference on the matter then or later.462  Finland
was not active when the passport system was extended to the Armenians, although
countries like Sweden did recognized the passports for Armenians.463  The above
mentioned plans were supplemented in 1926 and 1928. By these later arrangements
the Nansen Passports became available also for Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean,
Assimilated (Syrian and Kurdish) as well as for Turkish refugees.464
It appears that the High Commissioner together with the League advisors and the
concerned governments were considering two different models for finding a solution to
the legal problems resulting from the lack of passports and other documents among the
refugees. The first was that the necessary papers should be provided by the
governments of the countries where the refugees had found a temporary abode. The
second was that these papers should be issued by the High Commissioner acting on
behalf of the League of Nations. After some consideration Nansen finally came to the
conclusion that the first option was preferable, since it gained significant support
among the national representatives.465   In1926 it was confirmed that the price of the
Nansen Passport should be the same as the price of national passport.466
Nansen passports could be issued to Armenian refugees from 1924, and to Turks,
Assyrians, and Assyro-Chaldeans from 1928. In Finland, the head of the Secret Police,
Esko Riekki considered this very disadvantageous for Finland, since especially
Armenians were known as “adventurers” in the country which had received people of
this nationality also before, through the connection of being a part of the Russian
Empire. It was also suspected that the Soviet Union would use this opportunity to send
agents to its neighbouring countries. Consequently, Finland didn’t issue Nansen
461 Minutes of the 30. Session of the Council of the LON (20.8.-3.10.1924)/OJ, 5th year, No 10, Oct 1924, 1292
462 E.g. OJ, 5th year, No 11 (part II), Nov 1924, 1714-1717
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Passports to Armenians.467  In the Finnish system, the Security Service  EKP took care
of the tasks connected to the documents issued to the refugees. Nansen Passports
were thus issued only for Russian refugees. When the League system was extended to
further groups of refugees, Finland did not consider it appropriate or necessary to
comply with these arrangements either.468
In many countries there was no decree on who should be the issuing authority of the
Nansen Passport. In Britain it was very loosely defined. In Finland the police authorities
were the issuing officials.469  The Nansen Passport was not valid for return to the
issuing country in the beginning of its existence. Later in the 1920s also return was
made possible by international arrangements.470  The Nansen passport was in many
instances a sojourn permit as such.  Although it was not required from the refugees
while staying in a country, it had the qualification of giving the individual refugee a
better possibility to turn to the representatives of the High Commissioner.471
Passport matters were political and thus difficult to the ILO.  Since they were an
essential part of refugee work, it was impossible for the ILO to refuse to handle the
issues. In practice, that meant receiving applications.472   An international refugee
conference of 1926 recognized unanimously the right of the Labour Office to apply for
different types of visas for the refugees. In the same conference, it was recommended
that refugees without means should be able to obtain identity and travel documents
free of charge.473  This became actual in 1928, when Albert Thomas acquired some
3000 visas from different recipient countries for Russian refugees expelled from
Constantinople. In this connection, Thomas also had to negotiate with the Turkish
authorities on the delay of expulsions.474
The Nansen Passport system was a designated formula to help certain groups of
refugees. The only general measure affecting all persons deprived of nationality was
the 1927 recommendation by the Communications and Transit Organization. The
recommendation urged states to employ a uniform “document of identity and travel”
which was similar to the Nansen certificate bearing also the mention “Good for return”
to the country of issue. Most of the Members of the League accepted the
467 Leitzinger II, 516
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473 Minutes of the 32. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1926, 295 and Annex B
474 Minutes of the 38. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 173
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recommendations in principle, but in practice, as in many previous cases, a uniform
document was never achieved. Most countries continued to issue special alien’s
documents of their own. These documents had different names. In Britain it was a
“document of identity” given by the Home Office, in Germany a “Fremdenpass”, in
Holland a “Gunstpass”.475
The arrangements on internationally approved identity system were seen as very
significant from the viewpoint of the public image of the League.  It could be thought,
that in this respect, the League had corresponding capacities with independent states,
with its own passports and stamps.476  The League was, after all, an entity compiled by
plenipotentiary state members. Even the members were not donating any of their
sovereign rights or capacities to the League the position of the Intergovernmental
Organ was very different from that of the international voluntary organizations.
       3.3.3. Repatriation
The question of repatriating refugees during the Inter-war period materialized
especially in connection to Russians. Generally, if the refugees are able to go back to
their country of origin, it can be called repatriation as a method of solution of the
refugee problem. Moving must be then voluntary. According to the principle of non-
refoulement, refugees must not be returned in any manner against their will to
territories in which their lives or freedom may be endangered.477  Historically, voluntary
repatriation has not been easy to arrange. However, as there are some examples, it is
certainly possible.478  Many Russian refugees didn’t want go back to their original home
country. Reasons for that were various. Basically, returning may not be safe in cases,
where the reasons for fleeing are still remaining. Typically, former home area is
populated by violent political or religious enemies. Most of the family members and
relatives may have been killed. A whole new life with a family, work and dwelling has
475 Bentwich 1935, 121
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often been acquired in the place of refuge. In these cases, there is no motivation to go
back.479
For Fridtjof Nansen, it was quite natural to occupy himself with the repatriation plans
soon after his nomination as the High Commissioner for Refugees. In the beginning of
his duties Nansen was optimistically thinking that the Russian refugees could go back
to Russia. 480  He had just finished the task of repatriating half a million prisoners of
war. In his hopes the refugee problem was a temporary one, and he thought that it
would be possible to repatriate the bulk of the fugitives. Due to his multiple roles in the
beginning of the 1920s, Nansen had a permanent representative in Moscow. This
connection was also used in view to organize the possible repatriation. Some kind of
safety guarantees were discussed in this respect.481  It took some years to realize that
eventually this plan had to be abandoned.482
In his General Report in March 1922, Nansen estimated that the final solution483 of
the refugee problem in Europe was to get the refugees repatriated to their native land.
It was, however, more than challenging to try to tackle this program, since the ravages
of famine and disease throughout Russian territory precluded the execution of any
such proposal.484   In modern discussion, repatriation has been seen as the best and
most desirable solution for the refugees. The rationale for this is simple; people are at
their best at home. The only large efforts made by the League system that could be
called repatriation programmes, were prepared for the Russian refugees. For others,
alternative options seemed more suitable. These options were settlement and
resettlement.
Nansen’s statement in another report in May 1922 concluded that the repatriation of
the refugees to Russia at the present time did not appear to be a practicable solution to
the question. This was a contrast to what he had reported earlier that year. Based on
the reports the High Commissioner had received from the international agencies,
Nansen had come to a conclusion that it was better for the refugees to remain in
Western and Central Europe than to return to Russia.485  Therefore, the High
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Commissioner continued asking for financial allocations for the assistance and support
of the refugees.
The repatriation of Russian refugees from Bulgaria between 1922 and 1924 under
League of Nations supervision represents the earliest international attempt to organize
a coordinated refugee return. The Russian Red Cross in Great Britain provided relief
for people exiled from Russia and their children who were in the country. Many of these
people found it difficult to adapt to a new way of life in a foreign country. Russian
refugees were being shuttled from a country to another. Practically, all countries close
to the Soviet State were involved.
Repatriation was also an official issue in the negotiations and agreements between
the Soviet Russia and the bordering states.  There were talks concernig reciprocical
excange of people. Bolsheviks granted amnesty for those would return. It has been
reported, that the trust for those arrangementts was not very high.486  The feasibility of
repatriation as a durable solution depends on political factors, among them the reason
for the flight. There may be great differences between the individual refugees who flee.
Some escape personal persecution and some can be members of the group that flee
the impact of a political struggle.487  It was reported that in 1922 some 181.000 Russian
refugees returned to Soviet-Russia voluntarily. The Soviet authorities were not
altogether satisfied with this development, since it was obviously difficult for them to
supervise the repatriation.488   Although there is no statistical evidence, it is fair to say
that a great part of this repatriation process was spontaneous, i.e. self-initiated by the
refugees themselves, and not actively organized by the refugee agencies. When
evaluating the success of the projects, it has been shown in international studies that in
most refugee movements the spontaneous repatriation forms a major part of the total
result.489
Nansen’s preferred option in the beginning was to seek the repatriation of refugees,
but he was absolutely clear in considering that this should be voluntary. Many
refugees, however, didn’t want to return. They and the political opponents of the new
Soviet regime wanted to ensure that refugees were allowed to remain in the countries
of asylum, or to be resettled elsewhere.490  This was politically convenient. Many of the
refugees who had fled because of the rise of the Bolshevism, had their suitcases
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packed, waiting for the chance to go back. Many of them were active in establsihing
projects with the aim of overthrowing Lenin and his Soviet regime, with the help of
foreign powers.491  It was quite natural that the most active ones could not nourish the
idea of returning after it became obvious that the Soviet state was a permanent fact.
Repatriation of the refugees faced difficulties at the Russian side of the border.
Soviet authorities wanted to select those who were allowed to return. Special
evacuation committees were established for that purpose. It has been reported that the
working methods of these committees were not very efficient.492  It is always difficult to
determine whether the circumstances have changed so that the people can go back.
This evaluation and repatriation are always connected. The country of origin has, in
principle, a duty to receive back its citizens. Again, the state of origin may choose to
ignore these duties and refuse.493  Uncertain and contested property rights have also
been considered to be an important obstacle to refugees’ return. It happens quite often
that a rearrangement on property takes place in conflict situations.  The uncertainty
about the availability of a home on return reduces the incentive for the refugees to go
back.494  It also became obvious in the 1920s, that even for the Soviet authorities
working in the evacuation committees it was not clear, how covering the general
amnesties were.495
Nansen made an effort to negotiate a general arrangement on the repatriation of the
Russian refugees 1922-1923. The work was not completed because of the inconsistent
conditions posed by the Soviet authorities. There was also a deep distrust on the
conditions among the refugees.496  The complexness of the international refugee
administration led by the League didn’t particularly encourage the individual refugees to
lean on the system. It happened from time to time that the helpers and the refugees did
not speak the same language.  It has been shown by studies that generally speaking,
the irresolution of the refugees in dealing with the international system is sometimes
displayed when the refugees choose to go back home spontaneously.497 This is exactly
what happened in the exercises with the Russians.
The repatriations that were carried out practially on the grounds of bilateral ad hoc
agreements in the beginning of the 1920s, were not completely succesful. People were
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not able to cross the border even with temporary permits. The reason was reportedly
the chaotic enforfement of the border control at the Russian side.498   After all, it seems
that no permanent bilateral or multilateral internationally covering agreements  were
established for the repatriation.  Most of the returners went back individually, on their
own expense, and at their own risk.499
The situation in Soviet Russia was under constant changes, which was reflected in
the faciltitation of repatariation. The rules and conditions were changed from time to
time, and the practical arrangements sometimes worked, sometimes didn’t.  It was also
true, that some of those who returned, had a merciless end.500   Some refugees were
actually repatriated with the help of officials, but the program on the whole was not a
real success. By 1923 the scheme eventually came to its end.501
In the case of the Russians, voluntariness, safety, and protection in repatriation
were demonstrated to certain extent, although the situations were used for political
purposes by the refugee groups interested in resisting Soviet state power. Repatriation
was thus a fundamentally political project.  It eventually failed in the Russian-Bulgarian
case because of disputes between the League of Nations, the Soviet State, and the
Russian refugees themselves regarding the nature of the operations. These questions
of political communities and their ambitions in general have posed the greatest
challenge to repatriation as a durable solution to all refugee crises.502
By 1924 it was clear that the Soviet Government would not take back Russia’s
former subjects with conditions that would be acceptable for the League officials.503
From 1925 very few went back to Russia. If people moved, they traveled to third
countries, some even overseas. It was estimated that 181.400 refugees went back
1921-1931. However  rated, this was only a tiny number among those who came to
west.504
The biggest obstacle in refugees’ mind was the uncertainty. There were promises on
amnesty, but many were doubtful on those promises, since the messages were often
unclear and even contradictory. When negotiations between Soviet authorities and
Finnish Government were conducted, it was reported that the Soviets very clearly
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501 Grahl-Madsen, 361
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stated that some groups were not wanted back to Russia. This included those who had
carried arms against the Bolsheviks, as well as the former officials of the Czarist police
and the clergymen.505
There were also other obstacles during and after the turmoil of the revolutionary
warfare. The British troops recruited some Eastcarelians to their ranks when they were
maintaining the Archangelsk government. Many of these recruits escaped and were
afterwards considered as deserters.506  Negotiations were held between the British and
the Finnish authorities on the conditions of their return.507
In 1923-1924 Russian and Finnish authorities had several talks on the return of the
refugees. It seems that the refugees were going back in small groups, consisting of few
dozens of people. For each returning group there was a consultation between the
authorities in order to clear who was going, when and where. The checkpoints were
defined, and temporary passports were issued for those who were crossing the
border.508  In some instances the Finnish State Council (the Cabinet) also made
decisions concerning the arrangements made with the Soviet Russia, also instructing
the customs officials with the practicalities of returns.509   Finnish officials felt obliged to
make a note to the Soviet colleagues for the incidents wherein the returning people had
been arrested and convicted against the promises of amnesty.510
Despite the difficulties and irregularities, it seems that many of those who really
returned, were well received in Russia. The representatives of the High Commissioners
in Russia reported that the spontaneous repatriation gave good results511. Reports
revealed that Soviet authorities handled the situations favorably, even in cases where
the returning refugees had gone back home illegally, without any arrangements by
authorities.512  Later Nansen’s reports contained also information contradictory to this.
The emigration of Armenian refugees to Erivan was a movement to a new country of
settlement, rather than repatriation, but if regarded as an example of repatriation, the
numbers were quite remarkable. About 30.000 people were subject to this organized
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movement.513   At the end of the 1930s, John Hope Simpson presented as his
estimation that deliberate repatriation on a large scale is scarcely relevant in a
discussion of practical instruments of solution. By his words, “in predictable
circumstances voluntary return of refugees to their home countries could occur only on
so small scale as not to affect the refugee problem itself”.514
         3.3.4. International Agreements and Arrangements
The number of different international arrangements reflects the intensity of the work
the intergovernmental community was conducting on behalf of the refugees. The series
of the success in reaching international agreements and arrangements regularly over
the 1920s also indicates clearly the continuity and conscious strive towards organized
manner and discipline in handlings of refugee matters.
In the beginning of his refugee work career Nansen strove to obtain an ambitious
personal project. The objective was an agreement of the states in the League, which
would give the refugees the same freedom of movement and the same measure of
protection as was enjoyed by nationals of a state.515  In most cases, legal and other
arrangements concerning foreigners in general are based on conditions of reciprocity.
In case of refugees, this cannot normally be achieved. Traditionally, it has been difficult
for states to make concessions without compensation based on the idea of reciprocity.
Many bilateral treaties were concluded between nations providing assistance for
destitute subjects of the contracting countries. There were attempts to generalize these
obligations by an international or a multilateral convention.  Some of the arrangements
and agreements achieved during the 1920s and 1930s reflected these ambitions. The
nature of the final documents as non binding recommendations was always the
obstacle that prevailed. It often happened, that the international radicalism which was
expressed in conferences at Geneva and elsewhere, was confronted by national
conservative ambitions when the recommendations were supposed to be implemented
by the governments.516   The following concentrates on the agreements concerning
refugees explicitly. Other treaties are excluded from this deliberation.
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The Conference summoned by the Council of the League in August 1921
concerning the (Russian) refugee questions and the nomination of the High
Commissioner can be considered as the first arrangement on refugees coordinated by
the League. 13 States and other delegations were represented at the Conference, and
as a result, a series of unanimously adopted resolutions were passed. In those
documents, the first outlines for the work of the High Commissioner were
established.517
Nansen’s first task as the High Commissioner was to provide the refugees with
some kind of element of nationality. Refugees were stateless people and the first
necessity was a passport in order to be able to travel from a country to another. The
Arrangement with regard to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees
was adopted on 5.7.1922 by an international conference convened by the High
Commissioner. It can be considered a great success, since 53 states were able to
adopt it. This arrangement was the one that established the “Nansen Passport”.518
History proved this arrangement to be very significant, and this travel document system
and administration was current for couple of decades.519
Although the international conference convened by Nansen in 1922 adopted an
identity certificate which was approved by the Council of the League, Nansen could not
accomplish all he had been aiming at. The governments were intimidated of having
permanently a large number of alien inhabitants. Therefore, a weaker status for the
passport had to be accepted. The new Nansen passport was valid only for one year at
the time, without a right to return to the country of issue.520   It  must  be  taken  into
account, that all these provisions were authorized by an international conference
possessing no binding authority. At this point, there was still no generally valid
definition for a Russian refugee.521
The Protocol of Lausanne was signed on 24.7.1923. This protocol was a part of the
Peace Treaty between Turkey and the Allied powers. The Treaty included some
territorial clauses, which, in turn, led into other arrangements. There were articles
concerning nationality, protection of minorities, prisoners of war etc. 150 Turkish
persons were named in the Protocol.522  Later these people got an official legal status
517 E.g. OJ, Vol 3, Dec 1921, 1114-1115
518 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 360
519 Simpson 1938, 610
520 Bentwich 1935, 116
521 Grahl-Madsen, Atle: The Status of Refugees in International Law. Vol. I: Refugee Character. Leiden 1966, 122
522 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 361
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as refugees, called “the Friends of Allies”. In the Protocol, the League guaranteed to
protect the non-Moslem citizens of Turkey. There was, however, no obstacle for the
Turkish government to strip the nationality and make people practically stateless in
their own country.523
The refugee questions were often connected to other minority questions in the
exercises of the League system. It was thought that in this manner the established
position of refugees could best be reached. After the Lausanne Treaty 1923, the
League Council appointed a Swedish, a Danish, and a Spanish national as members of
the Mixed Commission provided by the Article 11 of the Treaty concerning the
exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. The rest of the members were appointed
by the Greek and Turkish Governments.524
After the Armenians had become a regular issue on the League’s agenda, Nansen
paid more attention to them, while the “old issues” concerning Russian refugees were
supposed to be handled by the Refugee Service of the ILO. In 1924 the High
Commissioner considered the issue of identification documents as the most significant
question, and a “Plan for the Issue of a Certificate of Identity to Armenian Refugees”
was drafted. There was no specific conference, but the Plan was simply circulated to
Governments and later adopted by 39 States.525  It was decided that the Plan would be
simply applied to ‘persons of Armenian origin’ who are not ‘Russian refugees within the
meaning of the Arrangement concluded at Geneva on July 5th, 1922’.526
The first really covering exercise took place in 1926. The Council of the League
authorized Nansen to convene an international Conference on the extension of the
work on behalf of the Russian and Armenian Refugees. An Inter-Governmental
Conference was held in Geneva on 10.-12.5.1926. 24 countries were represented. The
arrangement document was agreed upon on 12.5.1926. In June, Nansen reported to
the Council on the results of the Conference. One of the outcomes of the Conference
was the recognition of the necessity to create a revolving fund to provide for the cost of
the transportation and settlement of refugees. The legality of the Nansen passports
was strengthened in principle, and as a result of the conference, the League Council in
523 Simpson 1939, 32
524 Minutes of the 26. Session of the Council of the LON (31.8.-10.9.1923)/OJ, 4th year, No 11, Nov 1923, 1312-
1313
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its resolution invited the Member States and others to give effect to the
arrangements.527
The intergovernmental Refugee Passport Conference was summoned in connection
to a bigger exercise concerning passports in general. The Advisory and Technical
Committee for Communications and Transit arranged a Passport Conference in
Geneva on May 12-18, 1926. 45 States, Areas, as well as organizations were
represented. The Conference adopted a set of recommendations, including questions
relating to emigrants and persons without nationality. These recommendations were
not, however, very radical by nature.528
As a result of the 1926 Conference, another more far-reaching Arrangement was
adopted. It laid down the definitions of “Russian and Armenian” refugees. These
arrangements were subsequently approved by the Council of the League as well as the
Governing Body of the International Labour Organization. The definitions were as
follows:
“Russian: Any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the
protection of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and who has
not acquired another nationality.
 Armenian: Any person of Armenian origin formerly a subject of the Ottoman Empire
who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the Turkish
Republic and who has not acquired another nationality.” 529
As the word ‘origin’ in the definition referred to a territory, it was considered clear
that the definition applied without distinction of race or religion.530 There was a
consideration to extend the measures taken on behalf of the Russian and Armenian
refugees to other analogous categories of refugees. It appears, according to the source
material, that the initiative was made by Nansen. The Governing Body of the ILO took
no action on the initiative which was reported to the LON Council as such.531
The Third Conference on Communications and Transit in 1927 has been mentioned
in connection of refugee protection, because it took on its agenda questions closely
527 Minutes of  the 40.  Session of the Council  of  the LON (7.-10.6.1925)/OJ,  7th year, No 7, July 1926, 875-876
and 983-985
528 E.g. “The Conference considers it desirable that certain facilities for travelling should be granted to persons
without nationality… etc” OJ, 7th year, No 8, August 1926, 1088-1098
529 Minutes of the 47. Session of the Council of the LON, Annex 990/OJ, No 10, Oct 1927, 1336
530 Grahl-Madsen 1966, 123
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related to the problems of refugees, although the aim and purpose of the organization
itself was more general. The conference occupied itself with issues related to stateless
people, including also other groups than those which were defined as refugees. The
recommendations adopted by that conference included detailed instructions for identity
documents designated for travelers without a citizenship or nationality. One of the
recommendations recognized also the fact that bearers of the “aliens travel documents”
were not usually entitled to protection of the diplomatic and consular officials of the
country that issued the documentation.532
The above mentioned Conference on Communications and Transit adopted a
recommendation relating to Identity and Travelling Documents for Persons Without or
of Doubtful Nationality. This was the beginning of alien’s passports.533  This
recommendation showed its significance later when the German refugee problem
emerged. It was possible for German refugees to get a travel document only by virtue
of this set-up.534
The 1927 recommendation was the only general measure affecting all persons
deprived of nationality. The recommendation urged states to introduce a consistent
document of identity and travel which was similar to the Nansen certificate with an
improvement of the property “Good for return” to the country of issue. This
arrangement was also seen to improve the possibilities for the holder to obtain visas
and other permits.535   It was obviously easier for states to approve this kind of
arrangement under the umbrella of a neutral organization. This set-up was presumably
not considered as political as the arrangements initiated by the High Commissioner
were.
The Expert Committee which prepared the proposal and devised the document had
further desires and more ambitious goals. These more generous proposals were
strongly opposed by the representatives of the totalitarian states, and at the end they
were abandoned. Most of the Members of the League accepted the recommendations
in principle, but in practice a uniform document for stateless persons was never
achieved.  Most countries continued to issue their own special documents for refugees
and other aliens.536
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Towards the end of the 1920s, the body of experience on problems of refugees, as
well as legal responses to them, had increased to a point where the advocates of the
refugees could even consider attempts to create a more comprehensive arrangement
for the control of situations.
The Conference in June 1928 was able to produce a document which covered
almost all aspects of the status of refugees in general.537   The final document was
issued on 30.6.1928. The conference of the representatives of governments drew up
an arrangement concerning the juridical status of the Russian and Armenian refugees.
The binding effect of the documentation is much more difficult to certify. It
recommended that the High Commissioner, through his representatives in different
countries, should exercise a number of consular functions, such as:
-certifying the identity and civil status of the refugees, as well as strength of records
in the country of origin
-giving certificates to the refugees of their service history, of university degree etc.
-recommending the refugees to the competent authorities in various matters
The recommendations stated further, that the personal status of a refugee should
derive from the law of the place of residence, unless the law of the country of origin
was recognized or applicable to the situation.538
The League started preparing for the arrangement of the extension of the measures
taken to assist Russian and Armenian refugees also to other categories of refugees in
1927. In November 1927 the Secretary General of the League issued a circular letter to
State Members and Turkey, soliciting for opinions and positions on the matter. On the
basis of the replies of the States, there seemed to be very little opposition to the
proposal.539
Since the idea of extension received substantial support from the Member States of
the LON, the Council issued a resolution in its 50th Session in June 1928, inviting the
Inter-Governmental Conference on the Status of Refugees (28.6.1928) to consider
appropriate recommendations in order to extend the benefits previously granted to
Russian and Armenian refugees to other categories of refugees. It was particularly
defined, that these categories would be the Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish
Refugees. The particular groups in question were referred to as refugees who were in
conditions analogous to those of Russian and Armenian Refugees.540   From other
537 OJ, 10th year, No 3, March 1929, 483-487
538 Bentwich 1935, 116-17
539 OJ, 9th year, No 3, March 1928, 357-359
540 Minutes of the 50. Session of the Council of the LON (4.-9.6.1928)/OJ, 9th year, No 7, July 1928, 897-898
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connections we can also conclude, that these categories were small enough to be
managed.
The Assyrians and the Assyro-Chaldeans were scattered in several locations in the
Near East (notably in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon), in Greece, and in South of Russia.
The number of the Turkish Refugees was very small, only about 150 individuals, but
they were considered politically significant, since they were referred to as the “Friends
of the Allies” and proscribed by the Turkish Government.541
The Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, and Assimilated Refugees were defined as follows:
“Any person of Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean origin, and also by assimilation any person
Syrian or Kurdish origin, who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the protection of the
State to which he previously belonged and who has not acquired or does not possess
another nationality”.542 Turkish refugees were defined separately: “Any person of
Turkish origin, previously a subject of the Ottoman Empire, who under the terms of the
Protocol of Lausanne of 24 July 1923, does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the
protection of the Turkish Republic and who has not acquired another nationality” . The
words ‘Turkish origin’ was included in this definition in order to contradistinguish these
‘Turkish refugees’ from other refugees from the territory formerly belonging to the
Ottoman Empire.543
The same Conference also adopted an Agreement concerning the functions of the
representatives of the High Commissioner. This arrangement was ratified by Belgium
and France. By the virtue of this Agreement, the High Commissioner’s representative in
Brussels determined the eligibility for refugee status, and thereby the asylum on behalf
of the Belgian Government.  In France, the representative of the High Commissioner
became eligible to participate to the work of the French Office for the Protection of
Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA)544
 In order to implement the recommendations the League wanted replies from the
Member States. Some countries, like Uruguay, were very prompt and accurate in their
proceedings. The Government of Uruguay was finally able to send its positive reply to
Secretary General after long legal and political deliberations. The President of the
Republic had decided to issue a decree empowering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
541 Minutes of the 50. Session of the Council of the LON (4.-9.6.1928), Annex 1036/OJ, 9th year, No 7, July 1928,
1000-1001
542 Grahl-Madsen 1966, 127-128
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take measures in conformity with the League recommendation.545  On the basis of the
documented replies it seems that some countries were not as accurate in their
proceedings, and the decisions might have been made in a more unofficial manner.
After broadening the scope of the refugee work to new groups including Assyrians,
Assyro-Chaldeans, and Turkish Refugees, the League send another circular letter to all
Member States, as well as to some other Governments. The purpose of the request for
information was to find out to what extend the countries would be willing to perform
their policy on issuing Nansen certificates, visas, and other benefits for refugees. One
of the specified issues in the circular letter was the situation of Russian disabled ex-
servicemen (which should have been treated in the same manner as national ex-
servicemen!).546
It is difficult to see the purpose of this extensive exercise of bothering Governments
with this matter, except that the recommendation to do so was passed by the Assembly
of the League. The request was also sent to the United States.  The reply from the US
State Department made the position of the US Government clear.  The US was not in a
position to issue Nansen passports, had not adopted the Nansen stamp, and could not
regard the Russian ex-servicemen eligible to any national benefits. However, the reply
stated that the American consular officers may accept Nansen certificates in lieu of
passports.547
The League’s documents reveal, that the initiative for this exercise of 1928 was
initiated by the Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission. The initiative had obviously
passed its way in the Assembly becoming a resolution and recommendation, which
then had to be executed by the Council and other relevant organs of the League.548
After the Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission had been formed, the League sent
repeatedly circular letters to Member States. The mechanism seems to be the same in
most cases. The Assembly passed a resolution or recommendation on the basis of the
deliberations of the Advisory Commission, and the Council and the Secretariat had to
execute those by requesting the positions and indications of policies of the individual
governments. On the whole, the 1928 Arrangement gave the refugees “certain
elementary rights of the kind that nationals usually possess”.549  It contained provisions
concerning the personal status of refugees: expulsion, taxation, freedom of residence,
545 OJ, 11th year, No 4, April 1930, 323
546 See e.g. OJ, 12th year, No 8, August 1931, 1689-1692
547 OJ, 12th year, No 8, August 1931, 1689
548 See e.g. OJ, 12th year, No 9, Sept 1931, 1880-1881
549 Simpson 1938, 610
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as well as travel documents. This Arrangement has been seen as a “forerunner for the
Refugee Conventions of 1933 and 1938, and consequently for the present Refugee
Convention of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol”.550
       3.3.5. Statistics, Settlement, and Loans
In order to conduct any kind of measures on behalf of refugees it was essential to
know first how many people there were, who they were, and where they were located.
On a national level census and statistics have also been connected to the national
security. All states have had some kind of need and tendency to control the unwanted
foreigners staying in the country because they can be considered a potential risk to
security. Supervision of the comers started in principle at the border and ended with the
naturalization,551  or alternatively, with the exit.
The significance of the statistics was not merely satisfying curiosity. The ultimate
purpose was to find out how many refugees can be accommodated in a certain place,
how many should and could be transferred to other places, and whether states and
governments were willing to receive and able to contribute to the employment and
other needs of the refugees.552 Census was obviously easier to implement among the
agricultural settlements. In the agricultural communities these measures also had a
special function because of the nature of the livelihood and profession of the people.
The examples and the experiences of the agricultural census and statistics were
encouraging. They contributed to the entire establishment, as well as to many aspects
of the refugee work done by the national and international authorities.
Refugee women encounter specific problems regarding protection, assistance, and
participation in decision making. Most remarks on female refugees are not based on
statistical data, simply because such data on refugee women do not exist. The source
material from the 1920s is silent about female refugees specifically. In spite of the
recognition that women and girls constitute most of the refugee population, policy-
makers and field workers especially during the Inter-war time did not have proper
information which could have enabled them to take into account the specific situations
550 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 361
551 Leitzinger II, 334
552 OJ, No 4, 1922, 342
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and problems connected to female refugees. It can be concluded on the basis of the
source material, that refugee women were not specifically allowed a greater voice in
decisions regarding their own lives. On the other hand, it is not fair to say, that they did
not have adequate protection and assistance.553   Although the trend observed over the
last few decades has been towards a “feminization of global migrations”554, there is no
reason to believe that the proportions of women during the refugee movements of the
1920s and 1930s were essentially smaller than today.
According to Nansen’s reports, the first exhaustive census on Russian Refugees, in
all countries concerned, was implemented already during the first six months of
Nansen’s official work as the High Commissioner. The census was carried out by High
Commissioners representatives in different countries, classifying the refugees
according to their occupation.555 In his report in March 1922 Nansen didn’t forget to
praise the role of the ILO in providing invaluable services to the High Commissioner in
carrying out the census “with the greatest ability and foresight”. Nansen also reported
on the difficulties the census had encountered on the part of the refugees themselves
in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and in Constantinople, where the help of the Allied
Police was needed in order to get the work completed. However, Nansen was able to
report that the census was made complete, and that it offered invaluable basis for the
solution of the refugee problem.556
The Greek Refugee Settlement Commission also carried out similar measures in
urban settlements. This work had to deal with two different classes of refugees: a)
those living in settlements built for the refugees and b) those living in towns in hired
lodgings. All these refugees were asked to furnish:
-name
-number in family
-occupation followed in of origin
-present occupation
-whether any indemnity received from the State and if so how much
-what are the resources of the family?
553 Camus-Jacques, Geneviève: Refugee Women: The Forgotten Majority. Refugees and International Relations.
(ed.by Gil Loescher and Laila Monihan. Oxford University Press, New York 1989, 145
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The work was carried out by the employees of the Greek Commission and by
special agents engaged for that purpose. The Greek authorities and the Church
rendered their help for this enormous task.557
The Greek Refugees Settlement Commission reported on the results of the census
carried out in 1927 to the Council. According to the Commission, the census was
implemented with the double object of ascertaining, first, the number of families and
individuals, and secondly, their housing conditions. As regards the dwellings, the
refugees were divided into different categories and subdivided classes. The analyzed
results were used in order to be able to form a competent opinion as to direction in
which the assistance should be afforded by the Commission.558
In some countries statistics was taken more seriously than in others. For example, in
Finland it was the Secret Police EKP that controlled and supervised the refugee
administration as well as other matters concerning all foreigners in the 1920s. Local
police authorities were obliged to keep records on refugees and submit quarterly
reports to EKP during the first years after Russian mass emigration to Finland around
1920. This system was gradually lightened, and from 1926, the reports were given
semiannually. Finally, some subdivisions of the EKP stopped the reporting regarded as
“unnecessary burden”.559   Finland was a new state, and former Grand-Duchy of
Russian Empire, and most of the refugees in the country had come from Russia. These
were sufficient premises for the caution.
Despite all efforts in Finland it was impossible to know the exact amounts of
refugees in the country.560  This was the unfortunate fact, even the system of keeping
records and taking care of statistics was one of the most effective in the world, thanks
to the heritage of the regime of the Swedish Kingdom.561  The official material had the
problem of incompleteness and inconsistency.  In 1928 the responsibility of statistics
on refugees was transferred to the Statistics Authority of Finland.562  The statistics on
refugees in the 1920s and 1930s are still available for researchers in the archives of
the Tilastokeskus.563
It seems that the figures compiled by different study makers give us different
information. The material provided by the national authorities was inaccurate, and the
557 Minutes of the 46. Session of the Council of the LON, Annex 988/OJ, No 10, Oct 1927, 1298
558 Minutes of the 48. Session of the Council of the LON (5.-12.12.1927)/OJ, 9th year, No 2, Feb 1928, 236-237
559 Leitzinger I, 92-93
560 Leitzinger I, 88
561 Leitzinger I, 60
562 Then Tilastollinen päätoimisto, now Tilastokeskus, see Leitzinger I, 89
563 Leitzinger I, 90
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content of information depended on the provider of the material.564  This can be
followed roughly by scrutinizing the figures concerning Finland. According to the ILO
there were 13.000 Russian refugees in the country in 1924.565   The National State
Refugee Relief Centre, however, estimated that there should have been some 23.500
refugees in Finland, of whom, approximately half should have been ethnic Russians
(and half Ingermanlanders and Carelians).566  The figures to the ILO had been provided
by Colonel Schwindt, the representative of the HC in Finland. Obviously his figures
included only the ethnic Russians. They were close to accurate as numbers, but didn’t
give the right picture of the refugee situation in the country.
The statistics prepared by different organizations give following figures on the
numbers of refugees in Finland:567
ARC 1920……………………………25 000
Countess Bobrinsky’s office 1921…25 000
Dr. Izjumov 1922……………31 000-32 500
High Commissioner 1929…………..14 318
Subcommittee of private org.1930…18 000
Nansen Office 1936-7………14 500-16 000
The Refugee Service made a survey based on an inquiry in 1927 concerning the
expenses accrued to the governments as they were forced to take care of the refugee
problem of their country. It was pointed out, that the costs in the countries neighboring
Russia were immense; 20 million Swiss gold francs.568  This group of states consisted
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia
and Slovenia, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland.569
The work of the officials of the Refugee Service was never easy. It was challenging
for the officials to get reliable data.570  Obviously, field operations on census and
statistics had to be taken by national authorities. In some countries it was not advisable
for the foreigners to be counted as refugees since it would have led to expulsion.571  On
the other hand, it was impossible for the international bodies to make plans for
settlement of refugees without the statistical measures. The statistical work of the
564 Nygård 1980, 71-72
565 Minutes of the 24. Session of thye GB of the ILO, 1924, 409
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League and the ILO had thus practical aims because it was considered that
(re)settlement is one of the three durable solutions for refugees (the others are
repatriation to the country of origin and local integration in the country of first asylum),
allowing refugees to resettle in a third country, usually an industrialized one, with the
resources to provide the requisite support to ease the possible transition to a new
country.
In theoretical terms resettlement can take place to third countries (or “overseas” as
the terminology had it in the 1920s), or in the first country of refuge.  (Greeks were
“resettled” in Greece) Resettlement can never be an option for more than a part of the
world’s refugee population because it requires so much official international work and
benevolent cooperation. Nonetheless, resettlement has proven to be a blessing for
hundreds of thousands of refugees who have made new lives in new countries. If
durable solutions are evaluated according to the extent to which they protect human
lives, it can be alleged that resettlement in a third country is more valuable than any
other option.572
For first-asylum countries already suffering from massive unemployment or from
acute cultural and ethnic divisions, resettlement plans mean alleviation to the problem.
They give a clear signal that asylum can continue to be extended to new arrivals
because the refugee burden will eventually be shared.573  However, recent studies
reveal what people have always known: the complexities and hardships of third country
resettlement. Refugees resettled have learned that life conditions in a new country can
be hard, alienating, and troublesome. Solutions do not always correspond with the past
or promised circumstances.574
The most visible domestic concerns of host governments are economic. This
includes the high cost of public assistance, and difficulties in settlement. The most
fundamental issue, however, is the relationship that refugees form with established
residents in their new local communities. These relationships influence the acceptance
of the comers.575  When refugee women are resettled in new countries, their problems
take on entirely different dimensions. There are difficulties in adjusting to a completely
new environment. Very few of them can be prepared for the drastic changes in life. The
572 Bach, Robert, L.: Third Country Resettlement. Refugees and International Relations. (ed.by Gil Loescher and
Laila Monihan. Oxford University Press, New York 1989, 313
573 Loescher, 30
574 Bach, 314-315
575 Bach, 316
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female refugees are therefore silent and invisible in many instances and their needs go
largely unrecognized.576
After his appointment, Nansen recognized in the official League documents that the
only real solution for the refugee problem was to settle them in productive employment
in countries where they will not become “a charge on the public funds”. Nansen made
efforts to induce countries where such a prospect was possible. He mentioned
especially that the Government of Czecko-Slovakia had agreed to accept 6000
refugees from Constantinople and that the arrangements for execution of the plans
were well advanced.577
Restrictive measures in immigration policies took place in many places of the world
in the 1920s. The Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 in the United States marked
limitations on immigration from Europe, and favored immigrants born in northern and
Western Europe in the expense of those born in southern and Eastern Europe. In Latin
America, countries also developed restrictive immigration policies favoring those willing
to be agricultural colonists.578
In the beginning of his work, Nansen made an appeal to Governments through the
Secretary General of the LON, making it clear that in connection to resettlement
questions the High Commissioner was fully dependent on the assistance and
cooperation of the Governments of the various countries concerned. It was necessary
to arrange transport of the refugees to other countries, to grant transit visas, find the
necessary means for the maintenance of the refugees as well as their settlement in
productive employment.579
Among the very first duties Nansen assumed after his appointment was an inquiry
made to the governments as to categories of refugees which they might be able to
receive. The results were disappointing. The High Commissioner received only few
replies. With the exception of that from the Brazilian Government, they were practically
all negative. Brazil indicated that employment could be found for a certain number of
refugees in coffee plantations. An overall remark was, that owing to the universal
economic  depression it was impossible to find work for large numbers of refugees
since there was already extensive unemployment among the own nationals of
countries concerned.580
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The essential conditions for settlement had to be fulfilled. The question asked in this
connection was, whether refugees could be settled in wide open spaces which were
available in many places on the globe, notably throughout the British Empire. It was
recognized, however, that the space itself is not enough for a settlement. Careful
preparations beforehand were required. Financing had to be in place. Thirdly, technical
supervision was needed when refugees got there. Some kind of communications and
social amenities also had to be in place if the settlement was meant to be a success.581
Let alone the willingness of people to move to a place sometimes located in the middle
of nowhere.
The formal obstacles in resettling Russian refugees in Finland give an insight to the
circumstances and the environment where the refugee work had to be accomplished. It
was difficult for the refugees to acquire real property in Finland. A special authorization
was needed, and those were difficult to obtain. In some parts of the country, close to
the Russian border, it was totally forbidden for foreigners to own land or any other real
property.582   When the Finnish Red Cross was delivering humanitarian supplies from
Sweden to Russian refugees in Finland, a remarkable commodity among others were
boat tickets for travelling abroad.583
Some refugees in Finland had put their hope in rural settlement and agriculture in
the first place. Many refugees had been living in rural communities in Russia and many
were classified as peasants before the revolution in Russia. These people didn’t have
any other profession.The main obstacle was, that it usually was not possible to own
any land unless the person was a Finnish citizen. The refugee organizations made
efforts to facilitate the land acquisition of refugees, since a comprehensive general land
reform in Finland was realized at that particular time. The results were discouraging.
Only small amount of families were able to get land in order to start occupation. The
authorities were seemingly unwilling to change the regulations, even in case of non-
russian (“almost Finnish”) refugees.584
There were always push and pull factors in resettlement. One of the pull factors
during the period under examination was family reunification. After the Russian
revolution families were scattered in many places of Europe as well as in China.585
581 Simpson 1938, 608
582 Nevalainen, 87
583 SPR:n vuosikertomus 1922, 844
584 Nevalainen, 137-139
585 Ståhlberg, 178
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Immigration took place to Germany, France, Baltic States, and Czechoslovakia by this
motivation (i.e. family reunion).586
In the middle of the 1920s there was a scheme to develop a resettlement fund using
the revenue of Nansen stamps. Although the selling showed results, the creation and
performance of the fund was a disappointment. It was, however, one type of indication
of solidarity, from those refugees who could afford the fee of five gold francs, to those
who couldn’t. The most remarkable resettlement plans were made for Latin America. In
the 1920s the Refugee Service expanded its network of agents in Americas. A
Delegation assigned by the Refugee Service spent five months in Paraguay, Argentina,
Brazil, and Uruguay in 1925 on a mission. They reported that the success of the
resettlement scheme depended on the development of a necessary organization, as
well as on creation of a credit fund.587
Resettlement of refugees took place, but the volume of it was not what was
ambitiously planned. The results were few hundred people per target country.588  The
agent network was effective to certain extent, but the development of the credit fund
was left half way. The Agents of the ILO (Refugee Service) referred to the strict
legislations and administrative practices of the target countries.589  These, in turn, were
results of the economic recession in Latin America during that time.590   However,  it
was reported that on the average the refugees resettled to Latin America were better
off than those staying in Europe.591
One of the greatest efforts undertaken and completed successfully by Nansen was
the resettlement scheme of the Armenians in the 1920’s. Alone in Syria, about 40.000
Armenians resettled in Villages build with the funds and coordination by Nansen and
his staff.592  The Assembly of the LON allocated in 1924 funds for a mission that was
assigned to study possibilities to resettle Armenian refugees to the Armenian districts in
the Soviet Union. The practical arrangements were supposed to be handled by Nansen
and the Labour Office.593 Nansen visited the sites with a delegation in 1927 in an
586 Simpson 1939, 375
587 ILR, Vol 17, No 1, 1928, 80
588 Minutes of the 40. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 449-455
589 Records of Proceedings of the 12. Session of the ILC, 1929, 219
590 Simpson 1939, 198
591 Minutes of the 40. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1928, 449-450
592 Hansson II
593 Minutes of the 22. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1924, 169-170; Simpson 1939, 36
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attempt to find practical possibilities and negotiate terms and conditions for the
resettlement. The results turned out to be scarce.594
There seems to have been separate lines of activities concerning the Armenians.
The National Armenian Delegation issued an appeal on a scheme for the settlement of
50.000 Armenian refugees in 1924. The League received numerous replies from states
to this appeal during the same year. The positions of the Member State Governments
varied a lot. All had deep sympathy towards the homeless Armenians. Some
governments made non-specific and non-committal promises, but some, such as the
Government of Norway, informed directly that there were no funds available for this
kind of scheme.595  The British Government stated that there was very little information
on the scheme, and it could be brought in question whether the proposal had been
properly investigated and thus practically feasible.596
A more organizad approach was demonstrated when the Council issued a resolution
in September 1925 containing the Terms of Reference for the Armenian Refugee
Settlement Commission. The assignment of the Commission was based on the
Assembly resolution regarding the settlement of Armenian Refugees in Caucasus and
elsewhere. The Commission was supposed to be consisting of five members. The
Commission held its first meeting in Paris 30.10.-1.11.1925 with members who had
been nominated according to the Terms of Reference.  Nansen was one of the
members, and the rest of them were appointed by the President of the Council. The
Government of the Republic of Armenia was represented closely in connection with the
Committee. The Committee was supposed to have undertakings and representatives in
Erivan. This is interesting, taking into account, that it was quite unclear what the
Armenian State was, and where its Government was seated. The Commission
recognized that a loan of £ 1 million was needed for the activities.597
The Council noted the report given by the Commission for the Settlement of
Armenian Refugees  in its 37th session in December 1925.598 The financial position of
the Settlement Commission remained to be a difficult question. The Council adopted a
resolution in its 40th session, instructing the Secretary General to ask the Chairman of
594 About this see Nansen, Fridtjof: L'Arménie et le proche orient. Paris 1928, 198-250
595 OJ, 5th year, No 6, June 1924, 845-847
596 OJ, 5th year, No 9, Sept 1924, 1226
597 Minutes of the 37. Session of the Council of the LON (7.-16.12.1925), Annex 820/OJ, 7th year, No 2, Feb 1926,
227
598 Minutes of the 37. Session of the Council of the LON (7.-16.12.1925)/OJ, 7th year, No 2, Feb 1926, 129
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the Commission to appoint two of the members of the Commission to discuss the
financial aspects with the Financial Committee.599
It is quite obvious that the Armenian Refugee Settlement Commission had serious
plans for the resettlement of refugees to Armenia still in 1926, since the Commission
presented a report with resettlement schemes to the Armenian State, which then
already was one of the members of the Transcaucasian Federation of Soviet Republics
(the other two being Georgia and Azerbaijan). This Federation formed a part of the
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics with its headquarters in Moscow.600  The
Government of the U.S.S.R. informed the Armenian Commission and the League that
it, in principle, approved the irrigation plan connected to the agricultural settlement of
the refugees, as well as the loan arrangements for it.601
The Council still discussed the Armenian settlement scheme towards the end of
1928. Nansen stated that the appeals to the governments had not produced very great
results. Other representatives also recognized that the replies were not encouraging on
the whole. A number of suggestions in order to solve the problem were, nevertheless,
produced. The only thing the Council was able to decide was that the question will be
submitted to the Assembly for investigation.602  The League did not want to close the
case. The Assembly adopted a resolution in September 1928 requesting the Council to
continue negotiations with those governments which had offered assistance. The
Council decided to act accordingly.603
In the 41st  session of the Council, however, the Financial Committee expressed as
its opinion, that loan arrangements similar to the ones in case of Greece and Bulgaria,
were not possible in present circumstances for the resettlement of the Armenians. The
Financial Committee found the technical feasibility of the resettlement scheme
satisfactory, but regretted that the circumstances were as they were.604  The Council
recommended that money should be collected from private sources either in a form of
a loan or a gift. The Council discussed about nominating persons to supervise the due
expenditure of the money.605  Further reports by the Financial Committee and the
special commission set up by the Council made it clear, that in the view of legal and
599 Minutes of the 40. Session of the Council of the LON (7.-10.6.1926)/OJ, 7th year, No 7, July 1926, 875
600 Minutes of the 40. Session of the Council of the LON (7.-10.6.1926)/OJ, 7th year, No 7, July 1926, 977
601 Minutes of the 40. Session of the Council of the LON (7.-10.6.1926)/OJ, 7th year, No 7, July 1926, 981-982
602 Minutes of  the 51.  Session of  the Council  of  the LON (30.8.-8.9.1928)/OJ,  9th year, No 10, Oct 1928, 1649-
1651
603 Minutes of the 52. Session of the Council of the LON (12.-26.9.1928)OJ, 9th year, No 10, Oct 1928, 1669
604 Minutes of the 41. Session of the Council of the LON/OJ, 7th year, No 10, Oct 1926, 1340
605 Minutes of the 42. Session of the Council of the LON (16.-20.9.1926)/OJ, 7th year, No 10, Oct 1926, 1404
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other conditions prevailing in the territory of the U.S.S.R., the issue of a public loan with
ordinary guarantees could not be contemplated.606
Since it was obvious that the public loan to Armenia was not possible, the League
decided to make an appeal to all the Member States of the League to solicitate their
financial assistance to the plan which had been before the League for three years for
establishing the Armenian Refugees in the “Republic of Erivan”. The appeal was made
through Nansen. Some replies from governments were obtained. The replies were
unambiguously negative, with the exception of the response of Roumania, promising
thousand pounds for the mentioned purposes.607
It was clear in the 1920s that the resettlement plans in Europe were not going to be
successful. For the refugees, other than Greeks and Bulgarians, the only hope was
resettlement overseas.  These attempts towards solution were accelerated in 1922.608
This was also one of the reasons why the Nansen Passport system was created.609  In
retrospective, the Armenians were the only refugee group that Nansen and the Labour
Office were extensively and systematically trying to resettle. Serious plans were made
to settle the Armenians from Turkish territory to Soviet-Armenia. Nansen headed
missions to the area with the purpose to make an arrangement with the Soviet
authorities for establishing agricultural settlements. It was assumed that the LON would
issue funds or a loan arrangement for the purpose.610  Finally, the funds turned out to
be insufficient and the plans never really materialized.611  The Soviet authorities were
definitely not encouraging the plans, and a general observation can be made, that it
was specifically the reluctance to provide sufficient guarantees for loan arrangements
which finally made the plans unrealistic.
Arranging loans as a method of financing the resettlement activities had a crucial
bearing. When Greece had to find room to resettle and assimilate some 1.3 million
refugees coming from Asia Minor in the 1920’s, a loan was arranged for these
purposes.612 This scheme included the establishment of an independent settlement
commission supervised by the League as well as large scale loan arrangements to the
Greek Government. The details of the terms and conditions of the Greek loan were
606 Minutes of the 45. Session of the Council of the LON (13.-17.6.1927)/OJ, 8th year, No 7, July 1927, 774
607 OJ, 9th year, No 3, March 1928, 355-357
608 Minutes of the 13. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1922, 347
609 Stoessinger 1956, 18; Thompson I, 27-30
610 Plans can be obtained from ILR, Vol 8, No 5, 1923, 710; Minutes of the 26. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1925,
163; Records of Proceedings of the 7. Session of the ILC, 1925, 932
611 Thompson I, 33
612 Hansson II
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brought to the attention of the League of Nations. Normally, a loan arrangement
includes at least the following: lender, borrower, guarantor, and possible
countersecurity. If these cannot be revealed from the documents, the package can be
considered concealed for a reason or another. On the basis of the source material, it is
not quite clear, what the role of the LON was in this package.613
The Greek Refugee Settlement Commission concerned itself about the agricultural
as well as urban resettlement. The Commission was occupied with initial
arrangements, implementation, and also post appraisals of the activities. A tour for the
members of the Council was arranged to the settlements in Greece. Belonging to the
same category of functions was the follow-up of the harvest situation in Greece among
the areas where refugees had been resettled. The Council voted in 1927 a sum of 4
million drachmae for the relief of those who had suffered from serious losses in certain
regions due to drought.614
In urban settlements the Greek Commission contributed to the facilitation of urban
refugees purchasing the dwellings they were occupying. The Council backed the credit
arrangements, as well as contributed to the legislation of Greece in order to enhance
the development.615 The Greek Commission, being desirous to give rural refugees a
feeling of stability and permanence, took steps to issue, to those whom it had settled,
title-deeds for their property as soon as the final allocation of their land was completed.
The final title-deeds were supposed to be granted to settlers when their debts to the
Commission were paid. The League Council approved the final forms of these
documents. This legal ratification of possession was to intensify and improve the
performance of the settlers on their land.616
The international organizations and the governments of the receiving countries put
their hope in agricultural settlement in treating the difficult problem. It was thought that
this would better facilitate the living of the people in their new conditions. The simple
thinking at the background was, that in agricultural settlements these people would be
producing rather than consuming food produced by others. However, it is a fact that the
attraction of big cities is common among all immigrants. In the report of the Greek
Commission in 1929 the text reveals, that it had been pointed out more than once that
agricultural refugees have for various reasons been unable or unwilling to establish
613 See e.g. OJ, 4th year, NO 10, Oct 1923, 1138-1148
614 Minutes of the 46. Session of the Council of the LON, Annex 988/OJ, No 10, Oct 1927, 1297-1298
615 Ibid.
616 Minutes of the 57. Session of the Council of the LON (13.-25.9.1929), Annex 1174/OJ, 10th year, No 11, Nov
1929, 1745
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themselves in the country districts, and are overcrowding the towns, which are already
over-populated with people scarcely able to earn a living. Many would prefer even low
wage town jobs rather than agricultural work.617
The League appointed a Commissioner of the LON for the Settlement of Bulgarian
Refugees in 1926. The Commissioner gave its first report covering two months at the
end of 1926. The Financial Committee examined the report and noted that it shows
already some progress. According to the report, a great part of the necessary
legislation had been voted by the Bulgarian Parliament, or was being discussed by it.
The Financial Committee also heard the Governor of National Bank of Bulgaria on the
financial arrangements. The Committee noted certain omissions or errors in this
connection. The Committee found it necessary to receive quarterly reports from the
Commissioner in the future regarding all facts of Bulgaria’s financial situation.618
The report of the Commissioner for the Settlement of Bulgarian Refugees
emphasized the basic problems which had to be taken into account. The first
precondition was that Bulgaria was not a very large country, the total area being only
some 103.000 square kilometers. The second premise for the difficult task was that
Bulgaria was poor in arable land. An effort was made to avoid over-populating the
cultivable areas and to increase the amount of arable land by drainage and preparing
land for agriculture.619  In the proposals to the League the Commissioner understood
that no settlement under the loan should be established within 10 kilometers of the
frontier (as required by the neighboring States) and the refugees coming from Greece
should be settled at the greatest possible distance from their place of their origin.620
These principles were recognized in the Council’s resolution adopted in December 7,
1926.621
In connection to the second report of the Commissioner, it was noted in the Council
that thorough contemplation of all related questions was absolutely necessary in order
to prevent mistakes, duplication of work, substitution of persons, and finally to keep
away from the frontiers the elements which might endanger the good relations existing
between Bulgaria and the neighboring States.622
617 Minutes of the 57. Session of the Council of the LON (13.-25.9.1929), Annex 1174/OJ, 10th year, No 11, Nov
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The acquisition of land was a central strategic question. It was not possible to make
agricultural settlements without allocating land to the settlers. Taking into account the
basic nature of this question, it is remarkable that so little concern was given to it in the
reports and other documents. First of all, appropriate legislation was needed since the
land had to be confiscated from someone, unless it was owned by the Government. In
Bulgaria, a Governmental organization called The Geographical Institution was used as
the advisor in the question. Otherwise, the reports don’t show much transparency
despite few references.623
In its 12th report the Commission of the LON in Bulgaria stated, that the most difficult
problem from the beginning of the establishment of the refugees had been the search
for land suitable for the settlement of the refugees. All other matters were depending on
that. Therefore, there were no tangible results until the summer of 1927.624  In the same
report it was noted that the work of establishing large communities of refugees was
deliberately avoided, because it was better to concentrate on construction of houses for
isolated units or small groups scattered throughout a large number of already existing
villages. This, in turn, resulted in the problem of separating the various workshops and
the difficulty of transport.625
As far as assistance, development cooperation, and relief in a larger context is
considered, we can divide the financial possibilities in two: grant and loan. Grant is
donated for good, but the purpose of a loan is to get it recovered. The market economy
in the global scale works so that there are always lenders. The lenders are willing to
lend, provided that there are sufficient guarantees. Normally, governments are
considered as sovereign guarantors and thus acceptable. In cases where governments
need the help in a form of loan, other guarantee arrangements are required. Another
party of the deal is the borrower. Governments may borrow money by issuing
sovereign bonds. By those, the governments are bound to pay back the sums they
have received.
In all these cases, the lenders will capitalize on the arrangement. Also the ones who
borrow and pay the interest, gain from the situation, provided that they are fast and
efficient enough to use the money efficiently before paying it back. Having this in mind
623 See e.g. Minutes of the 50. Session of the Council of the LON (4.-9.6.1928), Annex 1043/OJ, 9th year, No 7,
July 1928, 1058-1059
624 Minutes of the 56. Session of the Council of the LON (30.8.-6.9.1929), Annex 1172/OJ, 10th year, No 11, Nov
1929, 1713
625 Minutes of the 56. Session of the Council of the LON (30.8.-6.9.1929), Annex 1172/OJ, 10th year, No 11, Nov
1929, 1715
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there were plans in 1925 to create a Revolving Fund for the financing of the migration
of the refugees.626  The intention was to use the revenue from the sales of the Nansen
Stamps for capitalizing the fund. Nansen himself was the supervisor of the fund.
Another supervisor was nominated by the Governing Body of the ILO.  This assignment
was given to Jean Monnet (former Vice Secretary General of the LON) in 1926.627
The only really significant refugee loan arrangements organized by the world
organizations were the ones established for the settlement purposes in Greece and
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government came forward with a request for a loan for the
settlement of Bulgarian Refugees in 1926. The Financial Committee examined the
proposals, and gave thorough opinion on the possible terms and conditions of such
loan. The final recommendation of the Financial Committee was that the only possibility
for a successful credit scheme would be guaranteed with the League’s association to
the arrangements.628
The Financial Committee considered the matter and at the end of summer 1926 an
advance of £400.000 was arranged for the urgent needs in connection with the
settlement of Bulgarian Refugees. The Council finally approved the plans for issuing a
loan for these purposes in September 1926.629  In the 43th Session of the Council it
was noted that under the Protocol for the Settlement of Bulgarian Refugees, the
Council had undertaken to appoint Trustees to represent the interest of the
bondholders of the settlement loan. The proposal of the rapporteur was adopted, and
three Trustees were appointed, including Mr. Markus Wallenberg from Sweden.630
Another loan was arranged with the object of restoring Greek finances and
continuing the work of the establishment of the refugees.631  Similar arrangements were
prepared simultaneously in the case of Bulgaria.632 The loan was extended to the
Greek Government for relending. It was thought, that in this way the money would be
most efficiently spent. The legal basis for the Greek stabilization loan was a Protocol
signed on 15.9.1927. That plan covered a sum of 9 million pound sterling. In March
626 Minutes of the 32. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1926, 295; Simpson 1939, 204-205
627 Minutes of the 33. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1926, 389
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1928, it was reported that 6.5 million had been raised by the issue of loans for public
subscription in London and New York.633
The loan arrangements were referred to as ‘refugee loans’ in the beginning, but from
1927 the League documentation as well as the reports of the both (Greek and
Bulgarian) Refugee Settlement Commissions started referring to these arrangements
as ‘stabilization loans’. The development of the societies of Greece and Bulgaria
respectively was more or less supervised by the League of Nations. The sums
allocated to these development purposes were considerable, measured with any
modern day’s parameters. The purpose and the scope of the stabilization loans were
broader than just settlement of refugees. A scheme on reconstruction of the whole
country was discussed in connection of these loans.634
It was clarified in the report of the Financial Committee that the work in arranging the
loan scheme was conducted under the auspices of the League of Nations. A detailed
plan for the issue of the loan was drawn up in agreement with the League technical
organizations. The plan adopted was supposed to put the finances of the Greek State
in a completely sound condition. It comprised of the liquidation of Treasury arrears and
took note of the existence of a satisfactory state of budgetary equilibrium and provided
with the establishment of a new Bank Issue. The Committee seemed to have a solid
confidence that the Greek Government undertakes to maintain the equilibrium during
the forthcoming financial periods.635
In the same session the Council also discussed the possibility to issue a similar loan
to the Bulgarian Government. The Bulgarian Authorities stated that the task of the
settlement of the refugees can only be accomplished with the help of another foreign
loan. In their entry, the Bulgarian authorities referred to the undermining effect of the
war. Bulgaria considered that the loan would contribute to the consolidation of peace
and world stability.636
The structure of the stabilization loan arrangement was similar to the previous loans
in the sense that the money came from the International Financial Commission. It was
put forward for relending by the Greek Refugees Settlement Commission to the end-
633 Minutes  of  the  49.  Session  of  the  Council  of  the  LON  (5.-10.3.1928),  Annex  1012/OJ,  9th year,  No  4,  April
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users, i.e. the refugees in a need of loan. The Greek Commission’s reports include
detailed declarations on when, how much, and for what purposes the new credits were
issued. Typical purposes were purchases and distribution of seeds for the settlements,
construction of houses, and compensations for crop failures. Also loans to individual
families for their settlement were extended.637
The nature of a loan requires recovery. The Greek Refugees Settlement
Commission actually received repayments from the refugees in Greece. Payments
were made by both agricultural and urban refugees. The repayments were transferred
to the International Financial Commission for amortization of the Loan.638  The reports
of the Greek Commission contained information on amounts recovered. It seems that
of the amounts recovered, the main part was for the redemption of the loan, and
Commission retained a small part for other purposes.639  The repayments were made in
both cash and bonds. The bonds seem to have formed the major part of the
repayments, over 90 %. As to the bond, they were kept on deposit until redeemed. The
dates for redemption were fixed separately by the Commission.640
These arrangements had also further relevance. As a result of the cooperation
between the Greek Government and the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission,
creation of an institution to grant agricultural credits took place. The establishment of
the Agricultural Bank of Greece was decided upon by the Convention of June17th,
1929, concluded between the Government and the National Bank of Greece, which
until that had been in charge of agricultural credits. The aim of the new bank was to
encourage and assist the rural populations by according loans to them.641
A special bill was introduced in Bulgaria to guarantee the lucrative execution of the
rest of the loan arrangements after the work of the League Commissioner had been
terminated in 1932. A law concerning amendments and additions to the previous law
for the settlement of the refugees with the aid of the loan authorized by the League of
Nations was introduced to the League in the 22nd report of the Commissioner of the
LON in Bulgaria. The law stipulated, among other things, that the refugees shall be
637 Minutes of the 48. Session of the Council of the LON (5.-12.12.1927)/OJ 9th year, No 2, Feb 1928, 231
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exempt from all payments of overhead expenses paid from the proceeds of the loan for
the purpose of their settlement.642
The reports communicated to the League show that the repayments of the Bulgarian
loans declined after the Bulgarian Government took responsibility of them.643  No
explicit reason can be found from League sources. This gives us a possibility to
conclude that perhaps the League’s intervention was justified and in place. The use of
the loan schemes was limited to the cases where the refugees had a new stable home
country and a government to protect them. In the absence of a stable homeland the
attempts to arrange loan schemes for the Armenians and other refugee groups never
materialized.
There were some scattered exercises for arrangements on compensations for
abandoned properties of the refugees. The question of the return of the deposits of the
Armenian Refugees in foreign banks at Smyrna, as well as their property left in Asia
Minor, was brought before the Council several times in the 1920s. The Spanish, Italian,
and Swedish representatives in the Council sent a petition to the Turkish Government
concerning the matter. The situation seemed to be complicated. The representative of
the Secretary General stated in his letter that the League Secretariat had no power to
make any intervention on the issue.644
The Council of the LON made recommendations in December 1925 on Refugees
coming from Bulgaria in Greece as well as Refugees coming from Greece in Bulgaria.
The respective Governments were supposed to give reports through the Mixed
Committee formed by the representatives of these countries. In the beginning of 1927
both Governments provided statistics of liquidation cases taken place both in Greece
and in Bulgaria. The data included cases of Bulgarians in Greece and Greeks in
Bulgaria.645
The Mixed Greco-Bulgarian Commission issued debt certificates to Greek refugees
who had been forced to abandon properties back in Bulgaria while leaving the country.
642 OJ, 13th year, No 8, August 1932, 1518
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The Greek Refugee Settlement Commission accepted the certificates in an
understanding that those bonds bore interest and were redeemable for 12 years.646
        3.3.6. Residence, Employment, and Assimilation
The question of residence permits falls always into the domain of national
sovereignty. What the League could do, was to try to influence the matter by
establishing the legal status of refugees. Refugees were homeless people upon their
arrival to a new place. This brought great insecurity, and the first thing for them was to
find a place to stay. Problems were not solved, however, solely by finding or creating
abode. There was a constant threat of being driven away without a residence permit.
When refugees were allowed to settle, there was continuous fear that this right could
be withdrawn at any time.
The economic and other difficulties that refugees were facing at the place of their
arrival, could sometimes lead into mental disorders, which, in turn, drove the people in
activities considered to be unlawful or even criminal.  In many cases people were
willing to do anything to avoid returning to the country which had expelled them. The
worst scenario for them was to get forcibly pushed back to confront the law of their ex-
homeland and even be condemned by the law and politics that had originally
persecuted them. By establishing the legal status, the League hoped to save refugees
from unjustified expulsions.
Expulsion is an administrative or governmental act by which the state invites or
compels the refugee to leave the territory of the state. It is normally based on some
kind of legislation. Refoulement, in turn, is purely a police measure. The League of
Nations dealt with these matters in many occasions. This issue was first raised in a
questionnaire to governments by Nansen in 1928. The High Commissioner then
inquired whether the measures of expulsion and of refoulement were applied to
refugees at the frontier, as well as how they were carried out.647
Later same year, the Intergovernmental Conference on the juridical status of
refugees included in the Arrangement of 30.6.1928 a recommendation which stipulated
that no expulsion should be ordered in the case of Russian and Armenian refugees
646 Minutes of the 46. Session of the Council of the LON (1.-15.9.1927), Annex 988/OJ, 8th year, No 10, Oct 1927,
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647 Simpson 1939, 246-247
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who could not enter an adjoining country in a regular manner.  Since that, the matter
was on the agenda of the Consultative Intergovernmental Commission, and from 1932
to 1937 it was on the agenda at every meeting of the Assembly of the League of
Nations.648
In the 1920s it was believed that refugee problems could be solved in few years.
One of the facts that contributed to this belief was the rebuilding process taking place
everywhere after the First World War. The refugee work advanced rapidly in the
beginning, mainly for the reason that there was work available, and many countries
welcomed new labour force. It could even be said that the times were favorable for
refugees.649  Nansen considered from the beginning that maintaining refugees in
camps on doles was a waste of money. Instead, they should have been transferred to
places where they could obtain employment.650
Refugees caused a variation of problems as well as pressures to the authorities of
the receiving country. The handling of the problem required personnel that otherwise
would not have been needed. In most of the cases, the comers didn’t speak the
language of the recipient country. This imposed new forms of requirements to the
organizations receiving and taking care of the refugees.651  In Finland, the governors
issued a residence permit (ololippu) for one year at the time. This permit was valid for a
certain administrative district (lääni). Goverrnor’s office could also administrate the
place of residence or dwelling within its administrative district. Matters concerning the
removal of refugees from a district to another belonged to the Ministry of Interior.652
From 1926 the Governor could not alone make a decision on refusal of a residence
permit. The matter had to be submitted to the Ministry of Interior.653  A new  decree on
foreigners in 1930 changed the title of the residence permit as well as the connection
between the residence permit and the work permit. Those two became interlinked.654
The practicies with the residence permit were considered uncomfortable and
cumbersome. Many refugees who had come from east were illiterate. It was difficult for
them to take instructions from authorities and comply with the jungle of rules.655
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In his comprehensive investigation Sir John Hope Simpson points out that most of
the refugees given asylum have been adult people fully capable of working and whose
youthful training has already been paid for by their original home country.656  This,  in
turn, meant that the host country was receiving the economic benefit. In Finland, a
person who had obtained a legal status of a refugee was able to get a work permit with
much less bureaucracy than other immigrants. The permits for refugees were more
“liberal” and general by nature compared to normal foreigners’ permits. Those permits
were not bound to a certain profession or precise employment. All this was, however,
prevailing due to the division of labour between ministries and officials, not that much
about the needs or rights of the refugees.657 Some agencies were simply more liberal
than others.
The Finnish Ministry of Interior was reportedly in the position that there were two
possibilities to manage the refugee situation with so many comers; sending them back
or finding employment. As the first option was not possible for humanitarian reason, the
scond was favoured. Some other authorities, notably the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
did not agree with this view.658
The refugees in Finland were not entitled to all social security benefits. Also their
taxation was heavier than in case of citizens. They were not entitled to the family
deductions. Work permits were needed, but they were sometimes difficult to obtain.  In
this respect, Finland seems to have represented average treatmet of refugees. In some
countries the living was harder, and for highly educated professionals, such as doctors
and lawyers, it was practically impossible to find employment. On the other hand, in
countries like Yugoslavia and Czeckoslovakia, refugees had almost the same rights as
citizens.659
Only a small minority of the refugees made their  living in trade and other similar
livelihoods in Finland. There were also some restrictions.  The statistics are slightly
distorted in this particular matter since it has been reported that those who really had
some serious business and earlier connections to Finland, were able to get the
citizenship quite quickly.  Thus, they were lo longer refugees in the statistics.660  There
were confrontations between the refugee workers and other workers in all countries
where the comers were trying to find work and make their living. Local people
656 Comments on this see:  Hansson II
657 Leitzinger II, 183
658 Nevalainen, 127-128
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experienced the comers as rivals in the labour market. The refugees were also abused
as cheap labour force in many cases by the employers.661
The Assembly of the League and the International Labour Conference had the
Greek refugees constantly on the agenda in 1922. The representative of the Greek
government appealed to the ILO for assistance to the High Commissioner in his efforts
on behalf of the refugees. A resolution on the assistance was adopted by the ILC, and
the Governing Body was advised to act accordingly.662  The representative of the
Greek government referred to the fact that employment and residence were the biggest
concerns among the problems of the refugees.663
The ILO was involved with the question of serious unemployment among refugees
in Eastern Europe since 1921. The Red Cross appealed to the Labour Organization,
and the Director General was authorized to render technical assistance for developing
a labour exchange system for refugees in Eastern Europe.  Nansen took the lead in the
project. The High Commissioner had, however, very little knowledge and information
on the conditions and volumes of the refugees to be able to start any kind of action.664
A proper census was needed and the ILO stepped into the picture.
Nansen saw the census as the most urgent and essential basis for the future
actions.  The Labour Office conducted surveys in the member countries. The data
collected concentrated to the professions of the refugees and their ability to work. Also
inquiries on governments’ willingness and ability to provide work were made.  The
purpose of all this was to find suitable jobs for refugees in favorable countries.  In the
background there was the striving to make the refugees productive and useful
members of their present societies.665  Therefore it was believed that these actions
would be beneficial for both parties and also encourage people in the middle of difficult
economic situations.666
The census carried out by the ILO turned out to be a very important initial tool for
Nansen in his work for refugees.667 The reply activity was not what the High
Commissioner had hoped, and the data was for some parts incomplete.668  Some
661 Nevalainen, 148; These questions concerning employment in general: Minutes of the 38. Session of the GB
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member states showed attitudes which were not exclusively positive.669  Nevertheless,
it must be remembered that even as they were, the results were valuable information
for the High Commissioner. At least on the attitudes, if not for anything else.
Nansen pointed out in his report in March 1922 how important it was to establish a
labour exchange system in order to secure employment for refugees who would then
no longer be a burden upon the public funds. He used the Serb-Croat-Slovene State as
an example. About 10.000 refugees had been able to find a job through the well
functioning network of labour exchange bureaux organized by the Government.670  The
plans for a comprehensive employment exchange service turned finally out to be too
ambitious.671  However, single actions were taken. The representatives of the Labour
Office had some service activities since 1922 in Greece, Bulgaria, in the Kingdom of
Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.672  Labour Office was active in this respect in Greece still
after the Lausanne Protocol came into effect.673
The duties of the Director General of the Labour Office and the network of his
agents were defined thoroughly when the Refugee Service was formed. These
guidelines were mostly the same as the ones of the ILO previously.  The Refugee
Service was assigned to act as a coordinating and communicating umbrella
organization.  The core of the work was to try to improve the employment situation of
the refugees. In this respect, the capacity of the Labour Office was unique when it
comes down to the evaluation of the economic trends and the impacts of them to the
employment situation.674
The unemployment figures among the refugees remained high in many countries.
According to the estimate of the Labour Office, one fifth of the refugees were without a
job in Germany in 1924. In China the situation was unlimitedly hopeless; half of the
people were unemployed.  The statistics were compiled in a manner that only those
capable of working were counted.675  The additional burden was posed by those who
were not able to work.
The refugees found employment fairly well in France.  Agriculture was a large
employer, since there were farms that were big enough to absorb the supply of
workers. In Finland the farms were family enterprizes that supported only the family
669 OB, Vol 5, 1922, 233-235
670 OJ, 3rd year, N0 4, April 1922, 347
671 E.g. MInutes of the 6. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1921, 19-20 and 51
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673 Minutes of the 17. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1923, 153-154
674 Records of Proceedings of the 7. Session of the ILC, 1925, 933
675 Minutes of the 24. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1924, 409
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members, but the production was not real business and there was nothing left over to
be sold outside the farm. There was definitely  work to do, but no possibility to pay any
monetary compensation. In France the large car manufacturers Citroen and Renault
employed substantial numbers of refugees. Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia
absorbed great numbers of highly educated Russians in teaching professions.676 The
facilitating factor here must have been the lingquistic relation between Russians and
these countries. The good situation of France, due to the fact that there was a lot of
commercial agricultural work available, was suitable for the Russians. The national
authorities taking care of the employment of the foreigners were constantly in contact
with the Labour Office.677
Regardless of all the efforts and good examples, the overall situation was grim. It
was estimated in 1921 that there were one million unemployed Russian refugees. In
1927 there were still 182.000 Russians and 63.000 Armenians without work.  The
situation improved, but never became good. This was also one of the factors leading to
frustaration and to the closure of the Refugee Service.  If there was no work, there was
no settlement.678  In the 1930s, with the economic recession, it became evident that it
was even more difficult for refugees to obtain work permits.679
Most refugees in Finland were employed in agricultural jobs despite the practical
difficulties described before. For many this was the field of work they were used to. On
the othe hand, soldiers were put in the forestry jobs, which was like punishment, and
the results of those attempts were not encouraging. Many labour exchange services
showed results, but on the whole, this activity seems not have been a great success.680
Merely a curiosity is, that refugees were used as strike breakers.681  Anyhow, the shift
from agricultural work to industrial professions was very rapid in case of refugees,
mainly because of the difficulties in land acquisition. Also the earnings in industrial and
other jobs in towns were much more inviting than in agricultural communities.682
Albert Thomas was a diligent researcher of demographic phenomena. With this
background he had plans to develop arrangements which would improve the social
status of foreigners in general and the foreign workers specifically. This interest
676 Nevalainen, 147
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included then refugees seeking employment through all these preconditions.683
Thomas made concrete proposals in 1928, some of which led in international
agreements. Very few governments (5 states) were able to ratify these agreements,
however.684
Foreign persons working in industry and service sector often have to contend with
illegal employment and harsh working conditions. Migration, even for economic
reasons, is clearly an ordeal for people working in these professions.685  In  most
countries during the 1920s and 1930s, there were restrictions for foreigners to work in
certain professions and occupations. Also rights to social security benefits were
reserved for nationals of the country only.686  Many other limitations concerning private
rights and practices were prevalent in every day’s life of the aliens.687  All these matters
were in the focus of the international refugee organizations while contemplating the
overall alleviation of position of the people living abroad without a legal status. Each
country had its own stipulations concerning foreigners on entry and sojourn on the one
hand, and on naturalization on the other. Normally these two had been kept separate
from each other. Most countries also had specific alien’s legislation which worked in
between, regulating for example foreign ownership.688
The acquisition of some other nationality was the most radical solution for a refugee.
For certain categories of refugees this solution was feasible. The Greek refugees from
Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria and other countries, who arrived in Greece between 1913 and
1922, were granted Greek nationality by the Greek law of 1922. The Greeks, who
arrived from Bulgaria under the Convention of Neuilly 1919, became Greek citizens on
their arrival. The same concerned the people who came from Turkey under the
Convention of Lausanne 1923. Greek refugees outside Greece, for example those in
Cyprus, were enabled to obtain Greek citizenship on application to the Greek consul.
Bulgarian refugees arriving in Bulgaria from Greece under the 1919 Convention also
benefited from the provisions concerning automatic naturalization. Moslems of Turkish
683 See Simpson 1939, 204
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origin from abroad settling in Turkey were immediately granted Turkish citizenship by
special decisions even without the ordinary residential qualifications.689
Citizenship is a status defined in a constitution. It carries with it certain civil rights, in
particular690 the right to vote. In many societies during history, the citizenship has
signified subjection, a feudal link between monarch and individual, each side having
duties towards the other. Nowadays the most important nominator is that citizens
collectively participate in the political process.691 Originally citizenship was connected to
republics derived from the example of the French Revolution. In kingdoms the word
subjection or “subjecthood” was carrying approximately the same meaning.692  In many
connections the words citizenship and subjection have been used as synonyms.693  In
this presentation “citizenship” simply means the passport a person is carrying or a
hypothetical citizenship of the original home country.
People could lose their nationality or citizenship for various reasons during the Inter-
war period. In some cases the travelers could be denaturalized if they left their home
country for a certain number of years. In other instances people could lose their
nationality if they left the country “without intention to return”. It could be be even
possible, that people were automatically denaturalized if they just left their home
country.694  Individuals who lost their nationality, became stateless, i.e. refugees.
Legislation has no practical meaning unless there is effective enforcement and
execution of the laws. There was no centralized law enforcement concerning foreigners
in most countries before our modern time. From the point of view of refugees, this
meant that their lives were in many cases in the hands of officials who didn’t have
specific instructions to follow.695  This, in particular, was the situation where the political
help and technical assistance of the intergovernmental organizations were needed.
Assimilation in the sociological meaning signifies the blending of minority groups into
the surrounding dominant society. Immigrant assimilation is a complex process in
which an immigrant becomes fully integrated into a new country. Social scientists have
distinguished some primary benchmarks to assess immigrant assimilation for
describing the process whereby a minority group gradually adopts the customs and
attitudes of the prevailing culture. Citizenship is the state of being an integral part of a
689 Simpson 1939, 235-236
690 In our modern societies
691 Dummett, 79
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particular social, political, or national community. Citizenship carries with it both rights
and responsibilities. Generally citizenship can be seen as the relation between an
individual and a particular nation.
Legislation on naturalization seems to be more new-born than other types of
stipulation concerning refugees as foreigners. As noticed, citizenship has been rather
undefined thing until modern time. Therefore, naturalizing a foreigner and becoming a
citizen or a subject is not an unambiguous thing. During previous times, a citizenship
could be obtained through a guild, or by decision of a local authority. In the 19th century
the development went towards the need of an approval by higher or central authorities
as well as more definite stipulations. Naturalization and citizenship became political
and governmental questions.696
Men and women have traditionally been in a very different position in respect of
nationality or citizenship. In many countries women were considered to be under a
guardianship of a male member of the family, normally meaning a father or a husband.
Therefore, the citizenship would have been a consequence of the naturalization or
denaturalization of a male family member. Marriage was a dominant factor also in Inter-
war period. A woman could assume the nationality of her husband and in many
countries this meant losing the original nationality.697  It was reported that during the
1920s a number of female refugees were able to obtain a citizenship of the country of
arrival through marriage arrangements. In case of children and under-aged persons in
general, there have been simplified procedures in the assimilation process in certain
countries. The motivation has then been the protection of children.698  Interesting detail
is, that a Finnish person could be a citizen of Finland and a subject of Russia at the
same time during the 19th century, when Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy of
the Russian Empire.699
Citizenship was not the first concern for most of the refugees to come into their
mind. The circumstances allowed these considerations only later, after personal status
had been somehow stabilized. The refugees knew that they had been living in a place
located within the borders of a state. It is, however, impossible to know how many of
them had been registered as citizens of their home country. Today citizenship is
automatically connected to civil rights or the rights of a citizen. A common nominator
here is the right to get protection. This matter was specifically taken into the definitions
696 More about this in Leitzinger II, 303-319
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of refugees in the 1920s.700  The essence of the existence of refugees was uncertainty.
It was considered that after a reasonable period of time, the settlers should obtain
some kind of certainty for their living, without threat of being deported.
Russian refugees  were not particularly eager to assume new nationalities in their
countries of residence. The idea of getting back to Russia was in the background.
People also wanted to remain faithful to the Mother-Russia and russian identity.701  The
Soviet Goverment gave the possibility for the refugees staying abroad to obtain the
Soviet citizenship by registering themselves in the Soviet Embassies. Many took this
opportunity, and in the 1920s there were unknown number of Soviet citizens residing
as refugees in foreign states, since getting the citizenship didn’t coincide with the
possibility go back to Russia. It has been reported that sometimes the refugees do not
necessarily want to get naturalized even they have the opportunity. It can be
considered an asset to be able to live without a citizenship or with a double nationality
and identity.702
Many Russian refugees lived their whole lives without any nationality or citizenship.
They could travel and get identified by carrying a Nansen passports or alien’s
passports. Difficulties in naturalization processes throughout Europe were a result of
the thinking that states and governments had obligations towards their citicens; aliens
formed a different cast.703 After all, naturalization didn’t mean well or wealth for some,
on the contrary; it seems that some people wished to remain stateless, free of
obligations of any citizenship.
In Finland the application for the citizenship was addressed to the President of the
Republic. It was sent to the State Council (the Cabinet). There was a threshold of five
years residence in the country as a precondition for the citizenship. Other conditions
were e.g. clean reputation, ability to support oneself, etc. There was also a need for
recommendations and statements. It was seen that those with higher education and
professional position could more easily obtain the citizenship than working class people
with no or only little education.704
The Advisory Commission to the High Commissioner recognized in its report
12.6.1929 the impossibility of a radical solution to the refugee problem. This expression
referred to three models of final solution which had been contemplated by the League
700 See Chapters 3.3.2. and 3.3.4.
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during its refugee work. The three had been the guiding principles for the whole work.
The first one was naturalization of refugees. The Commission noted with satisfaction
the generous reception afforded by various countries to the requests for naturalization
of refugees. However, the Commission recognized that it would be impossible for the
various countries, in which refugees were located, to proceed to mass naturalization of
those aliens. Naturalization was seen as a privilege which cannot be granted without
distinction to every person who requests it.705
The Soviet Russian Government announced a citizenship to be granted to persons
who register themselves at the diplomatic missions of Soviet-Russia before 1.6.1922.
The Russian ambassador in Helsinki send a note to the Ministry of Interior two weeks
after the deadline announcing that the Finnish authorities should mark to the
identification papers given to the refugees with “Russian citizen or subject of Russia”
only in cases where the persons can provide a proof that they have registered in
time.706  In practice this arrangement was to make the refugees stateless. It is not
possible to verify from the existing material how this “procedural advice” was followed.
Several other legislative measures were taken later by the Bolshevik government in an
attempt to denaturalize former citizens.707  These measures coincided with the
introduction of the refugee passport system. In Finland, like in many other European
countries, Ius sanguinis principle was followed. According to it, a child born to refugee
parents was also a refugee without a citizenship of the country of sojourn, unless the
parents were naturalized.708
Naturalization as a solution to the refugee problem repeatedly engaged the attention
of the League Assembly. It would naturally have been an easy and elegant way handle
the refugee problem. League action was, however, necessarily restricted to
recommendations to the Member States, as the League could not interfere with the
sovereignty of individual states. As early as 1928 the League Assembly adopted a
resolution inviting the governments concerned to extend facilities for naturalization to
the refugees in the countries in which they were resident. Those recommendations
had, however, very limited effect.709
Residence, and the further form of it, assimilation are closely connected with the
question of arranging educational facilities for refugees. More people require more
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resources. Nansen sent a letter on March 15, 1922 to the Secretary of State of the
United States requesting the US Government to grant to the Russian students and
refugees in the US permission to attend, without charge if possible, the institutions of
secondary teaching and the universities of the country. In the reply in May the US State
Department informed Nansen that the colleges and universities in the US were under
private control and the Government had no direction over them. Also the public schools
in various States were not governed by the federal law. The State Department was
reportedly not informed of any reasons to prevent Russian residents in the US entering
these educational facilities.710
Nansen reported to the Assembly in September 1922 that the results of the appeals
to the governments to render help to the refugee students were disappointing.711  In
Finland, however, the first schools for Ingrian refugees were opened already in 1919.
There were as many as 22 operating refugee schools in Finland in 1922-1923. It was
counted that two thirds of the refugee children attended school education and half of all
refugee children went to school facilities designated for refugees.712
Wherever Russian refugees went, they had education and schooling of the future
generations in their own mind. Teaching of the Russian language was supposed to be
organized for  thousands of young people. There was a clear mission for the education:
preserving of the Russian culture. This was seen imperative for the building of the
“New Russia”, free of the Bolshevik rule. In 1924 there were 90 high school level
institutions all over Europe under Zemgor-organization only. Vocational schools existed
here and there.  Also even smaller refugee communities had their own elementary
school system.713   Little by little the Russian schools got integrated to the general
educational systems of the countries of residence. There seemed to be very little or no
hope of the collapse of the communist system in Russia and returning became an
increasingly distant dream. It was deemed more useful to provide integrating and
assimilating education than to nourish the dreams of old Russia.714
Czecko-Slovakia was known for its ability to absorb Russian refugees and provide
education for them. The motivation becomes clearer in the letter of the Foreign Minister
of the Czecko-Slovak Republic to the Secretary General of the LON in January 1922
and the Memorandum attached to it. Czecko-Slovakia was dealing with the education
710 OJ, 3rd year, No 7, July 1922, 724
711 OJ 3rd year, No 11, (part I), Nov 1922, 1137
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of nearly 5000 Russian and Ukrainian students, and it was financially at the end of its
resources. The Czecko-Slovakian Government called upon the High Commissioner as
well as the Member States of the LON to share the burden. The rationale for the
humane and liberal policy was that the Government believed that the education given
to the refugees will fit them to return and enable the people to restore the economic
and political life of Russia.  The reconstruction of Russia would, in turn, guarantee
peaceful development of the relations between the countries. The Czecko-Slovak
Government wanted to emphasize the sincerity of its suggestion by stressing the
humanitarian nature of its obligations: they were acting “on behalf of people so closely
related to the Czecko-Slovak nation”.715
Prague, Harbin, and Paris had Russian academy level institutions. Russian
academics had positions in the Baltic states, Balcans,Czeckoslovakia and France. It
was calculated that in the beginning of the 1930s there were 19.000 Russian emigrants
who had passed  an academic degree.716 The emigrants also moved from a country to
another in an attempt to seek decent education.717  France and Czechoslovakia were
exceptions in this respect. In Paris and in Prague some 5000 Russian refugees passed
a university degree by 1932. Another great educator of Russian refugees was the
US.718  Other refugee groups didn’t seem to have similar educational ambitions in the
new countries of residence. They more or less had to rely on the eduaction system the
surrounding society was offering.
In Finland, the Government’s authorities had certain goals and ambitions on
education and enlightment of the refugees. A designated refugee office was
established within the School administration for this purpose. The general interest of
this particular administration was clearly targeted on the Finnish-kindred refugees. The
activities were politically motivated. Also in these activities the impetus faded away
after it became obvious that these refugees would not return.719
In the 1920s a Russian refugee’s organization Zemgor paid special attention to the
situation in Finland and Estonia, where the refugee children were living “in
exceptionally bad conditions”.720  In Finland there was education available for the
Carelians and Ingermanlanders in their own language, but in very few cases for the
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ethnic Russians. There were also scarce opportunities for the Russian children to learn
Finnish, which was, in turn, a prerequisite for higher education. Some parents sent their
children to ordinary Finnish language or Swedish language schools according to their
possibilities.721
However, there were as many as 22 refugee schools supported by public funds in
the beginning of the 1920s. The general administration as well as the educational
curricula follwed the normal national schooling in Finland. There were also cases in
which refugee children could not attend school education because of the lack of funds
of the local administrative district where these people were residing. The legislation in
fact defined only the obligatory education of citizens, and this was interpreted strictly in
some local communities. This was changed in 1932, as the new legislation ordered
local communities to arrange education for all residents, including non-citizens. Some
refugee schools were active until the late 1920s, last ones closed their doors in 1930,
with the exception of two specialized institutions. Taking into account all refugee school
activities during the period under examination, there were 34 institutions providing
education for refugee children in Finland.722
What the material doesn’s tell us clearly, is the education of women. Discrimination
appears also in education and skill-training programmes. Some of this takes place
negligently in practice, something it is arranged on purpose. In most cases, today as
well as in the 1920s, the female refugees arriving in the host countries have less
education and fewer marketable skills than men. Due to this, refugee women have little
chance of improving their situation.  Household tasks often take major part of their time.
Most of the training opportunities today, as well in the 1920s, have a predominantly
male focus.723
It has been calculated that in Finland even one third of the public funds allocated to
refugee work were directed to educational activities in the beginning of the 1920s.
During the following decade  this amount was only about six percent. Although the
results have been described modest at the highest, it was clearly seen that the refugee
children who grew up in the 1920s and 1930s, had much better chances in their new
environment than the older generations which didn’t receive any education.724  Almost
1000 refugees studied in public secondary academies (Kansanopisto). The success in
721 Simpson 1939, 376
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vocational institutions was not as good. The attendace as well as the results were an
obvious disappointment for the educational authorities.725
The 4th Assembly of the League invited the Council to request the Governments of
the State Members to afford the High Commissioner their assistance especially as
regards the development of the means of general and professional education. It was
reported to the Council that the Russian school system was established in 1920 in
countries which harbor the great bulk of the Russian Refugees, namely, “the Slav
countries and the border states on the European frontier of Russia”. In the rest of
Europe there were reportedly only few Russian schools. The situation of Serb-Croat-
Slovene State, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Germany, France, Latvia, Poland, and
Estonia were separately reported before the Council. Remarkable sums for these
purposes were used by some of the countries.726  Curiously enough, Finland was not
mentioned. This could be due to the compilation technique of the report; perhaps the
agent in Finland was not alert enough at the point when information was needed and
gathered. It was not until the early the 1930s, when the Refugee Convention of 1933
prescribed on education: ”refugees were to have the same rights in the schools and
universities as were accorded to foreigners in general”.727
3.4. An Account of the First Decade of Intergovernmental Refugee Work
The 1920s was a period characterized by idealism, great hopes, and
disappointments for the League of Nations. Although the refugee problem was not new
or surprising as such, the scale and magnitude almost overwhelmed everyone
involved. The League of Nations opened a dialogue between states and
intergovernmental bodies as well as established a platform for deliberations between
nations on refugee questions, which had previously been handled bilaterally or even
internally in host countries.
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A sufficient general motivation for the LON to authorize itself to do refugee work was
that refugee problems could be seen as a threat to peace. Another important mind-
setting factor behind the policy making of the LON in the 1920s was the belief that the
refugee problems of the day were only temporary and could be solved quickly.
From the beginning, it was understood that the LON had been mandated to conduct
certain measures as general obligations. These would include issues in the field of
general international social justice. The mandate for the LON’s refugee work derived
from those general principles. Refugees were seen as a grave humanitarian problem
beyond national interests which required attention, and which only the new world
organizations could offer. There were different reasons and motivations for helping
each of the refugee groups. Universal humanitarianism or respect for human rights was
not particularly clearly expressed in these connections during the 1920s. The
discussions on the principles were manifested in the temporary nature of the mandate
of the High Commissioner, which, in turn, was the visible and actual administrative
outcome of the deliberations in the LON.
The larger League system worked in a relatively coherent way. The ILO had a
visible role during the whole decade. Recurrently it was deemed appropriate for the ILO
to take on the main responsibility for the intergovernmental refugee work. The role of
the ILO in the 1920s has attracted too little attention until this. Yet it was Albert
Thomas, who, together with Nansen, became the symbol of helping refugees during
the decade after the First World War. Although Thomas was the public face of the ILO,
diligent work at the Labour Office provided the basis for most big operations. It was not
possible to plan and implement assistance without receiving the necessary data on the
existing situation. The Labour Office was also a concentration of expertise in many
fields important for the execution of any refugee operation. The masses of refugees
could not be treated and maneuvered in the same way as military campaigns were
undertaken.
The special role of the ILO only becomes clear by scrutinizing the appropriate
sources that reveal the humanitarian as well as the more political premises of its
refugee work. The ILO was needed by the League because of its expertise, but behind
the scenes there were also motivations connected to the trade union movement, and in
the case of Russian refugees, about ideas on the socialist order in the Soviet Union
that were simply incorrect and overly positive.
A much more far-reaching matter was that through gathering information,
conducting censuses, and compiling statistics the regime obtained an insight into how
much work still remained to be done. Without this any policy making would have been
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impossible or incompetent at best. The ILO’s activities gave nation states a feeling for
the first time that the burden brought about by refugees could be shared.
The basic mission of the ILO was in the social and economic field. The organization
faced a dilemma in that it was trying to speak up for unemployed refugees as foreign
workers whilst at the same time trying to protect the rights of the host countries’
workers. The most difficult question faced by the ILO was trying to avoid political
questions connected to the refugee issue. The technical nature of the work was
therefore highlighted whenever possible. The ILO wanted to make a separation to the
passport system and concentrate its activities on coordinating matters connected to the
employment and settlement of refugees.
There was a constant tendency in the ILO to avoid political deliberations. While the
LON could undertake the political protection of refugees, the technical nature of the
services rendered by the ILO was always emphasized. Thus in the package of the
League system the obligations which the ILO undertook had a much narrower basis
than those of the LON.
For the first time in history there was a platform to carry out a reliable mapping
exercise on the magnitude of refugee problems in the form of conducting census with
the help of the ILO’s expertise. Basically, because of this activity, refugees were not
treated like cattle anymore. Who they were and how many there were was brought to
the fore for the first time. These ILO activities put pressure on national authorities to
carry out measures which otherwise would not have been implemented.
The original idea was to take care of Russian refugees together with prisoners of
war and the famine relief delivered to Russia. When it became obvious that other
refugee groups needed attention as well, it was not possible for the LON to refuse to
take on this responsibility. Protection was not extended to all refugees universally. The
definitions set out in international agreements only covered designated refugee groups.
The voluntary and involuntary exchange of populations between Greece, Turkey,
and Bulgaria also produced massive refugee problems, although in these cases people
had new homelands to go to. The grimmest of all the refugee problems between the
World Wars was the one of the Armenians. The Armenian question was brought to the
attention of the League soon after the establishment of the world organization with its
refugee regime.
The High Commissioner for Refugees was established when Nansen gave his
consent to be nominated to this high position. A less known fact is that the ILO began
its refugee work even before the League officially took action. The High Commissioner
was able to convince the League Council of the importance of the question for world
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peace and that it was indispensable for the LON to take on this responsibility. The
organization set up for refugee work was, at least at the beginning, based on ad hoc
solutions. It was quite natural to use the existing networks of voluntary organizations,
such as the Red Cross.
Funding was always to be problematic. Throughout the existence of the
organizations, the funds assigned for refugee work could only be used for
administrative purposes. Practical assistance, including humanitarian work, was
supposed to be undertaken by voluntary organizations. As the financing of the activities
was based on selectivity it was difficult for the High Commissioner to make coherent
long-term plans.
Refugee work took various forms and in some countries it ultimately reached
unexpected dimensions. The LON had a decisive role in Greece and Bulgaria, not only
in assisting local authorities with refugees, but also on a larger scale in developing
national economies and institutions.
There was a great need for emergency relief in the 1920s due to the huge
dimensions of the various crises. It seems that the original idea of the control was kept,
and the LON only assumed a coordinating role while the NGOs delivered the
humanitarian aid.
The seriousness of the League’s efforts in attempting to solve various refugee
questions was definitely illustrated in the chain of agreements and arrangements that
were made during the decade. As a matter of fact, there was a new international
arrangement almost every year throughout the 1920s.
It was considered necessary to define different categories of refugees, because the
various intergovernmental authorities believed that only in this way could the refugees
themselves make a claim, and thus be liberated from the previously existing position in
which they were totally at the mercy of the national authorities of the country of their
asylum.
The most essential issue for the refugees was to find a home somewhere. This
could be established through settlement in the country of their asylum or by
resettlement to somewhere else. Some schemes were made for Russian and
Armenian refugees, but in the case of Finland, for example, it was found that those who
were unwilling or for some reason unable to settle immediately found their way to third
countries on their own. Resettlement work was conducted successfully in Greece and
Bulgaria.
The legal system for protecting refugees was not particularly strong, because most
states reserved themselves the right to comply to whatever regulations did exist in their
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own manner. The LON’s legal system was much more important in that it brought
refugee issue to public and international attention. The message then was: “this is how
the national authorities should behave”.
In the beginning of the decade there seems to have been a general understanding
that the refugee problem was a temporary one, and that after some time the refugees
would return home. It took almost a whole decade for the international community to
realize that for most of the exiles, there was no home left to go back to. The plans
made for large scale repatriations of refugees were never implemented. Only voluntary
return, when possible, had some significance.
Although the LON’s refugee organization has been depicted as a band of prominent
individuals who enthusiastically drove forward their ideas, this project has clearly
shown, by systematically using sources connected to policy making and supervision,
that there was much more institutional stamina than previously assumed.
International refugee work started as the problem of Russian refugees emerged.
Finland was involved strongly because of its geographical proximity and political
position. The situation in Finland was two-fold: on the one hand, different ranks of
Russians came to the country on Russia’s border which had been a Grand-Duchy of
the Russian empire. On the other hand, many in Finland welcomed ethnic Karelians
and Ingrians, who were considered “almost Finnish”.
One extraordinary feature of the Finnish example was that Finland offered free
public school education for refugees, which was much more generous than the help
offered by many other host countries. This was targeted, however, almost exclusively
at ethnic Finnish kindred refugees. Moreover, this was at a time before
intergovernmental agreements stipulated anything about the education services to be
rendered to refugees. When the recommendations were eventually adopted, the entire
refugee problem in Finland had already been almost resolved.
Finland was typical of many countries offering asylum in the sense that in the
beginning Finland’s official policy was that the refugees should go back. When it
became obvious that this would not be possible for most of the exiles, measures to
take care of the new comers had to be taken, partly with the help of the international
refugee regime.
The asylum offered in those days was in most cases a practical asylum. Refugees
were allowed to stay in Finland without being granted any official status individually.
Only those who stayed more permanently received identification documents. Those
who returned quickly were often not even listed or registered. The system concerning
the legal status of refugees being worked out by the League tried to regulate and
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standardize this particular situation by creating model documents and by establishing
definitions.
The supplies delivered by international bodies to Finland were of the utmost
importance when the crisis was at its most acute phase. It took a few years for the
Finnish authorities to establish a governmental refugee assistance organization. Even
that agency more or less depended on relief material from abroad.
The work on establishing the legal status of refugees, including travel documents,
was something unseen before. It was conducted consistently throughout the whole
decade. Although Finland was the first state to adopt officially the Nansen passport, the
Finnish authorities were not particularly eager to issue those documents even though
the need in the country was great. It seems that many of the Russian refugees wanted
to travel on from Finland, further away from the Soviet Union.
The number of exiles in Finland decreased rapidly towards the end of the decade,
partly due to the unofficial return of refugees, and partly because of people moving to
third countries, encouraged by the refugee passport system of the LON.
The most visible administrative outcome of the decade was the creation of the
network of officials which was extended to all countries involved with refugee problems.
Nansen had a tremendous personal role in these networking operations. Finland had
both the High Commissioner’s representative as well as an official designated by the
Government for communication with the League in Helsinki.
Although the achievements of specific organizations and agencies in the field of
social rights and migration have been recognized, the enduring nature of the LON’s
refugee work specifically has been left almost unexplored. And yet, as can be seen on
the basis of the preceding discussion, it was specifically the LON’s refugee work, taking
into account its sensitive and border crossing nature, that can be singled out from
amongst the mass of other achievements during the 1920s. The problems were acute
and burning compared to any other issue to be solved by the world organizations.
Immediate interventions were sometimes needed in order to avoid mass starvation or
political and social unrest. In many cases, the physical security and integrity of people
was at stake.
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4. IDEAS ON A PROACTIVE APPROACH 1931-1939; NANSEN’s LEGACY
4.1. Previous Principles and new Human Rights Motivations
The refugee problems of the 1930s were not as massive by size as they had been in
the previous decade. They were, nevertheless, politically more significant. Issues
concerning refugees became known also to the general reading public. The problems
and the responses to them had some similar characters as in the 1920s, but some
differences also appeared.
There was a kind of an ambiguous attitude towards the people who were forced to
leave their home in Europe during the 1930s. General public was very much in favour
of giving necessary protection to those who were homeless, but the Goverments had a
different view. The desire to protect and promote human rights was among the variety
of ways of thinking about international cooperation, but it was far from being the most
important of these.1  In many cases people were travelling from a border to another.2
The authorities obviously had again their thoughts on possible political consequences,
whereas individual citizens could think more of the humanitarian aspects.
Based on the discussions and motivation during the Inter-war period, it has been
concluded that the difficulties of the refugees resembled a situation of a market failure.
International regime with its principles and codes was needed, because national
solutions alone could not solve the refugee problem. Lack of trust between nation
states prevented the formation of bilateral agreements that might have alleviated the
situation.3  According to Skran, the most obvious explanation for the formation of the
international refugee regime is that a consensus of humanitarian principles inspired the
international community to deal with the pressing relief problem.4  The assistance norm
required that states help refugees in need. The asylum norm gave states the authority
to grant or deny asylum to refugees. The initiatives of the international refugee regime
1 Mazower 2009, 191
2 Nevalainen, 82
3 Skran, 94
4 Skran, 85
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contributed to the development of the specific idea which was articulated clearly for the
first time:  refugees should be treated as a special kind of migrants.5
The principles established in the 1920s had their continuation in a form or another
during the 1930s. International politics in the 1930s was characterized by the rise of the
Nazi-Germany.  The principles that were laid down directly or indirectly were followed
faithfully for the entire League existence. The main principles identified and separated
from the mass of resolutions and other declarations were: The League accepted
responsibility for protection of certain classes of refugees; the suggestions to render
League’s protection to all categories of refugees were opposed. League intervention
was on a temporary basis. League funds could be used only for administrative
expenses. League’s organizations were expected to coordinate relief and settlement
efforts without using any funds of the LON. These principles remained practically
unchanged during the whole Inter-war period.6
The preconditions meant that the system only applied to specified categories of
refugees. Some refugees received international assistance, while others with equal
needs did not. This was clearly a deviation from the humanitarian principle of the
regime. There were some debates leading nowhere over this in the League. Finally the
matters were effectively postponed so that they did not come forward until after the
Second World War.7  According to Grahl-Madsen these principles “made the League
involvement half-hearted”.8   In 1935 Norway proposed that the League should create a
central organization with responsibility for all refugees regardless their origin. The
proposal did not achieve support in the Assembly.9
The actors of the international refugee regime responded to the German refugee
crisis in a manner where confrontation with the Nazi-government was evaded. The
regime concentrated on rule-making rather than dealing with the governments that
frequently expelled refugees. Major T.F.  Johnson, the Secretary General of the
Nansen Office, made an initiative in 1934 to discuss with the German and French
governments in this regard, but the Secretary General of LON was too hesitant to take
action.10
5 Skran, 185
6 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 366; Simpson 1939, 192-197; see also Chapter 3.1.1.
7 Skran, 143-144
8 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 366
9 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 364; Simpson 1939, 216
10 Skran, 142
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The situations producing refugees evolved during the 1930s and so did the thinking
of the international community. The refugee situation of Germany was not generally
considered to be a desperate one before 1938. Many thought that the problems could
be solved through normal migration channels. The threatening circumstances produced
by the 1938 incidents and the Evian Conference summoned by the United States as a
consequence, required new thinking within the LON. It was considered mandatory to
start negotiating with the German government as a part of the solution to problem of
the people who had to travel out of their country. The idea was to influence the
situation before the people became refugees.11
After Nansen’s death, the refugee work was completely reorganized. It was
considered best to entrust the political and juridical side of the work to the regular
organs of the League. International Nansen Office was established to bring the
humanitarian side of the task to the implementation phase.12   It  was  pointed  out  in
several connections in the 1930s, that juridical and political protection of the refugees
should lay on the shoulders of the League. But in reality, it was the Nansen Office that
took a dual role by carrying the responsibility of the political side of the work in the
field.13
As a result of conflicting goals, refugee assistance by the League was a product of a
series of compromises. It had to make sure that its programmes reflecting the policy
choices did not offend any members.14  The significance of the League in handling
issues concerning refugees was that it gave to these problems “certain uniformity by
standardizing more or less the conditions, under which they present themselves
internationally”.15  The tradition has prevailed. An analysis is that despite a few
exceptional attempts to bridge the gap between the humanitarian refugee work and the
international security and conflict management during that time, as well as after that, a
division remained between these two. The international refugee regime was based on
the separation of the humanitarian from the political. Even today, the modern UN
refugee machinery is seen as non-political and neutral, conducting peaceful and
humanitarian actions.16
11 Skran, 245-247
12 Hansson I, 16-17
13 See e.g. Hansson I, 11
14 Skran, 275
15 Bourquin, 16
16 See e.g. Morris and Stedman, 69
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The Committee on International Assistance to Refugees established by the League
Council in 1936 stated in its report in January 1937 that one of the most important
findings of its work was, that in all evidence gained, no satisfactory solutions for the
extensive refugee problems could be found unless they were based on the principle of
close cooperation between all states, whether Members of the League or not.17
The Committee of three18 set up according to the Assembly resolution came up with
a report in May 1938. On the basis of the fact that the refugee problem was far from
solved, the Committee saw that the coordinating role of the League would still be
indispensable. The Committee also took a view that a single organization might be set
up for a limited period of time, to take the place of the two existing organizations. The
proposed organization would be directed by a person designated by the League, as the
“High Commissioner for Refugees under the protection of the League of Nations”. It
was the idea that he would be assisted by a small staff comprising neither refugees nor
former refugees.19   It was important for the League to keep its impartiality in the eyes
of countries like Nazi-Germany, even those were the ones causing the actual
problems.
The League lacked a strong mandate for dealing with German refugee crisis. The
Great Powers wanted to conduct a peaceful co-existence with Germany and that
hampered the organization’s ability.20  The withdrawal of Germany was very damaging
to the League’s prestige and image.21  Therefore, a great part of the work was done
behind the scenes and stressing the detachment from the official League. However,
everyone could see that the human rights issues were becoming on the top of the
agenda. When the issue of refugees from Germany first came up at the League in
October 1933, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands proposed that the
League assist the refugees, without interfering in German internal affairs.22  There was
no mentioning how this would be achieved, and it represented clearly the traditional
thinking inherited from the 1920s. The Secretary General Joseph Avenol of France also
17 Minutes of  the 90.  Session of the Council  of  the LON (20.-24.1.1936),  Annex 1576/OJ,  17th year,  No 2,  Feb
1936, 142
18 These were ad hoc committees most often consisting of three Member States’ representatives. Matters
were usually handled confidentially in these Council committees-of-three, and often through direct
discussion with the state concerned. See Pedersen 2007, 1100
19 Minutes of the 101. Session of the Council of the LON (9.-14.5.1938), 8th meeting 14.5./OJ, 19th year, No 5-6,
May-June 1938, 365
20 Skran, 195
21 Skran, 207
22 Skran, 230
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represented the cautious outlook and was very careful not to offend Germany.23  The
success of some operations depended largely on the support of one or more Great
Power. Sometimes the Great Powers were the driving force behind the schemes and
their behavior contributed to the failures of the system.24
There are strengths and capacities in the international community which can provide
mandates for different tasks. Sometimes there can be competing mandates issued
simultaneously. This was the situation when the US Government took the initiative to
establish the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees in 1938. This can be
interpreted as a respond to the growing feeling that not enough was being done by the
international community on behalf of refugees.
The League was seen to have a special responsibility for those who fled from the
Saar, beyond its general responsibility of a humanitarian character. This was because
the inhabitants of the Saar were, in a sense, its former subjects. The League was
expected accordingly to be prepared to meet from its budget all the expenses deriving
from the maintenance and settlement of those refugees. The refugees from Germany
and other countries were seen as a responsibility delegated to the League by the
Members. The Saar refugees, however, were seen to be under direct responsibility of
the League because of the special obligation.25
In the beginning of his duties as the High Commissioner in 1933, James G.
McDonald accepted the mandate given to him by the League and was content to stay
within the strict guidelines given to him. He had a known background with
understanding some of the German interests.26 In his position McDonald proved to be
independent, demanding and energetic. He became disappointed with the separation
from the League. He realized within couple of years that institutional changes alone
would not solve the refugee problem. Frustrated enough, he made his resignation a
show and a public appeal in order to draw attention to political side of the problem.27
His appeal raised quite a lot of attention in news media, especially in the United
States.28 This was clearly the first time that the international refugee apparatus was
able to draw public attention to the root causes of refugee problems and raise issues of
human rights to the consciousness of the decision makers of the world.
23 Skran, 142
24 Skran, 183
25 Bentwich 1935, 128
26 Skran, 230-231
27 Letter of Resignation of James McDonald, High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and other) Coming from
Germany addressed to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. London 27.12.1935; Skran, 232-234
28 Skran, 236
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In his resignation letter James MacDonald expressed as his feeling, that efforts must
be made to remove or mitigate the causes which create German refugees. This should
be separated from the work of the High Commissioner’s Office. He also anticipated that
it could not be a function of any other body assigned by the League. It would have
been a political function, belonging to the League itself.29  McDonald’s call for an end to
human rights abuses within Germany was not completely wasted. In fact, MacDonald
was one of the first people to advocate international measures to protect human rights.
He believed that the abuse of human rights was not a domestic affair, but concerned
the entire international community.30
MacDonald wrote that the refugee problem should be tackled at its source of
disaster because in the prevailing economic conditions of the world the recipient
countries had only limited power to take care of refugees. This duty should belong to
the League, which was the only possible association of states for the consideration of
matters of common concern and such magnitude.31
There were serious obstacles to the work. In order to enlarge the jurisdiction of the
Nansen Office in the 1930s, a unanimous resolution of the League of Nations would
have been required. But, even the prolongation of the life of the Nansen Office was
already being fought by the Soviet Union because of the fact that it looked after the
interests of White Russians, who were considered enemies of the Soviet state. The
idea of broadening the jurisdiction of the Nansen Office was anticipated to meet
additional opposition from the Rumanian and the Polish Governments, due to their fear
that such action might involve greater interference by the League in their domestic
affairs. It was also anticipated that Germany would not be willing to have any
cooperation with an organization belonging directly to the League.32
In the presence of the allegations of being politically oriented or biased, the
President of the Nansen Office had to do his utmost to try to convince the international
community, that the Office was totally non-political in the most absolute sense of the
word. Therefore the position of the Office was compared to the neutrality of the Red
Cross.33  In order to be more convincing the Assembly occasionally characterized the
29 McDonald, vi
30 Skran, 257
31 McDonald, vi
32 Thompson II, 379-380
33 Hansson I, 23
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work of the two refugee organizations, the High Commissioner and the Nansen Office,
as being “vast in scope and eminently humanitarian”.34
Simpson wrote in 1939 that the reasons for the reluctance of the League in its
refugee work were obvious. The League was an association of states aiming at
universality, and in undertaking the protection of people driven by persecution from a
given state it was bound to incur a certain amount of hostility from that state, an actual
or potential state member. This important consideration was not operative when Fridtjof
Nansen was first appointed, because the Soviet Republic was not a member of the
League during that time. It was, however, strongly operative in the 1930s when the first
High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany was appointed. Germany was
then a Member of the Council.35
The activity of the Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission from the beginning of
the 1930s, as well as the accuracy of the work of the Governing Body of the Nansen
Office, brought about a number of resolutions and recommendations passed by the
Assembly. A major part of these can be considered as policy guidelines.  It was
normally agreed that the Council took note of the Assembly’s resolutions and instructed
the Secretary General to communicate them to the Governments concerned as well as
to the Nansen Office. It must be noted, that many of these recommendations included
elements that could be considered, at the least, extremely difficult to be implemented.
An example of this was the recommendation to invite Governments and international
organizations to resume their activities for obtaining funds for the Erivan Settlement
Scheme in the end of 1932 when the Soviet Regime in this Armenian area had been
more or less stabilized and in practice widely recognized.36
The League communicated all resolutions and recommendations as well as the
conventions to the Members states. Replies were expected to some of them, especially
to those including measures to be taken or commitments to be pledged. The replies
didn’t always come fast. This was due to the political, legislative, and administrative
procedures in respective countries. Sometimes there was probably no local
bureaucracy involved, but the Governments wanted to postpone the answering for
tactical reasons.37  Some of the requirements of the international community could not
34 The League from year to year (1936), 228
35 Simpson 1939, 191-192
36 Minutes of the 69. Session of the Council of the LON (3.10.-19.12.1932)/OJ, 13th year, No 12 (partII),
December 1932, 1934
37 Late replies see e.g. Polish reply to request concerning the application of the Nansen stamp system; OJ,14th
year, No3, March1933, 484
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be met by all countries involved with the refugee problems. In some cases the local
national authorities must have been uninterested.
Some rejections, however, were grounded with a good cause. The US Government
was a regular example of this. In its reply to the Secretary General on one of the
recommendations the State Department in 1933 stated that “under existing laws” the
American Government was not in a position to give effect to the proposed
recommendation. However, the US Government did not completely refuse the
proposed privileges, provided that internal (US) legal aspects will be fulfilled.38 This
could be interpreted that the US Government was willing to give protection and aid to
the refugees, but only on its own conditions.
A typical answer was the one from the Danish Government in September 1933. The
reply contained five lines and at the end of it the representative of the Government
stated: “…for the rest, the report does not give any rise to other observations by the
Danish Government….” 39 In the same volume of the Official Journal even sarcasm
could be recognized. The Yugoslav Government stated in its reply: “The Royal
Government, as it has duly informed the League of Nations Secretariat, has always
applied the recommendation embodied in this chapter”.40
The international economic recession brought its own characters to the guidelines
and appeals of the League to the Governments.  The Assembly recommended in its
15th ordinary Session in September 1934 that governments should put credits at the
disposal of the Nansen Office in order to settle unemployed refugees in countries which
were willing to receive them. The Council further requested the Secretary General to
ask the Governments concerned to inform the Secretariat as to what action they think
can be taken on the recommendation.41
James McDonald was appointed the High Commissioner from a non-member state
in order to maintain the relation between the League and Germany. Perhaps it was
thought that for the Germans it would be easier to negotiate with an American. Without
a closer link to League, the High Commissioner found that he did not have enough
authority and background support.42  McDonald resigned and Germany left the League
almost simultaneously in 1935. With these events it became obvious for the League
38 See e.g.OJ, 14th year, No10(part I), October 1933, 1169-1170
39 OJ, 15th year, No 1, January 1934, 92
40 OJ, 15th year, No 1, January 1934, 93-94
41 Minutes of  the 84.  session of the Council  of  the LON (11.-21.1.1935),  1st meeting 11.1.1935, item 3511/OJ,
16the year, No 2, Feb 1935
42 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 363
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Council by 1936, that the mandate given to the High Commissioner was not strong
enough. The separation of the High Commissioner from the League weakened its
ability to assist refugees. Therefore the next High Commissioner was officially
appointed by the League and more closely attached to its structures.43
In the 1930s the ILO disliked the idea of being involved in the politically sensitive
questions of German refugees. However, the ILO had its representatives in the IAC
throughout the decade. The Governing Body made note on the reports of the
Committee given to the League Council.44  The ILO was involved in large-scale
migration studies which were conducted in several parts of the globe. This made the
IAC to recommend closer cooperation between Nansen Office and the Labour Office in
1935. The scope was in the matters belonging to the core competence of the ILO, i.e.
employment, transportation, and other related matters, where the expertise of the ILO
could be best used.45  Also students and agricultural workers were seen as a part of
the ILO’s core competence.46
In the 1930s the ILO had its representatives in the Nansen Office’s Governing Body.
The ILO was represented in the IGAC as well, and the persons involved were the same
during 1929-32.47  The  ILO  seems  to  have  had  very  little  in  common  with  the  High
Commissioner for German Refugees. Since the High Commissioner’s office was quite
independent and distant from the LON, it didn’t have natural channels to the Labour
Organization either.
Not much had been moving in the ILO in the first years of the 1930s as far as
refugee policy was concerned. In 1933 the League Council made a proposal to the
Governing Body of the ILO on cooperation in refugee matters. ILO was requested to
lend its help to the LON within the limits of its competence.48  The ILO had had some
touch to the German refugee matters while making surveys on employment situation of
intellectual workers in different countries. There was unclarity among the members of
the Governing Body on what could be done. The outcome of the deliberations was that
the results of all studies could be shared with refugee organizations, although it was
43 Skran, 237
44 Minutes of the 73. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1935, 477
45 Minutes of the 74. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1936, 186-187
46 Minutes of the 74. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1936, 76
47 Minutes of the 46. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1929, 557-558; Minutes of the 55. Session of the GB of the
ILO, 1932, 546
48 OB, Vol 18, 1933, 399
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not known, what the usefulness of that data could be.49  The Governing Body of the
ILO would have preferred the Nansen Office as the competent organization. It would
have also enabled the cooperation between the ILO and the League on German
refugees. The situation was, however, such that the HC had the responsibility and the
two organizations remained distant from each other.50
At the end of the Inter-war period, the Evian Conference was convened. The
Governing Body of the ILO was at first reluctant to participate. Some pressure was
required from the side of Leon Jouhaux to produce a decision to send the Vice Director
General of the Labour Office to the Conference as an observer.51  The Conference
recognized in its resolution the invaluable work done by the Labour Organization. The
migration studies prepared by the Labour Office were considered as the basis of the
refugee work, and the IGCR was supposed to cooperate with the existing
organizations, including the ILO.52  The Director General of the ILO was called upon to
participate to the meetings of the IGCR when his expertise was required.53
It seems that the ILO did not have any particular budget allocation for the refugee
work during the 1930s. The measures taken on behalf of refugees were included in the
“normal duties” of the Labour Organization, e.g. in field of migration studies, and so
were the funds. The only connections where the ILO had to be present when politics
and the financing of the refugee policy were discussed were in its representation in the
advisory organs of the Nansen Office and the IGCR.
In 1932, after being “Mr. ILO”, and thus having assured the organization’s strong
presence in the world for thirteen years, Albert Thomas suddenly died. This, together
with the loss of Nansen, had an impairing effect on the refugee work, especially when it
happened during a period of economic recession.54  The successor of Thomas as the
Director General, and his deputy since the birth of the Organization, Harold Butler of
Britain, was soon confronted by the Great Depression with its resulting massive
unemployment. Butler took over the duties in the international committees and other
organizations as the representative of the ILO. During this period, ILO’s work was
marked by the confrontation between workers' and employers' representatives on the
49 Minutes of the 64. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1933, 418
50 Ibid.; Stoessinger 1956, 37-38
51 Minutes of the 84. Session of the GB of the ILO, 1938, 26; Leon Jouhaux was one of the founders and leaders
of the anti-nazist Centre of International Freedom and Justice in Germany; see Mammach, Klaus: Die Deutsche
Antifasistische Widerstandbewegung 1933-1939. Berlin 1974, 187
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subject of the reduction of working hours, without any visible results. In 1934 the United
States became a Member of the ILO. This made some contemporary thinkers propose
that it was the ILO which should take the responsibility and the leadership for the
international refugee work. Because of the advantage of the American membership,
the ILO was considered to be better equipped to deal with the problem of political
exiles in a more effective and comprehensive way.55
At the end of the 1930s the ILO was proposed again to take leadership of the
refugee work. It was obvious that the present organizations could not handle properly
the refugee questions which were heavily politicized. The new organization was
supposed to handle all groups of refugees.56  It could be observed from the documents
of the ILO already during the previous decade, that there were worries about the
refugees getting at the mercy of private employment exchanges and other even more
suspicious entrepreneurship.57  The overall motivation, however, continued to be to
encourage the refugees to become valuable individuals rather than burdens in their
new societies.58 The only realistic possibility to create an ILO-coordinated refugee
organization would have been to include all refugees universally to the scope of the
regime. By the end of the 1930s the opposition against any refugee work undertaken
by the ILO had grown drastically, and it was not possible to achieve any consensus on
assuming the wide responsibilities that the refugee work would have imposed to the
organization.
Some refugees had even more serious problems than just unemployment. Old age
and disabilities made the living hard for many. It was almost impossible to try to find a
favourable solution to these problems on a national level, since after the war the
inability to normal work was huge problem in many countries. The ILO tackled the
questions of the social security and working safety of foreigners in many connections.
Although refugees were not specifically mentioned in these connections, they were of
course “included”, since they were aliens residing abroad.59
Michael Hansson, president of the Nansen Office 1936-1938 also shared his
countryman Nansen’s view of the appropriate role of a refugee agency. In his public
appearances, he constantly stressed the humanitarian and non-political character of
refugee work.  In contrast to this, some actors in the international refugee regime
55 Thompson II, 378
56 Thompson II, 380
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challenged the idea that the refugee agencies should be politically passive. In fact
personalities like James McDonald even argued that fulfillment of the humanitarian
principle sometimes required stepping to the domain of state sovereignty because the
circumstances required this. The background for this perception was the simple
observation that assisting refugees necessitated addressing the root causes of a
refugee movement.60
After the Evian conference the IGCR represented the new hope of handling the
situation with a political solution. IGCR was harnessed with the dual task of negotiating
with Germany over departure conditions of refugees, as well as arranging with host
governments for places of settlement. George Rublee, the director of the IGCR,
devoted most of his time to the first assignment. The biggest issue was the practice by
which the German government confiscated most of the emigrants’ capital before their
departure. Rublee indeed was able to negotiate with the Germans. His ideas were
known as the Rublee Plan. At one point, German government came up with their own
modified plan known as the Schacht Plan, and finally a coordinated model was
discussed. This all came too late, at the edge of the war in 1939. Consequently,
everything concerning refugee aid was postponed until the post-war time.61
Even though the German refugee problem was not among the biggest by numbers
during the Inter-war period, it was very visible. One of the reasons for this was the fact
that a large number of the German refugees consisted of intellectuals, some of them
quite distinguished and famous. The academic society in many countries linked up for
action. The Academic Assistance Council was founded already in June 1933 in order to
protect and help people with academic professions forced to leave Germany without
any certainty of how to make their living in a new country. The Society for Protection of
Science and Learning worked for the same purposes since its creation in 1937.62  The
treatment of certain academic professionals and the forced migration of the scholars
and scientists from the German universities roused the free people of the world to an
understanding of the persecution and refugee issues. Before the Second World War
this had bigger public influence than any other happening or outrage of the Nazis.63
The results of the academic assistance were concrete. In 1933-35 of approximately
650 scholars who migrated from Germany, 287 were placed permanently in some 30
60 Skran, 229-230
61 Skran, 247-255
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countries, and 336 were placed temporarily.64  All the deliberations conducted around
the intellectuals contributed to the fact that the human rights issues were more
acknowledged and the international community on the whole became aware of them.
4.2. The Response to New Requirements
4.2.1. “Pre-Hitler and Post-Hitler” Refugees
If the 1920s could be characterized by naming it the decade of reconstruction, the
following decade was definitely politicized. This was also reflected to the refugee
questions. Refugees were seen as a result of ongoing political processes. The
responses to the refugee problems, when they occurred, were at least partly paralyzed
because of these same processes. Sometimes politics disturbed or even prevented
proper handlings of the issues.
During the years 1929-32 the League didn’t show much activity in refugee matters.
For example, the flow of Mennonites from Soviet Russia in 1929 did not cause much
reaction.65 Then, suddenly in 1933 everything changed. Stoessinger has described the
situation by saying that refugees have their own way of counting time: “Pre-Hitler and
Post-Hitler”.66  In contrast to the refugees of the 1920s, who were driven from their
home countries quite fast and suddenly, refugees from Germany left over a longer
period in waves: the rise of Hitler in 1933, the creation of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935,
as well as the Anschluss and Kristallnacht in 1938 were the most apparent push
factors.67  This could have had given the international refugee regime some time to get
prepared.
The Weimar republic was quite liberal in political sense and Jews had fairly good
economic, religious and cultural status in the German society.  The governmental
offices and universities were open for them. Jews themselves were mainly loyal to the
64 Bentwich 1953, 13
65 Frings, 25
66 Stoessinger 1956, 34
67 Skran, 49
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republic, and there was quite little enthusiasm on Zionism. Although the matters are
very much disputed, there seems to be quite little real evidence of serious large-scale
native anti-Semitism of the Germans. The beginning of the change took place in 1933
when Nazis came to power.68
Discrimination and violence started fairly soon after the Nazis took over in Germany.
The terror and atrocities were directed mostly to Jews but also to other minorities.
Since the Nazi Party became the only legal political party in the country, its political
opponents became targets. The refugees coming from Germany can be roughly
divided in two categories: 1) non-Aryans, leaving the country for legislative reasons,
and 2) political refugees, who were opposed in other practical terms.69 The Communist
Party had been made illegal by the end of May 1933, and the leaders of it had been
expelled, incarcerated, or killed. After this the attack was targeted to social democrats
and trade unions. The attack against the church was delayed. The Evangelicals and
the Catholics had somewhat different treatment in this respect.
The first wave of refugees was seen already in 1933. There were many prominent
artists and scientists among these refugees. 1935 Nuremberg laws and 1938
Anschluss caused visible peaks in the statistics. In late the 1930s Gestapo was often
the push factor.70   The persecution of the Jews took place in waves. Sometimes the
happenings were spontaneous, organized by the Sturmabteilungs, later also some
more systematic campaigns took place.71  The Nazi Government even had some
concerns on the negative impact of the treatment of the Jews to the foreign trade. It
can be said, however, that the persecution became more intensive as time went on.72
The anti-Semitism was an official governmental policy. In the beginning, the emigration
of the Jews was favored by the neighboring countries. Therefore, in the early 1930s, it
was fairly easy for Jewish refugees to settle in other countries with their assets. When
German borders were closed from financial assets, the sympathy for these exiles also
decreased.73
All became too evident in 1935 when the Nürnberg laws were issued.  The Jews
were denied of citizenship. The discrimination assumed systematic forms. This
68 Rautkallio 2004, 77 and 99
69 Thompson I, 45
70 Torvinen, 30-36
71 Rautkallio 2004, 81
72 Rautkallio 2004, 82-83
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development culminated in the Reichskristallnacht on 9.-10.11.1938. The leadership of
the Nazis was behind of the happenings or at least aware of the arrangements. The
first gatherings to the concentrations camps also took place in the 1930s. Paradoxically
enough, the Zionists in Germany had been very enthusiastic about the segregation of
the Jews from German society, aiming to have their own pureblood Jewish nation and
state.74
Another paradox is, that Nazi-Germany was a fairly open state. Domestic and
foreign media was able to make news coverage on treatment of the Jews as it
happened, realistically and timely. The treatment of the Jews was quite well known all
over the world.75 That was probably good on the one hand, and bad on the other:  Jews
received some sympathy in other countries, but the official states and governments
remained reserved having a fear of escalating the delicate international political set-up.
For the Nazis, the Jewish question was racial rather than religious. Belonging to
Jewish religion was seen as an evidence of representing certain race.76 The race was
also emphasized in the legislation, where there were references to blood lines. The
Nurnberg laws defined Jews as subjects of Germany, but not citizens. After 1938
Decree the Jews were not considered to be any kind of Germans. Then it was already
impossible for the Jews to obtain passports.77
Also the Jews who still had German citizenship and were carrying a German
passport were in trouble while travelling abroad. Some states could admit them into the
country only if they had another visa to a third country on their passport. The fear was
that they could apply for an asylum. This gave the authorities an excuse for a denial of
entry.78  The German National Socialist Propaganda Minister Dr. Joseph Göbbels
stated in 1938 that some 180.000 people, mainly Jews had left the Third Reich during
recent years, but there were still about 700.000 Jews in Germany, who must leave the
country.79
The German government made a somewhat complicated arrangement with the
Jewish organizations for the financing of the resettlement from Germany to Palestine.
Those who wanted to emigrate from Germany had to deposit a considerable sum of
74 Rautkallio 2004, 101
75 Rautkallio 2004, 41
76 Simpson 1939, 130
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money on a German bank account. The emigrants lost part of their deposit, and the
benefit was at least partly confiscated by the German authorities. This Ha’avara
agreement (signed 1933) was not even the most unbeneficial arrangement from
viewpoint of the emigrants. Those who were rich did not want to move to Palestine in
conditions that they considered primitive. Instead they wanted to move to the USA or
Britain, having to tolerate the prices for the arrangements which were much higher than
the one for Palestine.80
The definitions denied German citizenship from persons of Jewish or other “non-
German blood”.  The Nazi programme further demanded that “anyone who is not
citizen of the State may live in Germany only as a guest and must be regarded as
being subject to foreign laws”.81  Sicherheitsdienst had deliberations with the Zionist
organizations, both openly and in discretion. The common goal was the creation of a
Jewish state in Palestine.82
The biggest receiving countries were Britain and France. Palestine and the USA
received most of those who went overseas.83  The Jewish organizations implemented a
programme according to which the refugees were received in the first place of refuge,
and then transferred in a coordinated manner to somewhere with a permanent
settlement in sight.84  In some recipient countries the classification according to the
religion or “race” as Jewish was the most important criteria. In some countries (e.g.
Finland), however, the “jewishness” was a secondary criterion of classification, the
primary being the country of origin.85
The German refugee problem was significant by its nature. The attack against the
dissidents and other “undesirables” by the Nazis was so openly severe that it raised
reactions. In normal times the replanting of these intellectual and energetic emigrants
in other countries would have been an easy task, not calling for any organized
international effort. But the coinciding economic crisis made the times more difficult and
the task more substantial.86
The German Government dissociated itself, for obvious reasons, from the
international refugee cooperation. It agreed, however, to give written recommendations
to those of its subjects who were refused a renewal of their German passport. This type
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of document was required by the authorities in several states before they could issue a
document of identity and travel to a foreigner.87
The Ministers of economics of Germany and Austria had negotiations with the
Director of the IGCR George Rublee on the arrangement that would have guaranteed a
possibility for some 400.000 Jews the right to move out from Germany. In a
counterbalance these emigrants would have worked in foreign countries for the benefit
of German exports.88 The plan never materialized, but the essential thing was that the
talks were conducted by the person assigned by international community. Normally it
was the duty for the “intergovernmental officials” to try to keep the people in their own
home country, or get them back there if they had fled. It could be even stated, that in
this point, that Mr. Rublee showed some far-sightedness beyond his normal official
duties and mandate.
All together, at least 150.000 Jews moved from Germany during 1933-1938.89  For
the most part of the 1930s, the borders of the recipient countries remained open for
them. The British government had to restrict access to Palestine because of the need
of the support of the Arab governments.90  However, the estimates on the volumes of
the refugees coming from Germany vary a lot. The numbers come to results between
135.000 and 500.000. Apparently 90 % of the refugees were Jews.91
Another way of classifying the refugees was to try to identify the reason for the exile.
In 1935 this was estimated in the following way92:
-Jews…………………60.000-65.000
-Social democrats……..5.000-6.000
-Communists…………...6.000-8.000
-Pacifists and democrats……..2.000
-Catholics……………………....1.000
-For various reasons…………..2.000
When the refugees started to appear in the neighboring countries in 1933, it was not
easy to distinguish them from normal travelers. In some cases it was advisable for
organizations and authorities to inflate the numbers. Sometimes they would be
87 Bentwich 1935, 27
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minimized for a reason or another. Also people in transit would confuse the statistics.93
While leaving Germany, the refugees could have either ordinary passport, a passport
without possibility to return or a passport of a stateless traveler. Some didn’t have any
travel documents. After 1938 Jews didn’t get any new passports and the old ones were
invalidated. It was therefore impossible for them to get any foreign visas.94  France and
Czechoslovakia were the only countries where these refugees were granted admission
without any difficulties, often even without valid identity documentation.95
The German refugee problem was first addressed in the International Labour
Conference in 1933. The workers’ representatives of the neighboring states Holland,
Belgium, Switzerland, and France had drafted a resolution for the conference to be
adopted. Reference was made to the political situation of Germany. The economic
picture was grim in many countries due to the recession, and the refugees coming from
Germany were worsening the situation. Resolution made an appeal to the Labour
Organization to start taking measures to alleviate the conditions.96 The representative
of Holland referred to the traditions of freedom of his country and stressed that racial
matters should not form an obstacle in solving the problem.97
In some countries organizations were formed to unravel the question. The ILO was
advised to cooperate with those national organizations.98 The representative of France
Mr. Leon Jouhaux supported strongly the actions for the refugees, without interfering
the internal politics of Germany.99  A common view was that the refugee questions
should be handled, no matter what the attitudes towards Germany and its government
were.100
In the middle of the 1930s tens of thousands were seeking ways to flee abroad.
Many were prepared to sacrifice their savings in order to do that. The official
restrictions on export of capital effectively closed the gates, and the borders of most
countries were closed against fugitives with no money. Nevertheless, because the
pressure was not relieved, those who could were leaving Germany.101  The Jewish
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philanthropic organizations used huge sums of money to get the Jews out of Germany
and to find a refuge elsewhere, temporarily or permanently.102
As a result of the handlings in the ILO, a resolution of the Labour Conference on
refugees was presented to the League.103  ILO didn’t take immediate practical action in
the matter.104  Some studies on the position of refugee intelligentsia were made same
year.105  The ILO was using same principles as in the 1920s, despite the long period of
inactivity in refugee matters.106
The LON started soon preparing for a new organization for solving of the problem.107
The German government opposed the project such fiercely, that it became too distant
and independent from the League and thus inefficient. The German refugee problem
as such was not discussed much in the League Council, in fact it was addressed only
minimally. The Council handled the obligatory matters such as nominations and
establishment of organizations. Nothing referring to the political system of Germany
producing the movements of refugees was discussed. Only long after Germany had left
the League and the actions of Hitler made it evident that there may be a bigger conflict
in making, the League Council was activated.
The Jewish question was essentially larger than just the deteriorating situation of
Jews in Germany producing refugees as a visible indication of minorities’ ill-treatment.
The position of Jews in many other European countries started a discussion of
“national rights” for Jews in more general terms.108  The Committee of three exchanged
views in the beginning of 1938 on the desirability of extending the authority of the High
Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany to cover refugees coming from the
territory which formerly constituted Austria.109 The British Government pointed out in
their letter to the Secretary General in April same year, that it was increasingly difficult
to distinguish between the refugees coming from Germany and those coming from
Austria.110  The matter was brought before the Council in May. As a result of the
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deliberations, the Council adopted a resolution which authorized the High
Commissioner to interpret his mandate to be applied to refugees coming from Austria,
until a final decision on the subject has been taken by the Assembly. In the discussion
concerning the matter it was noted that the major part of these refugees were
Jewish.111
The High Commissioner was asked to consult the Governments concerned on the
subject of the application to refugees coming from Austria of the provisions of the
Convention concerning refugees coming from Germany (10.2.1938), and if necessary
of the Provisional Arrangement of 4.7.1936 on the same subject. The High
Commissioner drafted an Additional Protocol to be examined by the Governments
concerned, with the purpose that the document will put the refugees from Austria
legally to the same category with the German refugees. The case of the German
refugee was thus defined by the Convention of 1938 at Geneva. The difficult, long and
complicated definition was seen to cover also groups of people inside Germany –
notably the inmates of concentration camps who certainly did not enjoy the protection
of the German Government.112
In January 1939 both French and British Governments communicated a request to
the Council asking the League to consider the possibility of extending the powers of the
High Commissioner to refugees from the territory formerly part of the Czechoslovakia
which had become a part of the German Reich and did not enjoy the protection of the
German or the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Council authorized the High
Commissioner provisionally to act in accordance with the arrangements and protocols
concerning the refugees coming from Germany when dealing with these above
mentioned refugees. The matter was to be taken to the Assembly later same year for
official decision.113
As a result of a referendum, the Saar territory was returned to Germany in 1935.
The plebiscite held in the Saar territory in January 13, 1935, supervised by the League,
resulted to the clear victory of the votes for joining with Germany.  Francophile persons
and other opponents of the Nazi regime fled the Saar territory. France started almost
immediately receiving fugitives who felt themselves threatened. France took an active
role in speaking for the Saar refugees. It required action from the League to help these
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people. As a result of this, the Nansen Office started issuing passports for the refugees
and preparing for their resettlement to Paraguay.
The French government announced that it would receive the fugitives, but at the
same time it urged that the responsibility on the emigration should be taken by the
League of Nations. It had to be the League’s mission to prevent the expansion of the
problem. This was supposed to be done by securing the strict observance of the
undertakings of Germany so that it would not act upon those who had voted against
reunion. The enforcement by the Council of the League and the Permanent Court of
Arbitration had a central role in those undertakings.114
The French Government asked in January 18, 1935 that the question of refugees
coming from the Saar should be placed on the agenda of the 84th session of the
Council. The Council decided to take the item on the agenda of the present session. In
its letter and accompanying aide-memoire the French Government pointed out that
despite the declarations of the German Government and the international guarantees a
practical problem was arising. The French speaking Saarlanders did not trust those
promises. The position of the League was different in this case than in any of the other
refugee questions. The League had administrated the Saar territory for fifteen years,
and the people had been some sort of subjects of the League. Therefore the French
Government saw that now the League had special obligations towards the people who
had taken refuge.115
In the 84th session of the Council the Secretary General reminded the Council that
the League budget contained no available credit to which expenditure for the
maintenance and settlement of the Saar refugees could be charged. Should the next
Assembly decide to add to the budget by opening special appropriations for that
purpose, they would not be available before the beginning of 1936.116
The Secretary General sent a note to the members of the Council proposing that the
League should entrust the work of dealing with the refugees from the Saar to the
Nansen International Office.117  The proposal was regarded as accepted by normal
League procedures. Since the fugitives were French, the procedures concerning the
Saar refugees were effective and quick. The League Assembly decided to put the
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responsibility of the protection and care of the Saar refugees to the Nansen Office, not
to the High Commissioner. The Arrangement of 24 May 1935 extended the provision of
Nansen Passports to the Saar refugees.118  These people were thus added to the list of
people whose sufferings the League was attempting to alleviate. Even the Saarlanders
were regarded as having a special claim, the assistance of the League was not
considered very satisfactory. This was only in proportion to the insignificant funds at its
disposal. The most effective help still came from France.119 In retrospective, the help to
the Saar refugees must be considered very prompt and effective compared to any
other operation undertaken by the LON. When the pressures were in place and the
task was not too overwhelming, results could be shown.
Iraq was the only mandated territory to be granted independence through collective
agreement. The country was admitted the membership of the League in October 1932
after being under British administration since the end of the First World War.120  Studies
have shown, nevertheless, how limited the withdrawal of the British administration was.
The independence was granted only with extensive British military and economic
presence. The existence of the State of Iraq was a result of international or
intergovernmental deliberations and quite unique development as such. The
reservations directed against this “quasi-statehood” were for its own part based on the
fears related to the fragile status of the minorities in Iraq.121 This, in turn, may be
interpreted as one of the main reasons and primary impetus for the international
attention the (internal) refugees finally received in the League and elsewhere.
The Permanent Mandates Commission was deeply uneasy about the tens of
thousands of Assyrians who were considered to be especially vulnerable. They were
Christians, Britain’s wartime allies, and for a large part already displaced and dispersed
among the Muslim population.122 After reaching no acceptable covering arrangement
the international community had to witness deterioration of the Assyrian situation. The
crisis escalated with an armed group of Assyrian men clashing with Iraqi troops. Local
Muslims looted Assyrian homes and finally the army massacred hundreds of Assyrian
men. As a consequence, the League searched, with limited success, for a state willing
to accept the remnants of the Assyrians.123
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The Government of Iraq produced a letter to the Secretary General in December
1933 explaining how peaceful the situation was and how impossible it was for them to
detect any problems of Assyrians. In fact, the problems seemed to be solved except
some individual incidents, including the Assyrians refusing to work for their own relief.
Iraq in practice passed the problem to the League.124  The League representatives in
Iraq and elsewhere had a different opinion. Their gathering of the situation was that
there should be a resettlement scheme created for those Assyrians who may wish to
leave Iraq.125  It can be observed from the documentation, that for those who had
already left Iraq, there was no hope for returning home. This would mean resettlement
elsewhere as League’s remedy, rather than repatriation to Iraq.
In his Nobel speech Michael Hansson, the president of the Nansen Office, asked
what will happen when the Spanish Civil War comes to an end. At that time there were
enormous amounts of internal refugees in Spain, and it was anticipated that at some
point the neighboring countries will have to receive large numbers of these political
exiles. France was again anticipated to be the target country as many times before.
Some organizations provided help; there was the International Commission for Aid to
Refugee Children in Spain formed by several international actors. Also the League sent
a mission to Spain to gather information on the situation in the late 1930’s. The
indication was that there were as many as several millions of people who were living in
conditions that would make them de facto refugees.126
The question of Spanish refugees came up during the 95th session of the Council at
the end of 1936. The Spanish Government sent an appeal to the Council on the basis
of certain events. Several attempts to intervene with the atrocities taking place among
displaced people had obviously occurred. The Spanish Government (representing the
Falangists) stressed the fact that it was the duty of every State to respect the territorial
integrity and political independence of other States. They also reminded that the
Members of the League had recognized this duty in the Covenant. The Council in its
resolution unanimously endorsed these principles. In the same resolution the Council,
however, noted that there were problems of humanitarian character in connection with
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the present situation, in regard to which coordinated action of an international and
humanitarian character is desirable as soon as possible.127
The background for these deliberations was that a number of Spanish nationals had
taken refuge in Embassies and Legations in Madrid. These people had a reason to be
afraid for their lives, and they were offered protection by the Diplomatic Missions. This,
in turn, was interpreted by the Spanish Government as a violation of the principle of
non-interference. The representative of Spain required that if these refugees were to be
evacuated, it should be placed “in the hands of some neutral organization which is
beyond suspicion.” The International Red Cross Committee was considered an
organization qualified for this task.128
The initiative to take the issue to the agenda of the 96th session of the Council came
from the Government of Chile, sending a letter to the Secretary General concerning the
situation of persons who had taken asylum in the Embassies and Legations. Later this
request was endorsed by the Governments of Cuba and the Netherlands.129  It  was
brought forward in the Council that the movement of people fleeing from the area of
hostilities was considerable and extended behind the whole fighting front. In January
1937 there were more than a million refugees, representing about 15 % of the
population. In some places, the absorptive capacity was exhausted. A list of possible
available places of accommodation was presented to the Council. It was reported that
Madrid received refugees at the same time as almost half a million inhabitants of the
city were evacuated elsewhere.130  The conditions in the country were simply chaotic.
The biggest obstacle for any action was the attitude of the Spanish Government.
The main objection of the representative of Spain concerned international intervention,
to which he could not agree. The Spanish Government raised no objection as to the
actual evacuation of the refugees. However, it was the requirement of the
representative of Spain that Spanish military forces should be responsible for the safety
of the refugees and should guard them. This brought the situation to a dead end.131
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The deliberations were very extensive, obviously because all this happened in Europe,
in the vicinity of the core areas of the League. However, these refugees were not
abroad, and thus out of the reach of any intergovernmental organization unless the
Spanish Government otherwise decided.
At the beginning of October 1936, a “National War Refugees Committee” was
formed at Madrid as a controlling, executive and supervisory body. It was supposed to
make general arrangements for the evacuation, as well as arrange distribution and
accommodation of refugees. The Committee consisted of representatives of the
various political parties in Spain as well as of local authorities.132  The peculiar thing is
that the Government of Spain signed and thus joined the Provisional Arrangement
concerning the status of Refugee coming from Germany (1936) in the middle of their
own refugee crisis in January 1937.133
The Spanish Government submitted a request to the Council in September 1938 for
technical assistance in the study of measures for providing food supplies for refugees.
The Government was faced with the grave and urgent problem of ensuring the supply
of food during the coming winter for approximately three million displaced people. The
Council authorized the Secretary General to institute a preliminary enquiry on the
matter. In the same deliberation it was noted that there were similar needs on the both
sides of the front lines.134  The most exceptional thing was that the Spanish authorities
were requesting for help to people who were in their own country!135
In 1938 it was reported that in France alone there were tens of thousands Spanish
refugees. France had returned to Spain men between the age of 18 and 45, but had
kept most of the comers. The refugees were looked after by an organization called the
Comité d’Accueil which was organized by the French Trade Unions. The organization
provided accommodation and relief without charge.136  On the whole, there were lots of
discussions on Spanish refugees in the organs of the League. The course of the
discussions confirmed by the research literature shows that the refugees coming from
Spain remained without League protection.137  The LON Council virtually decided not to
take action on behalf of the refugees coming from Spain and Fascist Italy. The League
132 Minutes of the 96. Session of the Council of the LON (21.-27.1.1937), Annex 1644/OJ, 18th year,  No 2,  Feb
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members and the Council did not want to provoke the fascist governments of those
countries despite the call for help by the representatives of the Nansen Office in
France.138
The problem of the exiles from Italy was different from all other refugee problems
during the Inter-war period. Generally, refugees are and were stateless in the common
sense as well as from the legal point of view. However, the Italians were not stateless.
They did not fall under the legal definition usually applied in these connections. As
refugees, they were still Italian nationals and may have been in possessions of Italian
passports. Their exile was purely political in character. They could have, in theory at
least, terminated their exile if they were willing to submit to the Fascist State. One of
the unofficial definitions for Italian refugee was “an Italian living abroad, who cannot
return to his country without personal danger, because of his political activity against
fascism”.139
With an element of uncertainty, it is possible to estimate that the number of Italian
refugees who fled from Fascism amounted to 800.000 during the Inter-war Period.140
There were tens of thousands Italian political refugees in France alone. The French
Trade Union, the Confédération Générale du Travail, urged the French Government to
help these exiles. In 1937 a meeting was held in Lyon, at which Italian refugees
established an organization called the Unione Popolare Italiana to combine the efforts
of the Italian political refugees and the anti-Fascists.141
Dr. Giuseppe Nitti, in a report to the Simpson’s survey, defined Italian refugees in
more categorical terms:
-Persons who have gone abroad to escape from political judgments given by Fascist
Tribunals
-Persons who had crossed the frontier without passports to escape threatened legal
proceedings
-Persons who have left Italy legally with passports but who no longer enjoy the
protection of their Government142
Simpson’s report, being virtually the only covering source of information on Italian
refugees, divides the Italian political emigration falls into four periods: 1. The period
between the march on Rome in October 1922 and 1926; 2. November 1926 – June
138 Stoessinger 1956, 31-32. France was receiving most of the refugees from both of those countries
139 Simpson 1939, 117
140 Toller, 388
141 Simpson 1939, 618
142 Simpson 1939, 118
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1929; 3. June 1929 -  July 1936; 4. Since July 1936.143  The Italian refugees never got
a legal position by an international definition. A document, signed by a large number of
well-known Italians abroad, was presented to the Intergovernmental Committee at
Evian, asking for international recognition for Italian refugees, similar to the refugees
coming from Germany.144  Nevertheless, the verdict of research has been that the
refugees coming from Fascist Italy were unambiguously left without League’s
protection.145
       4.2.2. Nansen Office
Fridtjof Nansen died in May 1930 at the age of 68 years. In the fall of the same year
the League of Nations authorized the founding and the work of Nansen International
Office for Refugees. The Office began its work in April 1931. In its mandate it was
defined to be an autonomous body under the authority of the League.
The Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission for Refugees consisting of
representatives of the Governments most directly concerned with the problem of
refugees, held its second session in Geneva in the beginning of September 1930. The
Commission decided after exhaustive examination, to propose that the Assembly
should 1) entrust the political and legal protection of refugees to the League’s regular
organs, and  2) create an International Office for Refugees to deal with the
humanitarian work hitherto entrusted to the High Commissioner for Refugees. The
Council decided to approve the report of the Commission in its 60th Session and
forward the question to the Assembly.146
The Nansen Office was established to take charge of and carry out the humanitarian
and relief work for a limited period of time. Although this was the original mandate of
the Nansen Office, it was obvious that the Office had to intervene in political and legal
questions from time to time, since it had representatives in different capitals, and the
League didn’t.147  When the statutes for the Nansen Office were established in 1930, it
143 Simpson 1939, 120
144 Simpson 1939, 122-123
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was understood that the refugee work will cover the following refugee groups officially
defined by international arrangements: Russians, Armenians, Assyrians, Assyro-
Chaldeans, as well as Turkish refugees.148
The Council decided that the Statutes of the Nansen Office should be submitted to
its approval. According to this, the Chairman of the Governing Body of the Office, Max
Huber communicated the draft Statutes to the Secretary General. The same
documents were also circulated to all members of the Council. The Council approved
the Statutes in its 62nd Session in January 1931 and requested the Chairman and the
Secretary General to take necessary measures for convening the Governing Body of
the Office.149
According to the Statutes, the organs of the Nansen International Office for
Refugees became to be:
-The Governing Body
-The Managing Committee150
Although the Nansen Office was to be an autonomous body, it was regulated by the
Article 24 of the League Covenant. This Article dealt with the regulation of bureaus and
commissions dealing with international matters.151  The report of the Nansen Office was
considered each year by the Sixth Commission of the Assembly. A resolution was
issued on the subject each year by the Assembly.152
The Rules of Procedure of the Nansen International Office for Refugees were
published in the Official Journal in April 1931. All other regulative documentation of the
new refugee organization was presented in the same issue. On the basis of the League
material, it was the first time that any refugee establishment showed such openness
and transparency in its establishment and planned activities. The capacity, mandates,
and tasks of the Governing Body, The Managing Committee, as well as the
Administrative Secretariat were duly defined, regulated, and documented.153 Also the
members of each of the bodies were listed. The Governing Body had members
appointed by the IGAC, the Secretary General, the ILO, the Advisory Committee of
Private Organizations as well as the Governing Body itself. The Office had staff in its
148 Minutes of  the 60.  Session of  the Council  of  the LON (8.12.9.1930),  Annex 1232/OJ,  11th year, No 11, Nov
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1931, 310
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Central Service as well as representatives in different countries. All these were listed
even with their nationalities and addresses. The personnel had clear staff regulations.
The financial regulations of the Office were in place.154
In turn, the participation of the President of the Governing Body of the Nansen Office
in the work of the IGAC155  was seen necessary. In the report of the IGAC in
September 1931 it was clearly stated: “Inasmuch as the Nansen International Office for
Refugees is the successor of the High Commissariat for Refugees, the Commission
considers that the Office should be represented on the Commission. It accordingly
recommends that arrangements should be made to invite the President of the
Governing Body of the Office, M. Max Huber, to become a permanent member of the
Commission”.156  The President presented the first report of the work of the Governing
Body to the Secretary General already in May 1931.157
The first President of the Office, Max Huber, resigned for health reasons. He sent a
letter expressing his intentions to the Secretary General in November 1932. The
Council noted the matter in its first session of 1933 in January. The Council also noted
that Mr. Huber was appointed President by a resolution of the Assembly, and the
Statutes of the Office contained no rule for the appointment of the President. It
therefore seemed clear that the successor of Mr. Huber had to be nominated by the
Assembly as well. Since there were urgent budgetary matters to be handled in the
Office, the appointment of the new President was put to the Agenda of the Special
Assembly in session at that moment, rather than waiting to the next ordinary
Assembly.158  Already in May same year, the new President, Georges Werner,
appeared in his duties before the Council presenting the joint reports of the Nansen
Office and the Advisory Commission.159
The work of the Nansen Office was dictated by the prevailing political convenience.
When the Saar refugees started to cross borders, their protection and care was
commissioned to Nansen Office instead of the High Commissioner.160  This was to
emphasize the humanitarian nature of the work to be done. The protection of the Saar
154 OJ, 12th year, No 4, April 1931, 748-754
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refugees was greatly due to the activity of the French government. At that point,
Germany was still a member of the League. In this case the League deviated from its
own rules and accepted responsibility for both the legal protection and settlement of the
refugees. It did so because of its previous role in administrating the Saar territory and
because the French government offered to provide the funds for the settlement.
Moreover, these refugees did not travel with empty pockets, but brought with them
more financial means than the refugees who fled from Germany.161
The original thought was that Nansen Office would be mandated for ten years, until
the end of 1939. Already at the beginning the contemporary executive committee
proposed that the Office’s closing should be advanced to the end of 1938.  The
termination of the Office was brought forward because of the optimism derived from the
encouraging results of the time.162  When this decision was made, no one could expect
the change of the international situation as it then unraveled in the course of the 1930s.
Max Huber also held the position of the President of the ICRC. The Vice-Chairman
of the ICRC, Georges Werner, became his successor in the Nansen Office. Werner
died in 1935, and presidency was vacant for a year, until Judge Michael Hansson
assumed the duties in 1936. Major T.F.Johnson was nominated as the first Secretary-
General of the Nansen Office. Johnson had already been involved in refugee work for a
long time by this.
The Office had a Governing Body with a President who at the same time was the
leader of the whole organization. The Governing Body consisted of eleven members;
the Secretary General of LON and the Director General of the ILO and nine others. The
refugees were also represented in the Governing Body for the first time in
organizations’ history. Two of the members were Russians and one Armenian.163
The holders of the position of the President of the Nansen Office are here in a
consecutive order:
President                                                               Secretary General
Max Huber (Switzerland)           1931-33              T. F. Johnson (UK) 1931-
Georges Werner ((Switzerland) 1933-35
Michael Hansson (Norway)        1936-38
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The post of the President was quite windy at the beginning. Mr. Hansson finally
distinguished himself as the most visible character, being also the one to receive the
Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the organization.
At its creation, on the mandate of the Nansen Office, it was defined that the
organization will take responsibility for the material assistance of the refugees. The
League would assume the responsibilities connected to the legal and political
protection of the refugees. The essence and the meaning of the work of the Nansen
Office was that it brought the refugee work of the international community and the
donors among the needy recipients, while the official League of Nations often remained
distant. President Hansson himself also evaluated the work as having a powerful
influence to public opinion and the news media in many countries.164
In the 1930s, during the existence of the Nansen Office, Norman Bentwich
described the work of the organization: “The work of the Nansen Office was not
restricted to the provision of identity and travel documents and of quasi-consular
protection for its refugees. Together with philanthropic organizations which were
associated with the work, it has contrived to find homes for the homeless.” It was also
noted that the Nansen Office had been commissioned in the work of settlement,
especially in case of the Armenians in their settlement to Syria and Erivan.165  The
Office was characterized as an international consular service, because of some
features connected to its portfolio.166
Michael Hansson, in his capacity as the President of the Governing Body of the
Nansen International Office, presented his report concerning the liquidation of the
Office to the Council at its 97th session in May 1937. The Council noted that big
problems of substance will be raised by the proposed liquidation. The report was
intended to be disseminated to Governments in a view to examine the magnitude of the
task entailed by the systematic termination. This was meant to involve the governments
that had associated themselves with the refugee work, as well as the various
organizations implementing the tasks. It was the duty of the 1938 Assembly to take the
final decision on the termination and Mr. Hansson expressed as his wish that the
decision by the League could be made with fullest possible information at its
164 Hansson II
165 Bentwich 1935, 119
166 Bentwich 1935, 120
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disposal.167  This may be interpreted as an appeal to the Governments; no extra time
for the Office was directly recommended, but the people responsible for the refugee
work would not have been dismayed if such decision had been the outcome of the
deliberations.
The administrative problems were emphasized in the report: work still remains to be
done after the liquidation of the Nansen Office. The activities, now performed by the
Office, must continue since the problem will not disappear by terminating the Office.
The credit scheme implemented by the Office should be continued, at least to the
extent of recovering the loans.168  It was noted that the Nansen Office is, however,
making strenuous efforts to bring the refugee problems as near solution as may be
possible.169
It was noted that the liquidation of the Governing Body, the Managing Committee
and the Finance Committee would meet no difficulties, since the appointments of the
members of these bodies expire at the end of 1938, and they were not paid for their
work. The representatives of the Office numbered 18 in 1937. Some of them were
receiving a fixed stipend, some were granted allowances to meet the costs of the staff
required. They were appointed by the Managing Committee and approved by the
government of the country in which the holder of the position was to carry out his
mission.170  All possible work performed by the Nansen Office and the costs of the
activities during the years 1931-1936 were presented statistically in the Appendixes of
the mentioned report.171
One of the serious handicaps of the Nansen Office was that it was competent to
protect the interests only of Russians, Armenian, Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, Turkish,
and Saar refugees. In several instances the development of the Nansen Office into a
world-wide refugee organization was seen the most effective solution for the refugee
problem on the whole. Covering all possible refugee groups with the political
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authorization of the League, it would have formed a strong backbone for activities.172
The Nansen Office faced difficult times during its existence. It was, however, supported
by governments more than many other organs. As the Nansen Office closed its doors,
it merged with the League’s other refugee organizations to form a larger unit.173
The composition of the Governing Body gave an opportunity for refugees
themselves to take an official part in the work for the first time. Two of the members
elected by the Advisory Committee of Private Organizations were Russians and one
was an Armenian refugee. This became possible only after Nansen’s death. Nansen is
said to have resisted suggestions that Russians should be given posts in the Service.
Later refugees were in some cases appointed as local representatives, and they
always played an influential part by their membership of the Advisory Committee.174
The Convention of 28.10.1933 was in fact prepared largely by the Nansen Office.
The successful operation of the Arrangements and of the Conventions depends, finally,
on local interventions in specific cases. The Secretariat of the League had no network
of local representation; hence much of the political and legal work was therefore de
facto conducted by the local representatives of the Nansen Office.175
Judge Michael Hansson definitely brought legal experience to the work. He also had
similar enthusiasm as his countryman Nansen. In addition to all this, he had certain
realism which had at times been lacking in the management of the organization in
earlier years. His main achievement was said to be the simplification of the complicated
machinery of the Nansen Office.176
It was clear that carrying out the humanitarian tasks required money, more than any
other form of assistance. The League allocated annually sums of 250.000 – 300.000
Swiss francs to the Nansen Office. These funds were earmarked for administrative
purposes.177 It was clear that this kind of sums were insufficient for any larger field
operations, even without the particular exclusion of operative purposes.
The League provided the Nansen Office with a mandate, but the funds for its
activities were insignificant. The basic structure of the funding of the Nansen Office
looks as follows:
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a) The League provided funds for administrative expenses of the Nansen
Office. The level of the allocations was diminishing yearly until the end of the mission of
the organization. The total administrative costs for Nansen Office for 1931-36 were just
about 2 million Swiss Francs.178  At his Nobel Peace Prize speech in 1938, Michael
Hansson pointed out that the League has time to time been quite reluctant in making
the allowances available to the Office.179
b) A total amount of 2.6 million Swiss francs was provided by the
Humanitarian Fund in 1931-36 for various purposes.180
c) Funds for the field work came from various sources: 1) revenues were
obtained from private contributions. 2) The bulk of the funding came, however, from the
fees charged for the Nansen Certificates/Passports. This contributed a total of 875.000
Swiss francs during 1931-36.  3) Third source was the sale of postal stamps in France
and Norway; this brought 72.000 Swiss francs into organization during 1931-36.181
d) A separate specific Near East Fund was able to accumulate a sum
totaling 6.8 million Swiss francs during the mentioned six year period.182
In 1935 the Norwegian Government introduced a scheme for issuing surcharged
postage stamps. The amount of the surcharge was transferred to the Nansen Office.
The IGAC endorsed the system and laid stress upon the importance of the scheme
which would help the Office to accomplish its tasks. The Council, however, did not
particularly endorse the scheme, except adopting the report of the IGAC including the
recommendation.183  In the very beginning of its existence, Nansen Office also got
donation from Nansen’s estate, a sum of 250.000 Norwegian kroner which was said to
represent partly the accumulated funds formed by the Nobel Prize, which Nansen
178 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 363
179 Hansson II
180 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 363
181 Ibid.
182 Simpson 1939, 213; Grahl- Madsen 1983, 363
183 Minutes of  the 86.  Session of the Council  of  the LON (20.-25.5.1935),  1st meeting 20.5.  item 3574/OJ,  16th
year, No 6, June 1935
280
himself received in 1922. The Office also got a contribution from the British
Government.184
In May 1935 the Governing Body of Nansen Office asked for an additional
appropriation of 20.000 Swiss francs. This was supposed to be an increase in the
League’s annual contribution to the Office, which was the administrative budget of the
Office. The Governing Body also further asked for an advance by the League to the
Office, 200.000 Swiss francs, in order to meet the costs of assistance, conveyance,
and settlement of the refugees.  These requests were made in connection with the
Saar refugees. The suggestions were handled in a very positive manner and received
positive consideration with notice that it was extremely exceptional. It must be noted in
this connection, that the refugees in question were French people from a territory
formerly administrated by the LON.185
The Supervisory Commission of the League considered the matter, and according to
their suggestion the Council decided further in September 1935 to allocate 10.000
Swiss francs (instead of requested 20.000) for the Nansen Office for administrative
expenses in 1935 in respect of the settlement of refugees coming from the Saar from
the budget item “Unforeseen expenses – Political”.186
There is an example of the budget of the Nansen Office in the League source
material for the year 1934, when the resources and the activities of the Office were in
full use. The budget was divided in two: Administrative budget and the Assistance
budget. For the administrative side there was a perfect balance; the income and the
expenditure were the same 319.183 Swiss francs. On the assistance side the income
was 851.336 francs and the expenditure only 587.080 francs.187 The practical work
obviously was a result of the present needs and the responses to them.
Michael Hansson pointed out in 1937, that the financial and other resources of the
Office had been far from sufficient in carrying out all the enormous tasks imposed to it.
The main source of own income had been the fee of 5 gold francs for the issuing or
renewal of the Nansen certificate.  The Office was supposed to conduct operations, but
184 Hansson II
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the League provided no regular funds for the humanitarian activities. The only
exception had been the allocation of 200.000 Swiss francs for the Saar refugees.188
The Nansen Office had counted that by the beginning of 1937 it had committed an
enormous amount of 520.000 individual interventions on behalf of refugees!189 The
criticism from outside towards the Nansen Office was focused in two main points: It
didn’t take action as fast as it should have done, and that the Office, or at least some of
its representatives in capitals, were politically oriented.190 The need for neutral
“consular representatives” was recognized. It was contemplated, however, that certain
types of “politically oriented” representatives could very effectively promote the
activities. An example of this was the Office’s honorary representative in
Czechoslovakia; daughter of President Masaryk.191  In the beginning of 1937 Michael
Hansson also expressed as his opinion that the present administration of the Nansen
Office should be simplified. One side of this was to make it possible for the
representatives to carry out humanitarian operations more independently.192
As any development aid or humanitarian assistance, refugee aid can be provided
either in a form of a grant or a loan.  A direct grant was used for those in greatest need.
People who were incapacitated or otherwise inadequately capable of providing for
themselves, were supported by donating funds for their immediate needs. The Nansen
Office used loans in order to encourage people to help themselves by initiating small
business or to get accommodation. In many cases, people were not able to repay the
loans. However, lending activities also contributed to the accumulation and recycling of
the funds. Some refugee organizations were able to use the funds obtained in a form of
subsidies in a manner that even increased the original bulk of funds.193 This refers to
successful microloan activity. It has been proven in modern development cooperation
that microloans have successfully enabled extremely impoverished people to engage in
self-employment  projects that allow them to generate an income and, in many cases,
begin to build wealth and exit poverty.
The Assembly adopted a resolution on 5.10.1937 in which it instructed the President
of the Governing Body of the Nansen International Office to arrange for the effective
and complete liquidation of the Office. The Assembly also noted that the mandate of
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the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany will come to an end on
31.12.1938 in accordance with the previous decisions. On this basis, the Assembly
requested the Council to draw up a plan for international assistance to refugees in the
future. The Council entrusted the examination of the whole of the questions connected
to the task to a Committee consisting of three of its members, which were the
representatives of Bolivia, Britain, and France.194
In some later studies it has been rather ironically assessed that the most important
achievements of the Nansen Office were the assistance of the Saar refugees as well
as the preparing the termination of itself. However, as this research work shows, as a
part of a larger system, it definitely had its role in the continuation of the regime and
formation of the intergovernmental refugee policy.
       4.2.3. The High Commissioner for German Refugees
The German refugee problem started to materialize soon after Nazis came to power.
The reaction by the League was rapid; the High Commissioner for the Refugees
Coming from Germany was established already in 1933. The office was defined to be
as independent from Geneva control as possible without totally dispelling formal
attachment to the LON.195
It was surprise to nobody that the German delegates raised objections to these
plans. As a compromise the High Commissioner was not placed directly under the
League. This meant that finally “the High Commissioner had the title but not the powers
nor the importance of a League Commissioner”. The High Commissioner had no
regular budget provided by the League, and the work had to be supported by privately
contributed means which was naturally a challenging state of affairs.196  When the new
High Commissioner’s post was under consideration in 1933, the German Delegation to
the League first said that it would disinterest itself in the matter. Later it severely
opposed the proposal that the High Commissioner should be directly attached to the
League. The final form of the Assembly resolution on the High Commissioner’s
mandate therefore stated that the Council of the League should invite states and
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private organizations to be represented on a Governing Body of the H C. The duty of
the Governing Body was to give guidance and practical help to the High Commissioner
in his work.197
All this meant that the autonomous High Commissioner for Refugees coming from
Germany had to report to a separate Governing Body instead of the Council of the
League. The probable reason for this was that Germany then was still a member of the
League198, and some hope existed for a peaceful settlement of the refugee matters and
cooperation with the Nazi regime in general. Before completing the establishing the
office, a long discussion in various international levels took place on topics whether the
position should be connected to the League and how closely that should be done.199
A remarkable step in League’s proceedings was the item on Council’s and
Assembly’s agenda in October 1933. It was formulated in quite cumbersome way as
“Organization on an International Basis of Assistance to Refugees (Jewish and Other)
coming from Germany”. That was the first time this item appeared in the deliberations
of the League, and in practice it meant the re-creation of the High Commissioner’s post
after some years gap following Nansen’s death. The Assembly suggested that the
Council should nominate a High Commissioner to negotiate and direct collaboration on
the work for the refugees coming from Germany in all countries which are able to offer
help.200
In October 1933 the Council appointed an American, James G. McDonald to act as
the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and other) coming from Germany. In
selecting a national of a powerful but neutral country, it was hoped that Mr. McDonald
could increase the involvement of the United States government in the League. Raising
funds for the work from wealthy American Jews was at the aim as well. It was though
that this way the new organization could avoid the dangers of European political
divisions. The headquarters of his office had to be in set in Lausanne. Although
neighboring cities, symbolically the HQ was far enough from Geneva, the seat of the
League. The Secretary General of the League, Joseph Avenol, made McDonald’s
independent and separate status clear to him. McDonald was ordered to report to the
Governing Body of the H C, instead of the League.201 The newly formed High
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Commissioner had two main responsibilities in the beginning: it was considered
important to coordinate the relief and settlement efforts, as well as to negotiate with
governments in order to facilitate refugee travel and settlement.202 The tasks sound
very similar to those of the High Commissioner of the 1920s.
The first and foremost practical matter and task the Commissioner entered into was
the personal documentation for the refugees who didn’t have German passport or other
document for identity and nationality.203  As emphasized in the previous connections,
the High Commissioner did not receive the responsibility of the protection of the Saar
refugees in 1935, since the Nansen Office was considered to be better equipped for
that.204
McDonald lacked strong support from the League and therefore was in a constant
need of friends with money. As anticipated from the beginning, the help of private
organizations became even more important than it had been for Nansen and the
Refugee Service during the previous decade. McDonald established an Advisory
Council of private organizations consisting of the representatives of 25 Jewish and non-
Jewish agencies. These NGOs formed later the major source of funds needed in the
operations initiated by the High Commissioner.205
The Headquarters of the Commissioner was in Lausanne for the beginning, but was
later transferred to London. The purpose was to signify the distance from the League
even geographically. As the League didn’t assign funding to the Commissioner, the
money came not only from private organizations but also from some individual
Governments (e.g. Sweden).206
The High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany had a Governing
Body/Board with 13 representatives of Governments. Its Advisory Council consisted of
representatives of different philanthropic voluntary organizations.207 In the autumn of
1935 the Governing Body took action to liquidate the office of the High Commissioner
at the end of January 1936. McDonald resigned just before that in December 1935.
Therefore his resignation could be interpreted as a protest against the inadequate or
lacking League policy. The Council of the League was supposed to make other
provision for the coordination of the activities on behalf of the refugees coming from
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Germany.  The idea seems to have been to reorganize the work done on behalf of both
“German” refugees and the “Nansen” refuges on a more coordinated basis.208
James McDonald left his post in December 1935 with great publicity because he felt
that the German refugee problem could not be tackled only by relief measures. The
autonomous High Commissioner did not have enough political muscle without a closer
connection to the League.209  In his resignation letter James MacDonald expressed as
his feeling that efforts must be made to remove or mitigate the causes which create
German refugees. Failing to accomplish this was one of the reasons to his
resignation.210
It has been later analyzed that the resignation of McDonald was a protest against
his inability to do the most important: political action required to address the causes.
Jews seeking to leave Germany had to leave behind their financial assets, which made
them also politically powerless. At the time of economic depression they were unable to
fulfill the basic conditions of potential home countries: not to become a burden on the
public purse.211
Soon after this, the League appointed a new High Commissioner for Refugees from
Germany, British Sir Neill Malcolm.  He had made a career as a League official and
received his administrative expenses from the League budget. As High Commissioner,
Malcolm directed his energy on developing a legal status for German refugees, which
was an open question at that time. Many other important but more practical questions
on emigration and settlement were put entirely on the shoulders of private
organizations.212
It was also the sense of the Governing Body of the High Commission for the
Refugees coming from Germany that the work could be better carried forward by an
organization directly under the authority of the League.  The effectiveness of the High
Commissioner’s efforts was weakened from the beginning by the compromises. The
compromises were originally accepted in order to avoid the veto of Germany,213 but
later definitely regretted as Germany had left the League anyhow.
The Norwegian Government made a proposal in 1935 that High Commissioner’s
office should be merged with the Nansen Office under the authority of the League in
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order to achieve better control, efficiency, and effectiveness of the activities. That
would have meant a League organization with centralized responsibility for all
refugees.214 The Norwegian proposal was not adopted, as it too ambitiously attempted
to widen the scope of the political and legal protection given by the League to include
all refugees regardless of their nationality or origin.215
The League took, however, some steps to coordinate the activities of the two
organizations. Although more clearly identified in the mandate of the HC, the same
basic principles applied in practice for both: 1. the activities must be defined to people
who already have left their home country, 2. The High Commissioner limits its work to
seeking governments’ support to the solution of legal problems, employment, and
dwelling, 3. High Commissioner should encourage the initiatives and coordinate the
work of the NGOs.216  During this period, the work seems to have been bothered by
some weaknesses; the three organizations, the Nansen Office, the High
Commissioner, and the ILO had their own responsibilities, but their work in practice had
overlaps.217 The Organizations were simply not coordinating their activities enough.
A recommendation of the Special Council Committee to examine provisional
measures to be taken on behalf of refugees in January 1936 considered that the
Council authorizes its President to appoint a temporary High Commissioner of the LON
to deal with questions connected with refugees coming from Germany. According to
the recommendation the Council also authorized a maximum of 50.000 francs to the
activities. For the first time, the High Commissioner’s immediate duties were duly
defined. Those were: 1. To prepare and arrange a meeting of an inter-Governmental
conference on legal protection of refugees coming from Germany. Also the United
States will be invited. 2. To undertake consultations in order to find work and placement
for the refugees. 3. To establish a liaison with private assistance organizations in order
to coordinate international efforts.218
The League obviously wanted to save the relationship with Germany as long as it
seemed possible. Only when Germany had left the League and Sir Neill Malcolm was
appointed High Commissioner for Refugees in early 1936, his status could be similar to
214 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 364
215 Hansson II
216 Basis for this classification, see Torvinen, 49
217 Stoessinger 1956, 37-38
218 Minutes of the 90. Session of the Council of the LON (20.-24.1.1936), 6th meeting 24.1./OJ, 17th year, No 2,
Feb 1936, 126-128
287
the first High Commissioner in the 1920s.219 The appointment process went on quickly.
In the beginning of February same year, the President of the Council and the Secretary
General were proceeding in consultation with the Council members on no objection-
basis, whether their candidate, Sir Neill Malcolm, could be acceptable choice for the
High Commissioner’s office. The new holder of the position was to assume the office
on February 14. The silence of the members  was interpreted as their consent.220  Sir
Neill Malcolm started at his office on a provisional basis in February 1936. Later that
year the Assembly recommended that the High Commissioner should be appointed
until December 31st, 1938. The Council made this final appointment by its resolution in
the 94th session in October 1936.221
John Hope Simpson expressed as his judgment in 1938 that the position of the High
Commissioner was changed after the resignation of Mr. McDonald, and the High
Commissioner became an agent of the League of Nations.222 The fact seems to be that
in 1936 the League integrated the High Commissioner more completely into its
structure.223  Sir Neil Malcolm’s functions were restricted to juridical advisory activities
and the coordination of the activities of the voluntary and academic societies. Money-
raising by and for his office continued to be a delicate question.224
The League Assembly reached a decision in 1938, encompassing the idea that the
refugee work should continue by combining the existing organizations, the High
Commissioner for German Refugees and the Nansen Office. The solution was a single
High Commissioner for Refugees under the protection of the League of Nations based
in London, and the arrangement became effective in the beginning of 1939. The
mandate for it was given for five years. Sir Herbert Emerson was appointed to the
office with effect from January 1, 1939. He was harnessed with the responsibility for the
Russian, Armenian, Saar, and German refugees, the last one including also refugees
from Austria and Sudetenland.225  This organization was in great troubles from the
beginning; it didn’t have funding and it was much hated by the Government of the Third
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Reich.226  Nevertheless, all this meant that finally the organizations for the “Nansen
refugees” (Russians, Armenians etc.) and the “German refugees”(German, Austrian,
Sudeten-Czech etc.) were gathered under one High Commissioner in London.227
During the whole decade of the 1930s, the High Commissioner was more loosely
attached to the League than the Nansen Office. Its reports were not officially appraised
by the Council or the Assembly of the League. Otherwise the High Commissioner and
the Nansen Office were quite similar by their structure. Both had a Governing Body and
an Advisory Council consisting of representatives of different types of NGOs dealing
with the refugees.228
A lively discussion on the future of the refugee organization of the League took
place before entering to the resolution. The decision to terminate the activities of the
Nansen Office was being implemented, and the High Commissioner was the part that
was still left. It was only after long and difficult deliberations that the League Council
and Assembly adopted the necessary resolutions in order to make decisions to create
a High Commissioner whose mandate would cover all the classes of refugees for
whose protection the League had assumed. This High Commissioner had no power to
enter into any legal commitment whatsoever on behalf of the League of Nations.
Furthermore, the League assumed no responsibility, legal or financial, in respect of his
activities. The new High Commissioner was completely independent from the previous
two offices, the Nansen Office and the former High Commissioner.229
When the High Commissioner for refugees coming from Germany was established
in 1933, it became evident soon that the main part of the financiers were Jewish.230
Since the funds released by the League could be used only for administrative
purposes, an important source of financing of the field activities of the refugee
organizations was the selling of the Nansen stamps to passports of the refugees.231
The revenues were considerable, taking into account that it was estimated that the sum
required for the employment of one refugee individual was only 30 centimes.232  It is not
explained in the source material how this calculation was obtained. If we consider what
was said about the use of the League funds, it could mean personnel costs and
administrative cost divided by the number of refugees assisted.
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Altogether, the High Commissioners position and Office was in a crisis during the
entire1930s. The death of Nansen in May 1930 exposed the leaders of the LON to a
very difficult position. All administrative matters had to be reconsidered. The well
known figure was gone, and purely economic and financial matters became dominant
in the organization.233 At one point, there had been a decision to discontinue the whole
refugee work at the end of 1938.234  The High Commissioner for Refugees from
Germany could not afford to maintain a system of representatives in major refugee-
hosting countries, which meant that the High Commissioner could do very little in the
way of providing consular or other services to refugees.235
When the Committee of three236 came up with a report in May 1938, it noted the
Invitation made by the United States Government to set up a special committee to deal
with certain aspects of the refugee problem. On the basis of the fact, that the refugee
problem was far from solved, the Committee of three saw that the coordinating role of
the League would still be indispensable. The Committee also took a view that a single
organization might be set up for a limited period of time, to take the place of the two
existing organizations. The proposed organization would be directed by a person
designated by the League, as the “High Commissioner for Refugees under the
protection of the League of Nations”. The idea was that he would be assisted by a
small staff comprising neither refugees nor former refugees.237
Both the Nansen Office and the High Commissioner were thought to be provisional
organizational arrangements. The possible continuation of the mandate of the refugee
work was a constant topic of deliberations. Even at the end of the mandate of the High
Commissioner for German Refugees at the end of 1938, there was a decision taken by
the League Assembly concluding that the refugee work must continue under the
League authority for the next five years at least. This was supposed to be done in
practice by combining the High Commissioner and the Nansen Office.238
Holders of the High Commissioner’s position:
-Fridtjof Nansen (Norway) 1921 – 30
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-James McDonald (USA) 1933 – 35
-Neill Malcolm (UK) 1936 – 38
-Herbert Emerson (UK) 1939 -
        4.2.4. The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
At the end of the 1930s demands for a new kind of refugee organization were
growing. The direction of the proposed work was supposed to be placed in the hands
of prominent personalities who had international reputation. The necessary financing
had to be found, and the various private bodies were supposed to subordinate their
activities to this organ. It became increasingly clear by the end of the 1930s, that the
jurisdiction and mandate of the organizations connected to the League could not be
broadened and strengthened. The opposition among the countries actually or
potentially producing refugees was too pronounced. Therefore, it seemed more
appropriate to concentrate the handling of the Jewish refugee problem in an
organization which not a part of the League.239
The demands for better handling of the problem were increasing, especially among
the Jews of America, who constituted one-fourth of world Jewry. The proper handling of
the problem was a political approach, charity was simply considered to be not enough.
This could be achieved only by an organization headed by outstanding politicians or
diplomats of the democratic world. Moreover, practical and full collaboration with
Jewish organizations everywhere, and the support of the democratic governments was
required.240
There were some political pressures in the United States to do something about the
Jewish refugee problem even before 1938. President Roosevelt made a decision in
March 1938 to invite representatives of governments to a conference in Evian in
239 Thompson II, 380
240 Thompson II, 386-387
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France.241 This Conference took place in July 1938. The Intergovernmental Committee
on Refugees was created by 30 governments following the conferences held in Evian
and London in summer 1938.242  Despite the great attention attached to it, one of the
later judgments of historians has been that the Evian Conference failed to establish its
original idea, i.e. to negotiate seriously on migration between nations, the main
international political players.243
United States was not a member of the League of Nations. Thus this committee was
entirely independent of the League. It was supposed to collaborate with the League’s
High Commission in order to make arrangements for the movement of refugees to
overseas countries.244 The initial purpose and motivation of President Roosevelt and
his administration in making the proposal for the new Committee remains somewhat
obscure.245  Tommie Sjöberg has described the substance of the Committee: “…IGCR
was not the very first intergovernmental body created to deal with the refugee issue,
but it was the first to be set up outside the increasingly discredited League of Nations’
machinery…… IGCR was also the first international refugee organization set up on a
permanent footing”.246  The shortcoming of the League as U.S. not being the member
came fully into open as the refugee problem of Nazi-Germany was faced by the
international community.247  An international body with the U.S. as an active participant
was clearly needed. As it was not politically realistic to get the US join the League,
something else had to be done.
Soon after the Evian Conference the Secretary General of the League brought to
the notice of the Members of the League a letter received from the Secretary General
of the Inter-governmental Committee, including the text of the resolutions adopted by
the Conference on 14.7.1938. In the text it was clearly emphasized that the resolution
concerns exclusively involuntary emigration from Germany, including Austria.248
The possibility of resettling Jewish refugees to Palestine was on the agenda of the
Evian Conference. The scheme was finally blocked by the UK as the administrator of
the Palestine area under the Mandate of the League of Nations.249  The underlying idea
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of the established Committee was a conciliatory one: The first task of the Committee
was to start negotiations with the German authorities on the issue of the assets of the
Jewish refugees. The purpose was to secure the right for the refugees to take at least a
part of their rightful and legal assets with them.  This was to be the first step in path of
establishing some kind of cooperation to enhance the resettlement.250
Another feature distinguishing the IGCR from the previous refugee organizations
connected with the League of Nations was that the membership of the Committee was
originally restricted to countries of temporary refuge or permanent resettlement (of the
Jewish refugees). No countries which were considered as producing refugees
themselves were invited to become members in 1938.251
The declared objective behind the American initiative on the IGCR was to achieve a
decisive improvement in the prospects of assisting refugees. The machinery at the
disposal of the League was regarded as quite inadequate for dealing with the far-
reaching refugee problem created by the Anschluss in the spring of 1938. However,
Sjöberg has in his doctoral dissertation demonstrated that this objective was never
reflected in the behavior of the states particularly well.252
The Committee has been described as an American construct. It consisted of
representatives of 31 states. The work of the Committee covered two classes of
refugees forced to leave their homes on account of their political opinions, religious
beliefs, or racial origin: 1) those who had not yet left their country of origin (e.g.
Germany and Austria); 2) those who had already left their country of origin but had not
yet settled permanently elsewhere. The aim of the negotiations carried out by the
representatives of the Committee with the Nazi authorities was to get the legal property
of the comers from Germany and Austria to their countries of refuge. The Second
World War interrupted also this invaluable effort.253
It is remarkable that for the first time officially concern was expressed for those who
were in danger in their own home countries, i.e. the potential refugees. The methodical
terror by the Nazi organizations was everywhere already in 1933. Concentration camps
were established in Germany in the course of the 1930s, and they were used
increasingly instead of ordinary prisons. This was widely known by those who listened
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to the stories of the refugees in the 1930s,254 but it took until 1938 before something
was done about it.
After being duly established, one of the two main tasks for the IGCR was to
negotiate with the German government concerning a more orderly emigration plan. The
other was to try to achieve a more favorable reception for refugees in settlement
countries through negotiations with governments. Through diligent proceedings, the
Director of the IGCR was able negotiate an unofficial plan for the emigration of about
400.000 Jews with the German government.255  The outbreak of the Second World War
made the concrete implementation of these programmes impossible.
The Committee had its headquarters as well as a permanent secretariat in London,
with the purpose to aid potential and actual refugees coming from Germany (including
Austria).256  It was felt only natural, that an American was appointed as the Director of
the permanent secretariat. Mr. George Rublee was the first holder of this position. The
idea was that the Director could negotiate with the German Government without having
to carry the burden of being connected with the League of Nations.257  The task turned
out to be overwhelming for the Director. Germany simply was not in the mood to
negotiate. Mr. Rublee resigned after few months of posting in February 1939.258
Only six months after the Evian Conference there were indications that the United
States as the leading power wanted to work for the integration of the IGCR and the
High Commissioner. In this plan the Committee was supposed act as an advisory body
to the High Commissioner on resettlement questions. Later the Americans argued that
the work of the IGCR would primarily be supervisory and consultative in the future. In
order to avoid overlapping duties, there was no need to maintain an independent
administrative centre for the IGCR or even hold regular meetings.259  It was thought
that if the High Commissioner and the IGCR’s Director were one and same person, the
work could be conducted within the framework of the High Commissioner’s regular
duties. The member states of the IGCR could then only meet occasionally as
required.260 After the Second World War the policy of the United States was still
consistent as it continued to favor an institution with specifically designed functions.
This policy field reflected the concepts of the US Government in its foreign policy in
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general, as it was to limit international influence over national migration and refugee
policies as much as possible.261
The Secretary General communicated to the Members of the League the exchange
of letters that took place between Lord Winterton, Chairman of the Inter-Governmental
Committee, and Sir Herbert Emerson, the High Commissioner for Refugees of the
League. This communication stressed the advantages which would accrue from a
closer cooperation between the Committee and the High Commissioner. Furthermore,
it was proposed that this cooperation might be made most effective by uniting the
functions of the Director of the Committee and the High Commissioner in same person,
while maintaining the separate and independent existence of the two organizations. Sir
Herbert gave his acceptance to the proposed arrangement.262
This merger materialized as the High Commissioner Sir Herbert Emerson was
nominated as the Director-General of the IGCR.263  The IGCR was assigned to be
responsible for the refugees coming from Germany and Austria, whereas the High
Commission should concentrate on Russian and the people from the Saar Region. The
IGCR also took nominal responsibility for the Refugees who had escaped the Falangist
persecution from Spain to France. In practice it was the French government that had to
carry the burden of protecting these people.264
For the next four years, the IGCR existed merely on paper.265  However, after the
League had lost its credibility and capacity, the IGCR became more important actor
towards the end of Second World War. The Committee was able to assist thousands of
refugees from German and German-occupied territories and bring them to safety. In
1943 and 1944 the mandate was broadened and it became a part of the Allied efforts
to protect and assist people in liberated territories.266
On the whole, Sjöberg has demonstrated in his doctoral dissertation that it seems
highly unlikely that the United States government took the initiative on the IGCR in
order to increase the possibilities of assisting the European refugees in the first place.
Instead, the initiative could serve important political purposes for the Unites States
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government, both in foreign policy (the threat of German expansion), as well as in
domestic politics (something should be done about the Jewish refugee problem).267
          4.2.5. Other Supplementary and Advisory Organs
The work on behalf of the Greek and Bulgarian refuges continued until the beginning
of the 1930s. An Arrangement was concluded between the Governments of Greece
and Bulgaria in November 1931 in order to finalize the reciprocal population
exchanges. The Arrangement was based on a proposal of the US President Hoover
made in June 1931. The purpose of it was to enhance the execution of the previous
agreements made between these two countries, suspending the inter-governmental
debts and to arrive to a practical settlement of open matters. It was supposed to
prepare the termination the work of the League Commissions both in Greece and in
Bulgaria.268  For the League it was time to terminate its responsibilities in these
countries, and thus get the things cleared and done. At the same time, the work of the
Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Commission had to be terminated. The remaining tasks of the
Mixed Commission were referred to the Financial Committee of the League.269  The
President of the Greco-Bulgarian Intermigration Commission submitted to the Council
on 28.1.1932 a letter in which he confirmed that the Mixed (Intermigration) Commission
will definitely terminate its work on January 31, 1932. The task of this particular Mixed
Commission was to supervise reciprocal voluntary emigration between Greece and
Bulgaria. Its activities covered a period of just over eleven years. It was also reminded
in the discussions of the Council of the League that refugees are not voluntary movers,
and the activities of this Commission must be kept separate from refugee work.270
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In the course of changes and evolution of the organizations, there was some
continuity. Still in 1938, when the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was
formed, it was recommended that the Director General of the International Labour
Office should be invited to be represented at meetings of the Committee when
questions affecting migration were under discussion.271  A summary of the evolution of
the League refugee organizations was presented in 1938 by the League’s Information
Section. The evolution was then characterized as taking different forms as a reaction to
varying demands. For example, in the middle of the1920s, the Labour Office was
needed for taking the main responsibility simply because the refugee problem then was
taking mainly an economic form. On the other hand, in the 1930s, when the problems
were highly politicized, the organization had to take a corresponding shape.272
In the 1930s the Nansen International Office and the High Commissioner for
Refugees were organizations appointed by the Council and acting under the direct
supervision of the Financial Committee of the League.273  In addition to those, there
were some specific organizations formed under the umbrella of the LON, aiming to
solve the problems of one or some refugee groups, without any principle of universality.
Some of the bodies, in turn, had general, political, and advisory mandate and agenda.
Some were formally connected to the League; some were at least seemingly totally
separated from the League.
Subcommittee for the Resettlement of Assyrian Refugees, SRAR
A Subcommittee for the Resettlement of Assyrian Refugees was formed in 1933.
Iraq had joined the League in 1932. The minority problems of Iraq had been under
surveillance of the international community for some time. The Assyrians, being
Christians in the middle of the Moslem majority, formed the most visible minority group
in the eyes of the Europeans. Finally the big powers came to the conclusion that the
only feasible manner to tackle the question was to resettle the Assyrians to other
countries.274
The Council directly appointed the Sub-committee in October 1933 for the Assyrians
of Iraq and delegated extensive powers to it for the preparation and execution of a
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settlement scheme, and in December 1935 approved of the statutes of a Trustee
Board. The chairman and one member of the Trustee Board had to be appointed by
the League Council and the third member was supposed to be a representative of the
High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and Lebanon. The Trustee Board
had to report quarterly to the Council and could be dissolved by the Council.275
The Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission, IGAC:
The Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission was attached directly to the League.
It contained representatives of fourteen states.276  This  Advisory  Commission  had  a
visible role in forming the policy and guidelines of the League of Nations especially in
the 1930s. There seems to be quite close interdependency between these two. The
Commission consisted of representatives of important Member States. The leading
League organization, the Nansen International Office, had its representative in the
Commission, and the Commission, in turn, had close advisory connection to the Office.
The Commission had regular sessions, and according to the resolution of the
Assembly in 1931, the League received reports from the Commission on its sessions.
A typical recommendation of a Commission’s report to the Council was to undertake
tasks connected to the adoption of recommendations created by the Commission and
endorsed by the League. As result of this, numerous communications between the
League Secretariat and Member States Governments were circulated. The Council
also seems to have adopted the reports of the Commission.277
The Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission for Refugees was not an executive
office and thus had no regular budget as the High Commissioner and the Nansen
Office did.  It did not conduct any practical refugee work. The Commission examined
questions and made conclusions. On that basis, it gave its own recommendations to
the League, which, in turn, forwarded the questions to be implemented, if they were
supposed to be implemented. Some contemplations of the Commission were purely
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hypothetic and did not include any agenda for action. The sessions often lasted more
than one day, and there was a multiplicity of items on the agenda.278
Nansen Memorial Fund, NMF:
In May 1931 a group of prominent politicians presented an appeal for forming a
Memorial Fund for the completion of the humanitarian work of Fridtjof Nansen.  Among
the signatories of the appeal, there were heads of states and ministers from various
European countries. The main motivation for the appeal was, as the signatories
underlined, that Nansen’s work for the League of Nations was left unfinished when he
died. The aim of the contribution was to add to the funds and capacity of the Nansen
International Office which had been mandated to take care of the remaining relief work
among refugees. Contributions were called and could be sent to the Nansen Memorial
Fund at any of the branches or correspondents of Lloyds & National Provincial Foreign
Bank Ltd. A list of those included banks in 38 different countries and other platforms.279
Advisory Committee of Private Organizations, ACPO:
The Advisory Committee of Refugee (Relief) Organizations contained
representatives of some forty national and international philanthropic bodies.280 The
report of the IGAC in September 1931 stated that the Commission had decided that the
ACPO shall continue to be attached to it, and will participate in its work as hitherto.281
Committee on International Assistance to Refugees, CIAR:
 The Assembly decided in September 1935 to ask the Council to appoint a small
Committee of competent persons to report to it on “certain questions connected with
the problem of refugees”. The initiative behind the decision had come from the
278 See e.g. Minutes of the 86. Session of the Council of the LON (20.-25.5.1935), Annex 1541/OJ, 16th year, No
6, June 1935
279 OJ, 12th year, No 6, June 1931, 1005-1006
280 Bentwich 1935, 120
281 OJ, 12th year, No 11, Nov 1931, 2120; cf. also Chapter 4.1.
299
Norwegian Government. The Council acted accordingly and the Committee on
International Assistance to Refugees was established. The task of the Committee was
to collect all useful evidence concerning refugee problems and their solutions,
particularly from the IGAC. The Committee was to submit its report to the Council.
This, in turn, would equip the Council to take appropriate measures in finding solution
for the problems.  The financial aspect of the establishment was settled by a decision
of the Fourth Committee of the Assembly authorizing the appropriation of a sum of
5.500 francs from the credits placed at the Council’s disposal for the year 1935.282
The Committee met at Geneva from November 28th to December 7th 1935.  As  a
result, it submitted its report to the Council in January 1936. One of the principal points
which the Committee was called upon was the winding up of the office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany. The letter of resignation of James
McDonald came simultaneously with the preparing of the report of the CIAR. The report
of the Committee was divided into three main parts. Part I contained an analysis of the
information at the Committee’s disposal. Part II contained the conclusions of the
Committee on the main points with which it was called upon to deal. Part III contained
the Committee’s proposals regarding measures which might be taken by the Council or
the Assembly. The Committee recommended special remedy for the problem of the
High Commissioner for German Refugees; the appointment of a temporary
Commissioner for this class of refugees, and a definition of his duties and means of
action.283
The actual report shows that the scope of the work of the Committee was broad. All
possible aspects of the present refugee problems were handled. The magnitude of the
problem was divided into two parts: a) the refugees who were dealt with by the Nansen
Office and b) the refugees coming from Germany.284 The numbers of refugees that the
Nansen Office was dealing with were as follows, at the end of 1936:
Russians                                         700.000-800.000
Armenians                                                    240.000
Assyrians and Assyro-Chaldeans                    7.000
Turkish                                                                 150
Saar                                                          3000-4000
282 Minutes of the 89. Session of the Council of the LON (17.9.-7.10.1935), 4th meeting 28.9., item 3648/OJ, 16th
year, No 11, Nov 1935
283 Minutes of the 90. Session of the Council of the LON (20.-24.1.1936), 1st meeting 20.1./OJ, 17th year, No 2,
Feb 1936, 69-70
284  Who were supposed to be covered by the High Commissioner
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The number of refugees coming from Germany was estimated to be 80.000-
100.000.285
This shows how uneven the approach of the League was in respect of the groups
targeted. The motivation for the protection of Turkish refugees was clearly a special
one, since it is hardly imaginable that those 150 individuals could have caused a
humanitarian disaster compared to the huge amounts of some other refugee groups.
The Committee stated that the figures do not give a true idea of what the refugee
problem means from the point of view of commitments and regretted that at this point it
had not been able to obtain sufficiently exact data.286
It seems that the mandate of the Commission was not extended after it had
concluded its work in a form of a report. It was clearly a provisional establishment. The
composition of the Committee indicates that it was a band of experts, selected to be
best suited for the task to be undertaken. The nationalities of the members were
mentioned in documents, although it was quite clear that in this capacity they did not
represent their respective governments, but their own expertise.287
Special Council Committee, SCC:
The Council decided in its 90th session in January 1936 to constitute a Special
Committee of the Council to consider provisional measures to be taken regarding
assistance to refugees coming from Germany. The provisional measures were
recommended by the CIAR in its report. (See above). The Committee consisted of six
members and a rapporteur. The members were representatives of the United Kingdom,
Denmark, France, Italy, Poland and the USSR.288  The Committee was appointed on
January 22, and it gave its report to the Council already during the same session on
24.1.1936. The Committee recommended that the Council should immediately appoint
Norwegian Michael Hansson to act as President of the Governing Body of the Nansen
Office. Another recommendation was that the Council authorizes its President to
285 Minutes of the 90. Session of the Council of the LON (20.-24.1.1936),  Annex 1576/OJ, 17th year, No 2, Feb
1936, 144
286 Minutes of the 90. Session of the Council of the LON (20.-24.1.1936),  Annex 1576/OJ, 17th year, No 2, Feb
1936, 144
287 Minutes of the 90. Session of the Council of the LON (20.-24.1.1936),  Annex 1576/OJ, 17th year, No 2, Feb
1936, 142
288 Minutes of the 90. Session of the Council of the LON (20.-24.1.1936),  3rd meeting 22.1./OJ, 17th year, No 2,
Feb 1936, 77-78
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appoint a temporary High Commissioner of the LON to deal with questions connected
with refugees coming from Germany.289
It has been reported that a few difficult questions of the settlement were referred for
advisory opinion to the Permanent Court of International Justice. That same tribunal
was called upon to decide on some details as to the persons to be included in the
compulsory transfer of populations when the grand exercises between Greece and
Turkey took place. The reports reveal that the advice of the Court was adopted by the
parties.290
Some advisory organs, as well as some individual governments, made various
proposals towards the end of the 1930s concerning the future organizations for refugee
protection. Notably the Norwegian Government was active in this respect. The
background for these proposals according to the Norwegian Government lay in the fact
that it seemed illogical and unpractical to establish differences of treatment between
the various groups of refugees under the protection of the League of Nations. It would
be to the advantage of both the League and of the refugees if the whole work of
assistance could e consolidated and coordinated. Norway submitted a draft resolution
recommending creation of a single organization on the liquidation of the Nansen Office
and of the High Commission at the end of 1938, and instructing the Secretary General
to prepare a scheme for this purpose. The resolution was never adopted. Instead, it
was confirmed to wind up the Nansen Office and continue the work somehow, as it was
reaffirmed that “the political and legal protection of refugees has not ceased to be an
obligation of the League”.291
289 Minutes of the 90. Session of the Council of the LON (20.-24.1.1936),  6th meeting 24.1./OJ, 17th year, No 2,
Feb 1936, 126-127
290 Bentwich 1935, 124
291 Simpson 1939, 218-219
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4.3. Performance on a Practical Level
       4.3.1. Humanitarian Aid
The humanitarian field operations did not take place in the 1930s in the same scale
as they were necessary during the previous decade. The limitations in the mandate of
the League refugee organs were the cause for the fact that the intergovernmental
efforts in the field were restricted. Very little can be said about the practical
humanitarian aid that was supposed to be coordinated by the League system. In case
of the Assyrians, the League’s material offers a unique description from a refugee
camp in Mosul. A report by Major Thompson was forwarded to the League at the end
of November 1933. The camp was opened in August 1933, and it was administrated by
a local Committee consisting of five local Iraqi members and Major Thompson as the
President of it. In November 1933 the number of refugees in the camp was a little over
1500 persons, including men, women, and children, the latter two groups forming the
majority of the residents.  About two thirds of the refugees were accommodated in
tents, the rest in houses. According to the report the supply of foods seemed to be
sufficient for everyone living in the camp. Electric light was provided in the houses and
lanterns in the tents. According to the report, health situation in the camp had been
satisfactory, thanks to the assistance rendered by the British Royal Air Force health
and medical services.292
All this suggests that even in modern terms, the conditions in the refugee camp did
not indicate utmost destitution.293 Where did all the money come from? The report
confirms that the Iraqi Government had freely met all demands to finance the
administration of the camp. The biggest amount was expended in the initial stages of
the formation of the camp.  The sum actually spent on the running of the camp was
about 200 Iraqi dinars per week. This amount covered food, milk, rent of houses, tents,
pay of staff, electricity, and minor repairs.294
292 Minutes of the 78. Session of the Council of the LON (15.20.1.1934), Annex 1495/OJ, 15th year, No 2 (part I),
Feb 1934, 229-230. The RAF was entrusted with a significant role in defense of Iraq for a long time during the
Inter-war period; see Pedersen 2010, 979
293 This is said against the background of what we know about refugee camps in general all around the world
then and later
294 Minutes of the 78. Session of the Council of the LON (15.20.1.1934), Annex 1495/OJ, 15th year, No 2 (part I),
Feb 1934, 231
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The League sent a Health Mission to Spain in order to gather information
concerning the humanitarian circumstances as well as the situation of displaced people
gathered all around the country in Spain. The Mission was formally sent at the request
of the Spanish Government.295 Refugees, both men and women, were in a need of
protection. Men and women definitely shared the same needs for physical protection.
However, women refugees, because of their sex, were frequently subject to the
additional risk of sexual abuse.296  Health services are often inadequate for women in
camps. Poor sanitation in overcrowded refugee camp housing affects women the most,
because it is they who have to cope with frequent pregnancies and with children’s
illness.297  The League deliberations reveal nothing that would support the idea that this
was recognized during the existence of the refugee work organizations of that time.
Overall picture is, that whenever there was a question of aid supplies and money,
there were allegations on ambiquities. “Revelations” of misuse of funds  were frequent.
The sad thing is that many of the cases were real.298  It must be kept in mind that
humanitarian work or emergency operation requires money more urgently and in a
larger scale than any other form of refugee assistance. This was a constant problem as
the League simply didn’t have sufficient funds. Moreover, it was difficult and
complicated to get authorization to allocate the funds that were available. The
organizations didn’t have any reserves, and the operations had to be more or less
improvised.
        4.3.2. Political Protection and Identification
Refugee status was also in the 1930s considered to be essentially a temporary
position and to be terminated as soon as possible. This had to be done either by
returning to the country of origin and resuming full citizen’s rights there, or by
integration in a country providing permanent asylum, accompanied by legal absorption
295 Minutes of the 96. Session of the Council of the LON (21.-27.1.1937), 1st meeting 21.1./OJ, 18th year, No 2,
Feb 1937, 94
296 Reference to this fact; see Camus-Jaques, 145
297 Camus-Jaques, 148
298 Nevalainen, 235
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in the form of naturalization.299 In the 1930s the international community generally
accepted the idea that every individual should be in a possession of a nationality. The
existence of stateless people was considered to be an abnormality.300  A legal status of
refugees was largely depending on the documentation the people were able to obtain.
People needed to prove their identity and legalize their signature in order to live normal
life and comply with formalities in a modern society.
Not all exiles were officially refugees. Some people didn’t want the status of a
refugee, even they were fugitives. On the other hand, there were individuals who
applied for the status and asylum without being in real danger and persecuted. Again,
political and economic convenience dictated the approach of an individual. It was a
political dilemma. People were considered refugees as long it was convenient. When it
was not, they became “illegal immigrants”. People would like to have the status of a
refugee, if they feel that it is useful for them.
In the 1930s the German refugees were in a difficult legal position, since they were
not covered by the previous agreements. Only in 1936 the first Provisional
Arrangement concerning their documentation was adopted. In 1938 the Convention
relating to Status of Refugees coming from Germany made a serious attempt to
organize and arrange the situation. Later the same legal benefits were extended to
refugees coming from former Austria and Sudetenland.301
In the 1930s the delegates of the various League refugee agencies provided
refugees with a variety of services, from recommendations to government officials that
refugees be issued with an identity certificate or visa, to certifying professional
qualifications or family status. From 1932 to 1938 the Nansen Office made an average
of more than 18.000 interventions annually relating to personal status of Russian,
Armenian, Assyrian, and the Saar refugees. In addition, the representatives of the High
Commissioner provided consular services directly in France and in Belgium under the
terms of their 1928 Accord.302
There was also another curious phenomenon in connection with the Russian
refugees. Soviet authorities counter-expelled some refugees who had been returned
from Finland to Soviet Union unofficially, without the consent and cooperation of the
Soviet authorities. This happened also to some who had assumed Soviet citizenship.303
299 See Riila, 47
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The Honorary Representative of the League High Commissioner Mr. Gripenberg
protested the policy of the Finnish governmental authorities to return large numbers of
refugees to Soviet Union in 1933. In his request for explanation he told that the High
Commissioner had exact information on the deportations. The explanation of the
Finnish authorities seems to have been that the Soviet government had a number of
prison camps and forced labour camps close to the border, and unwanted fugitives
were frequently met crossing the borderline. This dialogue went on for some time and
lead to a slight conflict between the Finnish Government and the High
Commissioner.304
During the Inter-war period there was the division between a) political and legal
protection and b) humanitarian work. This distinction could not be faithfully followed in
practice. For example, in the 1930s it was the Nansen Office instead of the Secretariat
of the League to make (political) interventions in capitals, since the NO had the network
of representatives.305  There are, however, very little references in the League source
material to any real political activities in capitals on the matters of refugees.
The citizens of former Russian Empire were classified as refugees by the League of
Nations.  The people who later fled from the Soviet Union were treated equally and a
parallel was drawn between the groups.  It was politically difficult to create a new
definition after the Soviet regime was finally established. The granting of an alien’s
passport or a Nansen passport was considered a symbol of an asylum, even if the
foreigners had come to the recipient country with a legal (old) passport and visa.306
The Nansen Office and the Advisory Commission conducted a joint exercise in the
beginning of 1933 in order to secure a more stable legal status for refugees. The aim
was to simplify the international and national procedures, background for this being the
fact that only limited number of countries was primarily concerned with the problem.307
This was, of course, also a symptom of initial activity of the new President of the
Nansen Office, Mr. Werner, who had just started.308 The Nansen Office interceded on
304 Leitzinger II, 245
305 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 363
306 Leitzinger II, 551
307 In answers to the circular letters etc. the replies of individual countries had stated that this was none of their
concern
308 Minutes of the 73. Session of the Council of the LON (22.5.-6.6.1933)/OJ, 14th year, No 7 (part II), July 1933,
806
306
behalf of refugees in more than 800.000 instances during the first five years of its
existence.309
A crucial issue concerning the refugees’ legal status was the delicate question of
expulsion. The IGAC drew up several additional recommendations concerning
expulsion in its seventh session in 1935. The IGAC requested the Council to ask
information from the governments as to the principles at present applied in regard to
refusal of entry and expulsion in case of refugees who cannot be allowed to reside in
other countries as well as previous recommendations on the same subject included in
the resolutions of the League.310
The international conventions and arrangements of 1933, 1936, and 1938 contained
basic elements of the legal status of a refugee.311  Many of the elements were
connected to the limitations on expulsion or return. Refugees required to leave a
contracting State were supposed to be allowed a reasonable time to make
arrangements. Legally resident refugees were not to be expelled or sent back across
the frontier without a reason connected to national security or public order.
Governments also agreed in general not to return refugees to Germany.312
The word “asylum” was widely used for the first time in connection with the
discussion concerning the refugee situation in Spain. In the beginning of 1937 the
status of Spanish persons who had taken asylum in the Embassies and Legations at
Madrid was discussed in the Council. The Chilean Government raised the question of
the position of these people as well their possible evacuation to other countries.
Meanwhile, these people were safe in the premises of several Diplomatic Missions.
This was referred to as taking asylum.313  The question was, whether it is appropriate
according to international rules, to accommodate these people, and whether they could
be removed safely out from Spain.
The Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Madrid presented to the Foreign Affairs
authorities of the Spanish (Valencia) Government a memorandum setting forth the
principles applicable to the evacuation of persons who had been granted asylum in the
Embassies and Legations. The memorandum required safe departure abroad for
309 Hansson II
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persons who had been granted asylum. Old men, women, and children were to be
allowed complete freedom of movement outside Spain. Special provisions were laid
down for males capable of bearing arms that had been granted asylum.314  The Council
had very extensive discussion on the issue of Spanish refugees, without any obvious
outcome.
As the League of Nations sought to provide a solution for refugees, definitions were
adopted for each category by intergovernmental conferences convened for the
purpose. These definitions were adopted by the Council and the Assembly, and they
were incorporated in international Arrangements and Conventions concerning
refugees.315  When considering asylum, residence permit or expulsion, the refugees
themselves were often unaware of their rights. One of the most important of the
recommendations made by the Consultative Intergovernmental Commission in 1935
was that the governments should arrange for an internal organization to help the
refugee and give him an opportunity to represent his case. The evidence on the case
should not be made secret.316
The legal definitions were designed to serve League’s administrative purposes as
well as state authorities. The handicap was that they only covered those groups to
whom juridical and political protection had been extended by the League.
Nevertheless, they were used for the purpose of distinguishing refugees from other
aliens.317 The Assembly concerned itself about the practice of certain states punishing
the refugees for illegal entry and residence. The consequence of this often was the
dismissal of the refugees into neighboring countries, where the same process started
again. In 1937, however, the Assembly could note that certain improvement had taken
place.318
Refugees were often stateless people, but not always. Refugees were in a need of
identity certificates regardless whether they were stateless or officially or effectively
citizens of their original home country. For instance, a certain status of semi-
statelessness appeared in 1930s, when the refugees coming from Germany needed
help:  many of them were formally still German nationals, but practically unable to get
314 Minutes of the 96. Session of the Council of the LON (21.-27.1.1937), 3rd meeting 25.1./OJ, 18th year, No 2,
Feb 1937, 99-102
315 Simpson 1939, 3
316 Simpson 1939, 250
317 Simpson 1939, 229
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any identity papers from German authorities.319  In many instances money helped.
People who arrived to France with a transit visa had sometimes a possibility to stay
permanently and receive a carte d’identité, although people with transit visas should
not have been given permits to stay. Naturally, the refugees without means suffered
comparatively in such situations.320
The Nansen certificate was available only for the “Nansen refugees”. It was not
available, for example, for Italian refugees or stateless persons in general. Many
difficulties were encountered by the refugees who were not Nansen refugees. The
same applied to the Nansen refugees in those countries which had not joined the
Arrangements under which the Nansen Certificate was issued.321 The travel and
identity documents lacked uniformity, since not all countries adopted the recommended
forms. The consequence was that the bearers of the passports often experienced
difficulties in obtaining visas upon them. Similar difficulties were occasionally
encountered by refugees because their travel documents were issued in more or less
improvised manner.  Some were not in a form of a booklet like a normal national
passport and did not provide sufficient space for endorsements.322
Documents were required if the refugees wanted to travel on. The holders of the
Nansen Passport obtained a theoretical legal status as a result of the Convention
concerning the International Status of Refugees in 1933 prepared by the Nansen
Office. However, the Convention was ratified and respected by few nations only.323
Nansen passports were awarded to specific groups which were specified already
during the 1920s; Russians 1922, Armenians 1924, Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldeans,
Syrians, Kurds, and Turks in 1928.324
In Finland, the Secret Police (EKP) opposed the possibility to automatically prolong
the validity of the Nansen passports and the right to return which was connected to it.
This would have made it possible for the refugees to be returned to the country that
issued the passports after committing crimes in some other countries. There was a
suspicion that new agreement of Geneva on 28.10.1933 concerning the Nansen
319 Francois, 367
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passports was created in unrealistic philanthropic spirit and influenced by Russian
emigrants.325
The issuing of Nansen Passports in Finland was time consuming because the
applications were often incomplete. In many instances, the personal data seemed to be
inconsistent, “intentionally or unintentionally”. Plenty of bureaucracy was involved. This
was connected to the statistics and registration, which also had the problem of
incompleteness and inconsistency. The administration seemed to be fully aware of the
nature of the problem.326  In 1930s, as the world was close to a new war, travelling of
foreigners became reportedly more difficult. Some states and certain authorities were
worried and suspicious about agents and propagandists. Surveillance became more
intensive.327
The revenues accrued from the selling of the Nansen stamps were small. For
example in Finland following figures were recorded in the 1930s.328
1933….760 CHF
1934….585 CHF
1935….515 CHF
1936….660 CHF
There seems to be no reliable records from the 1920s on the revenues.
Besides the legal status, the refugee identity documents gave the refugees moral
support. Without papers, the refugees would be at the mercy of the national authorities.
With those papers, they could turn to the representatives of the High Commissioner.
Since the original Nansen Passport gave no possibility for the return to issuing country,
it was somewhat weaker travel document than normal national passport. It was not
until 1933 when an arrangement on the renewed Nansen passport was achieved.
According to that, the passport was also good for return. Although only few states
ratified this arrangement,329 the 1933 Convention marked a substantial improvement
compared to the original arrangement of Nansen Certificates in regards of the period of
validity as well as the right to return to the country of issue.
The German refugees were not included in the regular Nansen passport system.
The Recommendation of the Communications and Transit Conference in 1927 had
introduced an early alien’s passports. This was the arrangement that gave possibility
325 Leitzinger II, 245-246
326 Leitzinger II, 88-89
327 Leitzinger II, 336
328 See Simpson 1939, 206
329 See e.g. Thompson I, 28
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for the German Refugees to get identity and travel documents when the problem
became topical.  The German question was handled in separate procedure line when
the Provisional Arrangement concerning identity and travel documents for German
Refugees was adopted in 1936. This was followed by a Convention of 1938. The
benefits of the 1936 Arrangement and 1938 Convention were also extended to the
refugees coming from former Austria and Sudetenland.330
Demands were made publically for the extension of the Nansen passport system,
not only to the German, but especially to the Spanish refugees in 1930s.331 In fact, the
problem of the statelessness of the German refugees found its solution practically
already by the application of the recommendations of the Conference of 1927. The
majority of the German refugees remained German subjects, but some had been
stateless already in Germany. Some refugees became stateless since they left by
cancellation of their German nationality. Many of the refugees who still were Germans,
could not obtain a renewal of their German documents from the German consular
authorities. In these cases, the governments were invited, and generally agreed, to
employ the “International Passport” of 1927. There was an ongoing discussion whether
it was necessary to devise any new or exceptional document similar to the Nansen
certificate for the German refugees.332
The legal protection of the refugees coming from Germany was on a separate track
from other refugees. The special identity certificate system was established for these
refugees as a reflection of this. After the first appointment of the High Commissioner for
refugees coming from Germany, the majority of the exiles were still holding valid
German passports. That situation changed again when the refugees coming later
became stateless without any valid documents. The Provisional Arrangement in 1936
facilitated the issue of a travel and identity document to these refugees. The form was
similar to the Nansen Certificate, but there were also some distinctions. Finally, only
seven states became official members in the Arrangement.333
The Governments which were parties to the various arrangements regarding the
issue of the Nansen passports to refugees were using different types of certificates.
Certain governments had even introduced distinct passports for the various categories
of refugees residing in their territory. This sometimes caused confusion and different
practices, not only for the frontier officers, but also for the bearers of the passports. The
330 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 364, See also Chapter 4.3.3.
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IGAC gave a suggestion in 1935 for adoption of a standard type of Nansen passport.
The task of introducing such model type was entrusted to the Nansen Office.334  The
travel and identity system for refugees coming from Germany was not a particular
success in comparison with the Nansen passport system. Since so few countries
adopted the 1936 Arrangement, the usefulness of the system was naturally limited.335
In 1935 the Council put forward a recommendation stipulating that countries which
have introduced the Nansen passport system should extend the benefits immediately
to the refugees coming from the Saar – i.e. to all persons who, having previously had
the status of inhabitants of the Saar, had left the Territory on the occasion of the
plebiscite and were not in possession of national passports.336  In  July  1935  the
Secretary General gave a communication with a plan for the issue of Nansen passports
to the Saar refugees.  The plan contained a form of the identity certificate, as well as
conditions for the issuing officials and the eligibility of the bearers of the certificate. It
was not supposed to infringe the laws and regulations in force in any State with regard
to the control of foreigners, and was valid for one year from the date of issue. The
issuing authorities could, in case of need, be qualified to extend the validity of
certificates for a period not exceeding six months. Children under 15 years of age were
supposed to be included on the certificates of their parents. All these conditions derived
from previous arrangements and conventions concerning the certificates (1922, 1924,
1926, and 1933). There was a special provision in the certificate form: “It shall cease to
be valid if the bearer enters German territory”.  About twenty replies from the
Governments came before the end of 1935, most of them expressing the willingness to
apply the system to the Saar refugees.337  Replies from Governments continued to
come in 1936, most of them favorable for the proposal.338 This would suggest that there
were no big constraints in respect of accepting this kind of arrangements in general.
When the matters came down to Germany itself, however, political convenience was
practiced over the issues of the refugees.
334 Minutes of the 86. Session of the Council of the LON (20.-25.5.1935), Annex 1541/OJ, 16th year, No 6, June
1935
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        4.3.3. International Conventions and Arrangements
Compared to previous decade, the 1930s witnessed some serious attempts to
develop an all-covering, universal, and complete legal protection system for the needs
of refugees. A series of documents were negotiated, finalized, and signed during the
decade.
The Protocol on Stateless Persons 12.04.1930 was not specifically directed to
concern refugees, and there was a wider international agenda behind it. However, it
could have been interpreted to cover also refugees among other stateless groups. It is
also worth noticing that this agreement was among the very few long lasting
arrangements, which was even extended in application by colonial powers in Africa still
after the Second World War.339
The Convention concerning the International Status of Refugees 28.10.1933 was
drawn up by the Inter-Governmental Conference which met in October 1933. The text
was communicated to all Members of the League.  The Council made a decision
regarding the introduction of the Convention also to States non-members of the League
“which might care to become parties to it” for their signature proceeding.  It was
therefore transmitted to the following States: Brazil, Free City of Danzig, United States
of America, Liechtenstein and Monaco.340
The Nansen Office had in practice a major role in preparing the Convention. It
strengthened the legal status of the refugee groups covered by the Nansen Passport
arrangement of 1928. The handicap of the Convention was that it was ratified only by
few States.341  In the 1933 Document it was articulated for the first time that there was
a principle according to which the refugees should not be returned to their countries of
origin.  This principle occurs as an international instrument in many occasions since
that. The contracting parties further agreed that resident refugees should not be
removed or kept from their territory “by application of police measures, such as
expulsions or non-admittance at the frontier, unless dictated by national security or
339 Maluwa, 118-119
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public order.”342 In cases, where it was absolutely necessary to use expulsion, the
persons were not to be deported unless another country was willing to receive them.343
The Conference drew up the Convention with the object “to establish conditions
which shall enable the decisions already taken by the various states to be fully
effective”.  This was to say that the existing recommendations were supposed to be
collected and compiled in a binding international treaty. The main provisions of the
Convention, applying only to Russian, Armenian, and “assimilated” refugees,
concerned: 1) administrative measures concerning the issuance of the Nansen
passports, 2) juridical conditions concerning the legal assistance before the court of
law, 3) equal labour conditions with nationals, 4) refugees’ right to welfare and relief, 5)
education (refugees should have equal access to higher education),  and 6) the fiscal
regime stipulating that refugees should not be subject to any exceptional duties,
charges or taxes.344
The Convention didn’t contain any new definitions of the term ‘refugee’ or of special
categories of refugees. This was done in several other arrangements during the two
Inter-war decades. It appears that this particular Convention was originally meant to
cover all the refugee groups mentioned in the previous agreements and
arrangements.345 The 1933 Convention was defined to come into force as soon as
ratifications or accessions had been received on behalf of at least two members of the
League or non-member states. The governments showed no particular haste in
implementing the project and the Assembly of 1934 adopted a resolution inviting states
to ratify the convention without delay in order to get the problem eliminated.346 For the
later development it is worth noticing that it was not until 1933 that the important
principle of non-refoulement was included into an international treaty. It was particularly
the Article 3 of the Convention concerning expulsions which has been accepted by all
later arrangements since its creation.347
The Refugee Convention of 1933 has been considered one of the most important
international agreements on refugees. In practical terms it contributed considerably to
restricting expulsions (from the countries of refuge). Although the agreement was finally
342 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 202; Maluwa, 121
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ratified only by eight nations, it was respected by many others in practice.348  The
concrete relief work connected to this agreement was largely executed by the
representatives of Nansen Office even though they didn’t have a legal authorization to
do so. The 1933 Convention has been described as the Charter of Liberty for the
Nansen Refugees.349
The Nansen Passport system was extended for the Saar refugees by the
Arrangement of 24.5.1935. It was affiliated to by 17 countries.350 The Plan defined the
Saar refugees as “all persons who, having previously had the status of inhabitants of
the Saar, have left the Territory on the occasion of the plebiscite and are not in a
position of national passports”.351
The Provisional Arrangement of 4.7.1936 concerned identity and travel documents
for the Refugees coming from Germany.352  As a result of the recommendations made
by the IGAC, the CIAR and the Special Council Committee in 1935/1936353, the
Secretary General sent in March 1936 a communication to States Members and certain
States non-members of the League including a convocation and provisional
programme of an inter-governmental conference on assistance to refugees. According
to the programme, the conference was meant to deal mainly with the questions on
Jewish and non-Jewish refugees coming from Germany.354  The conference took place
at Geneva in July 1936 and as a result of it, a system of travel documents for German
refugees was drafted.355
The Convention of 10.2.1938 was relating to the Status of Refugees coming from
Germany. A similar approach was used in both 1936 Arrangement and 1938
Convention to cover the majority of the people who had left Germany for reasons of
persecution. The first article of the 1938 Convention defined the case of the German
refugee refugees as  “a) Persons possessing or having possessed German nationality
and not possessing any other nationality who are proved not to enjoy in law or in fact
the protection of the German Government, and b) stateless persons not governed by
previous Conventions or Agreements who have left German territory after being
established therein and who are proved not to enjoy in law or in fact the protection of
348 Hansson II
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the German Government.” .356  This was a very difficult definition. As Simpson
interpreted it, the definition covered also the people in concentration camps inside
Germany. They didn’t enjoy, as a matter of fact, the protection of the German
Government.357  Article 1 also excluded from the definition persons who left Germany
because of economic reasons or because it was personally convenient.358
The convention was signed by the representatives of 11 states.359 Simpson
estimated in 1938, almost immediately after the signing of the convention, that by virtue
of this convention the German refugees are practically in the same juridical position in
their countries of refuge as are the “Nansen refugees” (or “assimilated refugees”).360
The biggest shortcoming of this convention again was that it didn’t help in any way the
position of those to-be-refugees, who were still living in Germany.361
The High Commissioner was asked to consult the Governments concerned on the
subject of application to refugees coming from Austria of the provisions of the
Convention concerning refugees coming from Germany (10.2.1938) and if necessary of
the Provisional Arrangement of 4.7.1936 on the same subject. The High Commissioner
drafted an Additional Protocol to be examined by the Governments concerned, with the
purpose that the document will put the refugees from Austria legally to the same
category with the German refugees. The term “refugees coming from Austria” was
defined as “a) persons having possessed Austrian nationality and possessing German
to the exclusion of another nationality; who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the
protection of the German Government b) stateless persons not covered by the previous
Convention or Arrangement who have  left the territory which formerly constituted
Austria after being established therein, and who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in
fact, the protection of the German Government”.362
By the Protocol of 14.9.1939, the benefits of the 1936 Arrangement and the 1938
Convention were confirmed and thus extended to refugees coming from “the territory
which formerly constituted Austria” and from Sudetenland.363  It was also defined that
356 Simpson 1938, 608-609; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 17; Grahl-Madsen 1966, 131-132
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persons who leave the territory which formerly constituted Austria “for reasons of purely
personal convenience are not included in this definition”.364
In addition to the actual agreements and arrangements concerning refugees there
were some exercises that also may be considered somewhat relevant for them. In
1937 The League, together with the ILO, coordinated a multilateral exercise in a form
of the Committee of Experts on Assistance to Indigent Foreigners. As a result of that a
Convention on Assistance to Indigent Foreigners was drafted. There was no direct
mentioning of refugees, but as the agreement was concerning benefits deriving from
national legislation on social insurance etc., it could have been, to certain extent,
interpreted to cover refugees as well.365
As a result of the deliberations taking place within the League as well as in Evian
during the summer and autumn 1938, the Government of the UK proposed a Protocol
to be signed by any willing parties. The definitions for refugees coming from Austria
were almost identical to the previously proposed by the draft by High Commissioner.
References were made to the Arrangement 1936 and to Protocol 1938. The Protocol
did not require ratification.366
In many cases the member countries signed and ratified the arrangements and
indicated that they would be respected and implemented. But this was sometimes the
outer image without correspondence in the real internal situation. Again, the sporadic
evidence comes from Finland. There were great discrepancies between the different
authorities in respect of the compliance with the international arrangements. The
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice were often in favor of the arrangements,
whereas the National Security Service EKP was openly non-complying and even
hostile.367
The network of agreements and arrangements concluded in the 1920s and 1930s
had its significance that was proven only later. When the modern Refugee Convention
was adopted in December 1950, it was recognized that the definitions of refugees in
the previous arrangements and conventions of 1926, 1928, 1933, 1938, and 1939 will
be valid and considered to form the basis of the new Convention.368
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       4.3.4. Resettlement
The principle of trying to find a durable solution for refugee problems through
resettlement remained on the agenda of the intergovernmental refugee regime. There
were many obstacles on the way. In the 1930s national immigration policies that were
already strict in many countries, changed tighter, mainly because of the economic
depression. In 1931 the United States started to apply new provision in the immigration
controls which prohibited the entry of persons likely to become a public burden.369
The intervention of the international organizations was motivated partly by the fact
that the governments were controlling relatively empty territories which were not
welcoming immigrants. The idea was that the countries might well change their attitude
if the immigrants were carefully selected by representatives of international refugee
agencies. In that manner the comers were thought to be better equipped in advance to
become self-supporting and productive citizens. Many countries did not object to
immigrants as such, but feared that they might be consuming public funds or turn out to
be politically troublesome.370
The Assembly in its plenary session in autumn 1931 decided to invite the Nansen
International Office to devote particular attention to the precarious situation of more
than 100.000 Russian Refugees in China, in order to find employment for them in other
countries.  In response to this, the Government of Paraguay informed the League that it
was prepared to receive on its territory a thousand of these refugees.  It was further
defined that the eligible comers should be of German origin (Mennonites and
Lutherans) that would be particularly well adapted for this colonization. The cost of
transport and establishment would be met out of “special funds”.371
In this particular case, however, the sources are referring to a dispute between
Paraguay and its neighbor, to which the States wanted to raise international attention
and to get reconciliation from the League. It seems that the motivation of helping the
refugees in China could have been a secondary one for the activism that the
Government of Paraguay was showing. The intention was to resettle the refugees from
369 Skran, 24
370 Thompson II, 382
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China to an area bordering Bolivia. The representative of the Peruvian Government,
acting as a rapporteur for this question, made a statement before the Council in May
1932. He referred to the Council’s decision concerning the evacuation of the Russian
(German origin) Refugees from China and said that the decision of the Council and the
activity of the Nansen Office might have effects on the territorial disputes between
Bolivia and Paraguay.372  The Bolivian Government was firm in its position that the area
(territory of Chaco) was “a part of national heritage” of Bolivia.373
This above mentioned incident, although small by scale and rather unique, provides
us with valuable descriptions of the details involved in resettlement activities in general,
and in the practical work of the Nansen Office particularly. The President of the Nansen
Office supplied the Secretary General with detailed information regarding the
evacuation of the Mennonite Refugees from China. According to this communication,
the activities were limited to the evacuation of the refugees from the Chinese territory.
The Office took steps to obtain the necessary passports from the Chinese authorities,
to arrange for transport facilities to the port of embarkation, and to negotiate
agreements with the shipping companies. The Office didn’t assume any responsibility
for the selection of the final destination of the refugees and didn’t want to get involved
in the question bearing aspects of territorial disagreements between states.374
According to the President of the Nansen Office, Russian refugees were finally
resettled in 45 different countries.375  As the source material and the contemporary
research suggests, most of the result must have constituted of the activities of the
Russians themselves. Later in the 1930s, also the Nansen Office was involved with the
resettlement activities of the Armenians. It was reported in the middle of the1930s that
some twenty thousand Armenians had been distributed in agricultural and industrial
colonies in Syria, and another twenty thousand were transported to the Soviet Republic
of Erivan, which was by many considered as a substitute for the Armenian national
home. The plans of the Office’s settlement operations extended to all countries of the
world. According to assessments later, thousands of Russian Mennonite refugees from
Harbin were actually resettled to Paraguay.376 Nansen Office was able to resettle some
372 Minutes of the 67. Session of the Council of the LON (9.5.-15.7.1932)/OJ, 13th year, No 7, July 1932, 1207
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600-700 Armenian families in small houses in Greece during 1931-37.377  With the
approval of the Council, the Nansen Office arranged for the emigration and settlement
of the Saar refugees in Paraguay. Despite having full range of these services by the
refugee agencies, only disappointing amount of two hundred people from the Saar
settled in the colony.378
It was often said that the Jews were not suited to agricultural work. This was one of
the matters that made the schemes of resettling Jews in third countries challenging.
Nevertheless, it was considered that Germany was imposing burdens on its neighbors
by obstructing emigration by measures connected to identification and documents.
After all, it was the German Government that wanted to get rid of these people who
were its own subjects.379  This equation had to be solved somehow.
For the Jews there were two possible destinations of resettlement: Palestine and
Argentina, which were considered equally good for them.  Palestine was considered
the historic, ancient homeland of Jews. In Argentina there was plenty of room and a
good climate. The return to Palestine was a sacred matter for many of the Jews.
Theodor Herzl wrote his idea of modern Jewish state in his essay “Der Judenstaat”.
This was also in mind of those who started to work with the Jewish refugee problem in
the 1930s. In first years after the promulgation of Hitler’s anti-Semitic policy in
Germany, most of the efforts of world Jewry to direct the flood of Jewish emigration
from Germany centered on Palestine. Even the Jews who had been skeptical about the
success of the “Jewish Homeland” were happy that some of the persecuted German
Jews could find a refuge.380
Although for some Jewish leaders the issue of returning to Palestine was a sacred
one, some others came to the conclusion that it was better for them to try to settle
elsewhere. For many, the most important thing was that the Jews should be able to
settle somewhere on the globe and be there on their own, consider the land as theirs,
and thus avoid creating a new Jewish problem.381  Nevertheless, some 40.000 German
Jews immigrated to Palestine between 1933 and 1937. The growth of hostilities
between Arabs and the comers made it evident that the whole question of the Jewish
Homeland had to be reconsidered. Finally, the hopes of Jewish mass emigration to
Palestine had to be abandoned. It was simply not possible to get sufficient numbers of
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people absorbed in the Palestine to solve the Jewish problem of Germany and Eastern
Europe.382
The High Commissioner estimated at the end of 1935 that of the more than 80.000
who had left Germany by then, three-fourths had found new homes or had been
repatriated. More than half of the resettled had found their home in Palestine. This
accomplishment had been achieved primarily by the work of the refugees themselves,
as well as by the activities of the Jewish and Christian philanthropic organizations.383
1930s was not a good time to move for refugees. Perhaps at no time in history the
conditions had been less favorable to settlement. The lands of immigration which used
to need the influx of foreign workers were closed. Commerce and other occupations of
the refugees coming from Germany were faced by difficulties everywhere.384  The first
task of the IGCR was to open negotiations with the German Government on an
important issue: to secure German refugees (i.e. Jews) the right to take their assets
with them. Furthermore, the aim was in general to establish cooperation in helping the
refugees to further immigrate to other countries.385 On the whole, resettlement of
refugees was benefited very little by the activities of the IGCR before it discontinued
operations at the outbreak of the Second World War.386
The resettlement schemes for the Jews were undertaken mostly by the Jewish
voluntary organizations. The League did not have much practical role in the planning
and the execution of the programs. At the Evian Conference in 1938, Sir Neill Malcolm
made an observation in his speech stating that “in the present condition of labour
markets in the countries of the world, any large-scale scheme of migration could only
arouse hostility”.387
The Secretary General sent a communication to member states and to some other
governments in July 1935 concerning the settlement of refugees in overseas countries.
The purpose was to investigate possibilities to resettle people to places which had
possibilities to provide land and other facilities for these activities. Although the
essential scope of the exercise was not very sharply presented in the initial
communication, some replies were clearer. The Belgian Government stated that it
“does not propose to authorize the settlement of the refugees in the colony of the
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Belgian Congo”. The Government of the UK replied that any refugee who has definite
prospects of employment or means of subsistence should, subject to compliance with
the regulations enforced in the territory in question, have no difficulty in securing
admission to any of the British oversea dependencies. The US State Department was
faithful to its style: “The Secretary of State is not in a position to express any views as
to the disposition in the United States of such aliens as may be admitted into the
country for permanent residence. There are number of welfare, social service,
Americanization, and foreign language organizations in the US which deal with such
problems and to which individual cases might be referred for helpful advice.”388
After the British announcement to grant independence to its colonial protectorate,
the question on Iraq’s minorities was brought up in the discussion of the members of
the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC). The nation-building was feared to have
a negative impact on the position of the non-Arab populations.389 Indeed, a large set of
international debates on Iraq’s position concerned the relationship to its own people
and the existing ethnic antagonisms. As a result, the PMC was constantly approached
by petitions from Iraq’s Kurds and Assyrians.390
As the problem of the Assyrian minority in Iraq appeared, it became quite soon
obvious that resettlement to new territories rather than in Iraq was the only practicable
solution. The Iraqi Government stated that it was prepared to make as generous a
contribution as its resources permitted to facilitate the settlement of the Assyrians
outside its territory. What the Iraqi Government could not do, was to find land for the
refugees. That had to be left on the responsibility of the League.391  It was in these
circumstances that the (Resettlement) Committee was set up. One of the reasons for
the Council to push responsibility to a special Committee was the extremely difficult
economic situation worldwide, which made all kind of settlement plans challenging to
be carried out.392 The Iraqi Government nominated a local Committee to work in
collaboration with the representative of the Nansen Office in order to facilitate the
resettlement procedures.393 The (Resettlement) Committee accepted the offer of The
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Nansen Office to nominate Major T.F.Johnson (Secretary General of the Nansen
Office) to investigate, together with a delegation of the Committee, the possibilities of
the resettlement of Assyrian Refugees to Brazil. The purpose was to see whether
certain agricultural areas in Brazil were suitable for the project planned by the
Committee.394
The Resettlement Committee submitted its report to the Council on 13.9.1935.The
report was very thorough, consisting of over 30 pages. It contained a detailed study of
the plan for the settlement of the Assyrians in the plain of Ghab, situated north from
Beirut, near the Mediterranean cost. In the plan, there were lands reserved for the
Assyrians, as well as a projected reservoir for the use of the agricultural settlements.
The French Government had contributed greatly to the making of the report and to
resettlement plan itself. The Iraqi Government and the French authorities were able to
reach an agreement on transferring Assyrians from Iraq to other place in the Middle
East to wait for the final settlement.395
In September 1937 the Iraqi Government informed the League on their intention to
depute an expert of the Land settlement department to the north provinces of the
country to enquire into the economic conditions of the people, with a particular
reference to the Assyrians. The expert selected was British A.H. Ditchburn, a former
President of a Land Settlement Commission. In 1937-1938 the expert paid several
visits to the area, and submitted a comprehensive report which was transmitted to the
Council in August 1938.396
There was also a Trustee Board on the settlement of the Assyrians in Khabur. The
Trustee Board gave quarterly reports to the Council. The reports contained a
description of the general situation as well as agricultural conditions and health
situation. A separate medical officer’s report was attached.397 Another international
attempt to facilitate the immigration and settlement of Assyrian to South America had
been made by a special committee of the League already in 1933-1935.  These plans
had been found unfeasible, and finally they turned out to be unsuccessful.398
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      4.3.5. Permission to Stay and Reside
Only after getting a permit, the refugees could safely settle, without fear of
deportation. Satisfactory settlement of the refugees was also beneficial for the
countries in which they settled. Positive politics enabled refugees to make a
contribution instead of being a potential burden.399  As movements of people became
more active in Europe in 1933, states started to pay more attention to the entry
regulations as well as practicies in enforcing  them. In Finland a new decree on
foreigners entry of 1933 gave a wide mandate to athorities in considering who was able
to get into the country and who was not.400 Governments were afraid of bogus refugees
and foreign agents. The enforcement of the laws and regulations was not up-to-date at
all times. It was discovered that many refugees had been staying in the country without
valid permits, especially in the 1920s. The supervision of the aliens was simply not
efficient enough. Some individuals could have been living in the country for 15 years
without any registration or any authorities knowing.401
International action was comparatively successful in securing a travel document for
refugees, as no real question of national sovereignty was involved. The case was
different when an attempt was made to secure some guarantee of residence. The legal
and political protection of refugees, which had been accepted by the League as a
responsibility, required action also on the guarantee of residence. This was endorsed in
the Arrangement of 1928, in the Convention of 1933, in the Provisional Arrangement of
1936, and in the Convention of 1938.402  The difficulty in obtaining a guarantee of
residence for refugees was evidenced by the reluctance of governments to insert a
formula into the refugee certificates entitling the holder to return to the country of issue.
Guarantee of residence implies protection from expulsion. International action was
directed to an attempt to reduce the number and the arbitrary nature of cases of
expulsion. Although it was kept in mind in drafting the international arrangements that
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the governments had their ultimate sovereign right to expel an alien, the Nansen Office
intervened regularly in cases of expulsions which seemed to be unjustified.403
The economic crisis of the 1930 hit everywhere. Like always in these situations,
countries started to build barriers around them. Refugees were not welcomed anymore;
on the contrary, people wanted them to leave. The national labour force needed to be
protected against unemployment. As a consequence, refugees were in large scale
taken away the possibility to work and make a living.404  It was reckoned that despite all
talks about agreements concerning variety of things that carried more political content,
the greatest practical hardship for the destitute refugees in the 1930s was the difficulty
in getting labour permits.405
The economic recession made the life for refugees harder in Finland. The
possibilities for employment were scarce. Municipalities even refused to take refugees
to emergency employment works organizaed by government. Municipalities had their
authority in this, even though the central government was in charge for the
expenses.406  This could clearly be considered discrimination. In 1933 an advisory
committee appointed by LON Council urged the ILO to prepare proposals for improving
the status of foreign workers. The matter was prepared and worked on, but there never
was sufficient consensus to have anything at hands at the end of the day.407
The 1933 Convention prescribed on labour conditions that “the restrictions ensuing
from the application of laws and regulations for the protection of the national labour
market shall not be applied in all their severity to refugees domiciled or regularly
resident in the country”.  These conditions were supposed to be applied in favor of
refugees if the following conditions were met:408
-he had been resident for not less than three years in the country;
-he was married to a person possessing the nationality of the country;
-he had one or more children possessing the nationality;
-he was an ex-combatant of the (First) World War.
Furthermore, the Convention instructed that refugees who were victims of industrial
accidents were entitled to receive the most favorable treatment which was accorded to
foreign nationals. In case of unemployment, sickness, invalidity, or old age, and also in
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the application of social insurance laws, the refugees were also supposed to receive
the most favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country. Lastly, the
refugees were not to be burdened by any exceptional payments.409
The International Labour Conference of 1934 passed a resolution urging the
formulation of an International Convention which was supposed to regulate the rights of
foreign unemployed workers to participation in public assistance schemes. When the
draft convention and recommendations were considered by the Fifth Commission of
the Assembly in 1934, it was found that only very few governments were interested and
thus had submitted observations. These observations were so diverse that it was
impossible to make any definite conclusions in regards of a possible convention on the
international status of refugees.410
In most countries during the 1920s and 1930s, there were restrictions for foreigners
to work in certain professions and occupations. Also rights to social security benefits
were reserved for nationals of the country only.411  Many other limitations concerning
private rights and practices were prevalent.412  All these matters were in the focus of
the international refugee organizations while contemplating the overall alleviation of
position of the people living abroad without a legal status. Each country has its own
stipulations concerning foreigners on entry and sojourn on the one hand, and on
naturalization on the other. Normally these two have been kept separate from each
other. Most countries also have specific alien’s legislation which works in between,
regulating for example foreign ownership.413
Acquisition of some other nationality was feasible for certain exiles. The Greek
refugees from Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria, and other countries were granted Greek
nationality by the Greek law in the 1920s. Bulgarian refugees arriving in Bulgaria from
Greece under the 1919 Convention also benefited from provisions concerning
automatic naturalization. Moslems of Turkish origin settling in Turkey were immediately
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granted Turkish citizenship by special decision of the Council of Ministers even without
the ordinary requirements concerning residential status.414
It was recognized in principle that people could become useful members of the
communities and good citizens of their country of residence. This is the very essence
and the meaning of the term assimilation. Assimilation was the main task for the
Nansen Office for many years. The work of the NO won recognition in the countries
where the number of refugees was highest.415 The speed of assimilation depended
upon the character of the nation concerned. This meant the intellectual intensity and
the rhythm of life. It was discovered, that e.g. the “American way of life” transformed
most immigrants into “Americans” within relatively short period of time.416 Highly
educated migrants carried with them capital which was not always financial; there was
also transfer of skills and technology. This was positive brain drain.417  As time passed,
assimilation became complete. Another alternative was that these people became a
more or less isolated segment of the population whose customs differed from those of
the majority. In the positive alternative the children of the immigrants retained some of
the customs of their parents as a legacy but regarded themselves as full members of
the national community into which they were born.418
In most of the cases, however, the result was a kind of a dual identity.419 The fact
seems to be, that most refugees through time have wanted to return to their own
countries as soon as it has been safe to do so. Usually this continues until the refugee
individuals have lived so long in the country of refuge, that they come to think of it as
their home.420  When a place is a new home, the people are no longer refugees. In that
respect they don’t show in the statistics any longer. In Finland during the years 1920-
1939, altogether 4087 Russian families were naturalized. The statistics don’t tell us the
exact number of the individuals who obtained the citizenship, since we don’t know the
amounts of family members. The data shows, however, that the numbers of naturalized
families didn’t vary very much annually, being approximately 100-300 per year.421
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Some simplifications were introduced to the process of naturalization in Finland
during the 1930s. This, and the fading of the hope to go back and live peacefully in the
Soviet Union, resulted in slight intensification of naturalizations of refugees coming
from Russia in the latter half of  the 1930s.422  It must be stated, however, that a major
part of the people who obtained Finnish citizenship were non-Russians, i.e. Fenno-
Ugrians by their national or cultural identity. Also here Finland seems to represent the
approximate average.  In European states the naturalization required similar processes
of application and fulfilling certain requirements and conditions. Five years of sojourn
as precondition was applied in many countries. In Belgium it was ten years, and in
Germany even 20 years. In some Latin American countries the naturalization was
almost automatic, without preconditions.423 Some refugees did not want to go back,
some could not do so. Then the natural choice was to get naturalized.424 According to
Simpson, in 1930-36 altogether 1577 Russians as well as 1448 Ingermanlanders and
Carelians were naturalized in Finland.425
Naturalization fell in the capacity of each and every state to be considered according
its national legislation. When considering the provisions for naturalization in the
nationality laws of the main European countries of refuge, striking amount of similarities
can be identified. The conditions for naturalization, which prevailed at the end of the
1930s in most of the laws, may be summarized as follows:426
-The applicant must be of age according to the law of the country in which he seeks
to be naturalized
-The applicant must have resided continuously for a certain period in the country.
The most common period in the various laws was five years.
-The applicant must have sufficient means to support himself and his family.
-The applicant must be of good character.
-The applicant must have an adequate knowledge of the national language.
-The application must be supported by sponsors.
-The applicant must have lost his previous nationality or have reasonable chance of
being released from it in case of naturalization.
-The applicant must take an oath of allegiance
422 Nevalainen, 89-90
423 Nevalainen, 91
424 Kortistoluettelo Suomen kansalaisiksi otetuista Inkerin pakolaisista, VPAKA I, Ba6.
425 Simpson 1939, 376 and 602. Apparently this is referring to number of individuals, cf. footnote 1485.
426 Simpson 1939, 290-292
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Arrangements of education and schooling for the refugees had been in the focus of
the activities in the 1920s when the amounts of immigrants in Finland were high. The
national legislation in Finland actually defined only the obligatory education of citizens,
and this was interpreted strictly in some local communities. This was changed in 1932,
as the new legislation ordered local communities to arrange education for all residents,
including non-citizens.427 The 1933 Refugee Convention prescribed on education, that
the refugees were to have the same rights in the schools and universities as were
accorded to foreigners in general.428 As a general remark, it can be observed that the
education possibilities for refugees were not discussed very intensively in international
connections during the 1930s.
4.4. An Account of the Second Decade
The second decade of the existence of the League of Nations saw a deterioration in
its political credibility. On the other hand, however, far-reaching progress on social
justice and human rights was made.
In the field of refugee work, the different challenges presented themselves, but the
principles behind the responses remained almost unchanged. There was a growing
feeling that refugee questions were no longer just temporary problems requiring short-
term assignments. The refugee regime, however, was unable to convert this feeling
into action. Thus the organization chart kept changing. For these reasons, the biggest
refugee groups of the 1930s were left without the legal and political protection of the
League. The responses to crises and the projects implemented were not particularly
innovative either.
There was a lot of energy and effort, which was embodied in the multiplicity of
different organizations, but at the same time this multiplicity prevented effective
coordination of policy. Proposals to create a LON organ with overall responsibility for all
refugees never received sufficient support. The League was never able to build an exit
strategy for its refugee work, although each mandate for the refugee bodies was
provisional.
427 Nevalainen, 155
428 Bentwich 1935, 119
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The refugee policy of the 1930s appears to be much more selective since the
numerous groups of Spanish and Italian refugees were not included in the assistance
programs in the same way as some other groups. Officially, there was a legal basis for
this selectiveness, but it inevitably affected the evolution of the refugee work of the
LON.
The organization of the international refugee aid network became more complex
during the 1930s. This was manifested especially in the existence of parallel refugee
organs, but also in the multiplicity of different advisory bodies as well as in the number
of individuals who held overlapping positions in different establishments. This inevitably
indicated that there was still no clear master plan for refugee activities.
The new element in the approach was the ambition to search for the root causes of
refugee problems and to negotiate with the governments involved. This had, however,
relatively little significance when considering the outcome of the work.
The great paradox of the refugee question of the 1930s was that the refugees were
produced by fairly open societies and by open processes, which made it possible for
the news media to follow developments. This allowed the international refugee regime
to contemplate policies, activities, and measures as the problems occurred. The
circumstances led to a situation where some kind of proactive attitude became
possible.
One similarity with the previous decade was that the regime was trying to find
prominent personalities with international reputations to direct its activities. The
personal roles of Fridtjof Nansen and Albert Thomas were magnificent in the 1920s.
Historical research has been seeking answers to the possibilities of key solutions
through analyzing the activities of those individuals who stepped into high LON offices
after the deaths of Nansen and Thomas. It has become a habit to emphasize the
personal disappointments of these individuals, when things didn’t go as they had
wished. It has been a pleasure to find that these disappointments had ultimately little to
do with hard reality. This reality was the diligent work done by many other individuals
apart from these diplomats.
Accounts of the results of the LON’s refugee work in the 1930s have been
overshadowed by a few distorting factors: the most visible refugee group of the decade
was the Jews. The LON was not able to prevent the Second World War. The
international community was not decisive enough to stop the Nazis in Germany from
executing the plans they had for the Jewish people. All this led to the holocaust.
The verdict of historical research has been at least partly unjust. The High
Commissioners were not able to obtain the political support of the Great Powers or the
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financing they had hoped for. However, the system still functioned. Agreements were
drafted and finalized. Humanitarian assistance was provided where it was needed.
People were transported to new settlements, mostly, in practice, as a result of private
entrepreneurial activities, but nevertheless under the auspices of the intergovernmental
refugee agencies.
On the other hand, the LON system was able to make decisions and take actions
rather effectively, when there was enough pressure to do so and when conditions were
right. The decisions made on behalf of the Saar refugees constitute a good example of
this.
The refugee problems of the 1930s were more politicized than those of the previous
decade. The first decade had seen the shock of massive movements of people. After
ten years of refugee work many were already prepared to forget the whole issue.
Everything changed immediately when the Nazis came to power in Germany, and the
international community was plunged into a new refugee crisis with political characters
unseen before.
The League responded rapidly with the appointment of the High Commissioner for
German Refugees. Another organization, the Nansen Office, supposedly represented
humanitarian continuity with the heritage after the big characters of the 1920s, Nansen
and Thomas, had passed away. It was anticipated that while the NO would take care of
the more practical side of refugee work, the High Commissioner would try to negotiate
political solutions. This disposition could not always be maintained and the approach
was not completely successful either.
There were substantial, contradictory pressures against the LON and the ILO during
the 1930s. Given these political circumstances, some attempts were made to remove
responsibility from the LON to the ILO in order to underline the social nature of refugee
work. Ultimately this proved to be unrealistic, and on the whole, the role of the ILO in
the 1930s was not as visible as it had been during the first decade. The ILO was
represented on the governing bodies and advisory boards of the various refugee
agencies established in the 1930s. It also continued to provide its expertise through
technical assistance and advisory services behind the scenes. It is fair to say that the
ILO was less visible because of the politicized nature of the refugee problems of the
1930s.
The need for political negotiations with the countries producing refugees was
recognized, but that never developed into a tool for handling refugee problems. The
LON wanted to maintain relations with those countries producing refugees for as long
as possible. This made it impossible to address the root causes of refugee problems,
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which would have been the real and also loudly proclaimed remedy. Throughout the
1930s, there were two tracks for handling refugees: one for the Jewish refugees and
another for other exiles. Again, the real success lay in the continuity and consistency.
This was seen in particular when the times were bad and things went wrong.
The emergence of human rights as the general motivation for refugee work and the
deterioration of the human rights situation in Nazi-Germany were of course interlinked.
They coincided, but it is impossible to estimate which came first. This would require
more study of this particular question.
Towards the end of the decade the United States government stepped forward as a
result of domestic political pressures in order to find a sustainable political solution for
the Jewish refugee problem. This gesture didn’t prove very effective, and soon the
existing LON-agencies had to assume the remaining mandate of the Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees.
All those refugee organizations which were directly connected to the LON were
established on a provisional footing. The IGCR was the first one thought to be a
permanent organization without a temporary mandate. Nevertheless, this attempt was
also at least partly watered down with plans to integrate the body with the League’s
other organs.
The Saar refugees were targeted for “natural reasons” since the LON had a certain
obligation after its special administrative role in the region. The Spanish refugees
formed a problematic issue since most of them remained on Spanish territory and thus
beyond the reach of international action. The Italian refugees were not stateless, and
as they were, in a way, “voluntary exiles”, they were left without intergovernmental
attention.
The principles in the approach concerning funding during the second decade were
very similar to those of the 1920s. Administrative funds for both the High Commissioner
and the Nansen Office were minimal. The expenses incurred in the process of field
work were covered by funds coming from a number of different sources. Moreover, the
need for humanitarian aid and other relief operations were not as urgent as they had
been in the 1920s. The emphasis of refugee work lay in seeking legal and political
protection. The difficult nature of the situation was illustrated by the fact that it was very
difficult to find a covering solution for the issue of the statelessness of the German
Jews who required identification and travel documents.
The 1930s witnessed serious attempts to develop an all-embracing, universal, and
complete system of legal protection through a series of conventions and arrangements,
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but even then these didn’t cover all refugees equally. Definitions were still specifically
created for each refugee group.
The LON authorities clearly thought that there were relatively empty regions in the
world where refugees could be resettled, and some exercises were initiated to that end.
The practical implementation of the resettlement schemes were, however, almost
totally undertaken by voluntary organizations.
There were no really significant plans for repatriating any refugees in the 1930s.
Most resettlement plans were aimed at the “old” refugee groups, such as the Russians
and the Armenians. Plans to resettle Jewish refugees were almost completely in the
hands of the Big Powers and non-governmental (Jewish) organizations.
The economic crisis of the 1930s didn’t allow large employment and settlement
schemes. What the regime could do, with the help of the ILO, was to concentrate on
enhancing the labour conditions of foreign workers in general.
The second decade was more difficult for the ILO than the previous one had been.
The organization could not assume a very visible role in policy making, because of the
political sensitivity of refugee questions in general. This sensitivity, in turn, derived from
the fact that the most visible refugees came from Germany. Partly for these reasons,
the ILO didn’t have any designated budget allocation for refugee work and the
measures were included in the regular budget of the organization.
The big plans on achieving a definitive solution were unrealistic and thus remained
beyond the reach of the refugee regime. But so was too the dream of reaching a lasting
peace. The fact that a final overall solution for the refugee problem was not achieved,
does not decrease the success of the work which was done behind the scenes.
Although the problems of the 1930s were somewhat different from those of the
previous decade, the approach of the League and the ILO was very much the same as
before. The underlying motivations were developed, but responses to the various
crises itself were similar. The same methods were used, and the same remedies were
offered.
One difference was that the LON was more proactive, with a predetermined, more
systematic, or universal, approach, that could be applied to future crises.  Thus it can
be said that the system developed, and showed no sign of stagnation.
The attitudes of the authorities in Finland towards international cooperation became
harsher. This was especially the case in granting of Nansen passports. There was an
obvious fear that the position and status brought by the Nansen passport could be
used for “wrong purposes” and surveillance became more intensive. Finland didn’t
suffer from a refugee problem in the same way it had in the 1920s, thus the need and
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motivation to lean on international cooperation decreased significantly. Domestic
solutions for the problems of the remaining refugees were preferred to transnational
options.
Compared to the previous decade, the refugees of the 1930s were held hostage by
the threat of violence and international political circumstances. The attitudes in the
regime were right and sincere, but the LON was compelled to make concessions from
the beginning. This inevitably weakened the potential of the organs established
throughout the entire decade. The refugee policy of the LON and ILO in the 1930s was
a series of compromises. Nevertheless, the regime existed and performed during the
entire decade without any intermissions. The biggest importance of the LON policy was
that it gave these international issues a standardized form by maintaining the
organization with its mandate through difficult times, when actual results were not
completely satisfactory.
334
5. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ADVOCATES
5.1. Tools for Estimation
The purpose of this Chapter is not to give definite answers to questions concerning
the results of the refugee work accomplished by the intergovernmental system. Since
measurement is not in the scope of this presentation, the following rather points out the
critical issues that lead to the actual performance and possible results.
Previous research can give some references for the estimation. According to Susan
Pedersen’s testimony “League bodies dealing with transnational traffics – opium,
refugees, prostitutes – also proved surprisingly effective. All made serious efforts to
gather data on their subject.”1 This seems to lead us to the decisive factor while
evaluating the efficiency and the value of the work on refugees. The evidence gathered
from the source material refers indeed to careful scrutiny while gathering information, in
analyzing it, as well as in reporting the results for decision making.
Organizations aiming to social and economic effects have always been interested in
presenting the results of their activities from a comprehensive point of view. The
financiers of the activities normally want to see the outcomes and measure them in a
way or another. The more measurable the results are, the easier it is to give
justification to the activities. While measuring, quantitative as well as qualitative
aspects can be counted. There are tools created by the economic life to concretize and
display the social and economic effects of certain interventions. Then again, these tools
have little value when we are trying to evaluate the work of institutions that existed
almost a century ago.  This is because the methods of displaying the effects are based
on questioning, interviewing, statements of experts, narrative case studies, as well as
other contemporary practices of measuring both qualitative and quantitative evidence.
Local, national, as well as international reactions to refugee crises remained entirely
ad hoc for centuries. After the establishment of the intergovernmental organizations
their mandates remained narrowly restricted to certain refugee groups. The idea of a
global governance of forced migration has emerged only more recently.2  The
objectives, the scope, and the functions of the refugee regime were broadened
1 Pedersen 2007, 1110
2 Benz, Sophia and Hasenclever, Andreas: “Global” Governance of Forced Migration. (In Refugees and
International Relations. Ed. by Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher. Oxford University Press. New York, NY 2011),
188
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fundamentally during the decades. The refugee system was originally formed to deal
with the Russian refugee problem. It gradually grew to cover other refugee groups as
well. The regime was created to deal with refugee travel.  By the end of the 1930s,
rules covering personal status and security, employment, and social services
developed for refugees had been on the agenda of the regime. The functions also grew
to include refugee settlement, increasing employment opportunities, and facilitating
immigration.3
The question which history research must ask is whether the establishment of the
intergovernmental refugee regime in the 1920s was the initiative for the later creation of
modern global governance. As a normative concept, global governance points to the
responses where public and private actors coordinate their policies.4 It  is obvious that
the states were playing a crucial role in intergovernmental organizations because they
created the rules and were largely also running the institutions by providing able
personnel. They also held ultimate responsibility for policy-making and implementation
because of their input. In case of the international refugee regime, France and Britain
were the two countries that reportedly had the biggest influence on international
refugee policies. They provided most of the financial support. However, the Great
Powers in general “did not often exercise leadership in the positive sense”. They rarely
developed innovative proposals concerning refugee matters.5  In theory, this kind of
situation could have left some more space for independence and activity for NGOs, but
in fact they largely depended and were influenced by governments.6
It is extremely difficult to judge the success of aid operations. The aid projects may
have been successes in one respect but failures in another. They may have begun
successfully but then turned out to be failures, or vice versa. The objectives of the
operations may have remained so vague that it is not clear with what one should
compare the outcome. Therefore, it is more worthwhile to try to identify factors that
typically promote or complicate the activities.7
In emergency relief the most unfortunate cases are the ones in which substantial
part of the refugee aid ends up in wrong hands. The success of repatriation activities
depends of course very much on whether the conditions in the refugees’ home country
calm down so that it is possible for them to return, i.e. whether the initial causes for
3 Skran, 226
4 Benz and Hasenclever, 194
5 Skran, 279-280
6 Skran, 282
7 Hakovirta 1991, 87
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fleeing are removed.8  This criterion is far more important than the will or the capability
of the refugee aid organizations.
It has been demonstrated that large-scale third-country resettlement will only be
considered if and when the prospects of repatriation are not promising. It also depends
on whether one or more countries of first asylum close their borders and refuse to
receive any more refugees. The success of any resettlement project is related to the
attitudes of the recipient countries. In other words, how willing they are to receive
refugees.9  Whatever measurements will be used to assess the success of refugee
operations, it always comes down to the key question; the contribution of the rich and
powerful countries. The willingness and ability of the major players on the international
field to donate money and provide shelter for refugees is what matters most.10
The makers of the refugee policy in the1920s did not think in scientific theoretical
terms. Their goal was political as well as practical, aiming at concrete results.
Therefore, the formulation of modern development policies gives us better tools and
methods to estimate the work of the refugee organizations. A policy has goals and
activities defined by the policy have objectives. The objectives define the concrete
measures leading to the practical effects. Since we don’t have the definite scientific
tools at our disposal while conducting history research, these are expressions of
attitudes rather than a product of serious calculative assessment.
Modalities refer to what was done in practice besides moral support and words.
What kind of tool kit did the organizations have?
Efficiency means operations and resources allocated to the work in order to achieve
results. The ways and means of the action are examined.  According to basic
assumption it is only fair to say that the work of the High Commissioner in the 1920s
with the scarce resources was quite efficient.
Effectiveness means positive results in shorter term.  This is related to funding of the
work and the effective use of the resources available. It also goes into the decision-
making and administrative guidelines. Possible results are related to the question
whether the work of the League had any effect on the refugees in the field. Was the
effect different from the work of the NGO’s? The coordinating role of the League and
the ILO brought a lot of political relevance to the work. Without that the international
regime probably never would have developed to the effect it finally reached to.
8 Hakovirta 1991, 88-89
9 Hakovirta 1991, 94-95
10 Hakovirta 1991, 96
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Impact refers to positive results in longer terms. The most long lasting impact was
the tradition of protecting the refugees from persecution deriving all the way from the
beginning of Nansen’s times.
Quality is a broader concept that covers efficiency, effectiveness, and impact. Good
quality refugee work has positive marks on all of these components. It guarantees
predictability, consistency and the responsible use of taxpayers’ and other donor’s
money.
Complementarity refers to the division of work. The international refugee policy and
its concrete refugee work were implemented bilaterally, at the League level,
multilaterally, and in cooperation with the NGOs. Different actors should take into
account the wider framework of all aid delivery channels. Some actors have
comparative advantages in certain fields. For example, in the 1930s the Nansen Office
and the High Commissioner had a division of labour between each other. It was not
always clear, and it could not be followed “by the book”. In principle, however, the idea
was that the actors would complement each other’s work, while staying in their own
domain of responsibility.
Coherence requires that the strategies and actions in all policy areas support the
main goal. Coherent policy must strive to achieve, through concrete measures, the
objectives of internationally agreed and nationally accepted agreements. In the light of
what we understand by the term coherence, it would be fair to say that the different
actors and organizations were not really acting in a coherent manner. The different
parties were not always working in a totally comprehensive and consistent way
throughout the world.
The best solution would have been prevention of conflicts producing refugee flows.
Since this was not a realistic viable solution, the international community had to resort
to the second best, which was working properly with the existing refugee population.
This was not easy without international solidarity and equitable distribution of
responsibility. The world is not there even today, but before the Second World War the
international community was really far away from these goals.
In order to be able to measure the concrete effects we can use some references.
We can compare how commensurable or uniform the activities are, i.e. how they affect
different groups. We can also try to estimate how systematic and coherent the activities
are; whether they are conducted under all conditions and under longer period of time.
All this we can do only if it is possible to obtain some kind of standards of comparison
from the source material.
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A real solution would have been a situation where no refugees existed anymore.
When does a cessation of a refugee status take place? Significant developments in the
refugees own circumstances must be taken into account. The following factors bear
important evidence:
-acquisition of a new nationality
-reacquisition of a former nationality
-voluntary repatriation (whether or not premature)
-being specifically accepted and put on a democratic electoral roll in their native
state
It should be possible to verify in an objective and dependable way that the situation
which had justified the granting of refugee status has ceased to exist.11
The opposite to the cessation of a refugee status is a protracted situation. This
situation means a prolonged refugeehood, and at least partly forgotten promises. One
way in measuring the success of an operation is to consider whether, or to what extent,
the refugees are kept in a protracted situation. This is often seen in connection to static
and passive populations and groups of refugees that are staying year after year in
overpopulated refugee camps.12  The root cause for protracted refugee situation often
is the unwillingness of the country of origin to cooperate in peace efforts.  Assistance to
these refugees through humanitarian agencies should not be a substitute for sustained
political and strategic solutions. The humanitarian agencies cannot fully respond to,
and resolve protracted refugee situations without the international donor community
engagement contributing to the peace and security.13  During the Inter-war period the
donor community was clearly represented by the League of Nations’ apparatus.
11 Whittaker, 22-23
12 Loescher, Gil and Milner, James I: Understanding the Problem of protracted refugee situations. (In Protracted
Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications. Edited by Gil Loescher, James Milner,
Edward Newman and Gary Troeller. United Nations University Press. Hong Kong 2008), 20-25
13 Loescher and Milner I, 28
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5.2. Necessary Funding
The League declared in 1921 that it could accept no financial responsibility for the
relief, maintenance or settlement of the refugees. In spite of this, the Council and the
Assembly received appeals to save groups of refugees from disaster. This decision
was firmly maintained on the whole, and the official action of the High Commissioner
was strictly limited within administrative functions. These limits were imposed by a
budget of no more than ten to fifteen thousand pounds a year. Nansen never accepted
any payment for his services to the League. Due to Nansen’s personal reputation,
some additional funds were placed under his control from time to time. These funds
were partly raised by the refugees themselves and partly contributed by governments
or by private philanthropy.14
The League played the most influential role in international assistance projects for
refugees, although the organs of the League were prohibited from spending money
directly in the field work. Instead, they acted as important policy-making and planning
institutions. The coordination of the international activities was aimed at the
achievement of durable solutions. This work combined the resources of host
governments, donor governments, private organizations, and refugees themselves.
Money was moving from donors to the field where the refugees were with their
problems. The League’s activities manifested a spirit of international cooperation. In
that manner the burden-sharing norm was reflected in League’s operations more than
anywhere else in the refugee regime.15 Nevertheless, nation-state was at the centre of
things, despite all transnational thinking, and where there are nation-states, there also
remains inequality among nations.16 The Great Powers were fundamental contributors
to the League’s budget and obviously their views had to be heard.
The High Commissioner pointed out in his report on March 15, 1922 that the
immense sums of money put to the relief work was not exactly well spent money,
because it was not leading the situation anywhere. Nansen claimed that if the High
Commissioner had had these sums at hand, the whole problem could have been
brought to a final solution for a much less total expenditure. His remedy for the problem
14 Walters, 188
15 Skran, 147
16 Kennedy 1994, 122-127
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was to disperse the refugees from places where they were living in destitution to places
where they could obtain employment.17   Nansen was obviously referring to the fact
that voluntary organizations were providing humanitarian help to the refugees but
efforts were not coordinated in a proper manner. Instead, these operations took place
in the field in various countries separately.
The funds of the League were specifically earmarked for administrative expenses
only. Another general principle was that the League funds could not be used for
humanitarian or other field work. Paradoxically, the Assembly always insisted on the
importance of continuing the humanitarian work.18  There are references, however, that
sometimes the High Commissioner used the funds also for travel expenses of the
refugees.19
Although it was constantly reaffirmed that the funds of the League were not to be
used for any kind of field operations, the responsibility of the actions lay on the
shoulders of the High Commissioner and other League representatives. In some
instances the Assembly even gave instructions to the High Commissioner that he
should encourage initiative for field operations by private organizations and assist them
by negotiations with governments. The provision of funds for the settlement of refugees
had to be sought from outside sources. The funds were generally administrated by the
donors. In some instances the funds were, however, entrusted to the administration of
the Nansen Office, notably in the case of the Armenian settlement in Syria. Some
exceptions to the general rule took place in case of emergencies. For example, small
sums were provided in 1921-1926 for the work of assisting women and children at
Constantinople and Aleppo.20
Consequently, the refugee agencies did operate with tight budgets. Skran points out
that “throughout the Inter-war period, the refugee agencies ran on tiny budgets, put
together on a piecemeal basis without the benefit of long-term financial planning”.21
During the great survey 1937-1939 Simpson was able to compile a presentation on the
League expenditure for refugee services 1921-1937. On the basis of the
documentation it doesn’t become quite clear, from where these figures were found, or
how they were calculated. Nevertheless, there are no other covering estimates on the
17 OJ, 3rd year, No 4, April 1922, 342
18 Simpson 1939, 195
19 Skran, 188
20 Simpson 1939, 196
21 Skran, 284
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matter and it must be remembered that Simpson and his crew was as close to the
original sources and personnel of the League as one could possibly get.
According to Simpson:22
Year                       Swiss Francs
1921………………..34.620
1922………………119.000
1923………………293.000
1924………………214.000
1925………………253.000
1926………………303.000
1927………………325.325
1928………………339.175
1929………………298.000
1930………………328.594
1931………………333.800
1932………………297.763
1933………………297.763
1934………………300.000
1935………………280.000
1936………………318.490
1937………………476.697
The budget of the League was subjected to a series of controls for which it would be
hard to find a parallel. It was prepared by the Secretary General in the spring of each
year. This is to say, well before it was determined to come into effect. This was carried
out according to the Financial Regulations of the League. It was then carefully
examined by the Supervisory Commission. Next, it was submitted to the governments
of the Members of the League and studied by national Treasuries. Finally, it was
debated in the Finance Committee of the Assembly. When the Finance Committee had
finished its work, it was laid before the Assembly to be formally adopted.23 It  is
needless to say that with this complicated process it was quite challenging to allocate
funds for a controversial issue such as refugee work.
22 Simpson 1939, 195;  See Chapter 3.2.3. for comparison and scaling of the respective sums connected to
the refugee work. As it was mentioned, Nansen accepted no payment for his work. On the other hand, the
annual salary of the Secretary General of the LON was appr. 200.000 Swiss francs.
23 Walters, 133;  Singer, J. David: The Finances of the League of Nations. International Organization, Vol. 13, No
2. (Spring 1959, pp. 255-273),  269-270
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The loans required for the Bulgarian and Greek refugee settlement schemes were
raised directly under League auspices. In both instances it was made clear that no part
of the funds should be used for relief work. The refugee bodies acquired funds through
the Nansen stamp system under League auspices which was subject to League audit.
The Assembly sometimes indicated objects to which these funds may be devoted.24
The use of the loan schemes was limited to the cases where the refugees had a new
stable home country and a government to protect them. Consequently, the possibilities
to arrange loan schemes for the Armenians and other refugee groups never
materialized.
5.3. Uneven Attention on the Various Refugee Groups
The basic background notion is that archive based studies have revealed clearly,
how the League of Nation reflected the interests, perspectives, and habits of Europe,
and more particularly, certain part of the continent. Together with the ILO, the system
represented the preoccupations of the British, French, Dutch, Belgian and
Scandinavian states.25 The biggest flows of refugees during the Inter-war period were
directed from east to west. They also got the major attention. In the Balkans there were
also movements from west to east; from Greece to Turkey. The Turkish Moslem
refugees in Turkey were not targeted by the world organizations. Meanwhile the
Armenians in Turkey got attention and projects were implemented on their behalf.
Turkey was not a member of the League or the ILO on those days (until 1932). It was
probably more difficult for Turkey to appeal to these Intergovernmental entities than it
was for the Governments of Greece and Bulgaria. In the 1930s the refugees from Italy
and Spain had to leave their country for purely political reasons. They got almost no
attention. The refugees coming from Germany had a different background, since most
of them had to leave for racial-religious reasons. The refugee groups themselves were
typical in the sense that they were involved in the contemporary conflicts from which
their refugeehood resulted.  Some of the refugees might have belonged to active
24 Simpson 1939, 196
25 Clavin 2010, 628
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warrior communities, whereas some were politically passive refugees utilized by one or
more parties.26 This was the case in both the 1920s and the 1930s, perhaps with the
exception of the Jewish refugees from Germany.
The following presentation depicts the reasons and motives of the different refugee
groups for their departure:
reason
group
political religious racial ethnic economic
Russians x x
Greeks x x
Bulgarians x
Turks x x
Albanians x
Armenians x x
Assyrians/Chaldeans x x
Spanish x
Jews/Germany x x x
Saar x
Italians x
The presentation above describes the push factors. The motivations are always
mixed, and there is never one unequivocal reason. For the receiving country, the
question is always political to certain extent, since the comers are always opponents of
the ruling government.
Contemporary refugee research has created some tools to illustrate the timing of the
stream of refugees in relation to the conflict causing it. In this division, type1 is refugees
during the conflict, type 2 covers the period before, during, and after the conflict, type 3
is before and during the conflict, type 4 is during and after the conflict, type 5 is only
before the conflict, and finally, type 6 is only after the conflict. 27
According to this classification the refugee flows depicted in this research project
can be described as follows:
26 Hakovirta 1986, 150
27 Hakovirta 1981, 32
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type
group
1 2 3 4 5 6
Russians x x
Greeks x x
Bulgarians x x
Turks x x
Albanians x
Armenians x x
Assyrians/Chaldeans x
Spanish x x
Jews/Germany x x
Saar x x
Italians x
Why some refugee groups and nationalities got the attention of the world
organizations and some did not?  Why some groups were targeted with huge
programmes and some had to satisfy themselves to vague references? Why money
was found to assist some refuges but for others there was nothing? Politics can always
be used as a plausible explanation. The lack of funds is a natural reason and all too
well known for everybody who has worked in public sector, either in national or
international level. There is always more potential expenditure than revenue. Lack of
funds leads always to a situation, where trimming of the operational budget is
necessary.
Some refugees were considered, some not. Hakovirta has shown in his studies that
there is a modest positive correlation between the seriousness of refugee situations
and their potency of attracting international attention.28  But here again, we must
remember the difference between causality and correlation. All refugee situations are
definitely serious, but can we draw a conclusion that the refugees considered by the
League were the most destitute?
All too obvious and commonly used explanation to the uneven attention of the
regime on different refugee groups is prejudice. This, however, is unsatisfactory and
28 Hakovirta 1986, 144
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too simplifying attitude and doesn’t make justice to the actors of the refugee apparatus
of Inter-war period. Governments were more generous in aiding refugees when it
coincided with broader foreign or domestic policy objectives. There were conflicting
goals, and the intergovernmental organizations were making decisions on the basis of
consensus. Therefore, the refugee assistance decisions were inevitably products of
compromise. One more thing to be considered was scarcity of necessities; time,
money, and energy which made selection and prioritization involuntary.29
It can be noticed that the Intergovernmental Organizations were acting on behalf of
refugees in almost each case during the conflict. As late as 1935 the Norwegian
Government took initiative with a proposal that all political refugees should be included
to the League’s protection agenda without regard to their country of origin. The
Norwegian proposal was not adopted, and on the contrary to the original intention, it
was even feared that the League would disengage itself completely from all refugee
work.30
John Hope Simpson made a classification of refugees in three groups in his analysis
in 1938. The division describes the administrative situation as it appeared that time: 1)
the refugees who were looked after the Nansen International Office; the Russians, the
Armenians, the Saarlanders, a certain number of Kurds, Turks, and Georgians, as well
as Assyrians. 2) Refugees from Germany and Austria, and 3) small groups of refugees
for whom there was apparently no international concern.31
The Russians were the first “official” refugee category that received legal and
political benefits on the grounds of the status they had obtained by the definitions of
international arrangements. Later, the Armenians were included. The term that was
used in some connections was “assimilated refugees”. It refers to the fact that the
Armenians were now considered to enjoy similar rights as the Russian refugees. At a
later stage, the Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldeans, as well as a small group of Turkish
refugees were referred to as “assimilated refugees”. The similarity in their situation was
that they were deprived of their nationality and their travel documents. It was then
required to provide them with documents of identity and travel, and to establish some
agreement on their legal status, as well as to make sure that they received some type
of protection in the countries in which they were living.32
29 Skran, 272-277
30 Hansson II
31 Simpson 1938, 609
32 Bentwich 1935, 115-116
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Those refugees who had a new home country where to settle and a government to
protect them were called refugees, but not “assimilated refugees”. Greeks and
Bulgarians formed an example of this case. They were not in a need of refugee
documentation (Nansen passports) since they could assume a new nationality and
citizenship.
The Assembly of the League invited already in 1927 the Council to request the High
Commissioner for Refugees and the International Labour Organization to study how
the means and measures of protection and settlement in favor of Russian and
Armenian refugees could be extended to other similar groups. Action was taken for the
specific groups of Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldeans, and a small number of Turks. The
Inter-Governmental Commission recommended the Council to reconsider the question
of extending the arrangements for the Nansen refugees to new categories. But again, it
was in May 1934 decided that this was impossible. The League Council emphasized
that each government should have the possibility to decide what treatment should be
applied to refugees in its territory.33
The exchange of populations between two states was very different from the
“normal” refugee problem. The movement of populations in the Near East based on
international treaties during the years immediately preceding the First World War was
an enormous international exercise. Following the Balkan Wars, Turkey and Bulgaria
concluded a convention and set up a Mixed Commission to supervise the operation. In
1914 Turkey and Greece entered into a corresponding convention. Similar machinery
of a Mixed Commission was established. The scheme was interrupted by the outbreak
of the First World War, and the implementation took speed only after the War. That
time the League machinery was able to facilitate and supervise the activities.34
Three truly significant operations were conducted under the auspices of the League.
The biggest one was the exchange between Greece and Turkey.  An American
Chairman and British directors with large experience on Native American settlement
were appointed to the Commission administrating the operation. Two smaller
operations, the exchange of populations between Bulgaria and Greece, as well as
between Bulgaria and Turkey, proceeded reportedly smoothly. The transfer of the
Orthodox people to Greece and the Moslems to Turkey, in accordance with the
Convention signed at Lausanne in 1923, was compulsory. The exchange at field level,
33 Bentwich 1935, 120-121
34 Bentwich 1935, 123
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however, was in practice carried out by reciprocal and voluntary manner controlled by
Mixed Commissions.35
The international agencies recognized the fact that there were various kinds of
refugees, although visibly staying in fairly similar conditions. “Nansen refugees” were
refugees simply because they fled but large part of “German refugees” were made
stateless by stipulations of the German law makers. Nansen Office estimated that in
the beginning of 1937 there were still about 2 million stateless persons in Europe
alone.36  Most of them were not classified as official refugees at that time. This made it
possible for the press and public opinion to address the matters in a way that made the
situation look either better or worse than it actually was.
Organizations established in the 1920s and 1930s to deal with the refugee problems
were focused rather exclusively on European issues. Refugees existed in other parts of
the world, but these flows were generally ignored by a Euro-centric state system that
concentrated on humanitarian action closer to home.37 The only exception to this was
the situation in Harbin and Shanghai in China, but again, the refugees themselves were
of European origin.
The policy of including or excluding certain refugee groups was dictated by political
convenience. It was at least partly the result of concern not to invoke the hostility of
certain members or potential members of the League.38  Sometimes refugees were
supposedly used as a political tool. There were different types of connections between
refugees and power politics. The connection that can be clearly recognized in the
scope of this research project is that refugees were used as proof of the unpopularity of
certain dictatorial regimes.39  This interpretation applies at least to the cases of
Russian, Armenian, and German refugees.
It is quite obvious that determining whom to protect was a selective, political process
in the practice of the League. In a 1926 report, the High Commissioner identified over
150.000 people from eight national categories in analogous circumstances to Russian
and Armenian refugees. These included Assyrians, Montenegrins, Ruthenes,
Hungarians, and Jews. By choosing to extend legal protection to only certain few
35 Bentwich 1935, 124
36 Hansson I, 14
37 Benz and Hasenclever, 199
38 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 17-18
39 Roberts, 215
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groups, there was definitely a potential need and space left for ‘complementary
protection’.40
In the beginning of the era of the League, also the transient Government of Georgia
was trying to get their issues to the agenda of the world organizations. The situation of
Georgians was somewhat similar to Armenia as regards that it was an independent
state for a short period of time after the collapse of the Russian Empire, but was soon
absorbed again by the Soviet Russia. During the interval, the Georgian Government
also made an appeal to the League in order to get help in assisting the Russian
refugees in its territory, as well as to get assistance for the Georgian Refugees in
Constantinople at the time. There were reportedly some 400 Georgian refugees, most
part of which was willing to move to Georgia in spite of the dangers incurred by this
action.41  There seems to have been no visible reaction to this appeal.
In his report dated in June 1927 the High Commissioner Nansen named Ruthenian
refugees as the natives of Galicia who fled to Austria and Czechoslovakia during and
after the First World War. The number of these refugees was 9000 individuals. He also
mentioned an undefined number of Montenegrin refugees staying in France, who were
“unable to return to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”. Both of these
categories, according to Nansen, were in a need of “extension to them of the facilities
accorded to Armenian and Russian refugees”.42  In this case, Nansen’s appeal raised
only minor remarks and no real action was taken on behalf of these people.
Nansen went even further in the same report by recommending the extension of the
measures taken on behalf of Russian and Armenian refugees to “Refugees in general
in Central Europe without protection..”, numbering all together some 100.000 people.
The report came out with a statement “…many of those persons are desirous of
emigrating but are unable to do so owing to lack of passports.”43  One doesn’t need to
be a wizard to be able to see that these were exactly the remarks making member
state representatives negatively alert. The members of the League definitely saw other
political matters more important than investing into activities that many considered
tasks for humanitarian organizations.
The Turks settled their own people without help from the League. The settlement
programme seemed to have been a success. Turkey had substantial land left by the
Greeks while moving from Anatolia to the Hellenic State. Also agricultural facilities left
40 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 17
41 OJ, Vol 3, Nov 1921, 1026
42 MInutes of the 47. Session of the Council of the LON, Annex 990/OJ, No 10, Oct 1927, 1337
43 MInutes of the 47. Session of the Council of the LON, Annex 990/OJ, No 10, Oct 1927, 1338
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by the Greeks were available for the comers. Turkey received some 30.000 people per
year from Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania.44  There was also a small group of two
thousand Portuguese political refugees who were not looked after by anyone. Five
hundred of them were in Brazil, fifteen hundred in France.45
The Jewish refugee problem had its own features. Various Inter-war refugee
movements included Jews long before the well known German refugee problem. It was
estimated that the Jewish migration problem in Europe included about five million
people. It was also apparent that in a way they wished to seek an entirely new way of
life. Many countries had for centuries forbidden the Jews to own land. There were also
limitations for them to take up some professions or positions.46 These were the well-
known push factors. In 1927 the High Commissioner expressed in his report that there
were 16.000 Jewish refugees scattered in Bukowina, Bessarabia, and Transylvania.
Those people were stated to be unable to obtain Rumanian nationality, and were in a
need of identity papers and assistance to enable them to emigrate.47
Previous anti-Semitic movements and campaigns were directed to areas which were
occupied by Jews. However, the phenomenon of the 1930s was different and peculiar.
It was not directed against the ghettos, but against the Jewish race as such – against
the Jew who had retained his religion as well as against the Jew who had discharged
it.48  On the whole, by the end of the 1930s, Jews had become practically outlaws in
many countries. This sometimes lead to bizarre situations where Jewish refugees were
left to starve in between countries as no authority was willing to handle their case.
These people were even called “untouchables”.49
At the end of the 1930s in Poland about ten percent of the population was of Jewish
origin. The problem of anti-Semitism was an ancient one. Polish Government asked in
several occasions, both the League of Nations Assembly and the International Labour
Office, for coordinated large-scale action to secure admission of the Polish Jews into
other countries which might have room for them.50  Bulgaria has been depicted as the
only state allied with Germany that didn’t discriminate the Jews and where all Jews
44 Simpson 1938, 608
45 Simpson 1938, 619
46 Hansson II
47 MInutes of the 47. Session of the Council of the LON, Annex 990/OJ, No 10, Oct 1927, 1337
48 Thompson II, 383
49 Hansson II
50 Ibid.
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avoided the horrors of the holocaust. This is only partly true. The reputation seems to
be largely based on skilful propaganda carried out after the Second World War.51
It seems obvious that sporadic efforts were made to distinguish the Jews among the
Russian Refugees at least in some connections in the early 1920s. There were some
separate schemes planned for them, executed partly by Jewish relief organizations and
coordinated by the High Commissioner. There were some plans even then to transfer
those refugees to Palestine.52  It can be stated, however, that from the perspective of
the League and ILO systems there was no explicitly Jewish problem before the era of
Nazi-Germany.
5.4. Success and Setbacks
As in every international series of action, success and setbacks followed each
others. Different operations have been attributed by researchers with the merits
belonging to the respective steps. On the whole, the creation of the international
refugee protection system since the beginning of the 1920s, as well as establishing
modes of operation for it, can be considered a wonderful success. It must be kept in
mind that all this was created almost from scratch. There was no corresponding regime
before the League. It is therefore an amazing achievement that a couple of years after
the First World War there was an international refugee organization mandated by the
intergovernmental community.
The League machinery had the initiating and coordinating role in the refugee
regime. One way of measuring the success of the work is to see how covering the
variety of entities taking part in the refugee work really was. The Committee on
International Assistance to Refugees established by the Council in 1936 listed in its
report in January 1937 all the organizations that had contributed to the Committee’s
work during its existence in form of their own report.  This listing of organizations was
divided in three parts: A. private organizations dealing with refugees (13 organizations),
B. organizations dealing with refugees under Nansen Office (16 organizations), C.
51 Rautkallio 2004, 74
52 Minutes of the 18. Session of the Council of the LON (11.-17.5.1922), Annex 344/OJ, 3rd year, No 6, June 1922,
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organizations dealing with refugees coming from Germany (19 organizations). Each
category had a wide range of different groupings which they covered and some of the
organizations seem to have been quite specialized for certain type of people.53  Some
of the organizations which were active during the period under examination were
established on quite an improvised basis, as the refugee problems emerged.54
The role of the NGOs has been widely recognized in humanitarian work in general
as well as in refugee aid especially. This doesn’t mean that the organizations would not
have their own shortcomings. Sometimes the organizations may have too narrow
perspective to be able to respond to changing situations effectively enough. On many
occasions they can be bystanders only and perhaps record the violations.55 It has been
pointed out that during the Inter-war period the assumption was that the practical field
work of the refugee assistance would be financially covered by voluntary organizations.
The situation reportedly led to the exhaustion of the resources of these organizations.
This, in turn, obliged the NGOs to place limits on the numbers of refugees they could
support.56
There is no evidence that essential parts of the emergency relief would have ended
up into wrong hands during the operations of the universal organizations in the 1920s
and 1930s. Although these results are not directly demonstrated in the League
sources, it is presumable that any large scale wrong doings or failures to deliver the aid
to its destination would have been reported to the League. It would probably also have
been reported in the various studies depicting the aid operations. This does not
suggest that the people responsible on those days would have been any better or
moral. Any time when large scale international aid operations take place, there are
individuals who want to benefit by unfair or illicit means. However, we have a reason to
believe that major part of aid reached its target.57
Even though the rules of the international refugee regime did not guarantee a
refugee entrance to a particular country, they did make the lives of refugees better. For
many, having an internationally recognized identity document helped them to cross
international borders legally. It also gave them a more secure legal status and thus
prevented them from getting down to any illicit actions. As Skran has put it: “Holding a
53 Minutes  of  the  90.  Session  of  the  Council  of  the  LON  (20.24.1.1936),  Annex  1576/OJ,  17th  year,  No  2  Feb
1936, 154-155
54 See Appendix VI A and B, ”NGOs in Refugee Work”
55 Ruppesinghe, 136
56 Sjöberg, 228
57 A general study on these problems, see Hakovirta 1991, 88
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Nansen passport did not guarantee a refugee anything, but it sometimes helped a
great deal”.58
In order to become at least somehow respectable, a refugee needed a passport.
The Nansen passport system was definitely the best known tool ever used in the
international refugee work. The refugees had bad reputation without their own account.
They had to violate immigration rules of the recipient countries by crossing borders
without any permission.  If a state wanted to get rid of these people, there was most
probably another circle of violations ahead.
It has been demonstrated that the progress of asylum law and refugee protection
has been generally positive, mostly in favor of refugees and asylum seekers. After a
certain period of evolution, it has aimed at more or less durable and permanent
solutions. It has put a legal framework around those who need it. In this way the
Nansen tradition of direct action has been continued and cemented.59 One of the
success stories of the 1920s and 1930s was also the way the refugees were
themselves contributing to the solution of their problem. This was accomplished in
various ways, but symbolically not least by purchasing the Nansen stamps to be affixed
to their certificates and thus contributing to the fund raising of the League’s refugee
organization.60
The inconsistency in all refugee work was related to the lack of coordination. In
practice this could mean that some governmental authorities were trying to explore
ways of restricting access of refugees, while other officials were investigating ways of
overcoming an anticipated shortage of labour force.61  Today the governments would
talk about immigration required by the demographic factors.  Also during the Inter-war
period nations and national economies had need for people to take care of the jobs,
even the rhetoric was different from today. Looking for a better life was not the main
reason why refugees were moving during the 1920s and 1930s.  In general, there were
mass movements for economic reasons only to the North-America.
Various legal documents dealing with refugees formulated between 1922 and 1939
were compiling the rules created to enforce the principles and norms of the
international refugee regime. The most important ones concerned the definition of a
refugee. There were several of them, one for each category. The purpose of any
definition or description of the class of refugees was not only to facilitate and justify
58 Skran, 122
59 Sieverts, 84
60 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 367
61 On this see also: Joly, 3
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assistance and protection, but also to demonstrate the relevant rights or legal
benefits.62
The repatriation plans for Russian refugees can be considered as one of the failures
of the League. The attempts during the 1920s can be considered as an example of the
obstacles preventing repatriation as a solution. For such scheme to work, all three
parties must agree on its desirability. It includes the government of the host country,
the authorities of the country of origin, and the refugees themselves. In this case, the
Soviet Government initially expressed interest in the return of Russian refugees as part
of wider strategy. The Bolsheviks hoped to prevent former Russian citizens from
participating in anti-Soviet organizations abroad. Then, after some unfortunate
incidents connected to the repatriation plans, the Soviets lost their interest for returnees
who were considered politically questionable.63
The most important factor to be kept in mind, when estimating the possibilities and
results of repatriation is whether the refugees can return safely, without having fear for
their life or health. This criterion is far more important than the will or the capability of
the refugee aid organizations.64 In all the examples of the Inter-war period the situation
didn’t get any better. Whatever repatriation took place, it was based on voluntary return
on individual basis, and without much intervention of intergovernmental bodies. The
Inter-war refugees didn’t really have a place where to return to. In this sense the other
solutions became natural options.
The basic problem in finding a regional solution was that Europe was overpopulated.
Suggestions were made to find more sustainable solutions by settling the surplus
populations in underdeveloped areas or by exporting them so that the risk of conflicts
could be reduced.65 Eventually, the success of any resettlement project depends on the
attitudes of the recipient countries: how willing they are to receive refugees.
Resettlement was normally considered if and when repatriation seemed not possible
and when countries of first asylum closed their borders and refused to receive any
more refugees. Resettlement took place during the 1920s and 1930s, but it is
challenging to evaluate the success of the programmes. Thousands of people found
new homes as a result of resettlement projects. Most of the resettlement took place
unregulated. Only few countries were unambiguously willing to act as a recipient
country in large-scale programmes conducted and coordinated by the
62 Skran, 71-72; see also Appendix VII ”List of Agreements and Arrangements...”
63 See Skran, 155
64 Hakovirta 1991, 89
65 Mazower 2009, 111-118
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intergovernmental organizations. The normal reasons for unwillingness are connected
to security and domestic policy, fear for internal unrest, unemployment, as well as
inadequate guarantees of international cooperation.66
The settlement of Greek refugees in Western Thrace and the exchange of Greeks
from Turkey and Turks from Greece, involving about two million people, were greatest
success stories of Nansen and his colleagues.  Major part of the work for the Greeks
was undertaken by the Greek Settlement Commission which was assigned under the
authority of the League.67  The Greek Refugees had a country where to go to and a
government that would commit itself in taking care of them, though with its limited
resources and with the help of international community. This would also make the
procedures concerning Greek Refugees on the international platform somewhat
special.
Refugee settlements in Greece and Bulgaria, as well as in Syria and Lebanon did
have positive impact to the life of the people. Here the League coordination turned out
to be useful. This was, however, only a part of the resettlement story; the states and
the international refugee regime could not offer similar solution for all refugee groups.
The original humanitarian ideal of the system didn’t work completely.68
The settlement programmes were the highlights of the High Commissioner’s
achievements. In this operation, the broad result of moving the populations of the Near
East was that the populations of Macedonia and of Asia Minor and Anatolia became
homogenous. This was seen to have a pacification effect in the region. It was
estimated that politically, the exchange proved a signal of success. The old political
and religious jealousness was replaced by greater understanding.69 Resettlement in
third countries always require efforts from authorities’ side as well as struggle from the
refuges’ side, but the results can be sometimes as rewarding as they were in these
operations.
In the 1930s some specific national groups, including refugees from Germany (1936
and 1938) and Sudeten refugees from Czechoslovakia (1939) were able to benefit from
international conventions and resolutions.70 The Evian Conference in the late 1930s
turned out to be somewhat unsuccessful in terms of immediate effects. At that time no
66 About this see e.g. Hakovirta 1991, 94
67 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 362; see also Chapter 3.2.4.
68 Skran, 183
69 Bentwich 1935, 125
70 Joly, 7
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countries wanted to loosen their immigration policies in the middle of the present
economic situation.71
Sometimes the easiest altrnative is to stay and hope that the things turn better.
Interestingly enough, in most cases they turn better. Assimilation takes place. In case
of Russian refugees there was a huge resistance in the beginning  against all
integration and assimilation to the new homeland. When it became evident that they
were to remain outside Russia, it was sometimes too late to start to assimilate. The
closed Russian communities were being formed already. The generation that was born
in exile, became bilingual, or even trilingual. That has, in turn, probably contributed
somewhat to the tolerance and internationalization of the world as whole.
It seems that the international community on the whole was quite ignorant of the
refugee problems when the refugee relief work and the organizations were initiated.
The main reason was that no-one could predict the magnitude of the problem and the
volumes of the movers.72 States were not able to keep account on the people crossing
the borders. It is here, where the value of the work of the international organizations,
notably the ILO, has been recognized.
The intergovernmental world organizations were universal. This made the political
aspects of the refugee problem difficult for them to tackle with. The refugees were
always opponents of some government and always in-between; universal organizations
were not supposed to act against any governments. This became all too evident in the
1930s when most of the Members of the LON were very reluctant to provoke Hitler and
his followers.73 The paradox from the viewpoint of the refugee work was that although
in the 1930s the League was establishing systems to help people fleeing from the
dictatorships of Hitler and Stalin, there was nothing they could do to help the real
disaster, i.e. the people who stayed and were not able to escape.74
It was estimated that the effectiveness of the High Commissioner’s efforts in the
countries of refuge was weakened by the compromises of the 1930s, the most decisive
one being the resolution to separate the office definitely from the League. The
compromise was agreed upon at the time when the office was set up in order to avoid
the opposition of Germany, an active member of the League.75  The Covenant of the
League entitled the Council and the Assembly to deal with any issue on agenda within
71 Stoessinger 1956, 39-41
72 Thompson I, 14
73 Stoessinger 1956, 32-36
74 Joly, 8
75 McDonald, vi
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the scope of activity of the League or affecting the peace of the world.76  It  may have
been seen that the interventions on refugee matters would have been
counterproductive to the larger and more far-reaching endeavor; the conservation of
peace.
At the end of 1930s Dorothy Thompson estimated that neither the Nansen Office nor
the High Commissioner (at that time) was ever authorized to consider or deal with the
whole question of political and racial exiles. The situation was being made acute by the
fact that both of those organizations were supposed to expire and suggestions for their
continuation or extension were expected. The work was on a very uncertain basis. It
was reckoned that charity was not enough and problem should have been regarded
and treated as one of international politics.77  New and different approach was required
since there was now a need to help some people out of their home country, not only to
assist the exiles abroad. The situation formed a kind of a setback for the League, but
made the need for the approach of the IGCR more and more apparent.
The contribution of the rich and powerful countries has been identified as the most
important single factor in assessing the reasons behind the success of refugee
operations. The willingness and ability of the major players on the international field to
donate money and provide shelter for refugees is what matters most. However, “no
clear connection can be seen between the individual country’s wealth and its
contributions to refugee aid”.78  This means that other things also matter. The role of
the Great Powers in the processes of finding permanent solutions for difficult problems
was indispensable.  Collective mechanisms could not replace that input. This problem
was never solved in a satisfactory and durable manner.79  It was not always possible to
overcome the problems deriving from the contradictory interests of states.  This was
often the case with economic and social issues in which there appeared to be not only
sectors of common interests, but also spans of rivalry.80
Susan Pedersen makes a distinction between “great power agreements” and
“collective agreements” in connection to the League. Most international arrangements
related to the security and peacekeeping belonged to the first category, and were even
seen as weakening the system of the League. In many cases even public opinions in
76 McDonald, x
77 Thompson II, 378
78 Hakovirta 1991, 96 and 99
79 Bourquin, 54
80 Bourquin, 26
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Member states were not pacific and constructive.81  Agreements concerning refugees,
however, were different. In those, the League appears as a key agent and a promoter
of pragmatic and viable settlements.
The actors of the intergovernmental refugee regime were not able to develop a
system of universal protection for all refugees in the Inter-war period. They left,
however, a lasting legacy in the scene. The League and other actors developed a
comprehensive body of rules governing the refugee issues. This took place in identity
and travel, economic and social well-being, and physical protection. The authority of
international organizations to defend refugees and intervene on their behalf was
established. It is also a unique tradition in the field of human rights. Most importantly,
refugees became defined as a separate category which could be marked off from other
international migrants.82 Even the LON and the ILO were largely abandoned by
Member states in the 1930s, “these organizations were able to draw on transnational
networks of social scientists, economists, labour activists, and local activists to sustain
them when inter-governmental support failed.”83
5.5. Were the Problems Solved?
Not surprisingly, the basic finding is that states were asking for help and willing to
conduct international cooperation when they needed assistance with their refugees.
The approach was different when the intergovernmental bodies were soliciting for
contributions for the work done elsewhere. During the Inter-war time there was no
consolidated or regularized scheme to tackle this dilemma.
The refugee policy together with protection of minorities had their importance on a
level which was somewhat different from the original idea of the League. The systems
connected to these “soft values” could not coerce states or override sovereignty, but
instead, they contributed powerfully to the articulation and diffusion of international
norms.84  The international refugee regime did not develop according to a
comprehensive plan or a grand design in the beginning of its existence. Instead, it
81 Pedersen 2007, 1094, 1096-1097
82 Skran, 144-145
83 Clavin 2010, 628
84 Pedersen 2007, 1107
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resulted from a series of ad hoc responses by governments to successive refugee
cases, beginning with the exodus of Russian refugees.
The League system carried a structural asymmetry with it. Many NGOs involved
also “had European origins and characteristics, regardless of their universal
pretentions”.85 It has been estimated that the impact of the international refugee regime
was uneven, because the action varied over time, by refugee groups and by issue. The
impact in the 1920s seems to have been bigger than in the 1930s.  The regime
significantly affected the treatment of refugees within host countries, but its influence
on governments’ decisions about immigration policy or repatriation was much less. The
reasons behind these facts are various. In the 1920s the work was conducted in a
climate favorable to international cooperation which coincided with the founding of the
League of Nations.86  Other explanations have stressed the economic factors; it is well
known that the economic recession in the 1930s brought about vicious restrictions for
all human life.
Refugees was one of the rare questions during the Inter-war period that was
discussed on equal grounds by public, NGOs, government officials as well as elected
politicians. It was addressed on a national level as well as on intergovernmental level.
In that sense we can call it a genuine dialogue. The refugee aid system was originally
formed to assist only Russian refugees. However, by 1939 also Armenian, Assyrian,
Assyro-Chaldean, Turkish, Saar, German, Austrian, and Czech refugees stood under
this umbrella of legal protection. Although certain refugees remained outside the
regimes scope, this does not reduce the significance it had and the growth that did take
place. It also demonstrates that it had an impact on how governments treated refugees
and that some stakeholders wanted its field expanded.87
It was estimated that still after the Second World War there were about 250.000
Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, and Saar refugees requiring international care. There
were also some 110.000 German refugees and 212.000 Spanish refugees who had
been left on the responsibility of the IGCR. The end of 1946 finally marked the
termination of the work of the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Other organizations took responsibility for the Refugees the High Commissioner had
been taken care for. The new organization had new challenges besides the old
remaining. The new World War had again uprooted enormous amounts of people.88
85 Clavin 2010, 629
86 Skran, 270-271
87 Skran, 144
88 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 365
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There were different judgments on the results of the international refugee work
during the 1920s and 1930s. In his writing, internationally famous Dutch legal scholar
professor J.-P.-A- Francois stated in 1935, that a general conviction would be that the
actions taken by the international community on behalf of refugees were insufficient.
Some positive developments were identified in fields of legal and economic protection.
However, the big plans concerning the coordination of the efforts of the private
organizations, and the permanent solutions through resettlement and massive
naturalization programs, remained all unaccomplished.89
The refugee work of the League of Nations covered a period of time that evidenced
big and fateful events in Europe and elsewhere. Many of the features of the time made
the refugee work challenging. There was the uneasy recovery after the First World
War, economic crash with mass unemployment, the rise of dictatorial regimes in
important countries, collapse of the wishful idea of collective security, and finally
rearmament and new war.90  The refugee work of the League in the middle of all this
was one of the developments that finally found its way through the hard times and
survived until it was reassumed later. It is not altogether wrong to estimate that
Nansen’s prestige in some parts of the world was higher than the appreciation of the
League.91
The most important observation on the outcome of the refugee regime’s operation,
according to Skran, was the establishment of the idea that refugees should be treated
as a special category of migrant deserving preferential treatment. In this respect, the
refugee work did matter. The regime mattered both a) because it facilitated the
immediate refugee assistance in the field and b) because it led to the acceptance of
refugees as a special category and to corresponding treatment on a principled level.92
However, because the work of the refugee organizations was interrupted by the war,
we never know how efficient the work really was, as it was not completed.
Refugees were created by violations of human rights. Lasting solutions could be
found only by tackling the causes of the problems. Anything else is just remedy for the
symptoms. There was an attempt to accept and implement international legal
standards concerning refugees. This was supposed to be done by agreements to be
signed and ratified. There was an attempt to harmonize the international practices on
refugees. There was a search for a coherent system, consistent with international
89 Francois, 368
90 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 365
91 Bendiner, 195
92 Skran, 261-262
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standards. The refugee assistance efforts dealt with refugees only after they had de
facto become refugees, which meant that they had left their home countries. None of
the attempted solutions addressed the deeper problem how to keep the people in their
homes in a decent life and thus to prevent refugee movements from occurring in the
first place.93
Symptomatic to the time was, that in his resignation letter 1935 James McDonald
argued that it was not sufficient to attempt to alleviate the circumstances of the people
who have fled; political action was required to address the causes. Jews seeking to
leave Germany were prevented to do so because they had to leave behind their
financial assets. At the time of economic depression they were unable to find new
homes and to fulfill the conditions of potential asylum countries by which “they should
not become a burden on the public purse”.94
The resignation of James McDonald reflected a setback from angle of the refugee
work. But the political decision makers had had bigger task to be handled; the Peace. A
group of refugees, no matter how big or how visible, was seen as a reasonable
sacrifice for that cause. Mr. McDonald himself wrote: “When domestic policies threaten
the demoralization and exile of hundreds of thousands of human beings,
considerations of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of common humanity”.95
In the 1930s the international work was divided into two; there were the “Nansen
refugees” and the “German refugees”. The first category was covered by the
international arrangements concerning the legal status and travel documents. The
situation of the latter group was more indefinite. Both had separate organizations
looking after them.
The period covering the 1920s and 1930s has been characterized by the
confrontation of dictatorships and democracies. As far as refugees are concerned, the
depiction “era of democratic solutions” seems justified. It was the undemocratic
systems that created the refugee problems and the democratic ones that wanted to
seek for solutions.
In contrast to most refugees of the 1920s, refugees fleeing the Nazi-Germany in the
1930s had the misfortune to be from a powerful country with a rise in significance in the
world politics. Although the Russians also fled from a Great Power, they did so at the
time when the Soviet Union was a weak and isolated state. The Bolsheviks didn’t have
the tools to affect significantly the politics of other countries towards its former citizens.
93 Skran, 226
94 Joly, 8
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Germany was situated in the very center of international politics and the German
government in the 1930s had increasing influence throughout Europe and the world.96
Democracy and respect of civil rights are indeed the best remedies to all problems
that make people leave their homes. The League of Nations’ systems were established
to reflect the reaction of the democratic powers towards the bad regimes producing
refugees. Helping the refugees was thought to have an effect on those regimes,
especially when attempts to repatriate refugees were conducted.
States of the world had great expectations from the League of Nations. It was
supposed to maintain the peace and thus secure harmonious development of nations.
But the members of the League failed. In this respect it is fairly easy to say that refugee
questions had, after all, a very limited role, if any, in forming the political history of the
1920s and 1930s. We can say, however, that those solutions had influence to the later
history of Europe in Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as in the Middle East.
Most peace agreements and other international arrangements and conventions last
less than five years. They turn out to be too difficult to be implemented or the political
will to follow them disappears.97 In this respect the agreements concluded concerning
the demographic adjustments in the Balkans, Anatolia, and Greece were quite unique.
This work can be described as a success.
Refugee work was a new phenomenon. Nobody knew what to expect. Everybody
understood that the problem was immense and serious. It was allso life threatening and
peace threatening. The refugee problems were bigger than ever before. Therefore, it is
fair to accept what Atle Grahl-Madsen wrote in 1980 in his report: “The League of
Nations never promised the refugees very much, but with the scarce resources
available, it more than kept its pledge”.98
It was reported that certain authorities in Finland were unsatisfied with the results of
the international cooperation inasmuch the country had to, due to its geographical
position, carry a disproportionate responsibility of the mass movements of the Russian
refugees.99  The head of the Secret Police of Finland even stated in 1938 that the High
Commission had provided no help to authorities of Finland. On the contrary, in some
cases it had been an obstacle to execution of legal measures decided by national
authorities.100
96 Skran, 195
97 References to this are made in various studies concerning modern development policies (e.g. World Bank)
98 Grahl-Madsen 1983, 367
99 Leitzinger II, 182
100 Leitzinger II, 183
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There were motives that directly could be derived from the refugee questions
themselves, but also it must be recognized that there were hidden political and other
incentives that could not be spoken out openly. It is also important to understand that
the refugee policy reflected in the refugee work was hard every day work. It rarely had
any highlights. These high moments are, anyhow, the points why the refugee work is
remembered.  When the politicians didn’t take up their duties and responsibilities, the
international officials, national civil servants, as well as voluntary workers took care of
the things and thus were exercising refugee policy.
Policy is shown to us in non-ideological and sometimes inefficient measures. It is
bureaucratic, taking care of the regular everyday business. Despite the politics and
policies, it is certain that alien’s passports and asylums were granted to unknown
number of people who considered themselves refugees. When refugees were
assimilated and naturalized, they ceased to be refugees.
The Nazi-Germany is remembered first among all refugee problems of the time. The
obvious thing is that Nazi-Germany was no Cambodia or Sudan. There was certain
degree of openness, and information flows through political leaders, news media,
ordinary people, and, of course, the refugees. It was a dictatorship, but with modern
characters. The people outside Germany were not ignorant of the happenings and
proceedings in the country.  The question was: who could and dared interpret the
messages in a right way? International politicians were definitely not willing to do so.
And, most importantly, it is not our duty to try to claim that they should have.
The LON has been criticized by historians for its inefficiency. This also applies to the
refugee work. While recognizing this, we must bear in mind that the LON and the ILO
were organizations with sovereign states as their members. This signified a certain kind
of dilemma since the practical requirements were not matching with the universal
principles of the organizations. The refugees were always produced by some nation or
state, and at least on some level they were enemies of the present government. Acting
on behalf of those people would be, in theory, acting against that particular
government. On the other side of the coin there were requirements arising from the
burdens the new people were imposing to the countries of their sojourn.
The recipient countries of the Russian refugees after the First World War were all
economically weak, many of them newly independent (from Russia), and thus had no
ways or means to take care of the huge amounts of unwanted aliens. Therefore, the
help of prominent non-governmental organizations like the ARC was more than
welcome and urgently needed. When the ARC departed from Europe, somebody had
to step forward instead.
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The refugees of those days normally didn’t apply for any official asylum.101   Instead,
they were tolerated. This took place in most cases without any formal decisions by the
Government. The statistics show a gradual decline in refugee numbers all over Europe.
There were three main reasons to this: repatriation, assimilation to the present country
of residence, and (overseas) resettlement
In the first years of the refugee organizations they had their focus on the legal status
and travel arrangements of the homeless. Later the organizations wanted to
concentrate on something more permanent and get the exiles settled somewhere in the
world. After Nansen and Thomas died, there were really no ambitious large-scale
efforts taken on behalf of the refugees.102 The field was too scattered and the efforts
too incoherent to achieve real permanent solutions.
The organizations had their life spans, and they were not long enough. It was
thought that the refugee problem was only temporary by nature.103 The apparent
inefficiency of the refugee organs was due to the too weak and distant connection to
the League.104  Although many large scale programmes turned out to be failures, we
must keep in mind that the organizations were able accomplish a lot. These were
mostly small but important steps. The Nansen passport system was finally recognized
by some 50 states.
During the first decade of the refugee work, as long as Nansen was the High
Commissioner, the terms of reference for his work were rather loosely defined and he
took quite a lot of personal liberties in performing his duties. After his death the job
description became somewhat more precisely regulated.  The High Commissioner’s
post as well as the Nansen Office were both under control of the regular League’s
organs. They were also under guidance of the Inter-Governmental Advisory
Commission. The prefix “Nansen –“appeared in official connections only after Fridtjof
Nansen’s death. In the 1930 the previous refugee certificates became known as
“Nansen certificate” or “Nansen passport”. Moreover, the International Office for
Refugees was very quickly named as “Nansen Office”.
It was sometimes difficult to decide to which persons the arrangements concerning
refugees applied. The Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission was in the opinion
that in this question the legal aspects of the matter should be kept distinct from the
administrative aspect. The legal matter was to decide who should be defined as a
101 ... as they would do today
102 Simpson 1939, 197-198
103 Only today we understand that it was not
104 Ristelhueber, 173
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refugee. The administrative matter was to issue passports and other certificates for
those who were considered refugees.105
The Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission reminded the League on its
obligations while the new Nansen Office was in the making in 1930. It expressed a
hope that, when refugee work now was being reorganized, the situation of the staff at
present employed in the Refugee Service should be placed on a more definite basis
and the interests of the staff should be safeguarded as far as possible.  There was also
a reference to resolutions made by the League and the ILO concerning the status of
staff and employees.  An indirect reference could be noted, that these matters had
been on an improvised basis during the dominance of Fridtjof Nansen.106
The League took sincere responsibility for the activities of both the Greek and the
Bulgarian Settlement Commission. The natural reason for this was the large amounts
of money involved.  The arrangements for Greece and Bulgaria were different from
others in a sense, that extensive loans were raised for the settlement activities. This, in
turn, was possible only because both refugee groups had homelands with more or less
solid Governments to receive them and take care of their relief and settlement.
It becomes quite obvious from the documentation that the greatest and the most
thorough effort the League was taking, was Bulgaria. The country, its national economy
on the whole, was supervised by the League. The settlement of the refugees was a
small, but natural part of this supervisory work and assistance program. The National
Bank as well as financial and fiscal policy of the Government of Bulgaria was
conducted in cooperation with the League. The League had its representatives not only
in advisory role, but also taking part into the political decision making and
administration. It was involved in the public revenue as well as in the public
spending.107
It is not possible for the observers of today to see the reasons for the politeness of
the actions. This becomes real in the case how the international community was
treating the Government of Iraq. It seems that the Iraqi Government and Authorities
were making jokes on the international attempts to solve the problems of the Assyrians.
The situations with the Soviet Union and Germany were more serious. Those were
105 Minutes of the 60. Session of Council of the LON (8.-12.9.1930), Annex 1232/OJ, 11th year, No 11, Nov 1930,
1463
106 Minutes of the 60. Session of Council of the LON (8.-12.9.1930), Annex 1232/OJ, 11th year, No 11, Nov 1930,
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107 A good perception of all this can be obtained from the last reports of the League Commissioner in Bulgaria
1932; see 22. and 23. Reports;  e.g. OJ, 13th year, No8,  August 1932, 1503-1543
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countries that needed to be treated with utmost care because of their economic,
military and political relevance. This, with League’s peace preserving primary mandate
in the background, makes the politeness understandable and in a sense justified.
In the 1930s the attempts to solve the refugee problem was described as piecemeal
treatment. The actions were taken as the problems arose and a comprehensive
approach was missing. This was seen unsatisfactory by those politicians who wanted
to consider the problems on the whole. An integration of the different organizations into
one organization directly under the League of Nations was considered important, not
only because of the financial aspect of the question, but also because such an
organization would have become subject to entire machinery of the League. By the
existing approach, the public opinion was not made aware of the situation. A
centralized organization would have also meant that the burden of caring for the
refugees would have been more evenly distributed among the different actors.108
Surveying the record of the 1920s and 1930s it was estimated by Bentwich in 1935
that the League activity on behalf of the refugees was manifested in two contrasted
developments. The action in assisting the exchange of populations marked the success
of international action. It demonstrated constructive treatment of the problem of racial
and religious minorities. The activities of the High Commissioners in special
emergencies, and the Nansen Office in general, indicated that something can be done.
The larger problem of stateless persons as a phenomenon remained to be tackled.109
In the 1930s the Nansen Office was criticized for slow actions. This was also
addressed by the President of the Office Michael Hansson, who admitted the fact but at
the same time explained how it was impossible for the Office to take action without the
consent and the full cooperation of the individual governments and national authorities.
This bureaucracy caused delays.110
The refugee work accomplished during the Inter-war period influenced governments
greatly. Firstly, the developments facilitated cooperation between states by changing
the environment in which negotiations took place. Cooperation became more likely.111
The regime and deliberations around it also changed the preferences of governments.
The formal institutions associated with the refugee regime gave governments new
policy options unknown to them before.112
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The policy makers of the League presumed that once the crisis producing refugees
had passed, the refugee problem would disappear. In any “turning point” when a new
refugee organization was established, it was assumed to need no more than few years
to “solve” the problem. This was mainly due to the lack of relevant and covering studies
concerning the experiences on refugee crisis. This does not, however, erase the fact
that the League was able to react to new refugee situations at these “turning points”.
The sequence of this strategy forms the coherence in refugee work of the League and
the ILO during the period of the 1920s and 1930s. The body of experience on the long
lasting and even permanent nature of the refugee crisis was only in the forming phase.
The organizations established after the Second World War were then able to exploit
this evidence material.
It seems that after all the IGCR had even less consistency than the League’s
organizational refugee regime, although originally the whole idea of the Evian
Conference and the Intergovernmental Committee was to create a permanent
organization to replace the League’s “ad-hoc methods” in handling the refugee
situations.
The Council had to take an attitude which was colored by carefulness, since the
Members of the League were not prepared to undertake any large financial burden for
the sake of refugees. But humanitarian aid and refugee settlement cannot be carried
on without heavy expenditure. Therefore “the League’s endeavors were condemned to
be always a palliative, never a cure”.113  Regardless of the different points of view, an
international programme proposing to solve the global refugee problem would have
been “a utopian task”. It should have removed from the world all conflicts and political
instability, military actions, and even poverty as well. On the whole, it would have been
impossible.114 The symptoms, however, were alleviated.
The greatest benefit the League was able to donate was to provide the refugees
with legal protection. This was done above all through the invention of the Nansen
passport. The question of passports was clearly connected with those of emigration
and employment. Once this legal issue had been solved, it was possible to give very
substantial assistance in other respects.115
Before the “new” refugee crisis in the 1930s when certain groups of people started
to flee from Nazi Germany, the situation was less acute for some time. Most of the
113 Walters, 188
114 Einarsen, 23-24
115 Walters, 188
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refugees of the 1920s were either self-supporting, naturalized in their country of
residence, repatriated, or dead.116  It must be kept in mind that the only full and lasting
solution of the world refugee problem would be possible only through elimination of its
causes.117 The refugee agencies of the League clearly had the potential to take
responsibility without listening to the wishes of any particular member state too much.
In the 1920 this leadership was able to gather support for programmes which were
innovated. These efforts did not meet the needs of all refugees, but they certainly
helped some of the most destitute people in exile.118  As Pedersen has evaluated, “The
specialized bodies reconciled state interest and the demands of mobilized publics more
successfully than the security bodies… often by incorporating experts and activists
directly to their work.”119  This definition applies especially well to the refugee
organization, where personalities such as Fridtjof Nansen were able to interrogate
governments and to carry out on-site visits without having to fear for their personal
integrity.
116 Walters, 189
117 Hakovirta 1986, 151
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6. CONCLUSION; Consistency and Stamina formed a Policy
The initial assumption of this historiographical discourse was that it should be
possible to find evidence which will speak for the existence of continuation and
consistency in the actions of the League of Nations and the International Labour
Organization taken on behalf of refugees during the entire Inter-war period. This would
be identified by finding elements consisting of advocacy work conducted by people who
had the right position and influence for making plans that would systemize the
approach applied in the refugee work as norms and administrative practices. The ‘hard’
evidence for the existence of this responsibility which is called ‘policy’ will be
summarized in this synthesis (Part B) after discussing the general preconditions
prevailing for the work as well as the outlines of the evolution of the activities during
time between the wars (Part A).
A.  The failure of the League of Nations in its central task, maintaining peace, has
influenced the evaluation of other operations of the intergovernmental machinery
during the Inter-war period. The achievements and the importance of the refugee work
undertaken during the 1920s and 1930s have been shadowed by the mainstream of
the assessments. Nevertheless, there are some researchers who have given an
impetus and inspiration to this work by presenting the values behind the refugee work
as well as somewhat remarkable results. The scope and the basic task of this study is
to try to find and present elements which could allow us to conclude that there was firm
determination and continuation in the work of the League and the ILO in finding
solutions for the refugee problems which were previously unseen because of their
magnitude as well as politically quite delicate. This has been done by scrutinizing the
cross-cutting themes in order to verify whether there was coherence in the concrete
action to support the main goal, which was alleviation of the refugee problem.
The new century after the First World War witnessed a shift from politically and
militarily oriented alliances to a more comprehensive approach in cooperation. It was
recognized that more sustainable patterns of international behavior must be promoted.
The refugee policy of the world organizations was formulated, planned, and
implemented by the Member States through the different Bodies of the League and the
ILO. This was done in close cooperation with Non-governmental organizations, private
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sector, and societies on the whole. The substance of the policy was guided by a
number of prominent personalities who were able to draw the attention of the
international community to the matters that otherwise would have been forgotten and
left to be handled by national governments alone.
During the Inter-war period permanent solutions to refugee problems were
extremely challenging to achieve with the means the international refugee regime had
at hand. The basic boundary conditions and policies derived from those limitations refer
rather to settlements that are described as the “second-best durable solutions”.  When
a problem consisted of overcoming a crisis with contradictory interests of certain states,
its solution called for methods only at disposal of the collective institutions such as the
League of Nations and the International Labour Organization in the 1920s and 1930s.
The international framework for protecting migrants and refugees during the Inter-
war period has been criticized for being fragmentary. There was a multiplicity of
categories of refugees as well as organizations for addressing their problems. There
was also some overlapping from time to time. One good example is the
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees formed by a number of states in 1938 by
the initiative of the US President Roosevelt. This committee itself was independent and
separate from the League, but was intended to collaborate with the High
Commissioner.
The previous, rather sporadic research concentrated in sociological, psychological,
and legal aspects of the refugee problems has produced a picture where the refugee
work activities of the League seem inconsistent and weak. The analytical attempts
have offered mainly normative analyzes to examine how the responses to refugee
situations should look. However, on the basis of preliminary analyses on the source
material it was possible to draw a presumption that this picture was a too simplified
view of the situation prevailing during the Inter-war period. The deliberations in the
organs of the League of Nations and the ILO included also serious considerations
towards comprehensive solutions.
The League of Nations was established in order to provide the world with relief from
armed conflict. The League was essentially a political organization. The League was
entrusted with doing its duty through international law, arms control, conference
diplomacy, and the idea of collective security. Taking responsibility of refugees was
initially not thought to be among the priorities of the League. The ILO had its own role
in this endeavor towards more just and sound world order.
The results of the research are based on interpretation and organizing the existing
material and filtering the facts towards a new wisdom. In case of the League of Nations
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we can hardly think of finding any undiscovered sources. Therefore we need to satisfy
ourselves with working towards a new mindset. This work at hand as a part of modern
and contemporary history research also seems to confirm the assumption that
Nansen’s appointment marked the first formal attempt to take refugee issues on the
agenda of the international political machinery.
The problem in every international and especially intergovernmental deliberation is
that it is often not possible to address the matters by their actual names. In most cases
this means that parties of an exercise are reluctant to admit that they simply don’t have
resources to go into it deeply enough. In modern days politics this is shown when the
civil society organizations actively advocate their agendas urging the governments to
take action. The governments on the other side of the table give promises and pledge
for future activities to fulfill the promises. However, the hands of the political leaders of
democratic societies are tied to the extent that they are responsible to their voters for
the use of public funds. During the Inter-war period the public revenue in countries was
not so exclusively tied to the citizens as taxpayers as it is now, but nevertheless, the
countries trying to solve the refugee problem were democratic and thus suffering from
this handicap of the people’s power.
While the challenges faced by the international refugee policy were bigger than ever
seen before, new solutions were also developed. New forms of governance and more
advanced approaches were being employed through broad international cooperation to
combat the marginalization of millions of people. This global governance did not signify
a comprehensive global policy. However, the foundation for this guideline for actions
was created by international debate on ethics; discussing the rights and responsibilities
of human individuals.
It was realized and recognized that States have responsibilities and commitments
towards their own citizens, but also towards other countries and other people.  It was
thought that the international fulfillment of these commitments created a basis for
common security and development. It was also for the first time in history clearly
remarked that progress towards democracy and the rule of law as well as the
consolidation of civil rights was a precondition for peaceful, sustainable international
community. This could be achieved only through a dialogue, coordination, and
cooperation between the stakeholders involved.
Experience has shown that favorable economic development is a powerful tool
against marginalization and political unrest.  Economic situation is reflected to the
treatment and the settlement of refugees. The fate of the refugees depended on the
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economic growth that created new jobs, but at the same time could deteriorate labour
standards.
Whatever the reasons are, developing countries have always been affected by
internal migration, migration between developing countries, and migration to
industrialized countries. This was also the heart of the story after the First World War.
The League together with the ILO was the first international attempt to support the
positive effects of migration while preventing and mitigating the harmful impacts.
Movement of people itself is a crucial development issue, regardless of the perspective
it is studied from.
It is fair to say that very few of the refugee situations during the Inter-war period fulfill
the features and characters of a protracted refugee situation. There were only some
sporadic remarks concerning any refugee camps. In Europe those camps seem to
have been almost non-existent. There are, however, references to refugee camps in
the Near East. These either don’t justify the labeling of the situation as an
unnecessarily prolonged refugee problem, since the populations in those camps were
selected, and at the same time some prospects of resettlement for them were
prepared. The League was in practice involved in all refugee problems in Europe and
its geographical surroundings, thus contributing to the evolution of the situation, in a
way or another.
The desire to protect and promote human rights was among the variety of ways of
thinking about international cooperation, but it was far from being the most important of
these. The overall ideology behind the activity of the world organizations was that
politics and action can and must be adapted to the needs of humanity.  This was seen
possible through international and intergovernmental arrangements and relevant
national policy instruments based on them. The coherent use of the instruments was
supposed to be leading to efficiency in the relief work done among the refugees.
Over the entire Inter-war period, the League and the ILO performed in connection to
refugee questions. The performance can be divided roughly into two periods, each of
them forming a category for itself. The first decade was a time of massive refugee
movements and responses to them, also in the field. The 1920s marked an extremely
active time, when refugee situations occurred rather suddenly and followed each other.
The League had to react accordingly. Because of the mass of the work to be done with
the refugees, there was no time to think much about the future and the creation of
standardized facilities which could form a tool for the refugee regime. The refugee
situations in the 1930s were not as acute and urgent even though some of them were
massive and politically delicate. Talking about predictability would be an exaggeration,
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but certain preparedness was taking place in the thoughts of the people working in the
intergovernmental system. This was the trend that finally led into the forming of modern
refugee policy and strategic approach in the attempts to solve the refugee problems
after the Second World War.
It is quite clear that the work of the international refugee regime mattered more in
the 1920s than during the next decade, simply because the numbers of refugees were
many times bigger after the First World War. Some kind of remedies and solutions had
to be found, no matter how improvised or provisory. From the beginning, the actions
were more successful in cases where the questions of national sovereignty were not
involved.
The similarity of the 1930s with the previous decade was that the different
conventions were mostly directed for certain refugee groups, e.g. refugees coming
from Germany, by mentioning the groups in order to get them under the protective
system of the refugee regime. The arrangements of the 1930s contained, however,
some universal elements which did not exist in the arrangements of the 1920s.
Because the problems were so politicized in the latter decade, strive appeared towards
developing a universal approach on refugee questions. This, in turn, could be used in
all cases, making individual nationalized approach unnecessary. It was probably feared
that this individual approach could be interpreted as intervening to countries’ internal
political affairs.
In the 1930s it was clear for the international refugee advocates that dealing with the
causes of refugeeism would be the right way to act. It was though that by giving the
High Commissioner a mandate to negotiate with the governments causing refugee
problems and keeping the refugee organs separate and independent from the League
could provide the representatives of the regime with the impetus and tools needed in
solving the refugee problems.
The ILO endeavored to reach its main goal, which was decent work for all. This
objective included quite naturally the refugees. This was the nucleus of the refugee
policy of the Labour Organization throughout the two decades under examination,
although occasionally other duties, such as coordinating the whole refugee work
efforts, were put on the shoulders of the ILO.
The Organization was always regarded as temporary, and the Assembly did not fail
to remind the actors each year that the machinery had only a few more years to live.
The refugee organs were somewhat unpopular during their time despite their valuable
efforts. Most European countries blamed the Organization for giving them less help
than they felt entitled to expect. Many countries were reluctant to contribute to the
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solution of a problem for which they admitted no responsibility. Mussolini’s Italy was
consistently hostile. Germany and Russia tried to put an end to the regime for their own
reasons. The United States refused to participate in its work. The only warm and firm
support came from France and from the Scandinavian countries. It was definitely not
easy to try to build up a proper, permanent, efficient, and well-defined organization in
these circumstances.
One type of criticism towards the Nansen Office was certainly known before its
times, from the start of the career of the High Commissioner’s Office, namely the
accusations of being politically oriented or even biased. This discussion had its
historical roots in the fact that the “customers” of the work were considered to be White
Russians. On the other hand, Michael Hansson also admitted that in some cases the
national representatives and delegates of the Office could have been more careful in
the way they had discussed the refugee matters.
In 1938 the Assembly decided to merge the Nansen Office and the Office of the
High Commissioner, with a mandate for five years.  At the end of the 1930s the
international political situation made the work of the organizations very difficult and tied
the hands of the people responsible for the actions. Just before the outbreak of the
Second World War, it was thought that the Director of the IGCR could negotiate with
German Government in order to secure an orderly emigration of persons unwanted in
Germany. Since this turned out to be impossible, the Director George Rublee resigned
in February 1939. In that connection, another merger appeared, as the High
Commissioner Sir Herbert Emerson, also became the Director of the IGCR.
Many evaluations have concluded that the real results of the refugee work were
small. Nansen and his followers had to demand and receive the approbations, as well
as the funds for the activities from the Assembly. The High Commissioner had to carry
out direct negotiations with individual governments, instead of reaching a
comprehensive intergovernmental consensus on refugee policies. However, in all these
assessments the target has been set on the level where Nansen personally raised it.
And that was ambitious; it was not less that the eradication of the entire refugee
problem in few years time. Today we know that it has not been eradicated or not even
dramatically alleviated, in spite of the huge resources given at the disposal of the
modern international and intergovernmental refugee machinery.
Despite the shortcomings listed above, the refugee agencies were able to play a
successful leadership role for several reasons. In contrast to states, they were primarily
concerned with refugee issues without other major burdens. Unlike private
organizations, their association with the League of Nations gave them the authority to
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negotiate with governments directly. Because their proposals were generally perceived
as being non-partisan, they were also more likely than those from Great Powers to win
a consensus. The most visible example of this was definitely the achievement of
creating a successful passport system never seen before.
The preliminary hypothesis in the task formulation was that the League of Nations
and the International Labour Organization did have a refugee policy. In the light of the
material gone through and the analyzing work done, is this proven correct? In many
respects it can be stated that the League actions on refugees were reactive more than
consistently planned.  Nevertheless, it was based on certain values and moral
guidelines as well as to legal principles.
It is fair to conclude that all the elements for a consistent policy were in place; the
purpose statements, applicability and scope, effective dates, responsibilities, policy
statements. They were established in a form or another. They were not in a single
covering document, and they cannot be found as titles or headings when looking into
the archives. Nevertheless, a policy document could be drawn up in retrospective on
the basis of the compilation of the various documents and the practical work. One
could even insist that an imaginary draft of this policy document could well be equal in
quality with the present day’s strategies.
The refugee policy of the League of Nations was formulated and adopted in the top
organs of the world organization. It was planned and implemented in close cooperation
with other intergovernmental organization, non-governmental organizations, State
Members’ governments, private sector, and representatives of refugees.
The substance of the policy was guided by the refugee situations. The League of
Nations faced challenges, sometimes smaller, sometimes bigger, throughout the whole
period of time it was conducting its refugee work. The League was, however, able to
respond and develop new solutions to the growing challenges. The organization was
capable of showing creativeness in its reactions to the refugee situations repeatedly
through the whole period under examination. Although the principles of the policies
remain somewhat unchanged, new techniques were applied in combating the
destitution of refugees.
There may have been sometimes even conflicting situations concerning the motives
when the main duty of the League, maintaining peace, would have required attitudes
where the refugees should have been forgotten. But, still the League reacted.
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B.  The original task was to provide evidence which will speak for sufficient
consistency and continuity in the actions and would in turn allow us to conclude that a
policy was in place and the evolution of it can be followed throughout the entire Inter-
war time. On the basis of the discussions presented in the main chapters 2.-5., it is
indeed possible to identify elements which are summarized in the following:
1. The practical aims and measures remained approximately the same throughout
the whole Inter-war period. The legal and political protection was seen as the most
important responsibility of the LON. In connection to this, the prime task was to provide
the refugees with an acceptable means of identification. This had dual consequence; it
gave the refugees a status, as well as the possibility to travel legally. The LON never
took responsibility for the humanitarian aid and emergency relief. The LON endeavored
to coordinate the measures taken by the private organizations. The LON spoke for the
permanent and sustainable solutions. The implementation of resettlement plans were
highly depending on the capability and willingness of the states. The schemes of
resettlement in the Balkans area demonstrated the policy of the League in a
magnificent way.  Turks returned from Greece to Asia Minor receiving compensation
for their financial losses. A LON loan enabled the Greek Government to provide new
villages and industries for homecoming Greeks. Similar arrangements were executed
in Bulgaria. The ambitious plan took almost a decade to complete, but it worked. In
many other connections, the lack of cooperation from the side of the intended recipient
country formed an obstacle for the success of the schemes.
2. There was always League’s funding available for the administrative activities
when it was necessary.  The funds were allocated to the organizations from the regular
sources, and there were no specific innovative financing mechanisms for the refugee
work.
3. There was a High Commissioner or corresponding official in place throughout the
entire Inter-war period.
4. There were delegates of the refugee organizations in the hosting countries
through the whole period under examination.
5. Because there was no permanent constitutional refugee organ in the League,
there were no fundamental principles either.  The policy was not based on the idea of
assuring the refugees their fundamental rights and freedoms. It was based on practical
observation and consideration that refugees are people in a need of help. It was also
based on the fact that the grant of asylum and residence place heavy burdens on
certain countries. The State Members were in the opinion that a satisfactory solution
cannot be reached without international cooperation.
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6. It was at all times recognized that the success of operations depended on the
cooperation between states and the League. The League never assumed an attitude of
an international super body in refugee questions.
7. When the modern Refugee Convention was adopted in December 1950, it was
recognized that the definitions of refugees in the previous arrangements and
conventions of 1926, 1928, 1933, 1938, and 1939 will be valid and considered as the
basis of the new Convention.
(8.) Additional element to the above listed is that the League protection was never
thought to be universal. Only selected groups of refugees were included to the
schemes of refugee work.
The policy was not a result of goal oriented intentional design, but rather consisted
of a series of responses without a single declaration. It was put into effect directly
under the parameters set up by the policy organs; no separate implementation plans
were drawn up. There was continuous monitoring in the form of reporting by the
different refugee organizations.  No final evaluations of the programmes were carried
out. The normal reporting was conducted in order to verify that the goals were targeted
and the declared principles were followed. The refugee organs were subject to regular
internal auditing but there are no indications that excessive extra auditing would have
been conducted. New modalities in refugee policy required also new and innovative
approaches in administration. The missions and representatives played an important
role in cooperation with governments.
During the 1920s the League and its refugee apparatus travelled from a crisis to
another. The problems came to the scene so fast and so forcefully, that there was no
time to think about the future or the approach after the acute situation. Things had to be
done here and now.  After the most burning situations were over and settled in the
change of decades, there was some time to take a deep breath before the next shocks
came. In the 1930s there was already a body of experience on the refugee questions.
That gave the intergovernmental community the possibility to consider matters of
consistency. Human rights issues came into picture, as well as the considerations of
why there are refugees at all.
Connecting local and global level by taking Finland as a sample to demonstrate how
ideas work and interactions are applied in practice has been done in order to offer a
platform for other researchers. It can allow and motivate further studies in the future.
This transnational approach can provide an important vehicle in the organization of
historical knowledge.
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Finland was involved with the international refugee questions from the beginning of
the existence of the LON because of its geographical and political position. Finland
offered asylum to refugees coming from Russia, but at the same time encouraged them
to go back. It was very difficult for a new state to provide the necessary humanitarian
aid, and the supplies delivered by the international organizations had a big role. Finland
adopted quickly the Nansen passport system, which contributed to the decreasing
numbers of refugees as many wanted to travel to third countries. During the 1930s the
international cooperation had a diminishing role in the handlings of refugee questions in
Finland as the problem itself was not significant anymore. Domestic solutions for the
problems of the remaining refugees were preferred to international settlements.
It is clear that the ideas of human rights, for example, were not autocatalyzed in
Finland, but they crossed borders. The same applies to the treatment of refugees in a
larger scale. Finland was a newly independent state, where nationalization and
transnationalization went hand in hand, interlocked with one another.
Traditionally seen by the history writing the global cooperation between the nations
is relatively new phenomenon which emerged with the foundation of the United
Nations. The League has been seen as focusing mainly on military security. But deeper
focus tells us that organization created by the winners of the First World War assumed
functions related to social and economic development from the beginning. The
attachment of the ILO to the League system is one proof of this as such. More powerful
evidence is the establishment of the refugee protection system. In order to further
these goals, the League and the ILO and their Member States set up various
specialized agencies, funds, and programmes.
The League had no quantitative targets for the international work. Today, the UN
promotes higher standards of living, employment, social progress, as well as solutions
to international economic, social, and health problems. The aim has been also to
further international cultural and educational cooperation in order to promote universal
respect for other people, nations, and cultures. The League had these ideas in the
background of its ideology and Covenant, but they were not articulated aloud.
There were different types of dissatisfaction on the handling of the refugee
problems. On the one hand, countries like Norway were discontent because the
League was not performing in an effective manner. On the other hand, some countries
didn’t like the way the League was making attempts to intervene. In other words, the
League was doing either too little or too much, depending on the observer.
The League recognized its powerlessness in some respects.  In order to find
sustainable solutions for the refugee problems, certain preconditions should be in
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place. To attain solutions, social conditions should have been stable. This would have
meant peace and security, well functioning democratic governance, respect for human
rights, and inclusive social and cultural development. The circumstances sometimes
were against all the goals.
Favorable economic development was the best way to alleviate the destitution of
homeless people.  When there was growth, there was work available. That, in turn,
made any excessive special arrangements for the refugees unnecessary. In that sense
we may say that the actual concrete results of the improvement in the position of the
refugees were not that much achievements of the refugee organizations. However, the
organizations and the policy backing up their work were most needed, when times
were economically bad.
The transnational character of the refugee policy becomes obvious when the scope
is directed to continents other than Europe. Although we have agreed that the LON
was a “European creature”, the refugee policy did not stop at borders on Europe.
Indeed, a large number of exchanges extended beyond the places where the
intergovernmental refugee policy was designed. The refugee communities in Far East,
notably in Harbin and Shanghai, were interlinked to the global refugee assistance
system. This development goes further as we acknowledge that it was especially the
areas in South America, where the refugees from Far East were supposed to be
settled.
Although Nansen’s personal prestige was considered higher than the appreciation of
the League in some parts of the world and by some evaluators, it can be concluded as
a result of all deliberations conducted in this work, that the refugee policy of the League
was consistent and a pertinent part of the essence of the Organization. Regardless of
what can be said about the overall performance of the LON, the refugee policy shows
that the existence of the League was not exclusively tragicomic history. At least there
was a Policy despite seeming inconsistencies. The refugee policy can be seen as one
of the first symptoms of the emergence of genuine transnational thinking even the fuel
for the League as such may have been utopianism and the platform for action imperial
internationalism.
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Appendix I
General Structure of the LON
(Designed by the author)
Assembly
Representatives of Member States
One Vote/Each Member
Permanent Secretariat
Council
Executive Body of the LON
4/5 Permanent Members
Non-permanen Members, see Appendix y
General
principl
es
Mandat
e
guidance
H C for
Refugees
Other organs; incl. ILO,
Permanent Court of
International Justice,
Slavery Commission etc.
Feedback,
Reporting
Covenant of
the LON
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Appendix II
Structure of the ILO
(Desingned by the author)
International Labor
Conference
”general  assembly"
2 Governments rep/country
1 Employers rep/country
1 Workers rep/country
Governing Body
20 Governments rep
10 Employers rep
10 Workers rep
International Labor Office
Execution, implementation
Research
choo
ses
guida
nce
Feedback
reporting
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APPENDIX III A
LIST OF STATE MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
If no date of entry is indicated, the country was an original member
Member Date of entry Notice of withdrawal
Afghanistan 09/1934
Union of South Africa
Albania 12/1920
Argentina
Australia
Austria 12/1920
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil 06/1926
UK
Bulgaria 12/1920
Canada
Chile 06/1938
China
Colombia
Costa Rica 12/1920 01/1925
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic 09/1924
Ecuador 09/1934
Egypt 05/1937
Estonia 09/1921
Ethiopia 09/1923
Finland 12/1920
France
Germany 09/1926 10/1933
Greece
Guatemala 05/1936
Haiti 04/1942
Honduras 07/1936
Hungary 09/1922 04/1939
India
Iraq 10/1932
Ireland 09/1923
Italy 12/1937
Japan 03/1933
Latvia 09/1921
Liberia
Lithuania 09/1921
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Luxemburg 12/1920
Mexico 09/1931
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua 06/1936
Norway
Panama
Paraguay 02/1935
Persia
Peru 04/1939
Poland
Portugal
Rumania 07/1940
Salvador 08/1937
Siam
Spain 05/1939
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey 07/1932
USSR 09/1934
Uruguay
Venezuela 07/1938
Yugoslavia
(source: Walters, 64-65)
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APPENDIX III B
Non- permanent Members of the Council of the League
1920 Spain, Greece, Belgium, Brazil
1921 Spain, China, Belgium, Brazil
1922 Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Brazil, Uruguay, China
1923 Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Brazil, Uruguay, Czechoslovakia
1924 Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Brazil, Uruguay, Czechoslovakia
1925 Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Brazil, Uruguay, Czechoslovakia
1926 Chile, Poland, Rumania, Holland, China, Colombia, Belgium, Salvador,
Czechoslovakia
1927 Chile, Poland, Rumania, Holland, China, Colombia, Canada, Cuba, Finland
1928 Chile, Poland, Rumania, Canada, Cuba, Finland, Spain, Persia, Venezuela
1929 Spain, Persia, Venezuela, Canada, Cuba, Finland, Yugoslavia, Peru,
Poland
1930 Yugoslavia, Peru, Poland, Spain, Persia, Venezuela, Norway, Ireland,
Guatemala
1931 Norway, Ireland, Guatemala, Yugoslavia, Peru, Poland, Spain, China,
Panama
1932 Spain, China, Panama, Norway, Ireland, Guatemala, Mexico, Poland,
Czechoslovakia
1933 Mexico, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Spain, China, Panama, Argentina,
Australia, Denmark, Portugal
1934 Argentina, Australia, Denmark, Portugal, Mexico, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Spain, Chile, Turkey
1935 Spain, Chile, Turkey, Argentina, Australia, Denmark, Portugal, Ecuador,
Poland, Rumania
1936 Ecuador, Poland, Rumania, Spain, Chile, Turkey, Bolivia, Sweden New-
Zealand, China, Latvia
1937 Bolivia, Sweden, New-Zealand, China, Latvia, Ecuador, Poland, Rumania,
Iran, Peru, Belgium
1938 Iran, Peru, Belgium, China, Bolivia, Sweden, New-Zealand, Latvia,
Dominican Republic, Yugoslavia, Greece
1939 Dominican Republic, Yugoslavia, Greece, Iran, Peru, Belgium, China,
Egypt, Finland, Bolivia, South-Africa
(Source: Jonkari, 405-406)
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APPENDIX VI A and VI B
NGOs in Refugee Work
A) In his report of survey in 1939, Simpson was using the following categorizing of
the private organizations:
Organizations with generalized aims:
a) The Red Cross; the international organs of the Red Cross were the first to help
refugees and to draw the attention of the League to the refugee questions
b) ARC: In 1924 the ARC withdrew from relief work for Russian refugees, but during
the fiscal year 1924-5 some help was sent for the Greeks, the Turks (through the Turkish
Red Crescent), the Bulgarians, and the Persians, as well as to the Bulgarian Red Cross in
1925-6. (Simpson,39,p.175)
c) The Save the Children Fund and the International Save the Children Union: The
Fund resembled the Red Cross in some respects. The Union worked in close cooperation
with the League.
d) Near East Relief: This organization carried out the most extensive operations in
Asia Minor during the refugee crisis. It provided emergency relief in huge amounts, but
also took care of construction of infrastructure.
e) The Society of Friends: The organization had ambitious schemes for general
assistance to “helpless victims of the War”. Their assistance was aiming to a sustainable
livelihood of the refugees.
Organizations for Relief of Russians:
a) Zemgor; Russian Zemstvos and Towns Relief Committee originated from a
federation of municipal and provincial organizations in Russia.
b) The Russian Red Cross; During the civil wars it worked in the areas occupied by
the White Armies, and after their defeat it operated in foreign countries.
c) The Federation of Russian War Invalids and Wounded Abroad; This organization
was founded at Constantinople in 1920, had headquarters in Paris, and operated
wherever there were disabled ex-combatants.
Organizations for the Assistance of Armenian refugees in the Near East:
a) Non-Armenian Funds; The Society of the Friends of Armenia and the Lord Mayor’s
(Armenian) Fund were established before and during the First World War.
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b) Armenian Funds; Armenian benevolent Union, Armenian Blue Cross, Hamazkayin
and the Committee for Assistance for Armenia were organizations channeling the most of
the substantial contributions of the Armenians to the relief of their own people.
Organizations assisting refugees coming from Germany:
a) Jewish Organizations; It was estimated that some 90% of the refugees coming
from Germany were Jewish. It was therefore obvious that the largest role was assigned to
these organizations. The most prominent of these were the Jewish Colonization
Association, then American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, The Jewish Agency for
Palestine and the Council for German Jewry.
b) Associations assisting non-Jewish refugees; the principle organs of assistance for
these political refugees were organized by European Social democrats and Communists.
c) Committees assisting Professional and Learned Persons; The interests of scholars
and of intellectual and professional workers were cared for by various bodies.
(More on this categorizing, see Simpson 1939, 172-190)
B) In 1937 the League reported that the International Liaison Committee working in
connection with the High Commissioner, consisted of the following non-
governmental organizations:
-American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (Paris)
-Council for German Jewry (London)
-Hias-Ica Emigration Association (HICEM) (Paris)
-International Christian Committee for German Refugees (London)
-Jewish Agency for Palestine (London)
-Jewish Colonization Association (Paris)
-Jewish Refugees Committee (London)
-The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (London)
-The Society of Friends, Germany Emergency Committee (London)
-Comité d’aide et d’assistance aux victimes de l’antisémitisme en Allemagne (Brussels)
-De Samvirkende Danske Emigranthjaelpekomiteer (Copenhagen)
-Comité d’assiatance aux réfugiés (Paris)
-Comité voor bijzondere Joodsche Belangen (Amsterdam)
-Schweitzerische Zentralstelle für Flüchtlingshilfe (Basel)
-Comité central tchécoslovaque pour les réfugiés provenant d’Allemagne (Prague)
-Zentralvereinigung der Deutschen Emigration (Paris)
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-Bureau  international pour le respect du droit d’asile et l’aide aux réfugiés politiques
(Paris)
-Congrès juif mondiale (Paris)
-International Migration Service (Geneva)
-International Stidents Servive (Geneva)
-International « Save the Children » Fund (Geneva) : Inter-Aid Committee for Children
from Germany (London)
-Comité international pour le placement des intellectuels réfugiés (Geneva)
-Alliance israélite universelle (Paris)
-Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish
Association (London)
-Agudas Israel World Organization (London)
-Notgemeinschaft Deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland (London)
(See: Les Réfugiés. Le activités de la société des nations, 9. Section d’information.
Geneve 1938, 51-52)
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APPENDIX VII
LIST OF MOST IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS CONCLUDED
DURING THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
(Compiled by the author)
Arrangement with regard to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees
5.6.1922
Protocol of Lausanne 24.7.1923
Plan of 1924/31.5.1924
Arrangement 12.5.1926
Recommendation of the Communications and Transit Conference of 1927
Arrangement 30.6.1928
Protocol on Stateless Persons 12.04.1930
Convention concerning  the International Status of Refugees 28.10.1933
Arrangement of 24.5.1935
Provisional Arrangement 4.7.1936
Convention 10.2.1938
Protocol 14.9.1939
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